THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001900010057-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 57
• Publication Date: May 10, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
The Situation in Vietnam
Top Secret
1.10
10 May 1967
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Information as of 1600
10 May 1967
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Heavy fighting betweeen US Marines and North
Vietnamese Army regulars in the area of Khe Sanh in
western Quang Tri Province has subsided.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
The heavy fighting around K he San in western Quan
Tri Province has subsided (Para. 1).
provided additional information on the command struc-
ture in VC Military Region 5 (Paras. 2-11). Weekly
Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics (Para. 12).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
The Constituent Assembly has approved more than two
thirds of the articles pertaining to the presidential
electoral law, but faces the possibility of delay
over Article 24 (Paras. 1-2).
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam: The
Kien An Airfield near Haiphong was bombed on 10May,
leaving only the major air bases at Phuc Yen and
Hanoi/Gia Lam not yet hit (Paras. 1-2).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: Soviet
Premier Kosygin remarks on Soviet aid to the DRV
(Paras. 1-3). Many North Vietnamese students study-
in(:, in the Soviet bloc (Paras. 4-7).
VI. Other Major Aspects: A recent report indi-
cates that the Viet Cong make arrangements with Cam-
bodian officials on the local level for use of Cam-
bodian territory (Paras. 1-6).
Dong Dang rail line (Paras. 7-8).
Appro
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South Vietnam Battle Statistics
1963 to wee of 30 Apr - 6 May 1967
- Weapons and Personnel Losses
- Viet Cong Attacks and Incidents
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Demilitarized Zone
J V HH
ON=
Can Tho
ICf,N HOA.,'j
BINH
P H U A i
YENJ VY Hoa
SOUTH VIETNAM
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Cheo F21eo."HU
ON
66569 5-67 CIA
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
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1. Fighting between US Marines and North Vietnam-
ese Army (NVA) regulars in western Quang Tri Province
near Khe Sanh has subsided following the sharp contact
reported during a five-hour engagement on 9 May. A
Marine patrol reported the discovery of 203 fresh
graves, each containing at least one NVA body, raising
cumulative Communist casualty toll to 764 since the
heavy fighting began in the area northwest of Khe Sanh
on 25 April.
Additional Information on the Command Structure of VC
Military Region 5
has provided additional details on the evolving
the US military successes in this region and to plan future
Viet Cong counterstrategy. One conclusion of the con-
ference was that MR 5 was too large to operate under a
single command and control structure. The conferees sug-
gested that MR 5, known as the central Vietnam battle-
ground, be divided into several separate military regions
to take advantage of the ~rea'r different geographic
features and to improve the command system. After the
conference, the commander of MR 5, NVA Major General
Nguyen Don, went to Hanoi to submit the recommendations
of the conference to the North Vietnamese high command.
command structure of the Viet Cong's Military Region 5
(MR 5). In mid-1965,1 I MR 5 head-
quarters held a meeting o ig -ranting cadre to discuss
3. The followin Ao
General
announced von tnat e Hanoi ig command a ecided
to establish several military regions within MR 5. The
existing MR 5 command staff was to be responsible for
transacting all of the business of the newly established
military regions until new staffs could be developed.
10 May 1967
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Mb17TH
Dong Ho.
YIt`TNAM,. ~
$avannakhet
N - KEEN HOA
Can Th?
rl
VINH?ti
SINN
Vinh
LON,
PHU_C
TI I',
Vupe Tau
BINH
TUY
BINH
TH UAM
New
Military
Region
5
U 25 50 75 100M1es
0 25 50 76 100 KitCmete,s
I
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The Tay Nguyen/Lower Laos MR
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5. he Communists consider the Tay
Nguyen or western highland battleground the most important
or "principal strategic" battleground in South Vietnam and
as such the number one theater of operations. The concentra-
tion of enemy forces in this area has been evident since early
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there. the Tay Nguyen battleground is im-
portant to the Communists because it is located on the Cam-
bodian border and offers a safe haven for the maintenance of
Communist reserve forces. The terrain of this area is also
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erations.
The Tri Thien/Central Laos MR
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6. this region, the site of much
of the current mi itary action in South Vietnam, is impor-
tant because it offers the Communists the best opportunity
for tactical surprise. With Communist-controlled areas of
North Vietnam and Laos adjacent to this battleground, NVA/
VC forces can easily and quickly maneuver and redeploy both
their troops and their firepower. Communist success in this
respect can be attested to by the recent experience of US
Marines in the Khe Sanh area. The Marines ran into extremely
well-fortified Communist positions which may have been un-
der construction for as long as six months to a year.
7. the Communists consider this
area the first line o defense for North Vietnam and use
this theater of operations to gain combat experience for NVA
troops. The forces used in the Tri Thien battleground are
330th,and 271st ,::livisions. Elements of the first three units
have been identified in Quang Tri Province.
to be divisions mobilized in North Vietnam, and are to be
rotated every three months for service in South Vietnam.
the divisions located from Thanh Hoa south to
the 1-7th Parallel include the 324B, 325th, 341st, 304th,
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Q
o
an
r
rov
nce
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gions of ri Thien and Tay Nguyen are subordinate to MR 4 in
North Vietnam, and have left the impression that the reduced
MR 5 (comprised of the six coastal provinces) is not.
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8. Communist forces in this area are tasked with "pin-
ning down" several divisions of allied forces, and,
to occur in this area in June. Increased Communist aggres-
siveness in this area did begin in April, but it is not yet
clear what effect the fighting of recent weeks will have on
future Communist plans.
F had the mission of inaugurating the summer cam-
paign in central Vietnam in early April. Main attacks are
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The "Delta Battleground"
9. This battleground, which lies in the delta and 25X1
coastal regions of MR 5, presently constitutes the main source
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the objectives of operations in this area
are to push guerrilla warfare, develop and hold liberated
areas, wear down and destroy allied units of battalion size and
smaller, attack allied posts at any costs, destroy communica-
tions, disrupt economic activity in urban areas, sabotage the
rural pacification program, support the guerrilla effort in
the delta area, and establish base areas in the mountainous
regions,, Activity was to begin in this region in April or
May 1967. If allied forces were too powerful for the Viet
Cong, the program was to be pushed back to June.
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10. Much of the information on-
firms previous information available to MACV. For example,
there is a concentration of Viet Cong forces in each of the
three regions mentioned, and in recent months there have been
a number of indicators that these forces--particularly in the
coastal provinces and Tri Thien areas--were preparing for ex-
panded operations.
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11, the reorganization of MR 5,
however, still leaves a number of unanswered questions. One
of these is the relationship of the MR to the Central Office
of South Vietnam and to North Vietnamese authorities in either
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reports indicate several Hanoi-controlled military command
echelons in the area
f the DMZ and in
u
T
i P
i
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12. the
term MR 5 is used interchangeably to refer to both
the pre-1965 region (all the northern provinces as
far south as Darlac and Khanh Hoa) and the new, more
limited six-province-region on the coast. He re-
ports North Vietnamese General Hoang Van Thai as
currently commander of MR 5--presumably the newly
reduced one
enera
Thai'is a vice minister of the DRV Ministry of
National Defense, a senior general and deputy
chief of staff in the North Vietnamese Army, and
a full member of the North Vietnamese central com-
Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics
13. The week of 30 April - 6 May compared with
the week of 23-29 April:
I. Viet Cong Incidents
23-29 April 30 Apri
l-6; May
Attacks 26
Battalion or larger ............ 0 .......
Small Unit ................. 26
37
....2
.35
Harassment 393 4
17
Terrorism 27
45
Sabotage 20
11
Propaganda 8
32
Antiaircraft 314 3
28
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II. Casualties
VC/NVA GVN
23-29 Apr 30 Apr-6 May 23-29 Apr 30 Apr-6 May
Killed
Wounded
Missing/
Captured
1,903
TOTALS 1,152 1,903
US
76 212
311 690
54
956
23-29-Apr 30 Apr-6 MMa 23-29 Apr Apr-6 May
Killed 181 243 4 18
Wounded 957 1,747 9 26
Missing/
Captured 0 0 0 0
TOTALS 1,138 1,990 13 44
III. Weapons Captured
VC/NVA GVN
23-29 Apr 30 Apr-6 May 23-29 Apr 30 Apr-6 May
Individual 386 Not
Crew-served 15 Reported
19 103
0 3
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. The Constituent Assembly has voted on more
than two-thirds of the articles dealing with the pres-
idential election law. If the present pace continues,
the assembly conceivably could finish the job by the
end of this week. The articles pertaining to the
election of the legislature are yet to be considered.
2. One possible obstacle to a quick end to the
proceedings connected with the presidential electoral
law is the reopening of debate on Article 24. This
article provides that the winner of the presidential
race will be the candidate who gets the most votes.
As the provision now stands, there is no assurance
that the winner will achieve a convincing popular
mandate, either by garnering a specified minimum per-
centage of the vote, or by winning a runoff election.
It is possible, however, that the assembly may reopen
discussion on this issue before voting approval of
the entire electoral law. Opponents of the present
provision are mainly delegates backing civilian can-
didates who fear that the provision unduly favors a
military candidate.
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. The third of North Vietnam's five principal
air facilities was bombed on 10 May when US Navy air-
craft struck the Kien An Air Base six miles southwest
of Haiphong. The airfields at Kep and Hoa Lac have
been hit repeatedly since 24 April. Results of the
,strike on Kien An have not yet been received. One
A-4 aircraft was lost to a surface-to-air missile.
2. The 5,900-foot airstrip at Kien An has been
used as a base for AN-2s--small, armed transport
aircraft involved in coastal defense operations--and
as the home field for North Vietnam's largest heli-
copters, the MI-6 Hook.
It is possible that some s were
transferred to is field after the raids on Hoa Lac
and Kep.
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY'DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
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loov_LuL eosygin recently
confirmed tnat an arrangement has been worked out
to ensure the satisfactory delivery of Soviet aid
materiel to the DRV th_rnu.crh China_ I
osygin said that all
proniems
relative to tIaIS agreement had not been
cleared
up, but that it will permit a "conside
rable
increase
in support" to the North Vietnamese.
The
Soviet premier stated that the North Vietnamese
would transship the material from the Sino-Mongolian
border, whereas previous reports had indicated the
transshipment point would be at the Sino-Soviet
border at Manchouli.
2. The significance of any new agreement, if
indeed it is more than an updating of the 1965-67
transit agreement, should not be exaggerated. A
30 April Chinese Peo le's Daily "Observer" article
which bitterly attacked Moscow s appeals for "united
action" on Vietnam made it very clear that any
procedural agreement on the transit question will
not carry over into the broader area of Sino-Soviet
agreement on tactics on the Vietnam war.
3. Kosygin's statement, which like other re-
ports have probably been intended to reach US
officials, seems primarily designed to warn the US
of the willingness of the Hanoi regime to persist
in the war, and of Soviet determination and ability
to assist the DRV in the face of continued US
bombing.
North Vietnamese Youth Training in Soviet Bloc
4. The 30 April issue of Pravda stated that
512 Vietnamese youths had just left North Vietnam
to study in the Soviet Union. According to the
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Soviet newspaper, this was the first of a group of
6,000 Vietnamese workers and engineering-technical
officials who will be accepted into vocational-
technical schools throughout the USSR in the next
few years.
5. On 30 March the Soviets also announced that
under the terms of the new Soviet - North Vietnamese
cultural and scientific agreement there would be
1,500 new Vietnamese students and trainees enrolled
in Soviet institutions in-1967. The announcement
also stated that there were currently 2,100 Vietnamese
students in the USSR.
6. In the past six months several agreements
to train North Vietnamese have been announced by East
European countries. Last December the Hungarians
stated that they had agreed to train 1,000 Vietnamese
in the areas of pharmaceuticals and telecommunications,
and on 5 May the East Germans announced that 300
unspecified Vietnamese trainees had arrived there.
7. Czechoslovakia announced in March that 2,100
Vietnamese apprentices are to be trained in Czecho-
slovakia in the next three to five years. The first
group of 500 is to arrive in July. The Czechs further
stated that 20,000 Vietnamese are now or soon will be
training or studying in countries of the socialist
camp.
8. There is no way to verify these figures,
but it is likely that the USSR and East European coun-
tries would be willing to step up the education and
training of North Vietnamese in the face of the
disruption caused by the war. If the estimated fig-
ure of 20,000 Vietnamese going abroad for education
and training is relatively accurate, it would not
seem that the war is yet causing Hanoi any signifi-
cant manpower shortages.
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VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
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Viet Cong Use of Cambodian Territory
1. Further indications that the Viet Cong are
using Cambodian territory were revealed in a pre-
liminary analysis of an enemy document which was re-
cently captured in northern Tay Ninh Province.
2. The document, dated 8 September 1966, is
a report from the party committee probably subordi-
nate to the 70th Security Guard Regiment and indi-
cates that the Communists made an agreement with
unspecified Cambodian officials in April 1966 en-
abling Communist forces to use Cambodian territory
for sanctuary during allied sweep operations. The
document also stated that in some instances Viet
Cong elements refused to return to Vietnam follow-
ing allied search-and-destroy operations because
of the safety they enjoyed in Cambodian territory.
4. It is likely that the agreement mentioned
in the document represented only an understanding
between one or more Viet Cong units and local Cam-
bodian officials in the Tay Ninh Province/Cambodian
border area. In the past, the Viet Cong and Cam-
bodian border forces have made other agreements
which usually involved the stipulation that the
Communists must be unarmed when crossing the border.
The document does not clarify what arrangements the
Vietnamese Communists have made for the construction
of permanent installations, some of which are in the
area and cannot be concealed from Cambodian authori-
ties.
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5. Tribal people are fleeing from northeastern
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Cambodia into southern Laos because of unrest in
their native areas.
mon agnar elements have come unc er increasing harass-
ment from "Vietnamese Communists" operating in the
area. The montagnards also expressed fear that
fighting would shortly break out between pro-Commu-
nist Cambodians and anti-Communist Cambodian Army
units.
6. Over 200 Cambodian Lave have sought refuge
in Laos thus far and more are reportedly en route.
It is possible that increased Communist pressure on
tribal elements to aid them is the cause of the un-
rest. The northeastern area of Cambodia bordering
Laos and Kontum-Pleiku provinces in South Vietnam
has come under increasing use as a base area by
North Vietnamese units since early last year.
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sta ar an me er-- rac extending 12 miles tart her
north from the last observed cut-off point nine miles
north of Cao Nung. It is probable that the entire
Kep - Ping-hsiang segment of the Hanoi - Dong Dang
line may be dual gauge, although there is as yet no
complete photographic confirmation. Standard gauge
trains, however, have been observed on the Kep -
Cao Nung section of the line.
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Weapons Losses
MARCH
4,215
Personnel Losses
(Killed on/y)*
Viet Cong/N VA
-?-- GVN/US/other Free World
US Casualties to Date: Killed 9,680 Wounded 57823 Captured 157 Missing 403
Due to a change in the reporting of personnel losses, beginning 72 February 7967, the weekly figure will represent
only personnel killed
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Viet Cong Attacks
MARCH
219
Viet Cong Incidents
(Excluding Attacks)
FEB MAR APR MAY
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