FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC INFLUENCES ON THE COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, 1957 - AUGUST 1966

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001800010015-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: March 1, 1967
• Content Type: IR

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Report
Foreign and Domestic Influences on the Colombian
Communist Party, 1957 - August 1966
Secret
23
March 1967
No. 0627/67
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the united States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
F:XCLVIIFC) FHUM A111011ATIC
I,SI'A N1 i11 Alll NO AN))
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FOREWORD
Foreign and Domestic Influences on the Colombian,
Communist Party, 1957 - August 1966, the second of OCI's
intelligence studies to deal with a free world Communist
party, should be read in conjunction with Foreign and Do-
mestic Influences on the Venezuelan Communist Party,
1958 - MID-1965, published in late 1965. As a category,
the OCI intelligence studies are aimed at situations where
study and analysis in some depth seem likely to shed new
light on long-standing US security problems, to give timely
warning about an emerging problem, or to assist the pol-
icy maker in considering ways of coping with any such
problems. These research. papers appear on no definite
schedule but rather as a suitable subject happens to co-
incide with the availability of the special manpower re-
sources required.
Assistance in the preparation of this paper has
been received from various components of the Directorate
of Intelligence, notably the Research Staff. It has been
informally coordinated with the Office of National Esti-
mates. Comments should be directed to the Office of Cur-
rent Intelligence.
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Page
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ........................... Vii
II. THE COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN NATIONAL
POLITICS ................................... 3
PCC Policies and Programs, 1957-1966 ........
The PCC in National Politics After 1957 ...... 9
Relations With Leftist Splinter Groups ....... 12
The Split in the PCC ......................... 14
III. FOREIGN INFLUENCES ON THE PCC ............... 19
Castroism and the PCC ........................ 19
PCC-Soviet Relations and the Sino-Soviet
Dispute .................................... 22
Relations With Peking ........................ 24
ANNEX A: The Colombian Communist Party (PCC) and the
Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV): A Com-
parison of Experiences Since 1958 ......... A-1
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Illustrations
Page
Table: Estimated Membership of Colombian
Communist and Pro-Communist Or-
ganizations .............................. 14
Map Selected Areas of Colombian Guerrilla
Activity, June 1966 . .................... 16
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The years 1957-1966 offer a special oppor-
tunity to study foreign and domestic influences
on the Colombian Communist Party (PCC) because
the period covers both the rise of the Sino-Soviet
dispute and an era when the chief question for the
party domestically was whether a policy of violence
or of orthodox political activity--the via armada
or the via pacifica--provided the most promising
road to power. With the overthrow of dictator
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in May 1957, the PCC found
itself in circumstances seemingly conducive to
growth. Like its fellow Communist party in
Venezuela (PCV) the following year, it regained
legality after a prolonged period of suppression;
it enjoyed a reputation of consistent opposition
to the despised dictatorship; and it faced bright
prospects of advancing its national political status
through orthodox political activity. In August 1966
the party, although still legal, was politically
ostracized--regarded generally as obstructive at
best and subversive at worst. Its national organ-
ization was largely intact and retained at least. the
nominal backing of the principal Communist rural. and
paramilitary forces; but a pro-Peking faction had
formally broken away in 1964, and much of the party's
.youth following had been drained away to this and
.other "ultraleft" factions advocating the via armada.
After regaining legal status in 1957, the PCC had
firmly adhered to a program which placed primary
emphasis on the via pacifica or mass struggle. The
party refused to alter this "soft line" in its funda-
mentals, despite its long and pragmatic experience
with guerrilla warfare and other rural violence in
Colombia and despite. its influence over a number of
active paramilitary forces in the countryside. The
party did make some adjustments after 1964 to enhance
the role of the "armed struggle" in Colombia in an
attempt to answer the criticism of the "ultraleft,"
assume a more militant facade, and undercut the dis-
sidence within its own ranks. These modifications,
which gave a stronger endorsement of the Communist-
influenced paramilitary bands, were probably more a
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matter of shrewd semantics than a departure from
the via Pacifica.
The Communist main line of action throughout
this period was toward the development of a "national
patriotic front" in opposition to the National Front
coalition government under which the traditional
Liberal and Conservative Parties shared equally and
exclusively in all elective and appointive offices.
Communist success in undermining this "constitutional-
ized" arrangement required that the party concentrate
its resources and those of its pro-Communist allies
in support of the strong but minority dissident fac-
tion of the Liberals--the Liberal Revolutionary Move-
ment (MRL). This defector organization was just as
determined after 1960 to disrupt the National Front
as were the Communists. This projected PCC-MRL
alliance failed, however, because the moderate ma-
jority faction of the MRL increasingly shunned overt
cooperation with the Communists, and the old guard
Communist leaders seemed to lack the flexibility and
imagination to demonstrate to the skeptical "ultra-
left" elements inside and outside the party the "cor-
rectness" and efficacy of the via pacifica as a policy.
The secession of the hard-liners in 1964 to form a
pro-Peking rival party (the PCC-ML) contrasts with
the experience of the Venezuelan Communist party which
held together through 1965.
The foreign influences on the party--essentially
the same as those bearing upon the PCV--were inseparable
from the domestic conflict over the via pacifica versus
the via armada. The example of the Cuban revolution
and Cuban stimulation of the "ul-traleft" were partly
responsible for the hard-liners' attack on the PCC's
via pacifica line, though Colombian public opinion
was less stirred by the Cuban example than opinion in
Venezuela. Though both the PCC and the PCV were Mos-
cow oriented, the Colombians gave the USSR their full
support in the Sino-Soviet dispute while the Venezue-
lans sought to avoid the issue under the guise of
neutralism. Moscow gave firm backing to the PCC'-s
program, including the attitude toward guerrilla war-
fare; Moscow could also be credited with substantial
indirect assistance to the PCC when Castro agreed,
at the Havana meeting of Latin American Communist
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parties in late 1964, to coordinate his subversive
efforts in the hemisphere through orthodox party chan-
nels. Peking's influence, on the other hand, seems to
have consisted of little more than providing ideologi-
cal support for the Colombian hard-liners.
No precise and definitive assessment is now pos-
sible as to the relative weights of the foreign and
domestic influences on the PCC over this nine-year
period, but it certainly seems to have been domestic
factors which were mainly responsible for the princi-
pal development in party policy during 1966. This
was a tendency, reflected in the resolutions of the
10th Party Congress and elsewhere, to give additional
emphasis to the policy of the via armada in an apparent
effort to recapture the leadership of the extreme left.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This study seeks to identify and evaluate the
principal forces influencing the course of the
Colombian Communist Party during the period from the
fall of the Rojas Pinilla dictatorship in May 1957
to the end of the Valencia administration in Au-
gust 1966. With this aim in view, the paper first
examines the impact of domestic political events on
the program of the PCC and then the relevant develop-
ments in international Communism.
In this examination it is useful to compare the
PCC's experience with that of the Communist Party
in adjacent Venezuela (the PCV) during the years which
followed the ouster of the Perez Jimenez dictatorship
in January 1958.* Both parties emerged with legal
status after a protracted period of suppression un-
der authoritarian rule--a suppression much more severe
in Venezuela, however, than in Colombia. Perhaps un-
til 1962 both parties had relatively bright prospects
for improving their positions in national politics
through ordinary political methods; the Communist
prospects in Venezuela seemed especially bright, partly
because the prevailing political climate was more
radical there than in Colombia. But opportunities
for Communist exploitation were plentiful in both
countries, as coalition regimes--with their inher-
ent weaknesses--struggled to restore representative,
constitutional government and cope with various eco-
nomic and social problems left unsolved by the ousted
dictators.
The PCC and the PCV were each torn with internal
dissension over the issue of whether to pursue power
primarily by overt political action (variously
termed, in Latin American Communist parlance, the
mass struggle, viarparliamentaria and via pacifica)
or by revolution (the armed struggle or lucha
armada). On this critical issue neither party
followed a policy of complete consistency. A
*See FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC INFLUENCES ON THE VENEZUELAN
COMMUNIST PARTY, 1958 - MID-1965, InteZZigence Study by
the Directorate of Intellligence, 6 December 1965 (SECRET
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variety of pressures and influences gradually led
the PCV to choose the armed struggle, with em-
phasis on guerrilla warfare after 1963, even
though it had little experience in this tactic or
capability for carrying it out. On the other
hand, the Colombian party, in spite of its exten-
sive experience and substantial assets for conducting
guerrilla warfare, generally held to the via
pacifica as the primary way to power.
Both parties were traditionally oriented to-
ward Moscow, yet they chose divergent paths in the
Sino-Soviet dispute. The Colombian party gave
solid support to the USSR and the PCV took a neu-
tral stand in an effort to reduce conflicts be-
tween hard-liners and soft-liners within the party.
Each party was subject to strong pressures to fol-
low Cuba's revolutionary example--pressures of both
a direct and an indirect nature, since Castro's ap-
peal to left-wing opinion in Venezuela, and, to a
lesser extent in Colombia, was one of the politi-
cal facts of life in those countries.
The Colombian party formally split in early
1964, largely as a result of differences over
domestic strategy and tactics, and, to a lesser
degree, over its stand in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
The PCV maintained a facade of unity through 1965.
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II. THE COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN NATIONAL POLITICS
The position of the PCC has been much affected
by Colombia's traditional two-party system of
government (now modified by the agreement for a
bipartisan National Front) and by the extensive
rural violence which has troubled the country
for nearly two decades.
Since its formal establishment in 1930, the
PCC has been severely limited in influence by this
two-party system, under which Liberals and Con-
servatives have monopolized power by constitu-
tional procedures throughout most of the 20th
century. The nominal membership of these two
parties has included the vast majority of the
people cutting across all class and regional
lines of the country; each, in this sense, has
been a truly national party. Liberal and Con-
servative affiliation, which is generally "in-
herited" rather than based on clear ideological
conviction, approaches a kind of religious
fervor, sometimes transcending loyalty to the
nation. The political monopoly of the Liberal
and Conservative parties explains in part the
weakness of the Communist Party and other minor
parties.
Partisan attitudes caused a gradual breakdown
of constitutional government in the late 1940s,
marked particularly by the serious rioting in
the capital in 1948 (the Bogotazo) and the wide-
spread rural strife known as la violencia which
began after that date and still continues, al-
though greatly diminished since then. This
highly complex phenomenon of rural unrest can-
not be attributed to any single cause; its geo-
graphical centers have been continually shifting
and much of the guerrilla activity has always
been apolitical and little more than organized
banditry. During the years 1948-1953 rural vio-
lence was largely motivated by the deep hostility
between the Liberal and Conservative parties,
including family and clan vendettas. In subse-
quent years, the causes have been primarily eco-
nomic and social, including robbery, land seizure,
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and protection racketeering among the peasantry.
Banditry has become a full or part-time way of
life for many of the elements participating. How-
ever, political motives are still present, and are
seen especially in conflicts among local caudillos
to maintain their spheres of dominance and in their
determined efforts to block the re-establishment of
departmental and central government authority.
A number of peasant leaders in various parts of
the country have been pro-Communist and in varying de-
grees have followed the guidance of the party. In
some rural enclaves, such as Viota and Sumapaz, Com-
munist leaders have exercised direct control. Some of
the largest active or partly active guerrilla bands
have been under the sway of Communist chieftains or
tended to adhere to the party line. In recent years,
the party's role in violence has been publicized by
government counterinsurgency campaigns which have con-
centrated to a large degree on the centers of Commu-
nist rural paramilitary strength. The PCC, however,
although consistently attempting to exploit la vio-
lencia, has not been a key factor in promoting vio-
lence.
The PCC was outlawed during most of the dicta-
torship of Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957) but regained
its legal status under the provisional military
junta (1957-1958) and seemed prepared to exploit the
social, economic and political problems confronting
the subsequent elected government--and in particular
the weaknesses inherent in the newly devised National
Front.
Under this arrangement, the two traditional
parties agreed to share equally and exclusively all
elective and appointive offices at local and national
levels for sixteen years; that is, for four presiden-
tial terms beginning in 1958 and ending in 1974. The
presidency was to be alternated between them every
four years. No one could hold any governmental ap-
pointment without some acceptable version of the
Liberal or Conservative label. At the conclusion of
this agreement, which was incorporated into the Con-
stitution, the parties presumably were to resume nor-
mal competition for political offices.
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The National Front was born of a recognition by
both the Liberals and the Conservatives that their
deep-rooted animosities had to be bridled; that
they had to live together peacefully in order to es-
tablish an effective, stable administration and
avoid another dose of dictatorial rule. In many
respects it appeared to be a plausible method for
re-establishing representative government, restoring
economic and political stability, and implementing a
bipartisan program to reduce rural violence.
All other parties were frozen out by the National
Front agreement. The Communists, because of the gen-
erally right-center orientation of the two major par-
ties, were reduced largely to working with radical
minority elements of the Liberal Party--including
students and organized urban labor--to develop alli-
ances which might exert a significant influence on
national politics. The Communists, nevertheless, de-
rived certain opportunities from inherent weaknesses
in the National Front. The fundamental defect was
that the Liberal Party clearly commanded a majority
of the electorate, and many Liberal elements were re-
luctant or openly opposed to a self-denying bipartisan
peace treaty. Moreover, the divisions existing within
each of the traditional parties placed additional
strains on the arrangement which the Communists were
in a position to exploit. The PCC apparently recog-
nized that dissolution of the National Front might
lead to military intervention, but thought there was
a good chance that it would produce a new order in
which Communists could participate directly and play
a greater role in national politics.
The National Front's weaknesses were apparent
even before the inauguration of the first Liberal ad-
ministration under Alberto Lleras Camargo in 1958,
and in early 1960 the liberal Party split. Alfonso
Lopez Michelsen, son of a former president, es-
tablished a strong, minority Liberal organiza-
tion which eventually adopted the name Liberal
Revolutionary Movement (MRL). At least until late
1962 it was strongly pro-Castro in its leadership,
anti-US in many of its policies, favorable toward
cooperation with the PCC in elections and other po-
litical activity, and adamantly opposed to the
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National Front. These policies,
which paralleled those of the
PCC, suggested the makings of a
powerful "national patriotic op-
position front." At the height
of its power in 1962, the MRL,
with the backing of the Communist
ana pro-Communist vote, was emerg-
ing as a major challenge to the
viability of the government coali-
tion. In this year, Lopez ran as
a protest presidential candidate
against Conservative Guillermo
Leon Valencia and won almost one
fourth of the total popular vote.
in addition, the MRL substantially
increased its representation in
Congress, many of these legisla-
tive seats being filled by Commu-
nists and pro-Communists under the
camouflage of the MRL label.
Factionalism in the Conserva-
tive Party proved to be an even Leader of the MRL, the minority Liberal
greater limitation on the effec- Party faction which cooperated with
tiveness of the National Front. the PCC .
The Conservativas, traditionally
hostile toward any kind of cooperation with the Com-
munists, were even more seriously divided than the
Liberals. Actually, several autonomous organizations
known as the Ospinistas, Laureanistas, Alzatistas,
and Leyvistas--titles derived from the names of the
principal leaders--were included under the Conserva-
tive label. After Rojas Pinilla returned to the coun-
try (1958) and organized his followers under the Na-
tional Popular Alliance (ANP) in 1961, still another
so-called "Conservative" faction entered the elec-
toral lists.
PCC Policies and Programs, 1957-1966
Throughout its 35-year history, the PCC has been
strongly oriented toward Moscow and responsive to the di-
rectives of the CPSU and the twists in Soviet international
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policies. The old guard leaders were products of the Stalin
era but had little difficulty in giving lip service to
denunciation of the "cu:Lt of personality" under the
de-Stalinization program, while in fact carrying on
party business as in the days of Stalin. Gilberto
Vieira White and his group had seized control of the
party in 1947 from the then Secretary General, Au-
gusto Duran--who, after his expulsion by Vieira, formed
a splinter party which has persisted in the region
around Barranquilla but has never posed a serious threat
to Vieira's leadership. As Secretary General, Vieira
was virtually unchallenged in his dictatorial control
over party policy at least until the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute became public and the Castro revolutionary ex-
ample began to have an impact on Colombian radicals.
A shrewd interpreter of the Colombian political
scene, Vieira developed skill over the years as a
party bureaucrat and manipulator of the Central Com-
mittee. In contrast to the party
situation in neighboring Venezuela,
Vieira's control faced no serious
competition from younger dynamic
leaders possessed of strong follow-
ings within the party ranks and in-
clined toward experimentation with
radical programs. Moreover, Vieira
managed to avoid exile or imprison-
ment, either of which would have
paved the way for others to pre-empt
his position. His long tenure thus
provided continuity of programs,
but meant conservatism and even
stagnation. The clandestine opera-
tions of the party had been limited
and ineffective during the regime
of Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957) and
even the Communist guerrillas were
used only to maintain the status
quo in the areas where the party
exercised strong influence, such
as Viota, Sumapaz and northern
Tolima. The objective of retain-
ing legality was evidently a prime Secretary General of the PCC, 1947-
consideration in party policy.
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In its personal characteristics the CCP leader-
ship had little to attract help from anyone outside
the party who might be interested in disrupting the
National Front. At least to the Colombian public,
the Communist leaders were notably lacking in dynamism,
imagination and political opportunism; they seemed con-
tent to receive their modest stipends, occasional
junkets to the bloc countries, and such limited for-
eign subsidies and other support as might fall to
their lot.
The principal Colombian Communist policy was
a firm and unconditional advocacy of the primacy
of the via pacifica, or p-arliamentary struggle. The
party did accept the armed struggle under appropriate
circumstances in designated local. areas, but dur-
ing the late '50s and early '60s it insisted that
the political consciousness of the worker class
had not matured to the requisite level for launch-
ing a general revolution.
As the principal action for developing the party's
mass strength, the PCC has on more than one occasion
since 1957 called for the organization of a "great
patriotic front of national liberation." At the time
the party reacquired legal status in 1957, Vieira in-
sisted that Communists would have to emerge from their
cocoon of isolation, cast off their dogmatic orienta-
tion, and work with any group opposed to the National
Front. At the 9th Congress in 1961, the party iden-
tified the MRL as the principal vehicle for this pur-
pose.
On the critical issue of armed struggle the par-
ty's statements up to 1965 were ambiguous and essen-
tially semantic modifications of its traditional theme
of "self-defense" by the peasant masses where justi-
fied by the oppressive actions of the "oligarchic" se-
curity forces.- In 1965, however, the PCC formulated
what it claimed to be a unique policy which it hoped
would satisfy those-who were clamoring for action and
yet not risk the party's legal status. The political
resolution of the party's Tenth Congress in January
1966 stated:
In Colombia there is opening an original revo-
lutionary way, based on the use of all methods
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and forms of mass struggle, combined according
to concrete local and general conditions. Peas-
ant guerrilla war is one of the highest forms
of mass struggle and only prospers and grows
where it is linked with the masses. At present,
although peasant guerrilla war is not yet the
principal form of struggle it is becoming more
important every day.
In this "unique policy," the PCC recognized
that "the guerrilla movement forms a part of the
combined political situation" and that "its perspec-
tive should be analyzed in relation to this over-all
situation." The party further asserted that guer-
rilla action "tends to promote and create certain sub-
jective and indispensable factors for the emergent
triumph of the revolutionary situation in Colombia."
It defended its ancient policy of self-defense of the
rural masses as "correct," and as having produced a
"vigorous guerrilla movement wherever the official
forces in cooperation with the Yankee military had
waged war against the masses in the countryside."
The PCC in National Politics After 1957
When the PCC regained freedom to operate overtly
in 1957, its political position and prospects were
better than at any time in the past decade, but
less favorable than the PCV's in Venezuela when the
dictatorship was overthrown there. Unlike their
comrades in Venezuela in 1958, the Communists could
take no credit for helping overthrow the hated author-
itarian regime, and they were excluded from office
by the provisions of the National Front.
The party did have substantial support in the or-
ganized labor movement, among university students, and
in the various intellectual classes. Even among the
students, however, the Communist potential was markedly
less than in Venezuela, where the university popula-
tion was concentrated in the strategically located
Central University in Caracas. Colombian students,
being dispersed among a number of universities in
Bogota and in provincial cities, have been more dif-
ficult to organize for large-scale demonstrations and
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have been generally less inclined to challenge the
government on purely political issues than students
in various other Latin American countries.
On the other hand, the party had one asset which
was unique among all Latin American Communist organi-
zations: prolonged experience in rural violence (la
violencia) and guerrilla warfare, including a knowl-
edge of the problems connected with coordinating
scattered paramilitary groups of leftist and Commu-
nist orientation. However, not until Castro had demon-
strated successfully the application of guerrilla war-
fare methods in Cuba did this Communist paramilitary
strength assume special significance in party eyes.
Despite the many deficiencies in party think-
ing, the serious domestic problems confronting the
National Front and the divisions within that coali-
tion gave the PCC a chance to expand its national
influence. In the MRL and the "national democratic
front" the Communists had a promising means of ex-
ploiting these divisions, and in 1960 they estimated
their prospects for disrupting the traditional two-
party system in Colombia to be the best in the entire
history of the party.
These prospects depended, however, on the main-
tenance of a basic unity among a number of compet-
ing leftist elements. There was some reason for
the PCC's optimism until the end of 1962, when
serious dissension began to plague the MRL, and
various pro-Communist leftist elements began to
challenge the PCC's line on the viapaacifica.
These elements were much influenced Cuban de-
velopments and by Chinese revolutionary ideology
(as will be discussed later) and with good reason
the Communists publicly blamed the "Chinese party
directors"--and privately the "Che Guevara fac-
tion" of the Cuban regime--for provoking the at-
tacks on the via pacifica which absorbed the party's
attention.
The dissension inside the MRL, partly attribut-
able to the issue of armed struggle and indiredtly
to foreign influence, was mainly caused by conflicting
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personal ambitions among the leaders. One group,
nominally a part of this maverick Liberal organization,
was the undisciplined "Youth of the MRL" (JMRL),
founded and led by ex-Communist Luis Villar Borda,
who was a proponent of lucha armada for Colombia.
Other pro-Castro MRL factions included the "hard-
line" group of Alvaro Uribe Rueda and the clique
of Camilo Aluma in Cali.
But it was Lopez who held the support of the
majority of the MRL after 1962. He moderated the
party's policies. Among other things, he rejected
Cuban-style revolution as applicable to Colombia
and muted the party's pro-Castro propaganda output.
More important, he shied away from entering into a
formal alliance wit!. the PCC--as advocated by some
radical elements in the MRL--although he did not
eschew informal cooperation with the Communists or
reject their electoral support. (His influence on
the FCC contrasted with that exerted by the princi-
pal ally of the Communists in Venezuela, where the
Castroite Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR) was
more committed to the armed struggle than the PCV
itself and pushed the PCV in that direction.)
Lopez' position in refusing formal alliance with the
PCC did, however, provide the pro-Chinese minority
in the PCC with further ground for insisting that
the via parliamentaria would never bring the Commu-
nists to power in Colombia.
The MRL, which had reached its high point in na-
tional influence in the congressional and presidential
elections of 1962, fared very badly in the elections
of early 1966--reflecting in part its internal dis-
sension. The majority Lopez faction of the MRL there-
fore seriously considered returning to the regular
Liberal party, a move which would strengthen the Na-
tional Front and the Liberal administration of Carlos
Lleras Restrepo, inaugurated in August 1966. Since
the Communist via parliamentaria was directly tied
to the destinies of the MRL as an opposition party,
the PCC prospects were similarly reduced to a new low
by the 1966 election results--a decline which had
been under way during the previous two years. The
PCC apparently had only limited influence remaining
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among some of the radical cliques of the MRL and
their pro-Communist leaders.
Relations with the Leftist Splinter Groups
The Communists' problems were compounded by
sterile battles with organizations which should
logically have been natural allies in developing
the united front tactic against the government.
After 1958, a number of radical leftist groups
of limited strength were formed in Colombia to
promote urban and rural violence. Most of them
were inspired by the Castro revolution and the
Chinese line on wars of national liberation;
their leaders maintained liaison with the Cuban
and Chinese governments and probably obtained
some financial support in those capitals. Some
of these groups were led by apostate Communists
--for example, Luis Villar, Alfonso Romero Buj
and Pedro Abella Larotta--who, after being ex-
pelled from the PCC, had siphoned off many Com-
munist youths and sympathizers to build the new
organizations. They also occasionally attempted
to recruit among pro-Communist guerrilla bands.
The PCC eventually branded most of these groups
as "charlatans, false revolutionaries, and ultra-
leftists."
The first of these subversive organizations
to launch into the armed struggle was the Worker-
Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC), initially or-
ganized in early 1959 under another name. Cuba
supplied training for the key leaders and also
some financial aid. Antonio Larrota, one of the
founders, had just returned from a long sojourn
in Cuba as a revolutionary protege and agent
of the Castro regime. Eduardo Aristizabal and such
other MOEC leaders as Eduardo Arismendi and
Pedro Abella also found encouragement and
sponsorship in Havana.
The United Front for Revolutionary Action
(FUAR) likewise had the blessing of Castro, who
sent it funds through Gloria Gaitan and Luis
Emiro Valencia. It was organized in early 1962
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by renegade Communists and native Marxists to
promote the armed struggle, and tried to ab-
sorb all the small revolutionary groups and to
enlist some active guerrilla leaders under the
FUAR banner. These efforts were largely unproduc-
tive, however, and most of the Cuban subsidies
appear to have been squandered or to have been ap-
propriated by the less idealistic members. The
FUAR dissolved itself in 1965.
Like the MOEC and FUAR, the National Liberation
Army (ELN) was inspired and financed in part by
Havana. The ELN, initially the paramilitary arm
of the Youth of the Liberal Revolutionary Movement
(JMRL), has engaged in limited guerrilla action.
It was responsible for the attack made in January
1965 on the town of Simacota in northeastern
Colombia--an attack which may have been directly
financed by Cuba, since the ELN
leader, Fabio Vasquez, is known
to have been in Havana in late
1964.
The short-lived United Front,
established in 1964 by the rene-
gade Catholic priest Camilo Torres
Restrepo to promote revolutionary
change in Colombia, also seems to
have been largely inspired by the
Cuban example. The United Front
gained some popular support and
hence received qualified endorse-
ment from the PCC. However,
Torres was killed when his guer-
rilla unit was engaged in action
with Colombian military forces in
early 1966. His activities re-
ceived extensive eulogies from the
Cuban propaganda machine, includ-
ing special praise.from Castro for
his choice of the "path of revolu- Leader of the ELN, the Cuban- supported
tion" ; but there is no evidence National Liberation Army.
that Cuba financed them.
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ESTIMATED MEMBERSHIP OF COLOMBIAN
COMMUNIST AND PRO-COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS
1962
Mid-1966
Colombian Communist Party (PCC)
10,000*
8,000*
PCC-Marxist/Leninist
Less than 2,000
(2,000-2,500
in 1964)
Worker-Student-Peasant Movement
(MOEC)
1,500
200-300
National Liberation Army (ELN)
-
100 active
guerrillas
United Front for Revolutionary
Action (FUAR)
10,000
Inactive
Youth of the Liberal Revolu-
3,000
Inactive
tionary Movement (JMRL)
Excludes youth auxiliary
The Split in the PCC
The major blow to the PCC came when the party split
in early 1964 over the armed struggle issue and the Sino-
Soviet dispute. The splinter party formed by the dis-
sidents and expelled leaders called itself the PCC-
Marxist-Leninist (PCC-ML), thus laying claim to the
mantle of "true" Colombian Communism. This revolt
cost the regular party prestige, the loss of a sub-
stantial number of members--including many party
youth--and disruption in its national organization.
Although the PCC-ML attempted to proselytize
among the pro-Castro revolutionary organizations,
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its inspiration and ideology were largely in-
fluenced by China. After the Havana Conference of
Latin American parties in late 1964, at which Castro
implicitly abandoned his "neutralism" in the Sino-
Soviet dispute, the PCC-ML turned hostile toward the
Cuban regime. It alleged that the Cuban leader had
fallen prey to the "revisionists," and had transformed
himself into an enemy of "the working class and the
Chinese people...and hence of the Communist parties
of the world."
Even the timing of the rift was tied to the de-
bate over armed struggle. In one of its initial publi-
cations, the PCC-ML denounced the old guard central
committee leaders for not adequately supporting a
major bastion of Communist guerrilla strength in
Marquetalia, after the government forces launched a
sizable campaign there in May 1964 to eradicate sub-
version. The PCC-ML insisted that
Marquetalia must be the beginning of the
war of liberation in Colombia.... It is
necessary to substitute the revolutionary
principle of active guerrillas for the false
and conservative principle of 'self-defense.'
...any peaceful method, as a principal form
of taking power, is definitely out of the
question in Colombia; parliamentary and
legal resources, together with other forms
of mass struggle, can only be used as second-
ary and complementary aspects of the principal
form of struggle--the use of arms.... The na-
tional leadership [of the PCCI is mistaken in
its policy....
The top leaders of the PCC closed ranks in the
face of the party revolt, and admitted that the ideo-
logical roots of their problems "originated in the
subjective concessions which the party has been mak-
ing to those extremist tendencies of the so-called
left." They denounced local extremists and openly
accused Peking of being the inspiration and major
cause of dissension within the party. But even though
the split had come largely on the issue of the lucha
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n
Dissem
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Safncta,
fir A R+ tit
Proposed area of acffnety by Wo ers-Students-Pets
MWAM"t (klOE )
Proposed area at opmation of pro-Peking PCC sptiater (PCr Mt )
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armada, of which Castro was the best known Latin Ameri-
can practitioner, the PCC leaders not only refrained
from condemning the Castro regime for promoting revo-
lutionary adventurism of the left, but actually praised
the Cuban socialist experiment and its significance
for the Communist movement in the hemisphere, although
they were rather noncommittal when relating the Cuban
revolution to the armed struggle in Colombia. This
propaganda treatment of Cuba derived from the PCC
leaders' consciousness of Castro's ties with Moscow
and of his appeal to various leftist elements in
Colombia rather than from any possible enthusiasm of
their own for imitating his rise to power.
The PCC's extensive experience with guerrilla war-
fare and the phenomenon of rural violence (la violencia),
and its involvement in various attempts to combine
scattered guerrilla groups into a coordinated move-
ment probably led to an awareness among the PCC lead-
ership that Castro's guerrilla success was a product
of unique conditions and circumstances rather than a
universally applicable experience. The decimation of
the resources of the Venezuelan Communist Party and
the Movement of the Revolutionary Left was additional
confirmation of its belief.
PCC antagonism toward the ultraleft promoters
of the lucha armada was expressed frequently both
before and after the party split. While the PCC-ML
was slinging epithets at the old Guard, such as
"Khrushchevist revisionists"--and raising Castro to
the rank of "No. 1 Khrushchevist"--the PCC was de-
nouncing the pro-Chinese as "anti-Soviet divisionists."
The verbal conflict assumed some of the features of
the Sino-Soviet dispute in a teapot, but was limited
to the issue of armed struggle and particularly
guerrilla warfare.
The 10th Congress of the PCC in early 1966
formally stigmatized the PCC-ML as "traitors who
have deserted the great party and who pretend to
carry out a revolution without a party, a revolution
without Marxism-Leninism.". A key resolution of the
Congress stated:
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The party must pursue its firm ideological
struggle against the disastrous 'ultraleftist'
tendencies, which are characterized by empty
revolutionary phraseology without foundation
in Colombian reality; against the dogmatic
thesis that the via armada is the only form
of struggle worthy of revolutionaries, ac-
companied in practice by passive opportunism
before Yankee imperialism and its oligarchic-
militarist instruments; against the depreciation
of the just struggles for the worker masses and
toward the political activities which can ad-
vance them in overt and legal form.
By Communist definition the "ultraleft" thus
included not only the party traitors and defectors
but the pro-Communist splinter groups seeking to
launch the lucha armada. Occasionally, the PCC
singled out specific names in its counterattacks
against these groups, always reserving special in-
vective for the apostate Communists who went to
Peking in search of aid.
The renegade priest Camilo Torres was described
more sympathetically by the PCC leadership, which,
nevertheless, lamented his departure from the orig-
inal parliamentary path of his United Front organi-
zation to join the lucha armada--a departure made
without "consulting the PCC. The sacrifice of his
life in a guerrilla action "was a valiant and heroic
deed, but this is not the principal form of struggle
for the majority of the Colombian people."
Criticism of "ultraleftists," however, has
been muted since early 1966 as the PCC has been
making tentative efforts to collaborate with and
gain control over the violence-prone ELN and MOEC.
In retrospect, the Tenth Congress may have marked
the beginning of a new PCC policy phase which will
feature a somewhat greater emphasis on armed struggle
without necessarily abandoning the over-all precepts
of the via pacifica policy.
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III, FOREIGN INFLUENCES ON THE PCC
Varied foreign pressures on the PCC, when seen
against the backdrop of domestic political factors,
have also contributed to dissension in the party.
The example of the Cuban revolution, in combination
with tangible Cuban aid for programs of violence,
stirred the splinter groups of the "ultraleft" to
actions which opposed the efforts of orthodox PCC
leaders to promote the mass struggle through a national
patriotic front. These groups also found supplementary
encouragement from Peking and, at least until the PCC
split and the Havana Conference of Latin American
Communist parties in 1964, the Cuban influence appar-
ently acted as an indirect stimulus to the pro-Chinese
hard-line elements within the PCC.
Castroism and the PCC
In many parts of Latin America the principal im-
pact of the Cuban revolution was its provocative ex-
ample for radical leftist elements. Colombia was a
special case, ranking high on the Cuban priority list
for external subversion, probably second on the South
American continent only to Venezuela. Moreover, the ex-
perienced Colombian guerrilla bands of Communist and
pro-Communist orientation undoubtedly made the target
more attractive to the Cubans. Castro himself seemed
to regard Colombia in a special way. He had been in
the country at the time of the bloody Bogotazo of April,
1948 and was a personal friend of Gloria Gaitan,
daughter of the leftist liberal leader Jorge Gaitan
whose assassination had touched off the rioting. Yet
it was probably Che Guevara, a principal architect of
Cuban subversive policy in Latin America, who was
largely responsible for Havana'a decision to circum-
vent the PCC and turn to the militant leftist groups
to promote rural and urban violence in Colombia.
During the 1961-65 period, the MOEC, FUAR, ELN,
and JMRL were the principal recipients of Cuban aid
which was dispensed in a sporadic, poorly planned, and
largely ineffective manner. Direct cash grants probably
totaled less than $250,000 but political and guerrilla
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training, propaganda subsidies, and travel for members
of these organizations probably cost Cuba several times
that amount. In addition to tangible forms of aid, all
of these groups were the beneficiaries of stimulation
and guidance from Cuba; and sooner or later, all of them,
with the possible exception of the ELN, fell out with
the PCC over the latter's program of mass struggle.
The PCC was well aware of Cuban relations with the
leftist groups in Colombia. Castro's cash grants to the
FUAR, for example, were public secrets in Colombia, only
the specific sums being in doubt. The PCC had good
reason to resent this Cuban meddling deeply. As
previously noted, Castro's aid went in many cases to
men who had been expelled from the party. In addition,
the PCC feared the government might charge it with com-
plicity in the subversive activities of these Cuban-sup-
ported organizations and suspend its legal status.
Nevertheless, the PCC's public position toward
Cuba, as expressed in party statements and propaganda,
was invariably eulogistic after 1959. The Communist
press in Colombia gave extensive coverage "in defense of"
the Cuban revolution and government, called for solidarity
with Havana against the "imperialists," praised Castro's
achievement as an example in the construction of social-
ism, and even acknowledged that Cuban experience had
been incorporated into the tactics of the "self-defense"
guerrilla organizations in Colombia. The party probably
spoke with greater sincerity in its repeated endorsements
of the decisions taken at the Havana Conference, at
which the Cubans agreed to curb their scattered sub-
versive efforts in Latin America and coordinate their
activities through orthodox Communist channels. The PCC
gave similar unqualified approval to the Havana Tri-
Continent Congress in early 1966 which called for active
"solidarity" with Latin American revolutionary movements.
Despite such public praise, there nevertheless is
reason to believe that the PCC was sharply critical and
resentful of Castro's "extracurricular" subversive
antics in Colombia. Top PCC leaders in early 1964,
when discussing the problems arising from the ultra-
leftist groups which followed the "Cuban and Chinese
lines," reportedly stated that the "Guevara faction"
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in Cuba openly backed revolution in Latin America
through groups other than the Communist parties. Pedro
Abella of the MOEC and Luis Villar Borda of the JMRL,
both ex-Communists, were pointed up as examples of ultra-
left leaders who had used Cuban and Chinese aid to
corrupt the Colombian Communist Youth. The PCC is
reported to have sent a letter of protest on Abella's
activities in Cuba and to have received a reply from the
Cuban Communist Party promising appropriate action. At
about the same time, the PCC--when answering a circular
from the Brazilian Communists inquiring about attitudes
on holding a Latin American Communist conference to dis-
cuss the Sino-Soviet dispute--stated that it approved
such a meeting but not in Cuba. The PCC pointed out that
participants in any meeting in Havana would be restricted
in their discussion of "certain actions of Cuba" against
other parties in the hemisphere.
The PCC had learned, apparently just before
sending this letter to the Brazilian comrades, that
Che Guevara had been disparaging its position and
policies. In a meeting with a Colombian Communist
delegation in Havana, also attended by ex-Communist
Luis Villar Borda, Guevara reportedly had insisted
that conditions were ripe for revolution in Latin
America. He noted, however, that in many countries, in-
cluding Colombia, the Communist Party was a hindrance
to such a program; and he added that the PCC would lose
popular support if it continued to act and think in a
"passive" manner.
After the Havana Conference of Latin American
parties, the Cuban regime apparently altered its sub-
versive policies toward Colombia and conformed to its
agreement to work through orthodox channels. The Cuban-
financed Simacota incident which occurred in January
1965 seems to be an exception. It was probably too
well advanced to be stopped by the Cuban regime. Mean-
while, the ultraleftist Colombian leaders are believed
to have lost their Cuban subsidies and other support.
The Colombian Communists and the Cuban leaders also
probably reconciled some of their differences on armed
struggle in Colombia and discussed a coordinated approach
to this facet of the PCC program at the Tri-Continent
Congress in Havana early in 1966.
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There is some evidence that the rapprochement was
based, at least in part, on the PCC's greater willingness
to support armed action in Colombia beginning possibly
in late 1965. The Cuban Government has not abandoned
its preference for the lucha armada in Colombia. In
his anniversary address on 26 July 1966, Castro praised
the Colombian guerrilla movement and indirectly berated
the PCC leadership and its policies.
The extensive Cuban propaganda coverage on Colombia
is almost entirely devoted to the Communist-influenced
guerrilla bands and their activities. For example,
Havana radio disseminated the decisions of the "Second
Conference of the Southern Guerrilla Bloc," which was
held "somewhere in the forest" in the spring of 1965.
For its part, the PCC has faithfully carried out
the barqain reached at Havana in 1964, which required
that the Latin American parties give ample expression of
"solidarity" with the Cuban regime. However, solidarity
is probably still defined by the party as it was when
Secretary General Vieira wrote, in an article in
Problems of Peace and Socialism in 1963,
Our solidarity with Cuba can best be, shown
by propaganda and explanation and carrying
out extensive work among the masses to
explain the results of the Cuban revolution.
PCC-Soviet Relations and the Sino-Soviet Dispute
The PCC has traditionally displayed an unconditional
adherence to Moscow; hence, its early endorsement of
the Soviet position in the dispute with China merely
reflected historical consistency. The Colombian party's
response included periodic homage to the Declarations
of Moscow in 1957 and 1960, recognition of the CPSU as
the "vanguard of the Communist and working class move-
ment," and ample condemnation of the "divisionist
Chinese leaders." The story is accurately and succinctly
outlined in a TASS dispatch in early 1966, describing an
interview between CPSU Central Committee Secretary Suslov
and Colombian Secretary General Vieira: "Once again
the complete unity of views of the CPSU and the PCC was
affirmed on the problems examined."
v Forei n Lissem
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Vieira has long been regarded by the Kremlin as
one of the most trustworthy of the Latin American
Communist leaders. He has attended almost all CPSU
congresses and other key international Communist meetings
over the past several years, including the Havana meeting
of Latin American Communist parties in late 1964 and the
subsequent gathering in Moscow. He has made other
special trips to the Soviet capital, presumably to coor-
dinate PCC policy. For example, he was reportedly there
in August 1964 at the time when the party had split
and the pro-Chinese elements were organizing the
PCC-ML. Other PCC leaders, such as the late Filiberto
Barrero and Jose Cardona Hoyos, have also been held in
high regard by the Kremlin.
In the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Colombian party held
firmly to the Soviet line in contrast to the evasive
"neutralism" of the generally pro-Soviet party in Vene-
zuela. The PCC gave unqualified and regular praise to
the CPSU as the vanguard of the international movement,
the savior of world peace, the defender of peaceful co-
existence, and the genuine fount of Marxism-Leninism.
It just as consistently upbraided the "Chinese leaders"
with such epithets as divisionists, schismatics, tools
playing into the hands of the imperialist camp, ex-
porters of artificial revolution, and Maoist deifiers.
The PCC's formal commitment to the CPSU side came
at the 9th Congress in 1961 and was reiterated at the
10th Congress in early 1.966. Similar resolutions re-
affirming this position were adopted at various inter-
vening plenums of the central committee. In addition,
the party followed the Soviet lead at international
meetings, such as those held in Moscow in 1957 and 1960
and at the East German Party Congress in Berlin in 1963.
In return for the PCC's stand on the Sino-Soviet
dispute, the CPSU has backed the PCC in such propa-
ganda media as TASS, Novosti, Radio Moscow, Pravda,
and Izvestia. Ample space has also been allotted to the
Colombian party in Problems of Peace and Socialism.
Vieira's speech at the 23rd CPSU Congress of March
and April 1966 was well publicized. At that time, he
lauded the CPSU as the builder of socialism and peace-
ful coexistence and the defender of "world peace." He
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then outlined the decisions of the 10th PCC Congress
indicated that "a new and original revolutionary" path
was opening up in Colombia, based on the use of all
forms and methods of struggle of the masses, among
them armed struggle. But he admitted that the struggle
would be "long and arduous" and that the PCC "cannot
conquer a still strong and cruel enemy with mere ultra-
revolutionary phrases." Acknowledging the CPSU as
"the vanguard detachment of the international movement,"
and "the glorious Cuban revolution as our greatest
stimulus," he then denounced "the stubborn campaigns to
downgrade the indestructible work of the Soviet power
and the schismatic maneuvers against the Communist inter-
national movement."
Relations With Peking
The militant Chinese advocacy of wars of national
liberation was an inspiration and moral comfort to the
various elements both inside and outside the PCC who
insisted on the armed struggle. After 1961 when the PCC
had unequivocally sided with Moscow in the Sino-Soviet
dispute, the party's problems with the pro-Chinese ele-
ments began to multiply, particularly when the latter
began to seek material aid and guidance from China. The
attitude of the radicals within the party is clearly
reflected in a letter to the central committee written
by Carlos Arias, a former candidate member who had been
expelled from the party in 1963 and was later a top
leader of the PCC-ML. Arias denounced the party's
arbitrary handling of
The Sino-Soviet problem which you /the
central committee] had tried to conceal
against all evidence;...the treason which you
will commit by supporting nonrevolutionaries
in the coming elections;....History will
decide who and how many are to blame for
delaying the Colombian revolution and who
scourged the revolutionaries of the PCC.
The people already know who insults the
revolution and the Chinese leaders; WF1o in-
sults the revolution and the Cuban leaders;
who refers to Venezuelan revo a onariiees as
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adventurers; and who insults the real
Colombian revolutionaries.*
Arias further noted that the central committee had not
only expelled him from the party but, in the same session,
had also "condemned Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese revolu-
tion. This is a splendid task which North American
imperialists are probably applauding."
The Chinese sought to inspire
the ultraleftist groups and the
dissident elements within the PCC
in an attempt to promote the armed
revolution in Colombia and to un-
dercut the policies and prestige
of the orthodox party. Travel of
pro-Chinese leaders to Peking was
heavy and included representatives
of the MOEC, FUAR, JMRL, and the
PCC-ML. Pedro Abella, Luis Villar
Borda, Leon Arboleda, Pedro Vas-
quez Rendon, Eduardo Aristizabal,
and Manuel Manotas Manotas were
among those who went to China dur-
ing the years 1963-65 to present
their plans `to the Chinese and to
obtain assistance and guidance.
After the PCC-ML was formed in
1964, however, the Chinese appar-
ently limited their paramilitary
training, financial aid, and other
support primarily to this organ-
ization and to the MOEC.
A leading figure in the PCC-ML, the
China's aid to its sympathiz- pro-Peking Communist splinter party.
ers in Colombia seems to have
been niggardly. Although some
of the travelers to Peking may
have received small cash grants, the one regular
source of financing has been through the NCNA agency
in Bogota. The amounts paid in salaries and for
other services to the local Communist NCNA representa-
tives are not believed to exceed $150 per month.
* Emphasis added
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Although the PCC attempted to prohibit the dissemina-
tion of Chinese propaganda in Colombia after 1963 and
expelled the pro-Chinese NCNA employees from the
party, the latter still retain their agency posi-
tions and apparently still receive the small monthly
payments. There is some ground for considering the
PCC-ML to be a poorly disciplined party, not in close
touch with Peking, since its two factions have con-
tended for control of the NCNA agency and the agency
has remained independent of both.
Peking's promises to its sympathizers in Colombia
for propaganda support, scholarships, paramilitary
training, and other assistance have probably been far
more lavish than the actual cash outlays. Peking has
disseminated sporadic propaganda in support of the PCC-
ML, branding the "orthodox" leaders "revisionists" and
endorsing the "revolutionary struggle to seize power
through a patriotic anti-imperialist popular
revolution...." The Chinese have also financed guerrilla
warfare training and "scholarship" programs, reportedly
in North Korea and Vietnam as well as in China.
The PCC response to Chinese collaboration with
its enemies has been sharp. Top central committee mem-
bers, well aware of the travels to Peking of such
"traitors" as Pedro Abella (and the purpose of such
pilgrimages), are known to have discussed in early 1964
the pressures and problems which such activities were
placing on the party. Besides trying to stop Chinese
propaganda emanating from the NCNA office in Bogota, the
PCC also attempted to stifle party discussion of the
Chinese line and of Peking's position in the Sino-So-
viet dispute. Chinese sympathizers were threatened
with expulsion.
Whether Vieira and his colleagues exaggerated
the Chinese responsibility for the PCC's internal prob-
lems is debatable, but they certainly sought to link
the pro-Chinese dissidents with the "ultraleft charla-
tans" who insisted on immediate revolution in Colombia.
Vieira wrote in 1965 that such groups had seized upon
the false and misleading Chinese position to attack the
PCC and its program.
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The PCC's general sensitivity to the effects
of the party split was illustrated by its sharp re-
sponse to a September 1964 article in El Tiem~ oo,
the leading daily of Bogota, which had described
the expulsion of leaders from the party, the splits
in regional Communist committees, and the disinte-
gration of the PCC organization. In its rebuttal
in Voz Proletaria, the party insisted that the great
majority of members had remained loyal to the ortho-
dox PCC, attacked "the methods of the Chinese lead-
ers" and charged that the principal objective of
the deviationist "ultrarevolutionaries" was to at-
tack the PCC rather than the true enemies--"the
reactionary national forces and Yankee imperialists."
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IV. ASSESSMENT
During the period under review (May 1957 -
August 1966) the PCC managed to maintain its legal
status and the unity of the old-line leaders headed
by Vieira. It kept the party organization intact
and retained the loyalty of the majority of the
rank and file membership as well as its influence
over traditional rural enclaves and the principal
pro-Communist paramilitary leaders in the country-
side. The close ties with the Soviet party were
challenged only by a few defectors.
Balanced against these accomplishments, which
were largely holding operations, are the substantial
reverses to Communist strength and potential in com-
parison to the party's outlook as late as 1962. The
program failed to prevent an internal split or to
satisfy the demands of the radical leftist groups
who were inclined to pursue the armed struggle.
During this period, foreign and domestic in-
fluences on the party were intertwined and, of course,
reacted on each other. No firm conclusions are pos-
sible about their relative weights. Nevertheless,
the developments rehearsed in this paper do suggest
certain very tentative generalizations on how these
influences have operated in the case of the Colombian
party.
The PCC was run throughout this period by an old
guard leadership whose own inclinations--particularly
on the key issue of the armed struggle--seem to have
accorded fairly well with the Moscow line; if Moscow
had favored intensifying the armed struggle, there
might have been some test of their allegiance. The
party's formal split in 1964 over the Sino-Soviet
dispute of course reflected its previous support of
Moscow's side in international Communist meetings,
as contrasted with the "neutralist" position taken
by the Venezuelan Communist party; but it also prob-
ably reflected somewhat less flexibility in the PCC
leadership at dealing with party dissension. The PCV,
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plagued with more serious internal conflict over the
armed struggle issue, did stay together through 1965.
The Cuban influence on the PCC was indirect and
in one sense more a domestic influence than a for-
eign one, in that it had a strong appeal (though, as
time went on, a diminishing one) to the radical leftist
opinion in Colombia, and Havana subsidized to some ex-
tent the splinter groups which competed with the PCC
for leftist support. This situation was reflected in
the PCC's attitude toward the Castro regime. The PCC
split in 1964 came largely over the issue of the armed
struggle, of which Fidel Castro was the hemisphere's
leading exponent, but it was Peking that was publicly
blamed by the PCC leadership; Cuba, both on that oc-
casion and subsequently, was praised. Castro's known
alignment with Moscow would of course have made it
embarrassing for the PCC to be publicly critical of
him, but his Moscow tie did not prevent the PCC from
being critical of his regime in a 1964 communication
to Brazilian Communists.
The extent of Peking's actual influence in Co-
lombian Communist circles has been very small, despite
the readiness of the proponents of the armed struggle
to invoke Chinese ideological support.
Domestic, rather than foreign, factors seem to
have been mainly responsible for the principal 1966
development in PCC policy: a reappraisal of party
policy on the lucha armada in an apparent effort to
recapture the leadership of the extreme left through
more tangible support and guidance for the guerrilla
forces. The propaganda facet of this modified policy
appeared in the resolutions of the 10th Party Con-
gress, which recognized that the armed struggle was
the "principal form" in certain local areas and that
guerrilla warfare had reached a "new stage" of de-
velopment. It is similarly reflected in the PCC's
formation in 1966 of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed
Forces (FARO), a "general staff" for coordinating rural
Communist subversion; the FARC has issued an open in-
vitation to membership for all leftist guerrilla ele-
ments, active or in process of being organized. The
reported Communist liaison with the ELN and the favor-
able Communist attitude toward this organization's
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guerrilla activity also suggest increased emphasis by
the PCC on this aspect of its program. In addition,
there is evidence of closer cooperation between the
PCC and the Cuban regime since the Havana Conference
in late 1964 and particularly since the Tri-Continent
Congress in early 1966, as partly revealed in Cuban
and Colombian propaganda and in the appointment of
Central Committee member Manual Cepeda Vargas as
permanent PCC representative in Havana.
The changes of early 1966 probably do not add
up to a basic shift in the PCC's long adherence to
the primacy of the via Pacifica, but they do suggest
a greater sensitivity to domestic pressures and
possibly some increased tactical flexibility.
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ANNEX A
THE COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCC)
AND THE VENEZUELAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCV):
A COMPARISON OF EXPERIENCES SINCE 1958
I. DOMESTIC CONDITIONS
AND INFLUENCES
Legal status Party outlawed, 1954-57;
regained legal status
after ouster of dictator
Rojas Pinilla, May 1957;
retained legal status
throughout period
Public and polit- Little change from pre-
ical status vious period; limited
after overthrow national influence; go-
of dictator litical atmosphere con-
servative compared to
Venezuela; strong poten-
tial opportunity through
cooperation with dissi-
dent Liberal faction,
MRL, and other leftist
groups
Outlawed 1950-58;
regained legal status
after ouster of dictator
Perez Jimenez, Jan-
uary 1958; the gov-
ernment suspended
political activity
of party and princi-
pal ally, Movement of
the Revolutionary
Left (MIR) , 1962.
Highly favorable;
party had consider-
able public credit
for contributing to
ouster of Perez
Jimenez; strong left-
ist orientation of
all political groups;
united front in labor
movement; potential
close allies for PCV
in factions of Demo-
cratic Action Party
(AD) and Democratic
Republican Union (URD)
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Party program Consistently emphasized Via pacifica until
primacy of via pacifica; 1662, with increasing
rejected lucha armada as use of violence;
principal form for entire lucha armada became
country; certain modifi- principal rm after
cations to defend pro- 1962; initial empha-
Communist guerrilla sis on urban violence;
forces after 1963, emphasis
on the "prolonged
struggle" through
guerrilla warfare
Program impact on Central committee re- Serious divisions
top leadership tained close-knit over lucha armada;
unity in support of via leaders shiftedin
pacifica attitude over the pe-
riod, but no overt
split; MIR ally split
Program results PCC split into pro-
Soviet and pro-Chinese
organizations in 1964;
running battle with
other radical groups
favoring lucha armada;
split in youth auxiliary
Informal cooperation
with MRL for political
and electoral action;
MRL factionalism re-
duced effectiveness of
front tactic after 1962
Principal leaders im-
prisoned; party and
MIR ally seriously
divided internally
and between them-
selves; party polit-
ical assets sharply
depleted; national
organization dis-
rupted.
Marxist, pro-Castro
MIR; pro-Castro ele-
ments of URD; sym-
pathy or "solidar-
ity" from other left-
ist elements.
Potential for Relatively strong; party
conducting had long experience with
guerrilla war rural violence and guer-
rilla warfare, enclaves
of rural support, and
varying control over
several active guerrilla
leaders.
Negligible; peasant
support limited; no
trained leaders in
guerrilla warfare and
no experience with
this form of subver-
sion
A-2
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II. INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES
Traditional
orientation
Position on
Sino-Soviet
dispute
Cuban impact
Party relations
and attitudes
toward Cuba
Chinese
influence
Unconditionally pro-
Soviet from the outset;
condemnation of Peking
Disrupted PCC relations
with the leftist groups
favoring the lucha
armada; contributed to
dissension in the MRL
Publicly eulogistic;
privately resentful and
critical
Ineffectual shotgun
approach to radical
leftists favoring
guerrilla warfare and
violence; a challenge
to the PCC program of
via pacifica; Cuban
propaganda in part a
criticism of party
leaders
Contributed to party
split into pro-Soviet
and pro-Chinese organi-
zations in 1964; party
blamed Chinese for its
troubles with the ultra-
left
Sought to avoid the
issue under guise of
neutralism; followed
Cuban stand; refused
to criticize the Chi-
nese
Strong, dominant, and
direct; equally strong
on MIR and other al-
lies; probably largely
determined the adop-
tion of the lucha
armada
Close; party sensitive
to Cuban views and
guidance
Substantial training,
propaganda, and other
aid; assistance
granted PCV allies
provoked no resent-
ment in party
Limited; PCV lucha
armada program coin-
cided--with Peking
revolutionary line,
but Cuban example
predominant
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Chinese aid Limited financial and
training assistance to
PCC-ML and to ultra-
left leaders; Colombians
often took initiative in
seeking aid from Peking
Party relations Hostile
with Peking
Party relations Party completely servile
with Moscow to Moscow throughout
period; reciprocal ap-
proval from CPSU
PCC-PCV relations Propaganda support for
the PCV lucha armada
and other difficulttiies;
party concerned by the
Venezuelan program;
occasional liaison; some
operational assistance
Considerable soli-
darity and propaganda
support; negligible
financial assistance;
some training and
guidance
Friendly; occasional
liaison
Strained by Sino-
Soviet dispute;
steadily improving
since Khrushchev's
political demise in
1964 and Havana Con-
ference of Latin
American parties
Party absorbed in
its own problems and
hence little coopera-
tion with PCC; bor-
rowed from Colombian
"self-defense" theory
to justify guerrilla
warfare; radical MIR
elements conducted
liaison with pro-Chi-
nese faction and
other lucha armada
leftists in Colombia
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