SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION-- ARAB SOLIDARITY IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A002200080001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 23, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
MEMORANDUM
Special Assessments on the Middle East Situation
ARAB SOLIDARITY IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS
Secret
66
23 June 1967
No. 0663/67
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
23 June 1967
Arab Solidarity in the Next Few Months
1. The Arabs demonstrated impressive solidarity
during the recent conflict. Unlike 1956, this time
all Israel's neighbors except Lebanon took part in
the battle. The conservative monarchies put aside
their long-standing disputes with the radical pan-
Arab nationalists to join in the popular cause against
Israel. Now, following their defeat, the Arab leaders
are trying to chart their course for the future.
2. The war brought changes to the Arab world.
One of the most notable has been the weakening of
Nasir's prestige among the Arab leaders. Not only
did the inept performance of Egyptian armed forces
earn him little credit among his fellow Arabs, but
his credibility was called into question by his ini-
tial concealment of the loss of his air force. Now
Nasir has to share the limelight with such hereto-
fore secondary figures as Boumediene of Algeria, and
to a degree with even King Husayn of Jordan. None-
theless, the willingness of the Soviets to continue
to support Nasir and his forces and the lack of an
alternative candidate with the necessary stature and
appeal to the masses make it unlikely that a new per-
sonality will soon win recognition as a paramount
leader. Hence the Arab world must face the critical
period of peace making without any clearly acknowl-
edged leader,
3. Another important change has been the broad
upsurge of popular hostility toward the US and the
UK as a result of the war. Most conservative and
moderate Arab leaders doubt Nasir's canard about
US-UK military participation in the conflict, but
all resent US sympathy and support for Israel and
all feel under pressure to retaliate. This anti-
American sentiment has not only undermined US in-
fluence among the conservatives, but has contributed
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to a general rise in radicalism throughout the area.
This has strengthened internal opposition, partic-
ularly to the conservative regimes in Libya and
Saudi Arabia which were not in the forefront of the
conflict with Israel.
4. However, the Arabs have shown a clear lack
of unity in their policy toward the US and the UK.
The more radical Arab regimes have broken relations
with the US and are urging far-reaching political
and economic retaliation. This the moderates are
unwilling to accept. Indeed, the Arab foreign min-
isters' meeting in Kuwait on 18 June appears to
have broken up in disagreement over sanctions to be
applied against the US. While in the heat of the
crisis the oil producing states bowed to pressures
for an oil boycott of English and American markets,
this united front is already cracking. Saudi Arabia
will probably soon drop its boycott. There is a
good chance that most of the other oil producing
countries will follow suit not long after. Similarly,
the odds are good that Morocco will ignore demands
to close American facilities, though Libya may feel
impelled to carry through its decision to remove
American and British bases there.
5. A key test of Arab solidarity will be its
success in concerting action against Israel. All
Arabs want to see Israel forced to disgorge its re-
cent conquests. Continuing Israeli occupation of
these lands and Israel's insistence on broad political
gains will provide further impetus to Arab coopera-
tion. Yet there is some diversity in approach even
to these matters. The losses of war have brought
home to Husayn the need for accommodation with Israel,
though he is unwilling to risk breeching the common
Arab front by alone engaging in even indirect ex-
ploratory negotiations with the Israelis. Husayn,
however, is seeking to convene an Arab summit meet-
ing in an effort to strengthen the hands of the mod-
erates. For his part Nasir has not been enthusiastic
about holding such a meeting, probably because he
fears challenges to his leadership and possibly be-
cause he has not evolved a suitable policy to turn
military defeat to political advantage. Particularly
in view of Syrian and Algerian opposition, it is un-
likely that this meeting will be held in the near
future. Such a failure would demonstrate that the
prospects for meaningful Arab solidarity have weakened.
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6. Dim as Arab chances for acting in concert
appear to be, we do not expect any imminent return
to the strident propaganda wars which have at times
past characterized intra-Arab relations. Suspicion
between the radicals and conservatives may grow;
Syria and Jordan are already again annoyed at each
other. The increasing violence in South Arabia will
also probably contribute strains to Arab coopera-
tion. Yet as defeat has shaken virtually all Arab
regimes, we believe no state wishes to agitate long-
ld
s
standing disputes, at least as long as Israel .ho
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