THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN EL SALVADOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010068-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 68
• Publication Date: February 15, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN EL SALVADOR
Secret
23
15 February 1967
No. 0793/67
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNC;NADINO AND
DECLASSIFICATION
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
15 February 1967
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Presidential Election in El Salvador
Summary
The presidential election to be held in El
Salvador on 5 March is expected to be a fair one,
and the candidate of the governing party, Colonel
Fidel Sanchez Hernandez, is expected to win. Colo-
nel Sanchez has pledged his administration to con-
tinue the present government's reform program within
the framework of a free enterprise system.
Sanchez is opposed by only one strong party, the
Christian Democrats, who do not expect to win this
election and are saving their most popular candidate
for 1972. There are two small parties, one of which,
the Renovating Action Party, has Communist support.
Despite pre-election nerves and occasional coup
rumors, there are good reasons at this time to believe
that the campaign will be relatively peaceful and that
the transfer of power from President Rivera to a freely
elected successor will take place in July as scheduled.
NOTE: Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence.
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Background
1. Traditionally governed by a wealthy oligarchy
and the military, El Salvador has had only limited ex-
perience with democratic processes. Before 1962, when
President Rivera was elected, governmental changes
were either forced by revolution or resulted from elec-
tions that were orderly formalities but presented the
public with no real alternative to the government slate.
2. Rivera has tried with considerable success to
develop respect for democratic institutions by estab-
lishing the opposition's confidence in the honesty and
freedom of elections. Opposition parties have publicly
acknowledged the fairness of elections during Rivera's
administration. One major step, which gave the opposi-
tion some hope for electoral success, was the initiation
in 1963 of a system of proportional representation for
filling legislative seats. This has resulted in sub-
stantial minority participation in the government and,
for the most part, constructive and responsible repre-
sentation by the opposition deputies.
3. If a smooth transition can be made from Rivera
to a successor equally committed to reform and electoral
honesty, the country will have taken another important
step in the development of representative democracy. On
the other hand, a coup or significant violence around
election time could nullify much of the progress of the
past four years.
The Electoral System
4. The 1962 constitution provides for a presiden-
tial term of five years and a unicameral legislature
renewable in its entirety every two years. Elections
for legislative and municipal offices were held in
March 1966 and will be held again in March 1968. Pres-
ident Rivera's successor will be chosen this March and
will take office in July. Rivera is not permitted by
the constitution to seek immediate re-election.
5. The president and vice president are elected
by a majority of the votes. If none of the party slates
for president and vice president obtains a majority, the
Legislative Assembly must make the final choice between
the two leading slates.
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6. All Salvadoran citizens 18 years of age and
over have the right and duty to vote. Prior registra-
tion is the only other requirement. The entire elec-
toral process from the registration of voters to the
announcement of results is under the control of a
three-man Central Electoral Council chosen by the
Legislative Assembly. The electoral law provides ad-
equate safeguards against multiple voting and other
electoral abuses.
7. There are no large blocs of Salvadorans to
whom suffrage is denied; on the contrary, those who
do not register and vote are subject to fines ranging
from 2 to 100 colones (US $0.80 to $40.00) depending
on their economic status. This requirement is seldom
enforced, however, and actual voting records indicate
considerable public apathy. There was a four-percent
increase in voter participation in 1966 over that of
1964, and most observers believe that this reflects
increased confidence in the honesty of the electoral
machinery. During the current campaign, the Central
Electoral Council is making a special effort to reg-
ister eligible voters and to persuade them to use
their vote in March.
8. The National Conciliation Party (PCN), the
governing party since 1962, has nominated Colonel
Fidel Sanchez Hernandez for president and Dr. Humberto
Guillermo Cuestas for vice president. Col. Sanchez is
widely respected within his own party, the largest in
El Salvador, as well as by many members of the opposi-
tion. His good reputation in opposition circles stems
from his service as minister of interior, under Rivera,
during which time he was given most of the credit for
carrying out the President's policy of honest elections.
He demonstrated his anti-Communist sympathies when he
successfully opposed the hiring of Soviet professors by
the National University in 1964 and defeated the uni-
versity rector in public debate on the issue. Sanchez
is identified with the progressive elements in the PCN
and has promised to continue the reforms begun by
Rivera. While not necessarily subservient to US views,
Sanchez has shown admiration and respect for the US
and has worked well with members of the embassy staff.
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9. The PCN was formed in 1961 as the political
vehicle for Rivera's election to the presidency. Most
of its leaders are government officials and military
officers close to Rivera, but its membership is drawn
from all social and economic classes. The PCN has
strong support in rural areas, to some extent because
rural workers have traditionally been pressured by
large landowners into supporting the official party.
This traditional rural support has been strengthened
by the PCN's efforts to raise the living standard of
the peasants. The party also has considerable support
from the urban labor movement. In the two most re-
cent legislative elections (1964 and 1966), the PCN
polled 59 and 53.7 percent, respectively, of the
votes cast.
10. The Christian Democratic Party (PDC) began
in 1959 as a movement patterned after Christian Dem-
ocratic parties in other countries, especially Chile,
and was granted legal status in 1961. Ideologically
the PDC is left of center but definitely anti-Commu-
nist; it believes the state is an instrument for the
common good and must take an active role in social
and economic fields. The PDC, however, rejects the
socialist state as totalitarian.
11. The main points of difference between the
PDC and the PCN concern the concept of private prop-
erty and the rights of labor. The PDC, while support-
ing private enterprise, believes that profits should
correspond to the risks and productive work involved
and maintains that private property must be employed
for the benefit of all. The PDC upholds the right of
labor, including agrarian labor, to organize and
strike; the PCN, on the other hand, has not pushed
the idea of organizing farm labor.
12. In foreign policy, the PDC has been accused
of being anti-US but most of its criticism has been
directed against actions and policies that it sees as
interference in the internal affairs of another coun-
try
13. The PDC has nominated its secretary general,
a capable lawyer named Abraham Rodriguez, as its pres-
idential candidate and Mario Pacheco, an engineer,
for vice president. Dr. Rodriguez is a moderate with
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a good reputation in intellectual circles, but he is
not widely known on a national scale. He is believed
to have been selected as a sacrifice, since the PDC
does not believe itself strong enough yet to win a
presidential election and is saving its most popular
candidate, the mayor of San Salvador, Jose Napoleon
Duarte, for the 1972 election. The PDC polled 25.9
percent of the total vote in 1964 and increased its
percentage to 31.2 percent in 1966.
14. The
oldest
political party in El Salvador,
the Renovating
Action
Party (PAR), was formed in
1946.
It was fairly
strong
in its early years because
it
represented opposition to military-government, but
its strength has declined significantly. The PAR
polled 15.1 percent of the votes in 1964 and dropped
to 6.8 percent in 1966. Weakened by internal dis-
sension, it has accepted Communist support in a des-
perate attempt to remain alive. Much of its decline
from 1964 to 1966 was due to public disgust with the
obstructionist tactics of PAR legislative deputies
who stood out sharply and unfavorably in comparison
with the generally constructive opposition of the
Christian Democratic deputies.
15. The PAR is supporting the leftist former
rector of the National University, Dr. Fabio Castillo
Figueroa, for president and Jesus Gochez Castro, a
lawyer with ,a history of Communist association, for
vice president. Castillo has no chance of winning
the election.
16. Nevertheless, rightist military officers
and civilians have been pressing Rivera to have the
Central Electoral Council outlaw the PAR, claiming
evidence that it presents a real threat. The attorney
general has petitioned the council to declare the PAR
illegal, pointing to its agrarian reform program as
proof of its Communist ideology. Rivera, Col. Sanchez,
and Minister of Interior Arias all oppose such a move
on the grounds that it would be better if the PAR were
defeated fairly at the polls. The legal red tape in-
volved does not permit a decision to be made before
2 or 3 March. With elections scheduled for 5 March,
it is very likely that no action will be taken until
after the elections.
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17. The Salvadoran Popular Party, a nondescript
but generally rightist aggregation including dissatis-
fied former PAR members, was organized just prior to
the 1966 elections. It has some support around Santa
Ana, the country's second largest city, but until re-
cent weeks it lacked funds. to do much campaigning and
organizing. It received only 2.4 percent of the votes
in 1966, but may do better this year by attracting
some of the dissatisfied conservatives from the PCN.
Its presidential candidate is retired major Alvaro
Ernesto Martinez.
18. The Communist Party of El Salvador is ille-
gal, and none of its front groups has been able to
obtain legal recognition. Infiltration of the PAR has
given the Communists a forum during this election, but
it has weakened the PAR by frightening away,its more
moderate members.
Outlook
19. The electoral campaign will probably.be rela-
tively peaceful and the opposition has been given a
fair chance to campaign. None of the PCN precandidates
who lost out to Sanchez appears capable at present of
perpetrating a successful coup, although two disgruntled
military officers have been involved in plotting. Sanchez
stands a very good chance of winning and, since he is
acceptable to most of the military and the oligarchy, an
orderly transfer of power seems assured. The greatest
dangers to constitutional order would seem to be a pre-
election coup attempt by one of several military malcon-
tents or an unexpected PDC victory which the military
and oligarchy might not accept.
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15 February 1967
Talking Paper for the Memo, The Presidential Election
in El Salvador
This memorandum is an attempt to place in perspective
the various political forces currently at work in El Salvador
including rumors of unrest and possible instability. It dis-
cusses briefly the historical base on which the present gov-
ernment rests, the important features of the electoral system,
the orientation of the four parties contesting the election,
and the outlook for a fair election and an orderly transfer
of power.
President Rivera's government has done much to establish
respect for democratic institutions and has used Alliance for
Progress assistance effectively. It it is followed by another
government equally committed to these goals, it can provide
a continued example of progress in an area known for its in-
stability. If a coup should take place, however, El Salvador
will lose much of the ground already gained.
Routine internal and external dissemination is suggested.
The Director need not take time for it. In light of the pro-
posed Summit Meeting it might be worth giving sub-cabinet
dissem. This is an OCX memo and has not been coordinated
outside this office.
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