SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION SOVIET MILITARY BASES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A002200250001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 27, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Rele2001/04/10 : CIA-RDP79TOO826AOO0250001-4
Secret
MEMORANDUM
Special Assessments on the Middle East Situation
SOVIET MILITARY BASES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Secret
27 June 1967
No. 0665/67
X.r
69
Approved For Release 2001/04/10 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO02200250001-4
 Approved For Release 1/04/10: CIA-RDP79T00826AO0220^001-4
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED PROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGHADINO AND
DECLA3$IF'ICATION
Approved or a ease - -
 Approved For Rele r 2001/04/10 5 RW9T00826AOO p0250001-4
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
27 June 1967
Soviet Military Bases in the Middle East
Summary
It is unlikely that the USSR is seeking naval
and other military bases in the UAR, Iraq, Syria, and
Algeria. The Soviets would be abandoning a long held
policy, would risk arousing anticolonial sentiments
directed against themselves in the Arab world, and
even hostile reactions in Eastern Europe. Above all,
they would be committing themselves to direct involve-
ment in any future fighting in the area, a course of
action they seek to avoid. There is likely, however,
to be an influx of Soviet advisers, trainers, and
technicians into the area and there is likely to be
increased use by the USSR of Arab port and air facili-
ties.
Except in the very unlikely event that the rev-
olutionary Arab states felt Soviet bases the only
means of preventing an imminent Israeli attack and
assuring their survival, none of them would seek or
agree to any foreign--including Soviet--base on their
soil. Though they might feel tempted to seek such a
base as a means of providing additional security and
a guarantee of Soviet involvement in a future war,
their xenophobia and fear of losing their independ-
ence would probably prevail. They are likely to per-
mit greater Soviet use of existing privileges, how-
ever, e.g., landing and overflight rights in the area.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/04/10 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO02200250001-4
 Approved For ReleaW2001/04/10 SbC T00826A00390250001-4
The Soviet Side
1. There is little doubt that the Soviets were
surprised by the outbreak of the Middle East war
and appalled by its outcome. They had surely reck-
oned both that their relationship with the "progres-
sive" Arab states would count for more than it did
as a deterrent to Israel and that, if it came to war,
the Arabs would give a better account of themselves
than they did. In the aftermath of the fighting, the
Russians must assess promptly not only their political
position in the Middle East but also the scope and
terms of their future military commitment. The need
for an assessment is all the more urgent, if, as is
probable, Nasir has been pressing to know what mili-
tary assistance the USSR intends to give him. The
missions to Cairo of President Podgorny and Marshal
Zakharov and parallel missions to Damascus which are
evidently in the offing are, we believe, elements in
this assessment.
2. There is as yet no firm intelligence on what
passed between Podgorny and Nasir. The Yugoslavs,
with whom Podgorny visited en route to Cairo, have
conveyed the information that he intended to indi-
cate to the UAR that there were limits to the Soviet
commitment. Other reports allege 25X6
that the Soviets have aske e gyp cans or base
rights and that these are also being sought in Syria,
Algeria, and Iraq. Such a request from the Russians
would have to rest on the claim that without facili-
ties in the area they would be unable to intervene
effectually on behalf of the Arabs in the event of
new hostilities. The Russians might also expect that
by this means their diplomacy with respect to the
Middle East could be made more credible and their
ability to monitor the military intentions of the
Arab regimes improved.
3. This would be a bold step on the part of
the Russians. It would announce that they are not
satisfied merely to preserve the position they have
-2-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/04/10 : CIA-RDP79T00826A002200250001-4
 Approved For Relea'2001/04/10 k@T9T00826AO02 A0250001-4
achieved in the Middle East but discern in the present
turmoil an opportunity to imbed themselves still
deeper. It would also be a risky venture.
4. The conflict has not, we believe, diminished
the disadvantages to the USSR of such a course of ac-
tion. The damage to the Soviet image among the non-
aligned nations to whom it looks for diplomatic sup-
port in the present circumstances would be considerable
and the argument that imperialist ambitions are at the
root of the trouble in the Middle East would lose much
of its forced The allegation that the Western powers
are to blame for bringing the Cold War into the area
could be turned against the USSR. There would be sus-
picion and anxiety about Soviet purposes among the
Mediterranean states as well as among the European
nations, especially those who rely heavily on the Suez
Canal. Moscow might, in addition, find it hard to
keep the majority of East European states behind its
Middle East policy and would certainly forfeit the
cooperation of the Yugoslavs.
5. Above and beyond these political hazards
are the military risks the Soviets would face by mov-
ing directly into the area. If there were renewed
fighting, they could not claim that they were too
far away to help. To a degree not precisely known
to them, they would have harnessed their fortunes to
a group of radical Arab leaders whose actions have
proven unpredictable and whose political futures are
not entirely certain. The likelihood of being drawn
into local conflict and closer toward a military col-
lision with the US would increase sharply.
6. The Soviets are for now more interested in
protecting their winnings in the Middle East than in
raising their stake. There seems to be no way they
can avoid a further substantial outlay in military
assistance though they can try to spread the cost of
this among their East European allies. Negotiations
have apparently already begun to establish the amounts
and conditions and perhaps also on new arrangements
for training. This might result in a substantial in-
flux of Soviet military advisers and technicians into
-3-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/04/10 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO02200250001-4
 Approved For Relea 2001/04/10 S t A T00826AO02 ib250001-4
the Arab countries which would give the Russians bet-
ter assurances concerning the state of Arab military
forces, and better intelligence on Arab military in-
tentions. We do not expect the Soviets to go so far
as to ask for bases on Arab soil.
The Arab Side
7. Prior to the recent war with Israel, there
seemed almost no chance that Nasir would tolerate the
presence of Soviet (or any other foreign) naval or
military bases on UAR territory. His views were
shared by his fellow Arab revolutionaries in Algeria,
Iraq, and Syria. The crushing defeat of their forces,
however, which will leave the Arabs at least for a
time completely unprotected from Israeli attack, may
have changed this attitude. There now may be a greater
receptivity among the leaders of these states to a
formal Soviet military presence. Indeed, in the un-
likely event they judged an Israeli attack imminent,
the UAR and Syria probably would welcome such an ar-
rangement were it the only means of national survival.
Neither Algeria nor Iraq, of course, would be faced
with this contingency.
8. Even if resumption of Arab-Israeli hostili-
ties does not seem imminent, the revolutionary Arabs
might see some advantages in having Soviet bases on
their soil. Syria and the UAR could reason that the
simple existence of a Russian base on their territory
would powerfully inhibit any future Israeli military
move against them. All the revolutionary Arab states
could consider even a small Soviet Soviet military pres-
ence there as the first step in getting the Russians so
deeply involved that they could not fail to intervene
in a future Arab-Israeli war. Further, some militant
Arab leaders--particularly the Syrians--who speak of new
and extended campaigns of terrorism and guerrilla war-
fare, might consider a Soviet base a necessary shield
against otherwise inevitable Israeli reprisals. Also,
in the postwar era,. some Arab governments, particularly
Syria, might feel so weak domestically that they would
seek Soviet armed forces simply to protect them from
their enemies at home.
-4-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/04/10 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO02200250001-4
 Approved For Releasq,2001/04/10 : br00826A002g250001-4
9. There remain strong arguments, however,
against the Arabs changing their minds about ac-
cepting any Soviet bases. Our knowledge of the
attitudes of the Egyptian and Syrian leadership
is limited, but we do not believe they feel that
another Israeli attack is either imminent or
likely, and that their survival is thus contin-
gent on the presence of Soviet military forces
in the area. Rather, they probably agree that
the US-USSR sponsored cease-fire will hold. They
probably think the Israelis, now seeking polit-
ical rewards for their military victory, are un-
likely to risk antagonizing the US and world
opinion with new military ventures.
10. Militating against any Arab move to
accept Soviet forces in the post-war era as a
shield for terrorist activity, as a deterrent
to future Israeli strikes, or even as protec-
tion from domestic insurrection, will be the en-
hanced distrust of the Soviets by the radical
Arab leaders themselves. The latter are aware
that Moscow counseled caution and restraint be-
fore the war; they remember that the Soviets
never endorsed the closing of the Strait of
Tiran; they cannot forget that the Soviets re-
fused to save them from ensuing disaster.
11. Arab leaders would almost certainly
fear that Soviet forces on Arab territory might
attempt to ensure that future policies would be
those of Moscow?s choosing rather than of the
Arabs. The latter, whose xenophobic suspicion
of outsiders is never much below the surface,
would hardly risk sacrificing their independence
to a major power whose aims have recently been
at variance with their own. In these circum-
stances, their long-standing aversion to foreign
bases will come to the fore. On balance there-
fore, it is unlikely that an Arab government,
even the ultra-leftist Syrian one, would abandon
its traditional hostility to foreign bases and
permit Russian forces on its territory.
12. On the other hand, most of the countries
discussed above are 1ke1 accept an enlarged
-5-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/04/10 : CIA-RDP79T00826A002200250001-4
 Approved For Releaft.E001/04/10 : ' IE716T00826A0022QP250001-4
Soviet presence in the form of additional techni-
cians and trainers, expanded maintenance facilities
and the like. Along with these will be a greater
show of the Soviet flag--particularly in the form
of naval calls, and visit of important Soviet mili-
tary figures. In the process, the Russians will
keep the advantages they now have in such things
as overflight rights, secure storage areas, air-
craft fueling and repairing facilities, and use
of ports and airfields in the area. They may seek
more privileges of this type. It is unlikely, how-
ever, that the Egyptians or other Arabs would agree
to a Soviet force of such a size as to pose a threat
to their freedom of action.
-6-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/04/10 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO02200250001-4
 Approved For Release01/04/10 : CIA-RDP79TOO826AO022OQ60001-4
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2001/04/10 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO02200250001-4