ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTHERN DELTA OF SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001800010065-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 65
• Publication Date: April 19, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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800010065-
fidential
Con
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Assessment of the Situation
in the Southern Delta of South Vietnam
RETURN TO RECORDS CENTER
AF TER U54
JOB` ~0~
Confidential
23
19 April 1967
No. 0632/67
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re:e-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
EXCLUDED FUOM AUTOMATIC
nO N(I ADLNC AM)
UF(1 AY !Ell ATION
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 . CONFIDENTIAL
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
19 April 1967
Assessment of the Situation
in the Southern Delta of South Vietnam
Summary
Recent US intelligence assessments from the
southern Mekong Delta provinces conclude generally
that the Viet Cong have lost their momentum in this
area and are now conducting what is essentially a
"holding operation." At the same time, these reports
warn that there has been little positive progress
on the government side. Despite some ambitious
plans for Revolutionary Development, the situation
in the southern delta at present appears to be vir-
tually stalemated.
NOTE: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA's
Office of Current Intelligence.
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NORTH \p6rjg Hai
VIETNAM
Demilitarized Zone
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THAILAND
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SOUTH VIETNAM
25 50 75 100Mdes
25 50 75- H,lorneters
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Viet Cong Status
1. The Communist loss of momentum in the south-
ern delta provinces--including An Giang, An Xuyen,
Ba Xuyen, Bac Lieu, Chau Doc, Chuong Thien, Kien
Giang and Phong Dinh--has been caused. to a consid-
erable extent by the presence of US and other allied
forces north of Saigon during the past year and a
half (see map). To try to "balance" and counter this
presence, Viet Cong troops, including guerrillas,
were drawn out of the delta, causing a decline in
their strength in the far south. Another major factor
contributing to the present static nature of the war
in the delta is the vulnerability of the Communists
in this area to US air operations. The open ter-
rain, which characterizes most of the delta, makes
it difficult to conceal large conventional combat
units. Viet Cong attacks of battalion size and
larger declined sharply after US tactical jet aircraft
were introduced in early 1965. In this context,
tactical air support has given ARVN forces in the
delta a great advantage in engagements with the enemy.
2. Consequently, the Viet Cong have apparently
been forced to maintain only a low tempo of operations
in the southern delta provinces. They have launched
a few company- and battalion-size attacks in recent
months, and have mounted mortar attacks against
government outposts and several district towns.
Current tactics for the most part, however, con-
sist of such harassments as sniping, mining of roads,
and setting booby traps. According to the various
provincial assessments, these actions have been suf-
ficient to keep the populace well aware of the VC
presence and to prevent any significant government
gains.
3. on the government side, the tempo of opera-
tions has been correspondingly low. Many South Viet-
namese Government officials in the lower delta are
considered by US observers apathetic, inefficient,
and corrupt. The Revolutionary Development program
in most of these provinces has started poorly, and
there has been little genuine interest in the pres-
ent round of village elections, except on the part
of those officials ordered to be concerned.
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4. In nearly all of the southern delta
provinces, US officials characterize the pre-
vailing attitude among the general population
as one of political apathy, with the primary de-
sire being for personal physical security. This
frame of mind has made it difficult for GVN offi-
cials to mobilize the people for effective action.
The average peasant exhibits respect for the gov-
ernment only when the South Vietnamese Army in-
creases its operations and shows force in an area.
5. In many instances, GVN provincial of-
ficials apparently tolerate'known Communist ele-
ments often because VC economic activities dove-
tail with their own. This is particularly apparent
in Chau Doc Province where, according to a US
provincial representative, a great deal of revenue
comes from the smuggling trade to and from Cam-
bodia, and where both GVN and Viet Cong officials
are heavily involved in the profits from this
trade.
6. US sources report that, in many parts of
the lower delta, there appears to be tacit agree-
ment between the South Vietnamese Government and
the Viet Cong to maintain the status quo. Both the
ARVN and the Viet Cong have maintained "safe" areas
for many years and neither side has shown a strong
desire to disturb this arrangement in recent months.
7. In the southern delta, the main VC strong-
hold is the U Minh Forest complex in Kien Giang and
An Xuyen provinces. Another important base is in
the Co To mountain region near 0 Lam village in
Chau Doc Province. The U Minh complex has remained
essentially untouched since the early 1950s despite
sporadic ARVN forays into the area. There is no
permanent GVN presence in 0 Lam village, one of the
richest rice-producing and cattle-raising areas of
Chau Doc Province. GVN forces rarely dare to enter
this area.
8. A change in the status quo did occur re-
cently when, after many weeks of vacillation, ARVN
troops moved into the Hon Chong peninsula in Kien
Giang Province. This was not accomplished without
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rumors of a Viet Cong/GVN "accommodation." This
rich and productive area had formerly been under
firm Communist control. Now the Communist control
is not overt, but US intelligence officers think it
is quite probable that peasants in areas such as
this still pay taxes to the clandestine Viet Cong
infrastructure. .
Prospects
9. Many of the reporting officers comment that
the Viet Cong are expecting a sizable number of US
troops to enter the delta and that some reactions
are already evident. In several areas the Co-nunists
are building up their main force battalions, suggest-
ing an intention to meet the US forces head on.
At the same time, they are reportedly storing caches
of food and arms in various locations to support
an increased emphasis on guerrilla activity.
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