POSSIBLE NEW SURPRISES IN CYPRUS AND/OR GREECE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001900010018-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: April 26, 1967
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01900010018-6
Approved For Release 2004/03/18 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01900010018-6
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
26 April 1967
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Possible New Surprises in Cyprus and/or Greece
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2. Looking first at Greece, it is difficult
to see what more could happen. The abolition of
the monarchy may occur, but there has been no hint
so far that this is part of anyone's plans. The
coup leaders' apparent policy has been to keep the
King if he will cooperate. A dramatic switch in
foreign policy seems out of the question at this
time, too.
3. Regarding Cyprus, there are a number of
possibilities. They are listed in descending order
of probability.
a. A purge of Greek officers in Cyprus
opposed to the coup. These officers, especially
the senior ones, evidently themselves expect to be
at least transferred. But there is nothing very
dramatic about this, under the circumstances.
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b. A move by the Greek forces in Cyprus
to round up Communists and other leftists in Cyprus,
whether or not Makarios is willing. Cypriot left-
ists, as seen by their press, evidently are appre-
hensive that this will happen. It could provoke a
crisis in Athens' relations with Makarios, who prob-
ably sees the coup on the mainland as another op-
portunity to solidify the independence of the island.
c. An attempt by Greek troops on the island
to overthrow Makarios and set up a government more
compatible with the new regime in Athens--i.e.,
more hard-nosed and overtly anti-Communist. This
might flow out of (b), or be a prelude to it.
Makarios, however, is no Kanellopoulos--and no
Constantine, either. This would be a tricky op-
eration for the Greeks to handle, especially since
the Turks would likely equate this with enosis.
d. An attempt to remove only General
Grivas, who commands the Cypriot National Guard and
who has long been difficult for Athens to control.
On the other hand, Grivas personally is the kind of
hard-nosed activist that may appeal to the new group
in Athens.
e. Least likely is simple, "instant enosis."
The risks here would seem to be prohibitive, par-
ticularly the risk that the Greeks might get a very
bloody nose in a military encounter with their Turk-
ish NATO allies. This plus the other complications
surrounding enosis--and these would include (b)
and (c) above--would seem rationally to be just what
the new regime does not need after only one week in
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power.
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