THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010058-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2007
• Sequence Number: 58
• Publication Date: February 10, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010058-5
0 Top Secret 5
MEMORANDUM
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
The Situation in Vietnam
ARMY review(s) completed.
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
113
10 February 1967
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010058-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010058-5
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010058-5
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010058-5
10 February 1967
The North Vietnamese have stepped up the move-
ment of supplies southward along their coast during
the Tet Pease-fire.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
A.total of 215 enemy-initiated incidents have been
reported during the first three days of the cease-
fire period (Paras. 1-2). According to several
recently captured documents, the Viet Cong have had
difficulty recruiting and keeping military forces
due to low morale and poor leadership.(Paras. 3-6).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
A recent US field assessment of conditions in t e
central highlands concludes that the tribal:- autonomy
movement FULRO, is not planning an uprising'during
Tet (Para. 1).
III. North Vietnamese Military Developments:
Field reports indicate that the Communists are
stepping up the movement of supplies toward the
southernmost areas of North Vietnam during the Tet
truce (Paras. 1-3).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There
is nothing of significance to report.
VI. Other Major Aspects: Recent photography in-
c}icates that efforts to improve and expand North
Vietnam's rail system are continuing (Paras. 1-5).
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010058-5
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010058-5
\ NoarN on
Hoi
VIETNAM g
~/? ` Z _. Demilitarized Zone
11 I - ?Quang TO
`avannakhet 1.,.
Hue'
,?
P/f0
~~ `?. _. . Da Nang
J .,
e~ (h Saravane
ILAND 1? r
Quang Ngai
'Pakse
1 . .. : ttopeu
...-~...a?.... r'/ .r%~:~ J J~ Kontum.
??~ r ~. ~~ Pleiku?
'An Khe
QiNhon
m I Cheo Reo.
Tuy Hoa
A
LMB ODIA ,,TnB
V ein -one _r
u . .
SOUTH VIETNAM
10 FEBRUARY
0 75 100 M4es
0 25 50 75 1 0 K1omererApproved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010058-5
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010058-5
1. As the third day of the Tet cease-fire
ends, a total of 215 Communist-initiated incidents
--85 major and 130 minor--have been reported. The
85 major incidents have resulted in American casual-
ties of 13 killed and 82 wounded. South Vietnamese
casualties are reported as four killed, ten wounded,
and two missing. Communist losses are 59 killed,
two captured, and 23 Communist suspects detained.
2. There appears to be no significant pattern
in the incidents that have occurred so far. How-
ever, the majority`of the enemy-initiated incidents
have been directed against US patrols and perimeter
defenses. The rate of these incidents remains about
the same as during the two previous military stand-
downs at Christmas and New Year's, 1966.
Viet Cong Difficulties in Binh Duong
3. Several documents captured during Operation
CEDAR FALLS indicate that the Viet Cong in Binh
Duong Province are losing popular support and are
having difficulty recruiting and keeping military,
-especially'guerrilla, forces.
4. According to one document, dated 29 August
1966, the people "lacked confidence in cadres and
soldiers." A second document, containing minutes
of a meeting held between 21 October and 3 November
1966, spoke of difficulties encountered by the Viet
Cong in attempts to induce refugees from Communist-
controlled areas to return to their native hamlets
and villages. The Viet Cong had offered to repair
houses belonging to these people and had promised
agricultural loans, but apparently with little suc-
cess. The document stated that the people "still
express concern about living in their former areas_
because of fear of bombings and artillery fire."
10 February 1967
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010058-5
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010058-5
5. A complaint in a 27 September 1966 quarterly
report prepared by the Dau Tieng District Command
Committee that the guerrilla movement was progress-
ing slowly because of recruitment difficulties is
probably related to the decrease of popular support.
Other documents have indicated that the Communists
in the province are having as much difficulty in
holding on to their military personnel as they are
in recruiting them. According to the 29 August docu-
ment, such "erroneous tendencies" as pacificism, cor-
ruption, and poor discipline among troops were cor-
rected during indoctrination sessions, but weaknesses
were still apparent in military leadership, thus in-
creasing the likelihood of desertions.
6. A 10 May 1966 document from the chief of
the Binh Duong provincial unit's political section
further revealed that troops of this unit feared
hardship, death, artillery and air attacks, and the
prospect of a protracted war. The document cited
several instances of entire platoons fleeing the
battlefield and leaving their weapons behind during
engagements with the allies. A third document, in
addition, reported that a number of guerrillas in
the province had deserted in October 1966 because
they feared exposure by former comrades who had
rallied to the government.
10 February 1967
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010058-5
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010058-5
?II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. A recent field situation report based on
the observations of US officials concludes that
there is no substance to recent reports that the
tribal autonomy movement--FULRO--plans serious
disturbances during the Tet holiday period. How-
ever, US observers warn that, if montagnard and
FULRO dissatisfaction with GVN economic. policies
continues, and if other FULRO-GVN differences are.
not settled, the breach between the government and
the montagnards may again widen. Finally, US
sources report that there is no evidence that the
Viet Cong have penetrated the FULRO movement in any
of the seven central highlands provinces included
in the survey.
10 February 1967
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010058-5
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010058-5
North Vietnam: Order of Battle
325 UoIocated
612,500)
341
(12,500)
vIN14 UN1-4
IAL ZONE
BI;26
A n Lin
t
104'
O
0ARCATION LINE
SOU I.1-VIE
1 \
3248\
(7,750)
kAM
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010058-5
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010058-5
III. NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. Reports from US military units indicate
that the North Vietnamese, as expected, are taking
advantage of the Tet_.truce to step up supply move-
ments in support of their war effort.
2. Up to 10 February, 900 to 1,000 coastal
watercraft have been sighted along the coast of
North Vietnam--all but a few between the 18th and
17th parallels. The boats could have been carrying
supplies destined either for Laos or the DMZ area.
Supplies are apparently being landed north of the
DMZ and transferred to trucks which can take them
either westward to Mu Gia Pass of southward toward
the DMZ.
3. The poor descriptions of the watercraft
sighted and lack Of information on trip frequencies
preclude. an accurate estimate of the tonnages being
moved. The capacity of most of the craft usually
employed along the coast is probably about ten tons
each. The sightings during the present truce have
been twice the sightings during the Christmas truce.
More units, however, are now observing this traffic,
and the area of coverage is greater.
10 February 1967
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010058-5
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010058-5
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to re-
10 February 1967
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010058-5
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010058-5
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010058-5
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010058-5
Hanoi Area Dual Gauge Railroad Development
70
s / nor ~-~
1
Ping-hsi ng
22-
CHINA Lang Son
40
`
Yen
/.
L
_
\
? ?
s
Ore Processing Plant .V. - ~~?'
Thai Nguyen
Probable dual auge
Cu"
Phut o con
~
P
vingction
a a
fe Kep ~- c
egf
..~
huc
Yen ~rr
Phu Lang Thuong p
-21
~
Hai Duong
n~ 1 HonG~ o ~o
t cV
a?
i3
~tl
a c
Ff iphor
~0
~
~ J
CAT BA IS.
~/
?
Phu L
RAILROADS
~~ t -----#- Meter gauge
LAOS
Ninh Binh
Standard gauge 25X1
?.
?
VIN AM
t,T
f Dual gauge
J
hank
O 40
HR oa NAUTICAL MILES
i
x ~.
06 C,
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010058-5
 Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010058-5
1. Recent photography indicates that efforts
to improve and expand North Vietnam's rail lines
are continuing. In the Thai Nguyen area the North
Vietnamese are beginning to lay a standard-gauge
third rail on the meter-gauge line between Thai
Nguyen and Hanoi.
2. Photography) reveals that the
rail line from Thai Nguyen to Hanoi has been con-
verted from meter gauge to dual gauge to a point
about three NM south of Thai Nguyen. The same
photography shows a curving connection being con-
structed to link the line coming into Thai Nguyen
from Hanoi with the newly constructed line from Kep.
3. The line from Kep is known to be standard
gauge up to the Thai Nguyen iron ore processing
plant. From this junction, photography
shows the line to be dual gauge unti the connection
w4th the line to Hanoi. The connecting curve is
shown in photography as being laid with only standard-
gauge track, but the switches connecting the curve
to the main lines are dual gauge.
4. Earlier photography has suggested that a
standard-gauge third rail is also being added to
the meter-gauge line between Kep and Hanoi.
5. Completion of both dual-gauge lines and
the probable dual-gauge line running from Ping-
hsiang to Kep would allow materials moving from or
through China on standard'-gauge track to pass all
the way to Hanoi,via Kep_-Thai Nguyen or Kep-Hanoi,
without transloading. These construction efforts
seem to continue Hanoi's policy of -steadily provid-
ing alternate transport facilities; the existing
rail lines are not used to capacity.
10 February 1967
Approved For Release 2007/08/30: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010058-5