THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001700010020-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: March 2, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
Top Secret
109
2 March 1967
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Information as 1600
2 March 1967
SC No.?00931/67
HIGHLIGHTS
There are indications that a decision by the
military establishment on its candidate for presi-
dent may be made in the next few days.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Communist soldiers have again shelled the US artil-
'_kv positions near the DMZ; however, no damage
was reported (Para. 1). An ARVN division head-
quarters was attacked by Viet Cong guerrillas on
1 March in southern Bac Lieu Province (Para. 2).
According to a captured document, Viet Cong per-
sonnel and food losses were extremely heavy in
Binh Dinh Provinc : last fall ' ;Paras. 3-7) .
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
The Constituent -Assembly approved 11 more articles
of the constitution and. wrapped up the c-:.-)ter on
the ~,u_'Aciary in its last three sessions ( _ uras.
1-3).
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
There is nothing of significance to report.
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: A Libera-
tion Front central committee statement reaffirms the
Viet Cong's determination to continue fighting until
the US meets the _ _ront's demands for a peaceful
settlei..ent (Paras. 1-2).
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1. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN
1. In another attempt to disrupt activities
of the US Marine 175-mm. heavy artillery just south
of the DMZ in northernmost Quang Tri Province,
North Vietnamese Communists attacked the US posi-
tions with 180 rounds of 81-mm. mortar fire early
on 2 March. In two similar attacks on the previous
night, 475 81-mm. mortar shells were directed at
the artillery sites. The latest attack caused no
personnel casualties nor has any damage been re-
ported to the heavily sandbagged, self-propelled
artillery, which has been shelling Communist posi-
tions in the DMZ and in North Vietnam since late
last week.
2. The Viet Cong shelled a South Vietnamese
Army division headquarters in the delta late on 1
March for the second consecutive night. Ten to 15
rounds of 75-mm. recoilless rifle fire struck
the 21st ARVN Division compound and adjacent hous-
ing area near Vinh Lai in the southern province of
Bac Lieu. Four ARVN soldiers were wounded during
the attack, which also resulted in civilian casual-
ties of four killed and 21 wounded. A three-battal-
ion ARVN reaction force was dispatched, but no con-
tact with the attackers has been reported.
Viet Cong Report Severe Losses in Binh Dinh
3. In a captured letter dated 20 January 1967
a Viet Cong district cadre in Binh Dinh Province
detailed to a superior the serious losses suffered
by the Communists during allied sweep operations on
23 September and 2 October 1966 in Phu Cat and south-
ern Phu My districts.
4. The letter complained that a large portion
of the population fled the area because of the op-
erations, that both the political and the military
structures of the districts were in "critical con-
dition," and "worse still," that almost all of the
area's material resources were burned or looted. Rice
rations for Communist cadres and soldiers, which had
previously been ten kilograms a month per man, were
now "completely inadequate."
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5. The allied military sweeps referred to in the
letter are probably portions of Operation IRVING,
which was conducted in the Phu Cat - Phu My area in
September and October 1966. According to the US data,
approximately 16,000 refugees left the IRVING opera-
tional area, which had been largely Communist-con-
trolled, and the Viet Cong suffered heavy casualties.
6. The letter's reference to a previous 10-
kilogram monthly rice ration for each cadre and sol-
dier indicates that food supplies were inadequate
even before the allies destroyed supply caches.
Standard rations for Viet Cong combat troops in other
areas of the country usually average 22 or 23 kilo-
grams a month, and rations which fall below this
dietary standard are supplemented with potatoes and
manioc, which the Vietnamese regard as less appetizing
and less nutritious.
7. Under optimum conditions, it would take the
Communists considerable time to recover from losses
of this severity in personnel, food, and in their
popular base. The letter writer's reference at the
conclusion of his letter to a hope for the future
revival of Viet Cong influence in the area indicates
that by late January 1967 no significant progress
had yet been made in improving conditions. This may
be a result of continuing allied operations in the
area.
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II. POLITICAL r)FV ELOPi;'.ENTS INN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. The Constituent Assembly finished up the
p: the constitution dealing with the judi-
cia.y on 28 February and, on 1 and 2 March, began
debate on the "special institutions" or councils,
approving 11 more articles of the constitution in
all. In its approved form, the article governing
the selection of the Supreme Court provides for an
indirect "election" rather than the straight
ination" of the candidates. The Supreme Cour-L
consist of between nine and 15 judges chosen by the
legislature from a list "elected" by the associa-
tion of judges, the association of prosecutors, and
the association of lawyers. The president, however,
must then appoint the Suprer Court. judges from the
legislature's list. The court is empowered to de-
clare laws unconstitutional and to dissolve politi-
cal parties upon a vote of three-fourths of the
judges, after consultation with representatives
from the legislative and executive branches.
2. Under the broad heading of "special insti-
tutions," the .-'ssernbly provided for a "special court"
of five senators and five representatives headed by
the chairman of the 'uprexne Court to remove high-
level government officials from office for treason
or other serious crimes. The motion to bring charges
against high officials must be made by a simple major-
ity of both legislative houses and approved by two
thirds of all the members of both houses; however,
in the case of c`i.arg?:s against the president and vice
president, the vote r--ast be two thirds for the motion
and three fourths for approval. Once the :y.ok.ion is
approved, the special court must muster a t;rc-L.hirds
vote to make the charges binding, except in the cases
of the president and vice-president, for which the
vote must be three fourths.
3. During the 2 March morning session of she
assembly, the deputies provided for yet another
watchdog organization in the form of an inspector-
ate. An inspectorate had originally been proposed
as a fourth branch of the government when the basic
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principles of the constitution were being worked
out, but that concept was dropped. Basically, the
inspectorate will be empowered to propose discipli-
nary measures and request prosecution of delinquent
government employees in the courts. Although the
exact duties of the inspectorate will be spelled out
in subsequent legislation, it will probably function
as an investigative office concerned with such mat-
ters as corruption at levels below the high offices
governed by the special court.
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
IV, OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
2. March 1P G7
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. The Liberation Front representative in
Hanoi called a press conference on 28 February to
release a new NFLSV central committee statement
reaffirming Viet Cong determination to continue
fighting until the US meets the Front's demands
for a peaceful settlement.. The statement called
for cessation of US bombing, recognition of the
Front ("the sole genuine representative of the
South Vietnamese People") withdrawal of US troops,
and willingness to let the South Vietnamese people
settle their problems according to the program of
the Front. The statement emphasized the five-point
Communist formula for a peaceful settlement. it
also accused. President Johnson of ignoring the DRV
foreign minister's recent gesture of "good will"
and the Front's offer to extend the Tet cease-fire.
The statement included a lengthy catalogue of al
leged US "crimes" in Vietnam and protested against
"new steps of escalation."
2. The release of this statement appears to
be designed to record publicly that the Vietnamese
Communists' position on a settlement of the war has
not changed despite speculation engendered in the
month since DRV Foreign Minister Trinh's statement
on peace talks on 28 January.
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