THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A002100010016-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 25, 2006
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: June 11, 1967
• Content Type: IM

Approved Foi4~lease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T008 0210' Qp
MEMORANDUM
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
The Situation in Vietnam
State Dept. review completed
ret /(0
Top Secret
I 3
11 June 1967
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO02100010016-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO02100010016-5
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO02100010016-5
 Approve
Information as of 1600
11 June 1967
The Military Directorate has decided to promul-
gate the presidential electoral law without the con-
troversial provision which requires that a candidate
be "introduced" by at least 30 elected officials.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
No heavy fighting was reported in South Vietnam
over the weekend although sporadic activity accounted
for a number of friendly casualties (Paras. 1-4).
recent
rallier reports possible sea infiltration into Binh
Thuan Province (Paras. 8-9).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
The Military Directorate has apparently decided to
override the Provisional National Assembly's require-
ment in the presidential election law for the "in-
troduction" of candidates (Para. 1). The Directorate
has sent a number of recommendations to the assembly
for changing several provisions of the upper house
electoral law (Paras. 2-4). Presidential candidate
Tran Van Huong airs his views on his candidacy and
peace negotiations (Paras. 5-7).
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
US Navy aircraft attacked the Hanoi thermal power
plant for the third time (Para. 1). Eight US
planes were lost over the weekend (Para. 2).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: There
is nothing of significance to report.
Approv0d For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826A002100010Q16-5
 Approved For ease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T008252100010016-5
pa Nang
.,QO
CA i afa Vane ( OUANG NAM /\ -
OUANG TIN Chu Lai
UE \PBo,G
VINH
BINH
dtit& Specs
Le Hong Phong 'Secret Zone'
^11 UOC
LONG
TUYEN
Da Lat.
DUC
66874 6-67 CIA
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826A002100010016-5
,
 Approve
I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. No heavy ground fighting was reported
throughout South Vietnam over the weekend, although
a number of sporadic military engagements and sev-
eral guerrilla-type harassments directed against
government installations accounted for a number of
friendly casualties.
2. Early on 10 June, Communist forces in Pleiku
Province directed approximately 120 rounds of 82-mm.
mortar fire into the provincial capital during a 30-
minute attack. Due to adverse weather, the terrain,
and the distances involved countermortar radar was
unable to locate the enemy positions and effective
counterfire could not be employed. The Communist
fire was directed against three US installations--
an artillery group, the bivouac area of two logisti-
cal units, and the provincial headquarters--and the
Truong Son Revolutionary Development Training Center.
Friendly forces suffered casualties of 26 killed
(two US) and 121 wounded (50 US) while the enemy
reportedly suffered only three killed.
3. Allied operations reported two favorable
contacts with VC/NVA forces over the weekend. In the
upper Mekong Province of Long An, a US infantry com-
pany participating in Operation ENTERPRISE engaged
an estimated reinforced enemy platoon on 10 June.
In a subsequent series of contacts, US forces suc-
ceeded in killing 42 of the enemy without suffering
a single casualty. Also, on 10 June ARVN forces
commenced Operation CUU LONG 65 in Dinh Tuong Prov-
ince south of Long An. Initial reports from that
operation indicate that the South Vietnamese forces
killed 45 of the enemy and captured 12 weapons while
suffering only four killed and 26 wounded.
Operation AKRON Begins
4. On 9 June, US and ARVN forces initiated
Operation AKRON, a clearing operation in an area
covering portions of Bien Hoa, Long Khanh, and Phuoc
Tuy provinces. The primary objective of the operation
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826A00210001001 ?-5
 Approve
is the neutralization of the Hot Dich - Phuoc Chi
base area. Concurrent with a search for the esti-
mated 1,400 Communist forces reportedly in the area,
security will be provided for jungle clearing opera-
tions. Units participating in the operation in-
clude elements of the US 1st Brigade/9th Infantry
Division and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and one
ARVN ranger battalion. As of 11 June, no signifi-
cant enemy contact had been reported.
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826A00210001 8016-5
 Appro
8. Iwho rallied
on 23 May in Binh Thuan Province indicated that the
Viet Cong in Binh Thuan were expecting to receive sup-
plies via sea infiltration. Although the rallier was
unable to provide any estimate of when such infiltra-
tion would occur, he stated that the supplies--small
arms and mortars--would be off-loaded in the vicinity
of the Le Hong Phong "Secret Zone" and would be used
to rearm the 482nd Battalion and two local force com-
panies. In addition, the rallier claimed that this
was to be the first effort to resupply Viet Cong forces
in Binh Thuan by sea and that in the past all arms had
been transported overland through Lam Dong Province.
9. In view of recent Communist efforts to secure
their overland infiltration route, primarily
the expansion of their con-
trol in Lam Dong Province, it seems unlikely that they
would risk sea infiltration when the overland routes
appear to be satisfying their supply requirements.
Recent increased enemy activity in Binh Thuan appears
to indicate that the Communists are not hard pressed
for supplies.
Approv0d For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO02100010016-5
 Approved
1. According to a report from the US Embassy
in Saigon, the Military Directorate, following a
9 June meeting, has decided to promulgate the
presidential electoral law without Article 10 (7),
the controversial provision which requires that a
candidate be "introduced" by at least 30 elected
officials. By this action, the Directorate will,
in effect, override: the Provisional National As-
sembly's (PNA). previous vote in favor of this-measure,
and may, as a result, cause further strains to de-
velop between the two bodies.
2. Also as a result of the 9 June meeting,
the Directorate in a strongly worded message for-
mally asked the PNA to make several changes in
the upper house electoral law which is currently
under consideration in that body. Chief among
the Directorate's recommendations to the PNA was
that the upper house elections be held concurrently
with the presidential election now set for 3 Sep-
tember and not in December as presently scheduled.
A second change recommended in law was that voters
be allowed to cast a ballot for all six lists of
candidates rather than only one. This recommenda-
tion 25X1
went against Premier Ky's strong
argument in favor of allowing voters to cast their
ballots for two lists of candidates.
3. The Directorate's third recommendation to
the PNA called for the revision of the amendment
which deals with the elimination of upper house
candidates who are either Communists or pro-Commu-
nist neutralists. As the amendment now stands,
only candidates who are adjudged to belong to
either of the two categories will be stricken from
the list while their running mates and qualified
alternates will be allowed to run. The Direc-
torate's request calls for the elimination of the
entire slate if any member is found to be a Communist
or ro-Communist neutralist. 25X1
25X1
Approved or Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826A002100010016-
 Approve
The Directorate's message to the assembly also in-
cluded the suggestion, but not the formal request,
that the size of the upper house be reduced from
its present proposed membership of 60 ?o 40.
4. In order to provide sufficient time for
the establishment of the machinery for the upper
house election, the assembly will have to make some
haste in passing the upper chamber electoral law
especially if it intends to incorporate the Direc-
torate's recommendations in it.
from three
to three-and one-half tnonths are needed to set
up the machinery for such an election. Therefore,
if the law is promulgated by 15 June there will be
enough time to complete arrangements for compliance
with the Directorate's requested 3 September dead-
line.
Tran Van Huong Views His Candidacy and Peace
5. Presidential candidate Tran Van Huong in
a recent conversation I uin-
dicated that he feels he does not need a political
party to win the forthcoming presidential election.
According to Huong, the Vietnamese are politically
unsophisticated and do not cast a ballot on the
basis of the issues but rather on the basis of the
fame and prominence of the candidate.
6. Huong maintained that it would be "impos-
sible" for him to make any deals with a military can-
didate. While he advanced several reasons for this
assertion, the overriding one seemed to be that he
wants to be president and that any lesser position
would not suit him. He also stated that it would
be impossible for him to make any deals with civilian
candidates, as it would be "unethical" for him to
ask others to withdraw their candidacy and he would
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO02100010016-5
 Approv
not attempt to buy them off. Huong was emphatic in
stating that he had not promised a position in his
government to any other candidate in order to gain
that candidate's suort.
7. On the issue of bringing peace to Vietnam,
Huong stated his belief that ending the war is
primarily a Vietnamese concern and that any settle-
ment must be negotiated between Saigon and Hanoi.
Huong said that in recent months talks regarding
that settlement of the Vietnamese problem have mainly
been a dialogue between the US and North Vietnam--
an approach which he considers invalid. He feels
that the principal US role in any peace talks should
be to support the negotiations of the GVN, although
he did not object to US participation in such talks.
Huong rejects as unrealistic any effort of the United
Nations to settle the Vietnamese problem.
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826A002100010016-5
 Approved For Fase 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T008262100010016-5
?
Nghia Lo
? Yen a
Hai -
Duong~-
Hung Yen
Phu Ly I
Nam
Ninh Binh
: E l
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO02100010016-5
 Approv
III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. Carrier-based US Navy planes employing tele-
vision guided missiles struck the Hanoi thermal power
plant for the third time in as many weeks on 10 June.
A preliminary review of 25X1
the raid indicated apparent amage at the junction
of the three boiler houses and the generator hall,
although the quality of the photography precluded
detailed interpretation of the extent of damage.
Strike pilots reported that their missiles were de-
livered on target and were observed to guide and
explode on or inside the face of the generator hall.
2. The power plant strike was part of a three-
carrier-coordinated raid which also included as tar-
gets supply depots in the Hanoi area. Pilots on the
raids reported intense surface-to-air missile (SAM)
and antiaircraft fire which accounted for the loss
of an F-8 Crusader and an A-4E Skyhawk. Six addi-
tional US planes were lost over the weekend to
a mix of antiaircraft and SAM fire, and several MIG
engagements were also reported with no losses counted
on either side.
Approv0d For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826A002100010016-5
 Top 9#1~t' For W (ease 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP79T008264002100010016-5
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO02100010016-5