THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001800010024-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: April 4, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Rese 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79T00826A00010g4 S
UN S
ON
25X1 F
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
//I
ecret
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
ARMY review(s) completed.
Top Secret
110
4 April 1967
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 App oved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001800010 24-0 25X1
Information as of 1600
4 April 1967
captured documents continue to reflect
Communist plans for offensive action in northern Quang
Tri Province.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Communists continue active south of the DMZ in northern-
most Quang Tri Province (Paras. 1-4).
III. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
There are increasing indications that Premier Ky and
Chief of State Thieu will be left to decide between
themselves who will be the military presidential can-
didate (Paras. 1-3).
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam: There
are tenuous indications that the North Vietnamese
"Mid-65" Division may be moving to South Vietnam
(Paras. 1-2).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There
is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: There is
nothing of significance to report.
ANNEX: Revolutionary Development in Quang Tri Province
Communist pressure against allied forces and
government organizations in Quang Tri Province has in-
tensified since the beginning of 1967. The Communist
effort to counter Revolutionary Development is pri-
marily military and lacks some of the propagandizing
that has accompanied the enemy's anti-RD program in
other areas of South Vietnam. Despite Communist
harassment, residents of some hamlets are identifying
with RD teams and participating in RD programs.
25X1
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 AW%k
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 App
1. Large Communist forces are continuing
to pursue a strategy of maneuver and attrition
against US Marine and ARVN units operating near
the DMZ in South Vietnam's northernmost province
of Quang Tri.
4. Information derived from documents cap-
tured in late February following an engagement
between US and North Vietnamese Army forces near
Khe Sanh reveals possible future enemy strategy
in the northern provinces. The documents, ap-
parently notes taken during Communist political
indoctrination lectures, refer to enemy plans
to mount a large-scale operation designed to "tie
down 15 battalions of allied forces." By forc-
ing the allies to spread their forces thin, the
enemy would hope to be able to attack smaller
units successfully.
4 April 1967
Ap
 App
II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
he congress would prefer not to have to make
t e decision for the military presidential candidacy
between Premier Ky and Chief of State Thieu. Most
of the approximately 45 members of the congress be-
lieve the two contenders themselves should come to
an amicable understanding; the candidate would then
be supported by the other man and by the congress as
a whole. It appears that the military members of
the Directorate would also prefer such a solution.
2. If the process of settling on a military
presidential candidate is informally left up to the
two men without the intervention of the Directorate
or the congress, it would appear that Ky has a
distinct advantage over Thieu. Thieu is naturally
reticent and reportedly wary of appearing to abuse
his present high position for his own political
advantage. Ky, on the other hand, has acquired a
definite proclivity for public life, projecting his
image as a socially conscious domestic leader when-
ever possible. Ky has admitted on several occasions
that he wants the job, while Trieu characterizes
himself as reluctant to assume the rigors of public
life, unless it is clearly the will of the military
establishment to draft him.
3. Ky has the added advantage of having activ-
ist' supporters:. General Loan, for example, who
wields considerable influence over election campaign-
ing. Ky's daily contacts as premier are more often
outside the military establishment than are Thieu's.
It is probably Ky's intention to try to develop a
broad base of public support in hopes of convincing
Thieu that Ky has a greater vote-getting potential.
4 April 1967
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LAOS PANHANDLE
Muong
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232
P. Song
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. Reports from MACV suggest that a large
enemy force is moving from North Vietnam via the
western part of the Demilitarized Zone to Laos,
then south on trails to the junction of Routes 9
and 92 into Base Area 606, and then into the A Shau
Valley in South Vietnam via Route 922.
Vehicle traffic, possibly in support
o is move, has been reported along Route 922 in
recent days as far as A Luoi, some 15 miles inside
South Vietnam.
2. There have been recurring reports of North
Vietnamese units using Base Area 606 in recent
weeks. In early March, for example, a friendly
guerrilla team in this area reported the presence
of an estimated enemy regimental-size force near
the Laos/South Vietnam border. Route 922 has only
recently been extended into South Vietnam and its
use for the infiltration of either men or supplies
has been expected.
4 April 1967
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 Apprc
ANNEX
Revolutionary Development in Quang Tri Province
1. Communist pressure against allied military
forces, government administrative centers, and Rev-
olutionary Development (RD) teams in northernmost Quang
Tri Province has intensified since the beginning of
1967 as part of a general military offensive involv-
ing primarily North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units.
The Communist effort to counter Revolutionary Devel-
opment in Quang Tri is primarily a military one, and
lacks some of the political propagandizing which has
gone hand in hand with the enemy's anti-RD program
in other areas of South Vietnam such as the delta.
To prevent the government from extending its control
into the Quang Tri countryside, NVA elements have
been conducting forays against hamlets and villages
where the RD-teams have been operating.
2. In the Communist. command structure, Quang
Tri Province, along with adjacent Thua Thien Province,
is known as the Tri Thien Special Region, and
may be ad-
ministered as a part ot or Vietnam s Military
Region IV. The principal NVA forces in the Demil-
itarized Zone (DMZ) - Quang Tri Province area at
present are the 324B Division, with three sub-
ordinate regiments, and at least one regiment of
the 341st Division. These units appear to cross
back and forth across the border. In addition, one
independent regiment and three to five separate
battalions normally operate in Quang Tri and Thua
Thien provinces. The total strength of these forces
is approximately 10,300. The strength of the Quang
Tri local forces, irregulars, and political cadre
is estimated to be about 5,000.
3. To provide security for the approximately
270,000 people in Quang Tri Province, the govern-
ment has some 6,400 Regional Forces (RF), Popular
Forces (PF), National Police, and Civilian Irregu-
lar Defense Forces (CIDG). Two regiments of the
ARVN 1st Division are also located in the province.
4 April 1967
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YI ETNAM
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 App
Under the RD plan, the regiments are to provide
the shield behind which most of the provincial
forces, except for the CIDG, are to operate. In
western Quang Tri, the Lang Vei Special Forces camp
with its CIDG and PF defenders serves as the capital
of Huong Hoa District and is responsible for Viet-
nam-Laos border surveillance. Elements of the US
3rd Marine Division have been operating continually
in the DMZ - Quang Tri area since mid-1966 to pre-
vent enemy infiltration across the DMZ and to de-
stroy enemy troop and logistical concentrations in
the area.
4. Although no part of Quang Tri Province is
a National Priority Area for RD, the entire coastal
plain is classified as a priority area for offensive
military operations. In 1967, the RD effort is to
be concentrated in Mai Linh District which surrounds
Quang Tri city--the provincial capital, and in Trieu
Phong District bordering Mai Linh on the north. Mil-
itary sweeps, a major RD reorganization, and the Tet
celebration delayed the start of the RD teams' work
in the 1967 priority area until after the Tet (lunar
new year) holidays in February.
5. As of 1 March, there were 15 Vietnamese RD
teams (754 workers) and four montagnard RD teams (222
workers) operating in the province. While the Viet-
namese RD teams will concentrate in the priority RD
area, the montagnard RD teams will presumably work in
the vicinity of the Lang Vei Special Forces camp in
the highland district of Huong Hoa or in montagnard
refugee camps along the coast.
6. The reaction of the RD teams to increased
enemy military pressures against them has, so far,
been satisfactory. Only one report has been received
of an RD team's abandoning its activities without
attempting to defend itself; this incident occurred
on 17 March when the team faced the prospect of en-
gaging an NVA battalion. In several other instances
RD teams, often paired with PF, have defended them-
selves against enemy attacks.
7. In spite of this satisfactory performance,
however, the stepped up pace of enemy activity ap-
pears to have resulted in a lowering of morale among
RD workers. Figures on attrition for February show
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 Approv
that, while only two workers were killed and seven
captured, three workers resigned and 58 deserted.
All of the deserters appear to have been from Viet-
namese teams, making their desertion rate for the
month about seven percent. Since RD workers were
not allowed any time off for the lunar new year,
a number of these deserters may have merely decided
to go home for the holidays.
8. Despite Communist harassment, there have
been indications that residents of some hamlets are
identifying with the RD teams and participating in
RD programs. In one hamlet, residents informed the
team of the presence of an armed NVA soldier who, as
a result, was captured by the team. In another ham-
let, 78 persons are being trained by the RD team as
hamlet defense personnel, under a recent government
directive authorizing the teams to establish a
"People's Self Defense Force." The Quang Tri Province
chief has agreed to provide some weapons to the de-
fense force upon the completion of its training. In
this same hamlet, a female member of the RD team
has organized and is teaching a kindergarten class
for 50 of the hamlet youngsters.
9. In Quang Tri Province, two ARVN battalions
are conducting operations in direct support of RD.
The mission of the battalions is to sweep the RD
target areas, cordon them off, and search for re-
maining guerrillas and members of the Communist
infrastructure. The battalions are still under the
control of their parent regiment, but the regimental
commander has been designated Deputy Sector (Province)
Commander for RD, a position which engages him in
provincial RD affairs and makes him responsive to
the Province Chief. In addition, the ARVN units have
increased their civic action capability by forming
civic action teams at both the sector (province) and
division levels. The Regional Forces and Popular
Forces have reportedly been assisting local self-
help programs.
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10, In general, the National Police are limited
to the main towns and are not yet effective in the
rural areas. Because of the large NVA military strength
in the province, the Police Field Forces are being
used to support normal police activities not associated
with the RD plan.
11. The Vietnamese Information Service and the
provincial technical staff are the government agencies
performing least satisfactorily in support of RD in
Quang Tri, as well as on a nationwide basis. Both
groups appear to be lacking in motivation and initia-
tive, and their activities are thus unimpressive.
12. The provincial RD Council, newly reorganized,
is not yet functioning to the degree anticipated.
This is in part due to the fact that the caliber of
provincial officials, with some exceptions, is rated
as low. Their effectiveness has been further hampered
by political jousting between various provincial of-
ficials owing allegiance either to the Revolutionary
Dai Viet Party (RDVP) or the Vietnamese Nationalist
Party (VNQDD). Both parties appear to view the RD
teams as an instrument for gaining local influence,
particularly since the teams play a role of organizing
village and hamlet elections. The RDVP, the stronger
and better organized party in Quang Tri, reportedly
gained some influence over the earlier People's Action
Teams (PATs) in the province, but the extent of its
influence over the present RD effort is not known.
13. The first monthly survey made in accordance
with the new Hamlet Evaluation System (HES)--a uni-
lateral US field assessment of progress in hamlet
development and population security--was completed
on 20 February. Although a trial period is neces-
sary before the statistics compiled can be consid-
ered as having some validity, the initial results
of the evaluation in Quang Tri Province suggest that
too many hamlets have been placed in the "consoli-
dation" category (C) and should be rated as "under
construction" (Category D) or "contested" (E).
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14. Following are the initial statistics:
Number
of
Category Hamlet Population Hamlets
A Completed* Secure 0
B Developing Secure 15
C Under Consolidation Under Securing 142
D `Under Construction Under Securing 121
C mo p1eted hamlets under an 11-point criteria are
the Ap Doi Moi ("Real New Life Hamlets"), AA Binh Dinh
(Pacification Hamlets), and Ap Cung Co (Consolidation
Hamlets). The Ap Tan Sinh (New Life Hamlets), under
the old six-point criteria, are also included in the
completed category.
4 April 1967
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Top Secret
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