SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A002100010013-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: September 9, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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Nw-i `' Top Secret
MEMORANDUM
Special Assessments on the Middle East Situation
Top Secret
45
9 June 1967
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
9 June 1967
I. TURKEY AND THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS
1. The Turks do not want to become involved in
the Arab-Israeli dispute and see no advantage in
playing an active role in it. They have no aspira-
tions to leadership in the Middle East, but rather
see their interests primarily in terms of their
relationships with the West. Moreover, they feel
that overt active involvement in the Arab-Israeli
controversy--even after the danger of fighting is
past--would risk considerable liabilities to them-
selves without any commensurate prospect of signifi-
cantly influencing the course of events.
2. In recent years the Turks have trid to
improve their relations with the Arabs in order to
gain support in the Cyprus dispute. (Turkish-Iraqi
relations have been quite cordial in recent months.)
Turkish hopes to receive such backing were fanned by
Arab overtures during the current c~-isis offering
assistance to Turkey on the Cyprus issue. The Turks
are unwilling to jeopardize the prospect of this sup-
port by moves that might alienate the Arabs.
3. At the same time, the Turkish Government
views Nasir with considerable suspicion
Turkish leaders are not swayed by
p eas or Islamic solidarity against Israel. Indeed,
they are at bottom sympathetic to the Israelis, with
whom they may strengthen an already close relation-
ship
They are also concerned that
any move to assist the Arabs would run afoul of the
US, for the Turkish leaders believe that the US bas-
ically favors the Israelis.
4. Hence, the Turks are following an overtly
neutral posture and probably would prefer to confine
themselves to support for any solution adopted by
the UN. The Turkish Government feels particularly
anxious to avoid getting involved in promoting any
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Western (i.e., NATO) solution, which by its very origin
might alienate the Arabs. Also the Turks do not want
to disturb their present relationships with the Soviets
whom they see as backing the activist Arab states, es-
pecially the UAR and Syria. Indeed, the Turkish
leaders are concerned at the prospect that the Arab-
Israeli dispute might become to some extent an exten-
sion of the Cold War.
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II. IRANIAN ATTITUDES AND POLICIES
1. Iran is taking a cautious approach to the
Middle East war, although the Shah's sympathies lie
with the Israelis. Iran has good relations with
Israel, and Iranian crude oil meets 80 percent of
Israeli requirements. Hatred of Egyptian President
Nasir and fear of his ambitions in the Persian Gulf
have been an important factor in Iranian foreign
policy, and the Shah would be happy to see him de-
stroyed. Nevertheless, the Shah does not want to
endanger the relations Iran has painstakingly devel-
oped with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, and Iraq.
2. Iran has been under pressure from these Arab
countries since the crisis first developed to stop
selling oil to Israel and to support, strongly the
Arab cause. The Iranian Government vigorously denied
that it was selling oil to Israel., although the gov-
ernment-owned National Iranian Oil Company does in
fact supply a large proportion of Iranian crude ship-
ments to Israel. On 31 May the government issued a
statement of support for the "legitimate rights of
Moslem peoples." The press has attempted to strike
a balance between criticism of Nasir and expressions
of Moslem solidarity.
3. In private, the Shah has told US officials
on 5 June that he hoped Nasir's forces would be
humiliated, and that he thought the long-range US
objective should be Nasir's destruction. He reit-
erated his long-standing thesis that US attempts to
cultivate Nasir had merely whetted his aggressive
tendencies, and, in general, seems to be taking an
"I told you so" approach,
4. Although Iran has established good relations
with the more moderate Arab states--particularly
Jordan and Saudi Arabia--the extent of the Shah's
influence over their leaders is probably quite lim-
ited. Apparently the Shah has already urged King
Husayn and King Faysal not to break relations with
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the US, but such exhortations probably serve only
as moral support for a course of action those
monarchs would prefer to follow anyway.
5. The Shah has indicated his intention to
continue oil shipments without interruption as normal
commercial transactions
Apparently shipments of refined
products from Abadan have been unable to travel down
the Shatt-al-Arab because of the refusal of Iraqi
pilots to guide the ships. To the best of its abil-
ity, however, Iran is expected to continue oil ship-
ments to the US and Western Europe. In fact, the
Shah would probably snap up any chance to increase
oil revenues. Presumably Iran will also continue
selling oil to the Israelis unless Arab pressure
gets much more severe.
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III. THE SITUATION IN JORDAN
1. King Husayn's viability depends in large
part on the character of changes in Syria and Iraq
as peace returns, on the degree of Israeli withdrawal
from the West Bank, on Nasir's possible demise and
on the over-all-make-up of the postwar Middle East
2. The most immediate threats to Husayn's via-
bility are the continued Israeli-Syrian hostilities
and the ability of the public security service to
maintain order when the numbness from battle wears
thin and the shock of the total disaster is fully
realized by the Jordanian population. This test of
the public security force will probably come during
the next several days. Their abilities to maintain
order will remain critical for close to a month.
Each day that there is no or little trouble in the
form of popular-' demonstrations the odds for sur-
vival increase in Husayn's favor. At present there
is no evidence of active public animos'it_y toward
the regime; reports from Beirut, not necessarily
reflective of other Arab attitudes, rate Husayn's
public image high for courage and the heroism with
which his army fought.
3. Husayn will suffer in the long term from
any permanent loss of territory. However, he can
probably survive, albeit in shaky condition, for
the short term if he loses only the Old City por-
tion of Jerusalem and minor strategic points along
the previous (prior to 5 June) Israeli-Jordanian
border. This estimate is based on the assumption
that the UAR will also suffer some permanent terri-
torial losses such as strategic portions of Sinai,
including the Gaza Strip and Sharm ash-Shaykh.
4. It is doubtful that Husayn could retain
his throne beyond six months if the Israelis retain
permanently all the territory they hold as of this
date.
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5. The GOJ estimates that there are 29,000-
30,000 refugees in the East Bank who arrived there
during the Israeli seizure of the West Bank. The
GOJ believes it can house and feed these refugees
temporarily. It is doubtful that it could do so
beyond a one-two month period. As the refugees can
be expected to number among their ranks many of the
leading political figures of the West Bank their
presence in and around Amman will definitely increase
the public security load on the police and the Husayn
regime. It will probably be sometime, however, be-
fore the full impact of the refugee pressure will be-
come operative against Husayn and his regime.
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Top Secret `r V
Top Secret
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