THE ELECTION CHALLENGE TO INDIA'S CONGRESS PARTY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010048-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: February 6, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
THE ELECTION CHALLENGE TO INDIA'S CONGRESS PARTY
Confidential
23
6 February 1967
No. 0792/67
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION
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? CONFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
6 February 1967
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Election Challenge to India's Congress Party
Summary
The ruling Congress Party will face its stiffest
challenge yet in the general election which begins
on 15 February after an unusually tumultous pre-elec-
tion period. Although the party is expected to re-
tain a majority in the national parliament, it will
probably suffer some losses. Congress will do even
worse in the balloting for the state legislative
assemblies; in at least three states it stands a
good chance of losing power or being forced into
coalition governments and in several others it faces
a hard fight. The stultifying effects of almost 20
years in power have weakened the party's appeal and
effectiveness. It is faction-ridden, internally di-
vided on major issues, and to some extent blamed for
India's current economic problems.
Despite these and other problems, Congress
still has important advantages over its splintered
opposition. No opposition party has been able to
attract a significant following on an all-India
basis. Even those with aspirations for national
standing--the conservative Swatantra, the two rival
Communist parties, and the Hindu nationalist Jan
Sangh--have only pockets of real strength. Congress,
on the other hand, has a generally strong nation-
wide organization. As the party that led the in-
dependence movement and has dominated the political
scene since independence, it is in a position to
dispense patronage and to command decades-old loyalties,
NOTE: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current Intel-
ligence, and although it benefited from sub-
stantive exchange with other offices and agencies
at the working level, it has not been formally
coordinated.
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The greater the setback to Congress in the
general elections, the less are Mrs. Gandhi's
chances of continuing as prime minister. The
immediate post-election period is likely to be the
first occasion in independent India's 20-year
history in which the incumbent Congress Party
leader has been challenged for the prime minister-
ship. As in the two previous succession struggles,
after the deaths of Jawaharlal Nehru and Lal
Bahadur Shastri, state leaders will play a key
role.
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INDIA
PUNJABI
AURA
,se 7r
CRANPIGARR (Won. Terr.)
CJandigarh %
UTTAR
New Delhi
Paine
BINAR
ORISSA
Bhubane
I~("alcutta~
ANDAMAN
AND
NICOBAR
LACCADIVE, MINICOY
AND
AMINDIVI ISLANDS 0
Figure in circle indicates seats in lower house
of National Parliament
Figure in rectangle indicates number of seats
in local legislative assembly (lower house only
where that body is bicameral)
OI
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Background
1. Over half of the 240 million eligible voters
of the world's largest democracy are expected to
exercise their franchise in the country's fourth
nation-wide general election to be held between 15
and 21 February 1967. They will choose delegates
for the lower house of the national parliament and
for the legislative assemblies of 16 of the 17 states
in the Indian union. (See map) The upper house of
the national parliament--a largely powerless body
whose members for the most part are elected by the
state legislative assemblies--will not be reconsti-
tuted at this time.
2. The ruling Indian National Congress (Con-
gress Party), which has dominated Indian politics
since pre-independence days, will for the first time
face the huge electorate without the charismatic
leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru. In earlier contests,
Nehru's appeal to the illiterate Indian masses and
his dominant position within the Congress Party en-
abled the party to stumble through to victory de-
spite occasional grievous intraparty feuding. In
his absence, voting patterns will be determined--
probably more than ever before--by the recent per-
formance of Congress-controlled national and state
governments and the ability of Congress and its
rivals to mobilize the voters.
The Campaign
3. The pre-election period has been a time of
unusual political and social turmoil, even for India.
During the past year there has been a continuing
series of strikes, demonstrations, and other forms
of popular agitation. Some of these have had spe-
cific political objectives, such as the campaign for
a Sikh-dominated state in northwest India and the
efforts to Maharashtra State to bolster its claims
to adjacent Goa or to territory now part of neighbor-
ing Mysore. Other agitation, such as the pressure
in Andhra Pradesh for a steel plant, or the crusade
in northern India for a national ban on the slaughter
of cows, has had economic and religious overtones as
well. Student unrest has led to violence in many
parts of the country.
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4. The opposition, seeking to capitalize on
this atmosphere, has tried to stimulate discontent
by championing popular grievances. Anti-Congress
propaganda mills have combined allegations of cor-
ruption and of hoarding and profiteering with
criticism of the government's devaluation of the
currency, rising prices, and famine conditions. In
the streets and in the legislative halls the oppo-
sition parties have assailed the Congress govern-
ments, and have kept alive the mood of discontent
and dissent. Factionalism within the Congress
Party, moreover, has increased in the post-Nehru
period and a commanding personality able to impose
unity on the party has yet to emerge.
5. Despite these problems, Congress has the
only nationwide political machine and is expected
to retain a comfortable but reduced majority in the
lower house of the national parliament. In this
body, which is to be expanded to 521* seats, Con-
gress now controls about 73 percent of the present
509 seats. However, as in past elections, Congress
is expected to do less well in the balloting for
state legislative assembly seats. The opposition
parties, none of which has nation-wide organization
or popular support, tend to concentrate their limited
resources in those states where they have the best
chance for success. Prospects are darkest for Con-
gress in the southern state of Kerala, where a Com-
munist-led electoral front seems almost certain to
triumph over a decisively split local Congress
Party. Congress could also fail to win a majority
in the legislatures of at least three other states.
Congress Party
6. Founded in 1885 under the auspices of both
Indian and British social reformers, the Indian Na-
tional Congress--popularly referred to as the Con-
gress party--led the Indian independence movement.
By the time India gained independence in 1947, Con-
gress had been shaped--largely by Mohandas Gandhi
*Two additional members representing the Ango-Indian
community may be appointed at the president's dis-
cretion.
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and Jawaharlal Nehru--into the most effective po-
litical party on the subcontinent even though it
was composed of many diverse ideological elements
bound together mainly by their common desire to
evict the British. Congress for a time retained
the aura of patriotism and virtue that surrounded
it before independence, and even today, after 20
years in power, the party is able to exploit to
some extent its role in the independence movement.
The Congress membership continues to embrace nu-
merous elements of widely disparate views ranging
from the strongly socialistic to the firmly con-
servative.
7. In theory, Congress is dedicated to the
development of a democratic socialist state. In
practice, however, its governments, especially since
the death of Nehru in 1964, have followed a more
pragmatic line and in most cases have avoided a
doctrinaire socialistic approach. Thus, while the
present Congress election manifesto is socialist in
tenor, there is no indication that a new Congress
government would abandon the present generally co-
operative, though at times strained, relationship
with private business. Likewise, the manifesto's
brief section on foreign affairs, which restates
familiar Indian foreign policy slogans on peaceful
co-existence, non-alignment, anticolonialism, and
disarmament, tends to mirror an idealized view of
past objectives, rather than current Congress
Party practice. Only in emphasizing the need to
modernize agriculture and to take rapid and effec-
tive steps to check population growth does the
manifesto appear to reflect recent experience and
practice.
8. Incessant factionaliam, some corruption
and disillusionment, as well as the stultifying
effects of almost 20 years of political supremacy
have weakened Congress' appeal and effectiveness.
On the other hand, the party retains a large measure
of popular support, has the only nation-wide grass-
roots political machine, and has considerable po-
litical leverage through the distribution of funds
and supplies for economic development and short-
term welfare programs, such as famine relief.
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Party Strengths in India's Past Elections
Total Seats
Total Seats 494
479
OI
Total Seats
494
OI
451
1951-52
73
1957
Name of Party
Congress
Praja Socialist*
Other and
Independents
1962
000 Number of Seats won in National Parliament
00 Percent of V09e
*Figures for 1952 show the total for the then separate Socialist Party and the Kisan,
Mazdoor, Praja Party , which subsequently merged to form the Praja Socialist Party.
"Formed in 1959
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9. The Congress Party dominated India's three
earlier general elections--in 1951/52, 1957, and
1962--winning in each over 70 percent of the seats
in the lower house of parliament and over 60 per-
cent of the total of all seats in state legislative
assemblies. (See chart) Over the years, its ma-
jorities have on the whole declined only slightly
more at the state than at the national level. Con-
gress, however, has won a number of seats dispro-
portionately larger than the size of its popular
vote, largely because its opposition has been
splintered.
10. Although since 1952 Congress has suffered
the temporary loss of its majorities in several
states, it presently controls all but two of the
17 state governments. Under a constitutional de-
vice known as "president's rule," Kerala, a tradi-
tional trouble spot for Congress, has been governed
directly from New Delhi since an indecisive elec-
tion in 1965. Nagaland, which elected its first
legislative assembly in 1964 and is the only state
not electing a new assembly this year, is governed
by a local party which has thus far cooperated with
the Congress government in New Delhi.
11. In earlier contests, Nehru's chairsma
papered over most intraparty conflicts or helped
to mute opposition on policy or party matters.
Nehru's immediate successor as prime minister,
Lal Bahadur Shastri, had neither the political
power nor the personality required to dominate the
party. '.Though. Indira Gandhi--Nehru's daughter--
was held in widespread popular esteem prior to her
selection as prime minister in January 1966, she
too has been unable to emulate her father. Since
Nehru's death, party political power has gravitated
increasingly toward state and local party bosses.
To a considerable extent, the most powerful of these
men retain a de facto veto over most government
policies and party matters. Within their own do-
mains they control the comprehensive party organiza-
tion that covers every district in the country. In
many areas this organization can deliver the vote
for Congress only so long as the party's state units
remain reasonably united and the opposition badly
divided.
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12. In some cases, however, the very ability
of the state-level party organizations to deliver
the vote is in itself a cause of division. Party
organizers tend to feel that they are the source
of power, and that the chief minister (the equiv-
alent of the prime minister on the national level)
and state government are merely a facade. In re-
cent years this has caused feuding in many states
between the "ministerial group" and the organization
men. There has also been conflict between the
party's "old guard" and those who have reached the
higher levels of Congress politics only recently.
Caste, family status, and personal wealth are also
at times major causes of factionalism at the state
level. The uneven equilibrium between competing
groups has been disturbed from time to time by
head-on collisions in their contest for supporters.
In some cases, the infighting has resulted in a
virtual collapse of the local Congress Party.
13. This year a prolonged struggle for nomina-
tion of candidates for state and national elections
has bruised many state Congress organizations and
has further hardened the lines of faction and caste
that have always tended to divide the party. In
several states--notably Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh,
Bihar, Orissa, and West Bengal--dissident leaders
have taken their supporters out of the party, have
established separate parties, and have attempted to
form anti-Congress fronts.
14. An older and more serious split is in Kerala
where a Communist-led electoral front is almost cer-
tain to win against two rival Congress Party organ-
izations. Congress prospects appear bleak in
Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, and Orissa. In Bihar,
where portions of the body politic seem to be dis-
affected with the government's ineptitude--partic-
ularly in the face of potential famine--Congress
might fail to win a majority, despite the absence
of a united opposition. Politically volatile West
Bengal will probably remain under Congress rule,
but mainly because the leftist opposition has been
unable to form an electoral alliance. Congress faces
heated battles in other states--especially Madras,
Gujarat, and Punjabi Suba--but is expected to retain
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a majority in all of them. Elsewhere, Congress
appears to have its house in reasonably good order
and confronts the opposition with a more or less
united party.
15. Congress still enjoys several distinct
advantages over its opponents. In most areas it
is better organized and financed than the opposi-
tion and in some it is virtually the only party
in the field. It is the only party putting up a
candidate for every contested seat. As the govern-
ment party, it can dispense patronage and commands
loyalties that go back to pre-independence days.
It has also acquired a degree of expertise in man-
ipulating caste and communal groups, an important
element in winning Indian elections. Congress,
moreover, has developed an ability to mobilize the
largely illiterate electorate which gives it a
decisive advantage especially in the elections
to the national parliament.
16. Congress' prospects have been improved
by the sorry state of the opposition parties in
many areas. No opposition party has been able to
attract a significant following on an all-India
basis. Some have only regional support or are
limited to a single state. Others, with national
aspirations, such as the conservative Swatantra,
the two rival Communist parties, and the Hindu
nationalist Jan Sangh, have only widely scattered
pockets of strength and little more than paper
organizations elsewhere.
17. The opposition parties have, however, been
more successful this time than in the past in mak-
ing electoral arrangements among themselves and in
some instances with rebel Congress organizations.
A substantial reduction in the number of multi-
cornered contests as a result of these efforts
would undoubtedly help to reduce the size of the
Congress majority in New Delhi and in some state
assemblies, and could swing some contests against
the Congress in doubtful states--perhaps to a greater
degree than would a drop in Congress' popular vote.
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Swatantra Party
18. The Swatantra Party, formed in 1959 to contest
the Congress welfare state programs, is the newest major
opposition party. Espousing free enterprise and the
cause of the middle-class businessman, Swatantra basically
stands for maximum individual freedom and minimum inter-
ference by the state. Swatantra's election manifesto
also calls for stepped-up efforts to raise agricultural
production, and for more pro-Western and anti-Peking
foreign and defense policies. In the general election
the party aims to reduce Congress to a minority in
parliament, form Swatantra-led governments in Rajasthan,
Orissa and Gujarat, and improve the party's standing in
other states.
19. Swatantra established its credentials in its
first major test at the polls in the general election
of 1962, when it won 4.4 percent of the parliamentary
seats and 5 percent of the state legislative assembly
seats. It displaced the waning Praja Socialist Party
as the third largest party in parliament--after Congress
and..the.then united Communist Party of India. Since the
1964 split in Communist Party ranks, Swatantra has been
the largest opposition party in parliament, holding 22
seats of the 500 actually occupied during parliament's
most recent session.
20. Swatantra's strength has always been unevenly
distributed in the Indian states. It has often appeared
to be little more than a loose coalition of local leaders,
held together by the stature of the aged C. Rajagopala-
chari, its founder, formerly a high-ranking Congress
Party member and India's first and only Indian governor-
general. The party has also benefitted from the energy
and organizational skill of its general secretary, M.
it. Masani, and from its access to Bombay money. It has
been able to build substantial organizational bases in
only a few areas and much of the party's political ac-
tivity at local levels has been confined to election
periods. Swatantra has won considerable prominence,
however, because of its distinctive political program,
its articulate spokesmen, and the membership of some
influential pre-independence ruling princes.
21. The party's strongholds are now Rajasthan and
Orissa, where it has a reasonably good chance of leading
post-election coalition governments. In both states,
the adherence of several former ruling families, who
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retain political influence among their one-time subjects,
has favored the party's progress, as has Congress Party
factionalism. In Orissa, where as the Ganatantra
Parishad it had participated in a Congress-led coalition
government between 1959 and 1961, Swatantra has worked
out an electoral alliance with the Jana Congress, a
new rebel Congress group. Under the terms of the al-
liance, the two parties will not contest one another in
most legislative assembly constituencies and each will
support the other in constituencies where it is not
running its own candidates. The Jana Congress re-
portedly has agreed to allow the Swatantra Party to
lead any future coalition government in the state.
22. In Rajasthan, also, Swatantra stands to
profit from Congress factionalism. Here, Congress has
been seriously weakened by defections, including about
one fifth of its members in the state legislative as-
sembly, and may not be able to woo enough independents
and opposition members to form a new government. As in
Orissa, Swatantra has worked out electoral adjustments
with a newly organized rebel Congress group and with the
weaker but militantly Hindu party, the Jan Sangh. Swa-
tantra is expected to head any coalition government in
Rajasthan.
23. In other states where Swatantra enjoys some
strength, its prospects are not as bright. In Gujarat,
as in 1962, rifts within Congress have worked to Swa-
tantra's advantage, as has the Gujarat electorate's gen-
eral dissatisfaction with economic conditions. Swatan-
tra has consolidated its position in constituencies won
in 1962 and has apparently gained a foothold in some
others. The-party has concentrated much of its national
financial resources and leadership in the Gujarat contest
and has cut down the number of triangular contests through
electoral adjustments with the Jan Sangh and others.
Congress, nevertheless, still has a strong grass-roots
organization in the state and is expected to keep its
majority.
24. In Andhra Pradesh, Swatantra is essentially
the political creation of national Swatantra president
N. G. Ranga. It is handicapped, however, by a lack of
effective leadership and organization and is unlikely to
expand its present modest holdings in the state. This
absence of organization also plagues the party in Madras,
where its influence largely derives from the prestige of
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S
Rajagopalachari. Despite electoral arrangements with
other parties, its prospects of winning more than a
few seats in Madras are poor. Swatantra has some
strength also in Mysore, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar,
but here as in the remaining states it appears to
have little chance of playing a meaningful political
role in the elections.
25. On the national level, Swatantra has no
chance of becoming the majority parliamentary party.
Most of its leaders, despite their goal of reducing
Congress to a minority, would be pleased if Con-
gress strength were reduced to 300 seats in an en-
larged houses of 521 seats. Swatantra is contest-
ing about 180 parliamentary seats and hopes to se-
cure at least 52. This would allow it to be offi-
cially recognized as a parliamentary "party" rather
than a "group" as at present. In its effort to
remain the largest opposition group;,,; however, Swa-
tantra faces a stiff challenge from the Hindu na-
tionalist party Jan Sangh.
Jan Sangh
26. The Bharatiya Jana Sangh (Jan Sangh) is
the largest and most rapidly growing communal party
in India. In size, it is second only to the Con-
gress Party and its leadership is younger and often
more dynamic than that of Congress. Unlike Con-
gress and Swatantra, both of which emphasize secular
trends in Indian politics, the Jan Sangh appeals to
Hindu orthodoxy. It claims to be secularly oriented,
with membership open to all, but in pratice draws
the great majority of its members from among orthodox
Hindus. A close association is also maintained with
a militant Hindu cultural organization, the Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which trains many youthful
Jan Sangh leaders and campaign workers.
27. The Jan Sangh, since its inception in 1951,
has advanced a strongly nationalistic program. It
advocates, for instance, greatly increased military
defense programs, a hard line toward Pakistan and
Communist China, a take-over of all of Kashmir, and
a unitary rather that a federal form of government.
The Jan Sangh would also ban the slaughter of cows,
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enforce a nation-wide prohibition of alcoholic bev-
erages, revise economic planning so as to free India
from dependence on foreign aid, and in all respects
promote an economically and politically self-suffi-
cient nation.
28. The Jan Sangh's greatest strength is the
fervent dedication of its members. Its Hindu ori-
entation has, however, kept it from becoming a
nation-wide party and discouraged cooperation with
other parties holding roughly parallel political
views. Its electoral strength has always been con-
centrated in Hindi-speaking northern and central
India, particularly in middle-class urban areas.
Despite efforts to expand into other parts of the
country this pattern is unlikely to change in the
coming election. Jan Sangh is presently the largest
opposition party in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh,
as well as in the Jammu Province of the state of
Jammu and Kashmir.
29. Jan Sangh election prospects are best in
Madhya Pradesh where it has a reasonable chance of
denying the ruling Congress Party its majority in
the state assembly. Congress suffered heavy losses
in the state in 1962 as the result of bitter intra-
party feuding, weak leadership, and a generally un-
impressive record. The Jan Sangh, which is well
organized and has strong and energetic leadership,
was the principal beneficiary of that Congress
debacle, and nearly quadrupled its state assembly
seats. This year much the same pattern exists and
the Jan Sangh, through electoral adjustments with
other opposition parties, including a rebel Con-
gress group, is in an even stronger position. Tribal
unrest and the failure of the Congress government
to improve the state's generally low standard of
living are other factors enhancing the Jan Sangh's
position.
30. In Uttar Pradesh, although the Jan Sangh
has only 48 of the state assembly's 430 seats and
only six of the state's 86 seats in the federal
parliament, it is the only opposition party that a
appears to have much of a future. The erosion of
Congress Party support in Uttar Pradesh over the last
two general elections is expected to continue, al-
though this will probably not go far enough to
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threaten Congress control of the state government
in this election. The Jan Sangh will, however, be
the chief beneficiary of any decline in Congress
strength at the polls. It possesses a state-wide
organization, adequate if not lavish finances, and
has actively worked to gain new supporters. It has
also built up a youth wing and has an appeal for
middle-class Hindus who fear the social changes
which Congress appears to advocate.
31. In other areas of northern India, Jan
Sangh election prospects vary. The party could
score an impressive gain in the newly formed Punjabi
Suba, where a significant number of Hindus may
switch from Congress to the Jan Sangh because of
opposition to the creation of the Sikh-dominated
state. In Harianna, the Hindu-dominated state also
carved out of the former Indian Punjab, the Jan
Sangh's earlier insistence on the unity of the old
Punjab has been damaging. Its identification, how-
ever, with orthodox Hindu forces opposing cow slaugh-
ter, coupled with some factionalism within the rul-
ing Congress Party, has brightened the Jan Sangh's
prospects of improving on its present meager hold-
ings in the state.
32. In Jammu Province of the state of Jammu
and Kashmir, observers believe that the high tide
of Jan Sangh strength has passed and that the party's
organization, which relies heavily on the cadre of
the affiliated RSS Hindu cultural organization, is
probably weaker than in 1962. Although the Jan Sangh
may gain a foothold in Bihar and Gujarat and may be
able to improve its holdings in Rajasthan through
electoral adjustments with the Swatantra and other
opposition groups, it does not present a significant
threat to the Congress governments. In Maharashtra,
the Jan Sangh has launched a big effort, but what-
ever slight gains it registers will be from a small
base. It has sought to improve its position in
Assam, Andhra Pradesh, Madras, and Mysore, but in
these states its prospects are relatively poor.
33. On the national level, the Jan Sangh
stands a good chance of becoming the largest op-
position party in parliament. It is expected to
benefit from the communal unrest that has plagued
India this year, especially the agitation over cow
slaughter. Like Swatantra, it will be one of the
chief beneficiaries of the expected Congress losses.
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34. At the other end of the political spectrum
from the Jan Sangh are the Communists. The forth-
coming general election will be their first nation-
wide test of strength at the polls since the Chinese
Communist invasion of India in October and November
1962 and the ideological and organizational split
in the Indian Communist movement in 1964. Reaction
against Indian Communism resulting from the deter-
ioration of India's relations with Communist China
is not expected to be a decisive factor affecting
the electoral results. Popular support has been
retained even in the periods of increased anti-Com-
munist activity by the government. Even the nega-
tive effects of the split in the party have been
somewhat mitigated by a tendency toward separate
geographical concentrations in the power of the old
right and left factions of the United Communist
Party of India (CPI).
35. Communist electoral strength has tradi-
tionally been centered in Kerala, West Bengal, and
Andhra Pradesh. Prior to the 1964 split, the Com-
munists were the main political opposition party in
all three states. The leftist Communists (CPI/L)
have inherited the bulk of the original party's
following in Kerala and West Bengal, while in Andhra
Pradesh the two warring state units are about evenly
matched. In northern India, the Communists have
pockets of strength in most states, but these
amount to little in electoral terms. Western and
central India are similarly barren areas for the
Communist, rightist or leftists,
36. The Communists will score their most im-
portant victories in Kerala, a small but densely
populated state--about 20 million--in southwest
India, The state manifests in an acute form many
of the economic, political, and social problems
that pervade India as a whole. In addition, communal
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and caste rivalries and a complete split in the local
Congress Party have rendered Kerala unusually vulner-
able to Communist penetration. The national Congress
Party hierarchy has apparently written off Kerala,as
a lost cause, and an electoral front led by the
CPI/L--but comprising parties all the way across the
political spectrum, including the right wing of the
Muslim League--is expected to win a majority in the
state legislative assembly.
37. In West Bengal, where the Congress Party
has pre-empted the right and center, the CPI/L is
the largest opposition party and the only one with
an effective political organization. Seeing the
election as an opportunity to document their mass
support, the West Bengal extreme left parties, es-
pecially the CPI/L, have concentrated their campaign
activities in the state's populous urban areas, part-
icularly Calcutta. A large Communist vote in the
cities is a likely result and would dramatize both
the degree to which the left can attract a popular
following and its capability to organize protest
movements that threaten law and order. In the state
as a whole, however, the rival Communist parties
appear more interested in defeating each other than
in ousting the Congress government, and their in-
ability to form an electoral front will probably
enable the Congress to remain in power.
38. Andhra Pradesh is-an extreme example of
the debilitating effect of divisive forces within
the Indian Communist movement on Communist electoral
prospects. Over the past two years both Communist
parties in the state have been largely preoccupied
with mutual recriminations, and their movement,
once monolithic, disciplined, and capable of winning
over 20 percent of the vote, has lost considerable
prestige and political attraction. As a result,
the local Congress Party, though itself rife with
factionalism, may even improve on its majority in
the state assembly.
Socialist Parties
39. The Indian socialists in 1952 provided the
strongest opposition to the Congress Party, but have
since suffered a gradual decline, mainly to the
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9
benefit of the Communists and other opposition
parties. Successive mergers and splits, combined
with individual defections to the Congress Party
of some prominent socialists, have sapped the
socialists' organizational vitality. Moreover,
since 1955 the Congress Party has adopted formally
most of the socialists' welfare-state programs, thus
pre-empting much of their popular appeal. After a
brief interlude in 1964 as a united party, they are
fighting the 1967 election campaign as two rival
socialist organizations.
40. The Praja Socialist Party (PSP) has
suffered grievously from the 1964 defection of
Asoka Mehta--now minister of planning in the central
government--and his followers and from the failure
of its brief and bitter merger with the Socialist
Party of India that same year. In some states
where the PSP enjoyed a modicum of popular support,
such as Uttar Pradesh and Kerala, many of its
backers stayed on with the remnant of the merged
socialist organization--the Samyuta Socialist Party
(SSP)--leaving the PSP organization all but wiped
out. A number of prominent party members are run-
ning this year as PSP nominees, but many of them,
given the collapse of the organization behind them,
will win or lose on the basis of their own personal
appeal and status.
41. The principal areas of electoral strength
for the rival SSP are Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya
Pradesh, and Kerala. Here the SSP has sought elec-
toral arrangements with opposition groups of all
complexions. The party's greatest chance of being
on a winning team is in Kerala, where it is a mem-
ber of the Communist-led electoral front.
State and Regional Parties
42. In addition to those political parties
seeking national status, India has a number of
parties based almost solely on communal, caste,
tribal, and sectional loyalties. Although their
national impact is negligible, they are significant
in state politics and in some cases form the main
opposition to the Congress Party. Usually they
seek to capture working majorities in the state leg-
islatures or at least to gain enough seats to en-
hance their prospects of forming coalition governments.
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Although none of these parties is expected to gain
power in this year's election, in at least one
state--Madras--a regional party is presenting a
fairly stiff challenge to an entrenched Congress
regime.
43. The most significant parties operating
largely or wholly in single states are the Dravida
Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) in Madras, two wings of the
Sikh Akali Dal in Punjabi Suba, and the National
Conference in Jammu and Kashmir.. Other locally-
oriented parties are not expected to play a mean-
ingful role in determining the outcome of the 1967
elections. These include the badly divided and
largely "untouchable" based Republican Party active
in Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Gujarat, the
All Parties Hill Leaders Conference of Assam, a
number of leftist parties in West Bengal, and a
plethora of caste parties in Madras. In Kerala,
the Muslim League is largely a local phenomenon
but is an important junior member of the Communist-
led electoral front which is expected to win a
majority in the state assembly.
44. The DMK is based on the regional loyalty
of the Tamil-speaking people of southern India,
chiefly in the state of Madras. Appealing to the
Tamils' traditional resentment against what they
regard as high-caste dominace and northern dis-
crimination, the DMK stands against the imposition
of the Hindi language and is strongly anti-Brahmin
and .antinorth. It's organizational strength has
increased sharply during the past 16 years. It now
claims an active membership of over 400,000, with
more than 4,000 branches throughout Madras. Mem-
bership is drawn largely from the laboring classes,
portions of the white-collar workers, students,
and other young people. Despite this strength, the
DMK, which in 1962 won 50 of the 234 seats in the
Madras state assembly and eight seats in the na-
tional parliament, has not grown enough during the
past years to project itself as an alternative to
Congress. Electoral alliances with Swatantra, the
Muslim League, the Praja Socialist Party, and an-
other small group do not appear to have reduced
sufficiently the large number of multicor.nered con-
tests which in the past have allowed the Madras
Congress Party to win a: sizable maJorxty:.-
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? CONFIDENTIAL 0
of the legislative assembly seats with only a plu-
rality of the popular vote. The DMK, however, may
win as much as 30 percent of the state legislative
assembly seats.
45. The Akali Dal, the Sikh communal party of
the newly created state of Punjabi Suba, is divided
into two rival factions--one dominated by Sant Fateh
Singh, the other by the aging, erratic Master Tara
Singh, The Sant faction is the largest opposition
group in the state, holding 17 of the 86 state leg-
islative assembly seats, but appears to have lost
some strength from the high point achieved la'st spring
when the central government capitulated to its de-
mands for a division of the Indian Punjab along Sikh-
Hindu lines. The rival Tara Singh splinter group,
although small, has helped to reduce the Sant's chal-
lenge to Congress by exploiting Sikh disappointment
over the size and character of the long-sought Sikh-
dominated state. Since Sant Fateh Singh's well pub-
licized fast last December, which ended with few if
any concessions to his demands by the central govern-
ment, Master Tara Singh apparently has had some suc-
cess in tarring the Sant as a traitor to Sikh inter-
est. As a result, the local Congress Party, al-
though itself subject to factionalism, is expected
to retain its majority in the state assembly.
46. The National Conference of Jammu and Kash-
mir, the former governing party, was revived last
July by the unscrupulous former state premier Bakshi
Ghulam Mohammed. It is now the leading challenger
to continued Congress rule in Jammu and Kashmir.
Bakshi's bid for a return to power will probably
fail, though the election may be close if it is fair.
The government's favor can be very important in
this state, and Congress controls the government
machinery, has a stronger organization and greater
financial resources, and enjoys the outspoken back-
ing of New Delhi. The National Conference, on the
other hand has not been able to form electoral:ar-
rangements with other opposition parties or to se-
cure the support of the Muslim self-determinist
leaders. Although the National Conference may score
important victories in Kashmir proper, it has not
made much of an impact in the Hindu-dominated Jammu
Province.
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The Post-Election Period
47. Indira Gandhi's hold on the post of prime
minister is by no means certain. If the Congress
does poorly in the elections, she may be forced from
office by disillusioned party leaders or may vol-
untarily retire. Conversely, a relatively good
showing by the party would strengthen her position.
48. Regardless of the outcome, Mrs. Gandhi,
will face the challenge of former finance minister
and party stalwart Morarji Desai, who has.announced
his intentions to try to wrest the government leader-
ship from her. Desai also made a determined bid
following the death of Prime Minister Shastri early
last year and, despite a lack of support from key
party leaders, managed to garner the votes of 32
percent of the Congress Party members sitting in
parliament. Should Mrs. Gandhi withdraw or should
it become reasonably clear that she could not win
in a contest with Desai, Home Minister Chavan might
also seek the office. He seems prepared to bide
his time, however, and has made no overt move to
use his influential cabinet position to build up
support for a bid this year. Party president
Kamaraj, another possible candidate for the job,
has certain shortcomings which would limit his ap-
peal to many members of the party hierarchy; his
knowledge of foreign affairs is rudimentary and he
speaks neither English nor Hindi well.
49. Once the elections are over, maneuvering
for power and position within the Congress Party
and the governmental hierarchy will increase, and
state and regional party bosses will vie for re-
presentation in key national government cabinet
positions. Much will depend on the electoral per-
formance of the party units controlled by the var-
ious party leaders and of the personal relationships
between these leaders.
50. At the state level, Congress will most
likely have to deal with a Communist-led govern-
ment in Kerala and with perhaps as many as three
other anti-Congress coalitions elsewhere. Congress
itself may, in some instances, be forced into shar-
ing power with opposition parties. Where no party
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is able to form a government, Congress leaders may
have to resort to rule from New Delhi through the
constitutional device of "president's rule."
51. The opposition parties most likely to
benefit from Congress' decline at both the national
and state levels--the Swatantra and the Jan Sangh--
will probably continue their efforts to discredit
the ruling party and to this extent will make it
harder than ever for the Congress to govern effec-
tively. On the other hand, definitive evidence of
erosion in Congress' dominance of Indian politics
could spur the party's leadership to rejuvenate the
organization, especially in those areas where the
dry rot is most advanced.
52. In any event, it would appear that Con-
gress faces the strongest challenge yet to its
domination of India's political life and that India
is on the verge of a new phase in its political
development; the party that brought the country
independence will have to base its appeal more on
performance than on the personality of a leader
who was a national symbol as well as a political
chieftain.
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'W 49
C O N F I D E N T I A L
6 February 1967
Talking Paper for the memorandum, The Election Challenge
to Indiats Congress Party
1. This memorandum, which was self-initiated, is
intended both as a limited forecast of the results of
the Indian elections and as a background paper which may
contribute to a further understanding of the election re-
sults as they unfold during the last half of February.
2. It is essentially an OCI production and has not
been formally coordinated outside OCI. However, members
of the ONE staff and of the Indian desk of the State Dept-
ment were consulted extensively while it was in prepara-
tion.
The paper makes the following points:
a. The Congress Party, which surprisingly enough
has never garnered a majority of the popular
vote, will retain its majority in the national
parliament although sustaining some losses;
b. At the state level, Congress may lose power
or be forced to form coalition governments
in at least three states;
c. Such losses will flow as much from troubles
within Congress as from the growing strength
of opposition parties, none of which so far
present any real challenge to Congress on the
national level;
d. After the elections, and depending on the ex-
tent of Congress' losses, there will be in-
fighting among Congress' leadership, and Mrs.
Ghandi's future as prime minister may be in
jeopardy.
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C O N F I D ENT I A L
4. It also traces in some detail the status and
development of each of the principal parties, the role
that each plays at both the national and the state level,
and the prospects for each in the various states.
5. The DCI might find interesting the Summary
(paragraphs 1 through 4) which describe generally the
election campaign and paragraphs 47 through 52, which
present a forecast of the postelection developments.
Recommend routine internal and external dissemina-
C 0 N F I D E N T I A L