SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A002100010058-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 58
• Publication Date: June 20, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
MEMORANDUM
Special Assessments on the Middle East Situation
SOVIET PREMIER KOSYGIN'S UN SPEECH, 19 JUNE 1967
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20 June 1967
No. 0659/67
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
20 June 1967
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Soviet Premier Kosygin's UN
Speech, 19 June 1967
1. Kosygin's speech at the General Assembly
yesterday combined a severe attack on Israel with
an effort to appear statesmanlike and generally
moderate. The aim seemed to be to pull as many
Assembly members as possible toward the Soviet
position on the Arab-Israeli question without re--
sorting,to bombast assuming extreme poses.
2. Throughout, Kosygin spught to portray
Soviet policy around the world as consonant with
the objectives of the UN, in.contrast with the US,
whose conduct in the Middle East, in Vietnam, and
elsewhere endangered international stability. His
presentation was undramatic, however, and did not
bring any new or more serious Soviet charges
against either Israel or the US.
3. The Soviet leader made it clear that he
did not regardrthe General Assembly session as an
end in itself or as the place for bringing forward
constructive proposals with regard to the Middle
East. The draft resolution he put forward called
on the Assembly to condemn Israeli "aggression,"
demand Israeli troop withdrawals, call for Israeli
restitution to the Arabs, and to return to the
Security Council for further "effective measures."
He ducked two of the most pressing immediate issues:
the question of direct Arab-Israeli talks and
Israeli access to either the Suez Canal or the
Gulf of Aqaba.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence.
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4. Kosygin's references to the US role in the
Middle East were on the whole temperate and unprov-
ocative. While charging that "imperialist circles...
took practical action which might have been inter-
preted by Israeli extremists solely as direct en-
couragement to commit acts of aggression," he came
nowhere near alleging that the US had intervened
directly in the hostilities. Whether Kosygin in-
tended to keep the door open for private talks with
the US, he seems to have chosen his words,so as not
to raise obstacles to such talks. In a general ref-
erence to the undesirability of arms'races, he
indicated Soviet concern over a problem which Pres-
ident Johnson had mentioned earlier in the day.
Kosygin may also have been intimating the possibility
of US-Soviet conversations when he said that it
would be good if the great powers "found common
language to reach decisions meeting the interests
of peace in the Middle East and the interests of
universal peace."
5. The Soviet premier made a not-so-magnan-
imous concession in the direction of Israel when he
said that "every people enjoys the right to estab-
lish an independent national state of its own."
Otherwise, for the benefit of the Arabs, Kosygin
was harsh and unrelenting toward the Israelis, even
to the point of accusing them of behaving as the
Nazis did. He said nothing to encourage the Arabs
to be conciliatory.
6. Kosygin made it clear that the chief Soviet
aim is to bring pressure on Israel to withdraw its
troops from captured Arab territory. From the Soviet
point of view, a good outcome in the General
Assembly would be a simple resolution calling for
such a withdrawal. The Soviet resolution goes well
beyond this, probably in the hope that the Assembly
will, by way of compromise, deliver an acceptable
half-loaf.
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Talking Paper for Soviet Premier Ko gin's UN Speech,
19 June 1967
1. This memo is designed to report the highlights
of Kosygin's address to the UN General Assembly and to
discuss its aims and general tone. Kosygin, the memo says,
combined a severe attack on Israel with an effort to appear
statesmanlike and generally moderate.
2. Routine internal and external dissemination is re-
commended.
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