SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A002100010022-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: June 12, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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MEMORANDUM
Special Assessments on the Middle East Situation
Top Secret
45
12 June 1967
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
12 June 1967
NASIR'S SITUATION AND POSITION AMONG THE LEADERS
1. The wide-scale and largely spontaneous demands
in Egypt that Nasir continue in office have demonstrated
that no early replacement of Nasir is likely. Nasir
probably counted on getting a favorable reaction to
his resignation, though he many have been prepared to
step down if sentiment ran against him. While he is
unlikely to be thrown out of office, there is some ques-
tion as to the extent of his power. He may be forced
to take advice from top associates, and the wholesale
changes in the military command are probably designed
at least in part to head off unrest among the officers
over the debacle.
2. It would be the sheerest speculation to es-
timate Nasir's chances for survival over the long term
until some clear idea of the dimensions of a peace
settlement can be formed. At most, we can say that he
probably will not be able to convert this debacle into
a smashing victory as he did in 1956. As the extent
of Egypt's humiliation becomes known, resentment
against him is likely to grow. It is unlikely that
any group seeking to oust Nasir would try to do so at
a time when it would appear to be capitalizing on Is
raeli successes, for it would be highly vulnerable
to charges of being "agents of imperialism." In the
long run, disillusion over Nasir's performance will
probably manifest itself in greater discontent within
Egypt than he has hitherto faced and in time this
might lead to a coup. But, for some time, the im-
mediate traumatic effects of the defeat impel the
Egyptians to stick with Nasir and seek other scape-
goats.
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4. The state of Nasir's relations with his fel-
low Arabs varies. His prestige has suffered greatly
with the Arab governments. Yet, as demonstrations in
dozens of cities testify, he still enjoys wide public
popularity. A very large number of people accept the
story that Israel could only have crushed Egypt with
the assistance of the US and UK. Nasir has succeeded
in associating many others with him in defeat, and
this tends to mute expressions of discontent. He is
trying to reassert leadership through the mechanism
of the summit meeting of Arab chiefs of state. But it
is an indication of his weakened position that he feels
it necessary to have another leader associated with him
in calling for such a meeting.
5. Even in defeat, Nasir is unwilling to drop all
old quarrels; he remains on bad terms with King Faysal
of Saudi Arabia. The Egyptian leader failed to mention
Saudi Arabia among those states which "adopted honorable
attitudes" in the crisis, though the latter sent troI
o s
to Jordan and stopped oil shipments to the US and UK
6. Jordan's Husayn has a good public image as a
loyal colleague of Nair who fought bravely and whose
defeat was no worse than Egypt's.
IThe other monarc ies
have made gestures o support--stopping oil shipments,
sending small numbers of troops. The monarchs generally,
as well as Tunisia's Bourguiba, are pleased that Nasir
has been defeated. They share the general Arab shame
and bitterness at Israel, however, for having inflicted
such a defeat. While all the Arab conservatives would
feel obliged publicly to associate themselves with
Nasir's moves against Israel, they would probably be
far more reluctant to follow Nasir's lead in adopting
measures against Western powers, e.g., nationalizing
oil, which would seriously harm their interests.
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7. Of the revolutionary states, Algeria is
disgusted at the humiliating collapse of the UAR
Army.
gerians
are
suspicious
ot
probably
are
unwilling
to
tige among the Arabs. Boumediene's current trip
to Moscow may indicate an intention to upstage Nasir.
Syria, berated last week by Cairo and Amman for
failing to join vigorously in the fight, has re-
gained some stature and sympathy in Cairo as a re-
sult of its 9 and 10 June fighting with the Israelis.
We know little of the present situation in Damas-
cus; the leadership is probably badly shaken. There
was serious infighting among regime leaders prior
to hostilities, and changes at the top are likely.
The attitudes of such an altered regime to Nasir
are not predictable at this time.
8. In the past year, Iraq had evolved a po-
sition of balance between Cairo and other Middle
Eastern capitals. It participated in a joint po-
litical leadership with Egypt, but sought better
relations with Iran and Turkey. Radical sentiment
has risen in the present situation; a number of
pro-Nasir politicians have been released from de-
tention. Despite the UAR's defeat, it is likely
to have a fair amount of influence in Baghdad in
coming months, although Iraqi moderation is likely
to reassert itself in time.
9. Until armistice arrangements have been
worked out, the Arabs will feel considerable pres-
sure to stay together. The emotions wrought by
the conflict will encourage this sense of solidarity.
However, a number of the Arab states--particularly
the oil exporters--realize that their interests are
not served by taking anti-Western positions. Hence
asir s a i ities and
help restore Nasir's pres-
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the disposition of these states to follow Nasir's
lead will be limited. In sum, there will probably
be a large measure of solidarity in opposing Israel
and rather less in supporting Nasir.
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