THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00826A001900010017-7
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
16
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 18, 2003
Sequence Number:
17
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 26, 1967
Content Type:
MEMO
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CIA-RDP79T00826A001900010017-7.pdf | 724.34 KB |
Body:
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MEMORANDUM
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
The Situation in Vietnam
Top Secret
111
26 April 1967
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Information 1600
26 April 1967
HIGHLIGHTS
Premier Ky is apparently confident that his
prospects for the presidential nomination are in-
creasing. Several sharp clashes between US and
Communist forces in I Corps occurred on 25-26 April,
and on 26 April the US lost four planes over North
Vietnam for the third consecutive day.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Several sharp clashes were reported between US and
Communist forces in northern I Corps on 25-26 April
(Paras. 1-4). Recent intelligence suggests Communist
main force units may be prepared to begin extensive
offensive operations in the strate is central 'hit-f
lands (Paras. 5-9). -
suggests that the Com spring campaign" may
have been interrupted because of a shortage of am-
munition (Paras. 10-11). The weekly review of South
Vietnam battle statistics (Para.. '_2).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Premier Ky s plans for con ucting a press entia
campaign apparently are going forward as his confi-
dence in his own prospects increases (Paras. 1-3).
Labor pressure is developing in Saigon for a 40-per-
cent increase in wages to offset the effects of
inflation (Paras. 5-6).
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam: DRV
missile and artillery units estroye four more US
planes on 26 April for the third consecutive day
(Para. 1). Improved North Vietnamese tactics and
the fact that US planes are striking targets close
to heavily defended Hanoi and Haiphong account for
the losses (Paras. 2-3).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
26 April 1967
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V. Comunist Political Developments: There is
nothing of significance to report.
South Vietnam Battle StatiELics
1963 to week of April 1967
-Weapons and Personnel Losses
-Viet Cong Attacks and Incidents
26 April 1967
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Apprc
I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Several scattered skirmishes between US and
Communist forces have been reported in western Quang
Tri Province. Early on 25 April, an enemy force of
undetermined size attacked a US Marine truck convoy which
was transiting a narrow pass on Route 9 about seven
miles east of Khe Sanh. Supported by reinforcements
and artillery and armed helicopter fire, the marines
forced the enemy to withdraw. Five Americans were re-
ported killed and 22 wounded. Two vehicles were dam-
aged.
2. Later, in an adjacent area, one of the rein-
forcing companies encountered an estimated company-
size Communist force in well-prepared positions. Dur-
ing an ensuing three-hour battle, nine marines were
killed and eight wounded before the enemy retreated.
A nearby US command post was hit by nearly 200 rounds
of mortar fire early on 26 April, but no American casual-
ties were reported.
3. Enemy casualties in this series of encounters
have not been reported, but may be high as a result of
the heavy American firepower which forced the enemy to
withdraw in each incident.
4. Farther south in I Corps, a US Army company from
Task Force OREGON established contact on 25 April with
a large Communist force about four miles northwest of
Duc Pho in coastal Quang Ngai Province. At least 21
enemy soldiers were killed and nine weapons seized dur-
ing heavy fighting which continued through the night
of 25-26 April. Initial US casualties are listed as
two killed and 16 wounded.
26 April 1967
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7. Currently, seven US Army battalions are com-
mitted to the long-term border-surveillance campaign in
Pleiku Province presently named Operation FRANCIS MARION.
The apparent enemy strategy in the highlands is to
force the deployment of US.maneuver elements over a
wide area of Kontum and Pleiku provinces so that at-
tacks may be mounted against lightly defended US po-
sitions.
I as s a e a e Knew
o a major attack p anne or tie height of the south-
west monsoon season during June and July. According to
these plans, five NVA regiments and several separate bat-
talions would strike Plei Me Special Forces camp and at-
tempt to destroy reinforcing American troops.
9. This and other previous intelligence reports, to-
gether with the threat of impending inclement weather,
may indicate that enemy military activity will be sharply
intensified in the strategic central'highlands in the
near future. The recent deployment of US Army forces
from the highlands to the northern provinces may
further encourage the Communist planners.
26 April 1967
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NVA 2nd Division Ammunition Shortages
10. Ammunition shortages forced the North Viet-
namese Army's 2nd Division to interrupt its "spr.inq
campaian" in southern I Cor s
Iear. in March Viet Cone
Military Region V Headquarters directed the 2nd NVA
Division to draw new ammunition from depots near
Tra Bong, Quang Ngai Province, and to be ready to
resume operations by 20 April.
11. US military officers suggest that these
shortages were probably the result of Operation LIEN
KET 81 (16-21 February) near Chu Lai, Quang Tin
Province, in which South Vietnamese Army forces
killed 388 troops of the 21st NVA Regiment and the
Headquarters, 2nd NVA Division.
Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics
12. The week of 16-22 April compared with the
week of 9-15 April:
I. Viet Cong Incidents
9
-15 April 16
-2
2 April
Attacks
36
35
Battalion or larger. .
. . .
. . . 3 .
.
. .
Small Unit . . . . . .
. . .
. 33 .
.
. . 35
Harassment
248
472
Terrorism
52
55
Sabotage
20
16
Propaganda
38
21
Antiaircraft
385
258
TOTAL INCIDENTS
779
26 April 1967
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VC/NVA
9-
15 Apri
l 16-22 April
9-15 April
16-2
2 April
Killed
1,511
1,081
287
228
Wounded
-----
-----
784
499
Missing/
Captured
-----
-----
TOTALS
1,511
1,081
1,085
756
US
FREE WORLD
9-15 April
16-22 April
9-15 April
16-22 April
Killed
147
148
21
9
Wounded
1,141
1,031
91
2
Missing/
Captured
0
0
0
0
TOTALS
1,288
1,179
112
11
III. Weapons Captured
VC/NVA
GVN
April
16-22 April
9-15 April
16-
April
Individual
417
Not
151
223
Crew-Served
28
Reported
4
3
TOTALS
445
155
226
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Ky's Presidential Plans
1. Premier
Ky is beginning to eve op more con i ence that he
will win the military's presidential nomination
with the help of senior officers of the Directorate
and that the present impasse between himself and
Chief of State Thieu over the nomination will be
settled in an amicable manner. Ky claimed that a
good friend of Thieu's had recently conducted an in-
formal poll. of the relative popularity of Ky and
Thieu among the people and that the results showed
Ky well ahead of Thieu. Furthermore, according to
Ky, Thieu's friend reportedly told Thieu that, even
if he were to gain the military nomination, he might
not be able to win in a. national election.
2. Two other reasons were advanced by Ky for
the further weakening of Thieu's position as a pos-
sible candidate. These were supposed to be two
serious mistakes made by Thieu in recent weeks. One
of these was Thieu's floating of a "trial balloon"
on the possible presidential candidacy of retired
Lieutenant General Duong Van Minh (Big Minh); the
other was Thieu's selection of a French hospital
rather than a Vietnamese hospital for his recent
appendectomy. Ky maintained that he is on close
friendly terms e.aith Thieu and that when Thieu finally
makes up his mind, the two will. be able to sit down
and reach an agreement on Ky's nomination without
rancor or loss of face for Thieu.
3. Ky also related that a military and civilian
front group, which is working to promote his own can-
didacy, is now organized and would soon occupy space
in Independence Palace. Regular meetings will soon
commence to draw up a political. platform appealing to
various religious and ethnic groups, after which the
group will turn its attention to the specifics of a
presidential platform. Included among the military
members of this front are major generals Linh Quang
Vien., Nguyen Duc Thang, and Nguyen Bao Tri, and such
civilians as former province chief Nguyen Huu Chi
and journalist Le Van Tien.
26 April 1967
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Labor Unrest in, Saigon
5. Pressure is mounting among some labor
unions in Saigon for a 40-percent increase in wages
to offset the increase in the cost of living since
mid-1966. Approximately..1,000 workers are now on
strike in Saigon because employprs,are willing. to
grant only a 10-percent increase in wages, according
to an official of the CVT Council. Precedent for a
40R-percent pay hike has already been established
with the recent grant of almost this amount to some
300 cigarette factory workers.
6. No demands for wage increases were voiced
at the CVT Congress which ended on 22 April, possibly
to avoid a confrontation between the national labor
organization and the GVN. Although a GVN Labor
Ministry official has branded the wage demands as a
political ploy by Vo Van Tri, the secretary general
of the CVT's Saigon General Council, to embarrass
CVT president Tran Quoc Buu, the fact remains that
the cost of living has risen in Saigon by about _124
percent since June 1966, and that rank-and-file mem-
bers are reported restive.
26 April 1967
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66432 4-67 CIA
Dong Van
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Apprc
III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. Four US planes were lost for the third day
in a row on 26 April as North Vietnamese air defense
units attempted to blunt continued air attacks in the
Hanoi and Haiphong complexes. US Navy,planes once
again attacked the major POL facility on the Western
outskirts of Haiphong. Two A-4s were lost southeast
of the city_,,one to a surface-to-air missile and one
to ground fire. The air force struck Hanoi's main
transformer station and a railroad bridge 4.6 miles
north of the capital. One F-105 was downed by a SAM
near the transformer station, and a second F-105 was
lost to unknown causes on the bridge strike.
2. The losses on 26 April bring to 16 the number
of US aircraft lost during the past eight days as
large-scale raids have been carried out against major mill-n
tary and industrial targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong
area. That US planes have been striking key targets
at the center of Hanoi's air defense system accounts,
in part, for the unusually high level of SAM, MIG, and
AAA activity and resulting US air losses.
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Weapons Losses
Personnel Losses
(Killed only)*
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Viet Cong/NVA
C VN/US/other Free World
*Due to a change in the reporting of personnel losses, beginning 12 February 1967, the weekly figure will represent
only personnel killed
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Viet Cong Incidents
(Excluding Attacks)
C~ L-U-LLJ-U-U-LLU-Lj-LL1 I I I I I I I I I I I I 1.t I
I
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
i...Eea MAR APR
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16-22 APR
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Top Secret
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