THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A002000010020-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 23, 2007
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: May 22, 1967
• Content Type: IR

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Secret 2
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Report
The Situation in South Vietnam
(Weekly )
ARMY review(s) completed.
USAID review completed
State Dept. review completed
Secret
1)
22 May 1967
No. 0351/67
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(15 May - 21 May 1967)
Section
POLITICAL SITUATION I
Presidential electioneering; Con-
stituent Assembly developments;
Candidates for future senate; Bud-
dhist developments.
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT II
Revolutionary Development in Chau
Doc Province; Educational develop-
ment in IV Corps; "New Life Develop-
ment" activities; National Police.
ECONOMIC SITUATION III
Prices; Currency and gold; Labor
problems; Port labor reforms.
ANNEX: Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon (table)
Saigon Free Market Gold and Currency Prices (graph)
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. POLITICAL SITUATION
Presidential politics continue to cen-
ter on the unresolved rivalry between Pre-
mier Ky and Chief of State Thieu.
The Constituent Assembly has completed
its work on the presidential election law,
and now is dealing with electoral regula-
tions for the future senate. At least one
formidable slate of senate candidates is
already definitely in the making.
The militant Buddhists are planning
to
use the occasion of Buddha's birthday on
23
May to exploit the peace issue, but they
probably will not attempt to incite large
demonstrations.
Presidential Electioneering
1. In press interviews and public statements
last week, Chief of State Thieu seriously opened the
possibility of his presidential candidacy in opposi-
tion to Premier Ky, but stopped short of committing
himself. Foreign Minister Tran Van Do told a US of-
ficial that General Thieu has definitely decided to
run, and several reporters also received that impres-
sion after interviews with Thieu. It is not yet
clear, however, whether an official announcement by
Thieu will be made soon.
2. In several interviews with the press last
week, General Thieu also appeared to be particularly
deliberate in stressing his belief that a presidential
contest involving himself and Ky on opposing tickets
would not lead to serious trouble in the army. Prior
to these remarks, most military leaders had taken the
position that only one military man should run for
president. Even Premier Ky, in announcing his can-
didacy on 12 May, paid lip service to this principle
by hinting that he might withdraw if Thieu chose to
run.
3. Thieu also declared that he was actively
seeking to organize a broad political front backing
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his candidate, and that he thought he could win.
1 appears ou 'ul that any broad front has
ye been developed. It would seem more likely
that Thieu is maneuvering within the military and
feeling out a handful of key civilian politicians,
some of whom are probably potential candidates
themselves. By promoting rumors of his imminent
candidacy in the meantime, Thieu probably hopes
to maintain his present military support and to
prevent the military establishment from consolidat-
ing behind Premier Ky. If successful, this tactic
would also allow Thieu to exercise another possible
option, that of backing or running with a prominent
civilian candidate.
4. Premier Ky, who is officially in the race,
told newsmen that he would have no comment on Thieu's
apparent candidacy until he had a chance to talk to
Thieu himself.
5. With Thieu in the race, Ky would still seem
to have enough support to wage a meaningful campaign.
It thus appears somewhat doubtful that Ky would ac-
tually resign from the government and withdraw from
the race.
6. Despite Thieu's remarks to the contrary,
open competition for the presidency between Ky and
Thieu would effectively divide the political power
that has ruled South Vietnam for the past two years.
At the least, Thieu's current stance indicates that
the rivalry which has built up between the two lead-
ers during the past several months remains as strong
as ever, does not appear to be susceptible to easy
resolution, and does not speak well for future mili-
tary unity.
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Constituent Assembly Developments
7. The Constituent Assembly voted final ap-
proval of the presidential election law on 16 May.
During its final review of the law, the assembly
voted down an attempt to include a provision stipu-
lating that the winner must achieve a necessary
minimum percentage of the vote, or win a runoff
election. As the law now stands, the candidate who
gets the most votes will be elected, regardless of
how small a percentage he receives. Supporters of
Premier Ky backed this provision and its acceptance
by the assembly is considered a notable victory--
and advantage--for Ky.
8. Before being promulgated by Chief of State
Thieu, the law will be considered by the Directorate,
which constitutionally exercises executive powers un-
til an elected president assumes office. Various
Directorate members, including General Thieu, have
criticized the law's provisions for nominating pres-
idential candidates. It is not clear whether the
Directorate will attempt to amend the nomination
process, which stipulates that a presidential can-
didate must be sponsored by a total of 30 assembly-
men and/or provincial or municipal councilors.
9. The assembly, meanwhile, has turned its at-
tention to drafting electoral regulations for the
upper house of the future legislature. In sessions
on 19 and 20 May, the assembly chose 17 December as
the date for the election of the upper house. It
also decided that the senate shall consist of 60
men, composed of the six 10-man slates receiving the
most votes nationwide. Each voter will only be al-
lowed to vote for one list.
10. When ratifying the constitution in late
March, the ruling Directorate and Armed Forces Con-
gress declared that the senate election would be
held on the same day as the presidential election in
early September, with the lower house election in
early October. By attempting to delay the upper
house election until mid-December, the assembly may
be trying to prolong its own life. The constitution
stipulates that once the president assumes office,
the assembly will assume full legislative powers
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until the elected legislature is convened. The as-
sembly has not yet set a date for lower house elec-
tions, but it presumably will decide on some date
after 17 December.
Candidates for Future Senate
11. With the assembly beginning debate on the
upper house election law, the nucleus of at least
one formidable slate of candidates already appears
definitely in the making. On 12 May, retired gen-
eral Tran Van Don stated that he plans to run for
the senate along with publisher Dang Van Sung and
former deputy premier Tran Van Tuyen. It is possible
that both the chairman of the Peoples-Armed Forces
Advisory Council, Nguyen Van Loc, and a ranking of-
ficial of the country's largest labor group may join
,this slate in the future.
12. General Don indicated that the slate would
back Premier Ky for president. In addition, Dang Van
Sung hopes to extend the influence of this group to
lower house candidates, and to make it the basis of
a national worker-peasants party. The US Embassy
believes that Sung's plans are at present some way
from reality. If the slate receives strong govern-
ment backing, however, it could conceivably become
the nucleus for a national party.
Buddhist Developments
13. The self immolation of a Buddhist woman in
the Saigon area on 16 May, the first day of a week-
long religious celebration leading up to Buddha's
birthday on 23 May, has raised the possibility that
militant Buddhists might attempt to launch another
serious antigovernment campaign. The suicide victim
left behind letters and a poem calling for an end to
the war; handbills distributed later stated that the
woman killed herself as a "prayer for peace" at a
time when monks were initiating a week of peace
prayers at all pagodas. In addition, a small Bud-
dhist parade, commemorating members of the "struggle"
movement who were killed last year, took place with-
out incident in Da Nang on 13 May.
14. In general, there have been numerous indi-
cations that the militant followers of Thich Tri Quang
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hope to monopolize the peace issue, and, by discredit-
ing the government and the US in the process, to re-
gain political momentum. The government, however, is
far better prepared to deal with any challenge to
public order than it was during the first phase of
last year's "struggle" movement. There are at least
implications that militant Buddhist leaders recognize
the current strength of the government, and do not
plan to initiate any large demonstrations at present.
15. On balance, it appears that the militants
presently intend to keep their antigovernment efforts
relatively low-keyed, while developing their capacity
to exploit any fissure in governmental stability.
Small demonstrations or other ploys to induce an over-
reaction or blunder on the part of the government also
remain a possibility.
16. Meanwhile, moderate Buddhists appear dis-
couraged about the degree of cooperation they are re-
ceiving from the government, but apparently do not
plan to all themselves with the militants in the near
future.
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11, REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT
Revolutionary Development (RD) efforts
are hampered in Chau Doe Province, even though
the essential resources are in place, by the
vested interests of provincial officials and
the general inertia among members of the Hoa
Hao sect, the predominant group in the prov-
ince. An assessment of educational develop-
ment in the IV Corps area offers some insight
into the status of education throughout the
country. "New Life Development" programs
in rural elementary schools, electrification,
and health are lagging about 20 percent behind
1966 construction. The National Police, in an
effort to meet their 1967 strength goal of
90,000, have been urged to recruit recently
discharged members of the Vietnamese armed
forces. Thkough 12 May, Communist ralliers
to the government under the Chieu Hai ("Open
Arms") program have reached 14,634, or
slightly less than double the total for the
same period of 1966.
Revolutionary Development in Chau Doe Province
1. The situation in Chau Doc Province has changed
little since the province was established in October 1964.
Areas under the control of the Hoa Hao sect, which dom-
inates the provincial leadership, remain secure but
prospects for securing the remainder of the province are
not good. Little progress in this direction is currently
expected unless additional resources are introduced and
those now available are better utilized.
2. Of the approximately 450,000 people in Chau
Doe Province, some 50 percent are Hoa Hao, and 10 to 15
percent are ethnic Cambodians. The Hoa Hao leaders in
Chau Doe, as in other provinces such as Kien Phong, re-
luct.,antly support the national RD program, valuing it
primarily in terms of what it can provide their own
group in the way of economic benefit. As a result, al-
though they do not notoriously discriminate against other
groups, the Hoa Hao have apparently been reluctant to
deploy RD teams, or to distribute commodities including
funds for flood relief, in non - Hoa Hao areas.
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3. According to MACV's order of battle holdings,
Communist strength in Chau Doc numbers 3,150, including
the 512th Provincial Battalion. Government forces in`
the province include--in addition to the 3rd Battalion/
15th ARVN Regiment which occasionally operates in Chau
Doc--some 3,000 Regional Forces (RF) in 22 companies,
and about 4,200 Popular Forces (PF). With a few excep-
tions among the RF, US advisers rate all of these forces
as relatively ineffective. Additionally, there are about
12 companies of Civilian Irregular Defense (CIDG) troops--
some 1,700 men--in three Special Forces camps in the
border districts of Tinh Bien and An Phu. Three of these
companies are ethnic Cambodians who defected from the
dissident Khmer Kampuchea Krom movement and have per-
formed poorly; the bulk of the CIDG in Chau Doc are
gradually being converted into Regional Force troops,
with the US Special Forces teams assuming a conventional
province-district advisory role.
4. Despite the presence of the Viet Cong (VC)
512th Provincial Battalion, which operates in both Chau
Doc and neighboring An Giang, and the probable presence
of the 267th Battalion of the VC Dong Thap I Regiment,
there is relatively little Communist activity in the
province. The three largely Hoa Hao districts of An Phu,
Tan Chau, and Chau Phu are virtually free of VC incidents
except for a section of northern An Phu District along
the Cambodian border, where the Viet Cong have recently
stepped up their activities.
5. Large areas of Tinh Bien and Tri Ton districts,
however, have been controlled by the Communists for years.
Tri Ton:District harbors a major enemy base area called
the "Seven Mountains." The government's large Chi Lang
RF training center, also in Tri Ton District, is acces-
sible by road only when clearing operations are conducted,
and the district capital itself has been largely isolated
by the VC.
6.
the VC are p anning to concentrate their efforts in Tinh
Bien District in the coming months. This decision was
reportedly reached because the VC felt they had been
unsuccessful in efforts to strengthen their organization
in Chau Phu--site of the province capital--during the first
four months of 1967.
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7. Inasmuch as the three districts of Chau Doc
in which the 1966 RD effort was concentrated have been
largely pacified by their Hoa Hao population, much of
the RD program last year was little more than a paper
exercise. Provincial officials, who show little in-
terest in extending the program into the non - Hoa Hao
districts, again this year wanted to confine RD efforts
to these same areas. However, the Ministry of Revolu-
tionary Development (MORD), with US advisory backing,
issued orders that most Ap Doi Moi ("Real New Life Ham-
lets") were to be constructed in insecure areas.
8. At present, there are five RD teams, with an
average strength of 47 cadre per team, operating in the
province, In Tinh Bien District, one team is consoli-
dating four hamlets while another team is constructing
two Ap Doi Moi. In Tri Ton District, two RD teams are
to build o ur~Ap Doi Moi. Each of these four RD teams
has RF and/or PF as a security force. The fifth RD
team apparently has arrived only recently in the prov-
ince and its activities are not yet known. In addition,
two more RD teams are scheduled to finish their Vung Tau
training and return to the province by July.
9. he performance to
date of the RD workers in au Doc is mediocre--a rating
that is not bad considering the lack of manpower re-
sources in the area. A better performance is expected
in the future as a result of the MORD decree that any RD
worker dismissed for cause in 1967 will have to pay back
the sum of approximately 15,000 piasters that was spent
on his training and pay.
10. Chau Doc is apparently one of the focal points
for smuggling to and from Cambodia, According to the
chief of the province's 620-man police force, use of wa-
terways to conduct this illegal traffic decreased follow-
ing the initiation of US naval patrols in the area, but
local merchants shifted their operations to land routes
through An Phu and Tinh Bien districts, allegedly using
ARVN trucks. Under pressure from US advisers, the prov-
ince chief, who is rumored to be involved in this illicit
trade, reluctantly agreed to establish military police
checkpoints and smuggling reportedly has now been reduced.
This type of vested interest among provincial officials,
together with the inertia that may reflect Hoa Hao indif-
ference to the RD program, has tended to hamper RD efforts
in the province despite the fact that the essential re-
sources are in place.
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Educational Development in IV Corps
11. Recent information on current educational
facilities and programs in IV Corps offers some insight
into the status of education throughout the country.
According to the US Mission, few of the problems en-
countered in. educational development in the IV Corps
area are insurmountable, but many of those that result
from the Vietnamese cultural pattern and the strong
French influence over the educational system will take
considerable time to ameliorate.
12. The most significant problem encountered has
been the teacher shortage, which may run as high as
4,000 in the IV Corps area alone. This shortage is
felt nation-wide and appears to have two principal
causes: (1) the military draft, and (2) the reluctance
of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development (MORD) to
provide funds for the recruitment and training of
teachers needed to staff the classrooms already built
through self-help efforts. In IV Corps, 1,564 self-
help classrooms were constructed by village and hamlet
residents between 1963 and 1966. Because of the lack
of teachers, however, the MORD in 1966 stopped the
authorization of self-help classroom construction,
perhaps not realizing that this program was one of the
best received by the rural inhabitants.
13. Under continuous advisory prodding, the Min-
istry of Education has now agreed to employ and finance
teachers to replace those drafted into military service,
and theMORD has promised to include funds in its FY 1967
budget to recruit and train sufficient teachers to staff
the self-help classrooms built in. previous years. The
problem caused by the drafting of teachers has been
partially alleviated by recruiting only women and draft
ineligible males for hamlet school teachers. If utilized,
disabled military veterans may also provide a much-
needed source of personnel for the program.
14. Primary school facilities in IV Corps are
available for approximately 52 percent of the school-age
children.. The secondary school system, however, in-
cludes facilities for only 21 percent of the pupils com-
pleting the fifth grade. The curriculum of the latter
SEZ.REI
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schools follows a traditional French liberal arts
pattern and advisory efforts to add vocational train-
ing have not been well received.
15. The following is a breakdown of educational
facilities in IV Corps:
Elementary/Primary Schools (81% government
controlled)
2,000 schools
8,400 classrooms
12,000 teachers
611,000 pupils
Secondary Schools (33% government controlled)
135 schools
1,000 classrooms
2,000 teachers
84,000 students
16. The primary schools are supervised by a
primary education chief in each province who has a staff
of school in.spectors. The source for many primary
teachers is the Vinh Long Normal School, a two-year
teacher training institution that graduates 250 teachers
annually. In order to provide the additional teachers
needed, every province has established a three-month
hamlet schoolteacher training course that provides two
months of professional training and one month of practice
teaching.
17. The secondary school program is administered
in. each province by the principal of the leading govern-
ment public secondary school. Supervision of these
schools,is, by and large, inadequate and planned ex-
pansion. of secondary schools may be lagging far behind
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the number of students who are presently receiving a
primary education. Teachers for secondary schools are
trained in the four national universities at Hue, Da
Lat, Saigon., and Can. Tho.
18. In addition to the regular secondary school
program in IV Corps, advanced training is provided in
special vocational high schools, including eight tech-
nical, one polytechnic, and one agricultural high
school.
"New Life Development" Activities
19. The Ministry of Revolutionary Development's
rural elementary school program is lagging about 20
percent behind construction in 1966 despite earlier
predictions by government officials that they would
have no problem in meeting the 1967 goals. According
to US Mission officials, the lag is apparently due to
the slow start made in the promotional campaign. to or-
ganize hamlets and villages toward a self-help effort.
During 1966 MORD had halted self-help classroom con-
struction primarily because of a lack of funds for
recruiting and training hamlet teachers. MORD has since
reinstituted this project, specifying that all 1967 ham-
let classroom construction be accomplished only through
self-help projects and not through construction.. This
is apparently an effort by MORD to maximize participa-
tion in. this popular hamlet project.
20. The two programs showing the least progress
in. New Life Development, however, are the rural elec-
trification and the rural health programs. The US
Mission. feels that the GVN ministries bear principal
responsibility for the lack of progress made over the
past year. An. absence of coordination. and! agreement
among Saigon. bureaucracies has retarded the success-
ful implementation of programs in these two areas un-
der broad RD plans. General apathy among local Viet-
namese officials and their concentration on village/
hamlet elections have also contributed to a delay. In
the opinion of US officials, the key to the success of
these programs funded under the RD budget lies in.
strong administration and strict control of resources
from Saigon to the villages.
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21. The calendar year 1967 program for rural
electrification. calls for a':50-kilowatt and a 30-kilo-
watt,generator to be placed in. each of 36 hamlets.
As of 25 March, the plotting of sites for these gen-
erators had been completed in. only seven. hamlets in
six provinces (Quang Nam, An. Xuyen, Hau Nghia, Binh
Long, Sa Dec, and Kien. Gian.g). US officials are con-
tin.u.ing to try to persuade the Ministry of Health to
adopt USAID recommendations to place tighter controls
on. retail sales of antibiotics in an effort to develop
a source for determining the end use of antibiotic
imports.
22: The US Mission.'s economic warfare adviser
has selected ph.rmaceuticals as one of a'small number
of strategic commodities upon, which tight control will
be exercised in+an effort to prevent these goods from
being illegally manipulated by local businessmen or from
falling into the possession-of Communist forces.. Health
Ministry officials are reluctant to impose stiff controls
on. antibiotics because of opposition from both retail
pharmacists and the local population who have so far
refused to cooperate.
23. The director general of the National Police,
General Nguyen. Ngoc Loan, has urged National Police re-
gional directors to recruit recently discharged members
of the Vietnamese armed forces. Loan has also con-
tacted the corps commanders to solicit their support
for the recruitment effort. The 31 December 1967
strength goal for the police is 90,000, whereas actual
strength, including the police field forces, stood as
of 22 April at approximately 62,500:.
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III. ECONOMIC SITUATION
During the week ending 8 May the
retail price index for Saigon was un-
changed as price increases for rice,
beef, and chicken were offset by a de-
cline in the price of pork. Gold and
currency prices rose on 8 May for the
first time in many weeks. Vietnamese
unions are threatening strikes against
Air America and Esso unless new con-
tracts
are signed soon. Premier
Ky
finally
has decided to push hard
for
certain
labor reforms at the port
of
Saigon
as part of his election cam-
paign.
1. During the week ending 8 May the retail
price index for Saigon was unchanged. A decline in
the price of pork offset increases for rice, beef,
and chicken. Rice prices rose for the second con-
secutive week, possibly because of lower deliveries
from the delta in April. The price of the domestic
rice consumed by the working class rose by one
piaster to 27 piasters per kilogram, while imported
US rice held at the subsidized price of 16 piasters
per kilogram. The price of pork declined, report-
edly because of large deliveries of hogs to the
Saigon slaughterhouse during the weekend prior to
8 May. Nonfood prices remained stable except for
a slight increase in the prices of charcoal and
laundry soap. (A table of weekly prices in Saigon
is included in the Annex.)
2. The prices of selected US-financed imports
declined slightly for the fifth consecutive week
during the week ending 9 May. The increases for
wheat flour and some steel products were more than
offset by continued declines in the prices of fer-
tilizer, chemicals, and cement.
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Currency and Gold
3. The prices of dollars and MPC (scrip) rose
on 8 May for the first time in six weeks, returning
to the level of 24 April. The price of dollars
rose by six piasters to 157 piasters per dollar,
and the rate for MPC rose by five piasters to 112
piasters per dollar. After declining for eight
weeks, the price of gold rose by 14 piasters to
208 piasters per dollar, the rate prevailing on
10 April. The Embassy reports that one factor in
the upward movement of the gold and currency rates
apparently was a decline in supplies of gold coming
into the market from outside Vietnam. (A graph on
monthly and weekly currency and gold rates is in-
cluded in the Annex.)
4. Vietnamese unions are threatening strikes
against Air America and Esso, with sympathy strikes
possible at Shell and Caltex. Air America's 550
Vietnamese employees at Tan Son Nhut could cripple
operations nationally by striking. They are asking
for 30 to 50-percent wage increases. Management's
position is not known. Union leaders say that
workers will walk out, even though no strike date
has been set, unless substantial wage concessions
are made soon. The local agency of Pan American
granted its Vietnamese employees a- 20-percent wage
increase in April.
5. Negotiations at Esso have been under way
since the first of the year when the union con-
tract expired. At issue are the amounts of wage
increases, cost of living allowances, overtime pay,
and bonuses as well as the effective date of a new
contract. On 16 April the workers voted overwhelm-
ingly to strike at a time designated by their union
negotiators, and the Embassy reports that the union
delegates are losing patience. A bargaining session
was scheduled for 8 May, but was postponed at the
request of the Ministry of Labor. As reported
earlier, Governor Hanh, the minister of economy and
finance, urged the Esso manager not to grant ex-
cessive wage increases. The Ministry of Labor
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apparently would like time to consult with Hanh in
order to establish a GVN position on wage policy.
Esso employees, meanwhile, are still working while
waiting for the Ministry of Labor to call a new
negotiating session.
6. Premier Ky finally has decided to imple-
ment his August 1965 decree establishing a dock
workers' hiring hall at the port of Saigon. Such
a move, which would eliminate the middlemen and
gang leaders who take cuts from the longshoremen's
pay, has long been opposed by the stevedore com-
panies and the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor
(CVT) dock worker' union. Ky, however, apparently
intends to push hard for the reform because he
wants to use this as a campaign issue to dramatize
his concern for workers' problems. According to
Secretary of Transport Thuan, Ky will address a
mass rally at the port to tell workers that they
must "revolt" against those who are exploiting them.
7. CVT President Tran Quoc Buu is an active
proponent of port labor reforms, but has little con-
trol over the Saigon dock workers' union whose lead-
ership defied him by calling a five-day strike at
the port last December. The leaders of both the
Saigon CVT council and the dock workers' union have
publicly supported reform measures., but reportedly
are dead set against changing the traditional way
of doing business at the port. Secretary Thuan
says that these men have "sold out" to the stevedore
companies and may try to provoke strikes at the
port or elsewhere in Saigon on other issues in
order to pressure the GVN to hold off.
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 Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826AO02000010020-1
Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon a/
13 June
16 Aug.
17 Apr.
24 Apr.
2 May
8 May
1966 /
1966 b/
1967
1967
1967
1967
Index for All Items
173
211
252
254+
260
260
Index for Food Items
190
216
279
282
289
289
Of Which:
(In Piasters)
Rice-Soc Nau (100 kg.)
1,250
1,1+50
2,600
2,550
2,600
2,700
Pork Bellies (1 kg.)
90
100
11+0
150
150
130
Fish-Ca Tre (1 kg.)
130
170
11+0
150
150
150
Nuoc Mam (jar)
70
85
150
150
150
150
Index for Nonfood Items
11+0
190
203
202
206
207
Of Which :
(In Piasters)
Charcoal (60 kg.)
1+60
600
650
61+0
650
660
Cigarettes (pack)
10
11+
11+
11+
11+
11+
White Calico (meter)
27
37
32
31
31
31
Electricity (kwh)
1+.2
N.A.
5.2
5.2
5.2
5.2
a. Data are from USAID sources. For all indexes 1 January 1965 =1000
b. Price levels just prior to and two months after the 18 June devaluation.
Cn
t~7
H
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 Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826AO02000010020-1
114011W "11111110
Saigon Free Market Gold and Currency Prices
PIASTERS PER
US DOLLAR
8 MAY
31 MARCH
217
208
173
157
112
1964
1965
1967
GOLD: Basis gold leaf worth $35 per troy ounce
US $10 GREEN
US $10 MPC Military Payment Certificates (scrip).
MAR APR MAY
1967
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 Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826AO02000010020-1
Secret ~'` ..
Secret
Approved For Release 2007/08/23: CIA-RDP79T00826AO02000010020-1