THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001800010074-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 74
• Publication Date: April 21, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved F2elease 2006/02/07: CIA-RDP79T00A001>~aQ,11et
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
Top Secret
110
21 April 1967
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Information as of 1600
21 April 1967
Military activities in South Vietnam remained
at a low ebb throughout the past 24 hours.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Communist units continue to evade allied forces of
Operation JUNCTION CITY in northern Tay Ninh Province
(Paras. 1-3). The harassment of allied shipping to
Saigon has been increasing and is the result of an
order to Group 10, a Viet Co unit in the Rung Sat
Special Region (Paras. 4-7).
I lAttacks against allied airfields in the Vie
Cong MR V will be increased, according to
a recent rallier (Paras. 11-12).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Constituent Assembly deliberations on the electoral
laws are scheduled to begin next week (Paras. 1-2).
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
There is nothing of significance to report.
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: Hanoi
has rejected Secretary of State Rusk's proposal for
enlarging the DMZ (Para. 1).
21 April 1967
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Enemy military forces normally associated
with the Communist War Zone "C" are continuing eva-
sive tactics against the sweeps being conducted by
allied troops of the four-battalion Operation JUNC-
Harassment of Allied Shipping Between Saigon and
the Sea
4. A captured Viet Cong document suggests that
the recent upsurge in Communist harassment of allied
shipping in the Long Tau River, a major shipping
channel, which leads to Saigon from Vung Tau on the
South China Sea, has been the direct result of an
order issued to Group 10--the Viet Cong Rung Sat
Special Region located in Quang Xuyen and Can Gio
districts of Gia Dinh Province.
21 April 1967
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5. The latest of the recent series. of attacks
came early on 20 April when a US Navy LST received
five rounds of 75--mm. recoilless rifle fire 14 miles
southeast of Saigon on the Long Tau River. Almost
simultaneously, a South Vietnamese landing craft and
four US minesweepers nearby received automatic weapons
fire, and one minesweeper was hit. Since late 1966 US,
South Vietnamese, and British ships have frequently
been the targets of Communist attacks from concealed
locations along the river bank. Allied minesweepers,
attempting to keep the channel open, have also been
subjected to increased enemy harassment.
6. According to the captured document, which is
apparently a transcript of a speech delivered by the
Viet Cong Group 10 commander on 31 January 1967, the
group was ordered in October to launch a concerted
campaign to harass all shipping channels in its area
of operations and to concentrate particularly on the
Long Tau River "since this was the allies' only water
route from Vung Tau to Saigon." The document also
revealed that the shelling of the National Day Parade
in Saigon on 1 November 1966 was the work of a unit
subordinate to Group 10.
7. A second document, issued by Group 10 on
1 January 1967, contained an official communiqu6
addressed to civilians in the area warning.them that
all "ships, ferry boats, lighters, and passenger car-
riers" traveling the Long Tau and other rivers in the
Rung Sat area "without proper authorization from the
National Liberation Front" would be destroyed.
21 April 1967
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Enemy Plans for Increased Aggressiveness Against US Air
Bases
11. The headquarters of the Viet Cong Military Re-
gion V (MR r; has ordered that more ate directe
against allied air bases, according to
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12. The directive to strike at air bases was pur-
portedly issued because allied air strikes on Communist
positions and installations have had the greatest effect
in lowering morale of the enemy troops. 25X1
successful attacks against 0S installations
demonstrate the vulnerability of allied rear areas and
thus boost Viet Cong morale and prestige. Another valid
explanation for the planned a ressiveness against this
type of target uis that it is possible
for small sapper units to cause maximum damage with
minimum casualties, logistics, and planning.
21 April 1967
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Constituent Assembly activity this week
was limited to the election of the remaining new
officers to chair the committees which will oversee
the electoral process and other special assembly
tasks. Following formation of the committees, the
assembly recessed for a week to allow research time.
2. The government has requested that the
assembly complete the electoral laws by the end of
April, but some deputies reportedly think-May is
probably more realistic.
21 April 1967
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
21 April 1967
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Hanoi's expected negative response to
Secretary of State Rusk's recent proposal for the
creation of an additional ten-mile-wide neutral
area on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)
came in a routinely worded Foreign Ministry
statement broadcast on 21 April. The statement
underscored that the DRV had "always" and "cor-
rectly" implemented the 1954 Geneva agreements
including the statute on the DMZ and alleged that
Secretary Rusk's proposal was a "trick" aimed at
"camouflaging the US war escalation and violation
of the whole of the 1954 Geneva agreements."
Moreover, the statement went on to list what it
alleged were repeated US violations of the neutral
character of the DMZ, and to demand that the
Communist terms for a settlement of the conflict
be accepted by the US.
21 April 1967
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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