THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00826A001900010017-7
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
16
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 18, 2003
Sequence Number: 
17
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 26, 1967
Content Type: 
MEMO
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00826A001900010017-7.pdf724.34 KB
Body: 
Approved Fo 'R`elease 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP79TO08Zb 00190QQ~0~+7 crat (7/k 25X1 MEMORANDUM DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE The Situation in Vietnam Top Secret 111 26 April 1967 Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01900010017-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01900010017-7 Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01900010017-7 Approv Information 1600 26 April 1967 HIGHLIGHTS Premier Ky is apparently confident that his prospects for the presidential nomination are in- creasing. Several sharp clashes between US and Communist forces in I Corps occurred on 25-26 April, and on 26 April the US lost four planes over North Vietnam for the third consecutive day. I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam: Several sharp clashes were reported between US and Communist forces in northern I Corps on 25-26 April (Paras. 1-4). Recent intelligence suggests Communist main force units may be prepared to begin extensive offensive operations in the strate is central 'hit-f lands (Paras. 5-9). - suggests that the Com spring campaign" may have been interrupted because of a shortage of am- munition (Paras. 10-11). The weekly review of South Vietnam battle statistics (Para.. '_2). II. Political Developments in South Vietnam: Premier Ky s plans for con ucting a press entia campaign apparently are going forward as his confi- dence in his own prospects increases (Paras. 1-3). Labor pressure is developing in Saigon for a 40-per- cent increase in wages to offset the effects of inflation (Paras. 5-6). III. Military Developments in North Vietnam: DRV missile and artillery units estroye four more US planes on 26 April for the third consecutive day (Para. 1). Improved North Vietnamese tactics and the fact that US planes are striking targets close to heavily defended Hanoi and Haiphong account for the losses (Paras. 2-3). IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There is nothing of significance to report. 26 April 1967 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826A0019~0010017-7 Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01900 V. Comunist Political Developments: There is nothing of significance to report. South Vietnam Battle StatiELics 1963 to week of April 1967 -Weapons and Personnel Losses -Viet Cong Attacks and Incidents 26 April 1967 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01900010017-7 Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01900010017-7 '' Z i.emilltarlsed ,Zpne Route 9 (~ *Qo~zag-Fri ?annakhet he $anfi.>~ l I` Hue THAILAND QUA G E Tra Bon 25X1 Duc CO r... .3'iYH '[ I F Special Forces, pieik Camp -_ y *An Khe P-19i _Me-~..,L Special ' Forces\ Camp la prang Voikey { Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001900010017-7 *Ban me Apprc I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM 1. Several scattered skirmishes between US and Communist forces have been reported in western Quang Tri Province. Early on 25 April, an enemy force of undetermined size attacked a US Marine truck convoy which was transiting a narrow pass on Route 9 about seven miles east of Khe Sanh. Supported by reinforcements and artillery and armed helicopter fire, the marines forced the enemy to withdraw. Five Americans were re- ported killed and 22 wounded. Two vehicles were dam- aged. 2. Later, in an adjacent area, one of the rein- forcing companies encountered an estimated company- size Communist force in well-prepared positions. Dur- ing an ensuing three-hour battle, nine marines were killed and eight wounded before the enemy retreated. A nearby US command post was hit by nearly 200 rounds of mortar fire early on 26 April, but no American casual- ties were reported. 3. Enemy casualties in this series of encounters have not been reported, but may be high as a result of the heavy American firepower which forced the enemy to withdraw in each incident. 4. Farther south in I Corps, a US Army company from Task Force OREGON established contact on 25 April with a large Communist force about four miles northwest of Duc Pho in coastal Quang Ngai Province. At least 21 enemy soldiers were killed and nine weapons seized dur- ing heavy fighting which continued through the night of 25-26 April. Initial US casualties are listed as two killed and 16 wounded. 26 April 1967 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001900910017-7 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Appr 7. Currently, seven US Army battalions are com- mitted to the long-term border-surveillance campaign in Pleiku Province presently named Operation FRANCIS MARION. The apparent enemy strategy in the highlands is to force the deployment of US.maneuver elements over a wide area of Kontum and Pleiku provinces so that at- tacks may be mounted against lightly defended US po- sitions. I as s a e a e Knew o a major attack p anne or tie height of the south- west monsoon season during June and July. According to these plans, five NVA regiments and several separate bat- talions would strike Plei Me Special Forces camp and at- tempt to destroy reinforcing American troops. 9. This and other previous intelligence reports, to- gether with the threat of impending inclement weather, may indicate that enemy military activity will be sharply intensified in the strategic central'highlands in the near future. The recent deployment of US Army forces from the highlands to the northern provinces may further encourage the Communist planners. 26 April 1967 25X1 Approv 25X1 25X1X Appro NVA 2nd Division Ammunition Shortages 10. Ammunition shortages forced the North Viet- namese Army's 2nd Division to interrupt its "spr.inq campaian" in southern I Cor s Iear. in March Viet Cone Military Region V Headquarters directed the 2nd NVA Division to draw new ammunition from depots near Tra Bong, Quang Ngai Province, and to be ready to resume operations by 20 April. 11. US military officers suggest that these shortages were probably the result of Operation LIEN KET 81 (16-21 February) near Chu Lai, Quang Tin Province, in which South Vietnamese Army forces killed 388 troops of the 21st NVA Regiment and the Headquarters, 2nd NVA Division. Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics 12. The week of 16-22 April compared with the week of 9-15 April: I. Viet Cong Incidents 9 -15 April 16 -2 2 April Attacks 36 35 Battalion or larger. . . . . . . . 3 . . . . Small Unit . . . . . . . . . . 33 . . . . 35 Harassment 248 472 Terrorism 52 55 Sabotage 20 16 Propaganda 38 21 Antiaircraft 385 258 TOTAL INCIDENTS 779 26 April 1967 25X1X 25X1 Approv Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001900 VC/NVA 9- 15 Apri l 16-22 April 9-15 April 16-2 2 April Killed 1,511 1,081 287 228 Wounded ----- ----- 784 499 Missing/ Captured ----- ----- TOTALS 1,511 1,081 1,085 756 US FREE WORLD 9-15 April 16-22 April 9-15 April 16-22 April Killed 147 148 21 9 Wounded 1,141 1,031 91 2 Missing/ Captured 0 0 0 0 TOTALS 1,288 1,179 112 11 III. Weapons Captured VC/NVA GVN April 16-22 April 9-15 April 16- April Individual 417 Not 151 223 Crew-Served 28 Reported 4 3 TOTALS 445 155 226 26 April 1967 Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826A00190 25X1 Apps II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM Ky's Presidential Plans 1. Premier Ky is beginning to eve op more con i ence that he will win the military's presidential nomination with the help of senior officers of the Directorate and that the present impasse between himself and Chief of State Thieu over the nomination will be settled in an amicable manner. Ky claimed that a good friend of Thieu's had recently conducted an in- formal poll. of the relative popularity of Ky and Thieu among the people and that the results showed Ky well ahead of Thieu. Furthermore, according to Ky, Thieu's friend reportedly told Thieu that, even if he were to gain the military nomination, he might not be able to win in a. national election. 2. Two other reasons were advanced by Ky for the further weakening of Thieu's position as a pos- sible candidate. These were supposed to be two serious mistakes made by Thieu in recent weeks. One of these was Thieu's floating of a "trial balloon" on the possible presidential candidacy of retired Lieutenant General Duong Van Minh (Big Minh); the other was Thieu's selection of a French hospital rather than a Vietnamese hospital for his recent appendectomy. Ky maintained that he is on close friendly terms e.aith Thieu and that when Thieu finally makes up his mind, the two will. be able to sit down and reach an agreement on Ky's nomination without rancor or loss of face for Thieu. 3. Ky also related that a military and civilian front group, which is working to promote his own can- didacy, is now organized and would soon occupy space in Independence Palace. Regular meetings will soon commence to draw up a political. platform appealing to various religious and ethnic groups, after which the group will turn its attention to the specifics of a presidential platform. Included among the military members of this front are major generals Linh Quang Vien., Nguyen Duc Thang, and Nguyen Bao Tri, and such civilians as former province chief Nguyen Huu Chi and journalist Le Van Tien. 26 April 1967 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001900g10017-7 Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01909010017-7 Labor Unrest in, Saigon 5. Pressure is mounting among some labor unions in Saigon for a 40-percent increase in wages to offset the increase in the cost of living since mid-1966. Approximately..1,000 workers are now on strike in Saigon because employprs,are willing. to grant only a 10-percent increase in wages, according to an official of the CVT Council. Precedent for a 40R-percent pay hike has already been established with the recent grant of almost this amount to some 300 cigarette factory workers. 6. No demands for wage increases were voiced at the CVT Congress which ended on 22 April, possibly to avoid a confrontation between the national labor organization and the GVN. Although a GVN Labor Ministry official has branded the wage demands as a political ploy by Vo Van Tri, the secretary general of the CVT's Saigon General Council, to embarrass CVT president Tran Quoc Buu, the fact remains that the cost of living has risen in Saigon by about _124 percent since June 1966, and that rank-and-file mem- bers are reported restive. 26 April 1967 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01900010017-7 Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01900010017-7 ? Dien Bien Phu ? F-105 ned `"? Son La Bhuc Ye* Son Tay' I ?\ Hanoi ??"~ 1?'? Hoa, Binh \"\ r ~? Transformer Station -105 Downed by SAM Than Hoa Linh Cam VIENT'~W?. among Khai ?~ THAILAND `?? Muang Nakhon PhanoN ?Kh mm a ouane /f II NORTH VIETNAM CHINA Mong Cai rUL 'Hon Gpi Duong ? Haiphong Hung Yen An x '...A 4n,'Cowned by SAM /??1 inh Mb DEMARCATION LINE ^ SOUTH-.'H '.. ~. ` VIETNAM 0 25 50 75 Miles 0 25 50 75 Kilometers 66432 4-67 CIA Dong Van Bao Lac?' ?v.?^ ? Ha Gian g Lao Cal ?Saravane Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01900010017-7 Apprc III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM 1. Four US planes were lost for the third day in a row on 26 April as North Vietnamese air defense units attempted to blunt continued air attacks in the Hanoi and Haiphong complexes. US Navy,planes once again attacked the major POL facility on the Western outskirts of Haiphong. Two A-4s were lost southeast of the city_,,one to a surface-to-air missile and one to ground fire. The air force struck Hanoi's main transformer station and a railroad bridge 4.6 miles north of the capital. One F-105 was downed by a SAM near the transformer station, and a second F-105 was lost to unknown causes on the bridge strike. 2. The losses on 26 April bring to 16 the number of US aircraft lost during the past eight days as large-scale raids have been carried out against major mill-n tary and industrial targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. That US planes have been striking key targets at the center of Hanoi's air defense system accounts, in part, for the unusually high level of SAM, MIG, and AAA activity and resulting US air losses. 25X1 26 April 1967 Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826A0019~0010017-7 Weapons Losses Personnel Losses (Killed only)* Approved F lease 2003/08/08: CIA-RDP79TO08UA001900010017-7 Viet Cong/NVA C VN/US/other Free World *Due to a change in the reporting of personnel losses, beginning 12 February 1967, the weekly figure will represent only personnel killed 25X1 66419 4-67 CIA Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01900010017-7 25X1 4000 f- Approved Fo, telease 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP79TO0&W001900010017-7 Viet Cong Incidents (Excluding Attacks) C~ L-U-LLJ-U-U-LLU-Lj-LL1 I I I I I I I I I I I I 1.t I I 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 i...Eea MAR APR Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01900010017-7 16-22 APR 25X1 Top /Mvdgl For Fase 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T008261W1900010017-7 Top Secret Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01900010017-7