THE SITUATION IN HANOI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A002300170001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 7, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
THE SITUATION IN HANOI
Secret
.. 16
7 July 1967
No. 0669/67
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Background Use Only
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
8 July 1967
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Hanoi
Summary
During the period 25 April-10 June 1967 a total
of 420 sorties were flown against significant military
and economic targets in the Hanoi area, including
eight JCS-designated fixed targets. There have been
no attacks against such targets since 10 June. The
attacks have caused significant disruptions to normal
life in Hanoi. There has been, however, no sign of
a change in Hanoi's determination to continue the war
or in its attitude on a political settlement. Despite
the attacks, the discipline of the people and their
willingness to endure hardship appear to be holding up.
About one-half of Hanoi's population has been
evacuated as have some industries and most of the gov-
ernment ministries. Food and water supplies have
become tighter, more expensive and less reliable but
all essential requirements continue to be met. The
transportation system--both within and leading to
Hanoi--performs adequately.
Although the city has only half its normal capacity
to generate electric power, a system of rationing,
alternative sources of power, and a reduced demand
because of dispersal programs make it possible to main-
tain adequate supplies.
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Table
Major Targets Struck in the Hanoi Area
25 April - 10 June 1967
Week Beginning*
Apr. May Jun
9 16 23 30., 7 14 21 28 4
Hanoi Transformer Station 2
Hanoi Railroad Car Repair
Shops, Gia Lam
Hanoi Railroad Highway
Bridge
Yen Vien Railroad Classi-
fication Yard
Ha Dong Army Barracks/
Supply Depot
Van Dien Supply /SAM Depot
Hanoi Thermal Power.Plant
Van Dien Vehicle Depot Complex
Nguyen Khe Military Storage
Kinh No Vehicle Repair
Bac Mai Motor.Pool Facility
*Numbers under weekly, columns. indicate number, of strikes.
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Reappraisal of the Air Strikes Against Targets in Hanoi
Magnitude of the Campaign
1. Since 25 April 1967 a total of eight JCS-
designated fixed targets have been struck within a
ten mile radius of the city of Hanoi. (See Table)
In addition, attacks have been flown against a few
important non-JCS targets, SAM sites, and other anti-
aircraft installations in the area. There have been
no attacks against JCS-fixed targets in the Hanoi
area since the 10 June strike against the Hanoi power-
plant.
2. During the 20 April-10 June campaign 270
sorties were flown and approximately 500 tons of
ordnance were dropped against JCS-designated fixed
targets. At least 150 attack sorties were flown
against non-JCS fixed targets, SAM and AAA sites,
and targets of opportunity within the Hanoi area.
These operations are summarized in the tabulation
below:
Type of Number of Attack Ordnance
Target Targets Sorties (Tons)
Other a/ NA 150 200
a Comprised of non-JCS targets, SAM sites, and
other pre-planned and armed reconnaissance targets
such as bridges, barges, storage areas, and AAA
sites.
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General Effects
3. The bombing of targets in the Hanoi area has
not drastically changed the attitude' of the North
Vietnamese regime toward continuing the war. It has
however, significantly disrupted normal life in the
capital. At the end of May the regime announced some
steps to ease the difficulties caused by the bombing
in the Hanoi area, including the evacuation of all
non-essential people and the construction of addi-
tional air raid shelters. The population was advised
to store kerosene and kerosene lamps and to dig
communal wells.
4. The evacuation program which the regime has
been promotina for well aver a veer was mare ri iu7
bodied people between the ages of 20 and 40 are said
to remain in Hanoi, presumably to carry on essential
economic activity.
5. Reports also indicate.that all of the North
Vietnamese government ministries except Foreign Af-
fairs and National Defense have been evacuated,
leaving only a skeleton staff in Hanoi. Foreign
embassies and legations have been told they are
welcome to evacuate 60 kilometers northwest of
Hanoi. None have accepted the invitation.
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7. Food rations in Hanoi are being maintained
at minimum of 13 kilograms (28.6 pounds) per person
per month with the help of food imports from the
other Communist countries; however, the percentage
of wheat flour or other secondary crops making up
part of the rice ration has increased.
8. Official food prices in Hanoi have not risen
but free market prices have gone up since 1966. Al-
though the official price for rice is about 7 cents
a pound, the free market price in April 1967 was over
45 cents a pound. Meat is in short supply and the
normal meat ration of 150 grams (5.3 ounces) per
month is being met with fat.
9. The amount of damage to civil-ian structures
in Hanoi is remarkably light in view of the intensity
of the attacks on relatively small but heavily de-
fended targets in areas close to civilian housing.
An intensive analysis of post-strike photography
through the 10 April-22 May period of heavy attacks
against Hanoi reveals only 181 civilian structures
destroyed or damaged, 135 of which were located along
one target, the Yen Vien Railroad Classification
Yard. It is probable that an additional 150 houses
were damaged or destroyed as a result of attacks
against the Hanoi Thermal Power Plant, the Ha Dong
Army Barracks and Supply Depot, and the Van Dien
Vehicle Depot early in.June.
Transportation
10. Transportation within Hanoi continues much
as it has in past months. Th,--r,- ;;rp nn indications
of a shortage of gasoline
there are no indications that the electric power
shortage has affected the use of the street car sys-
tem.
11. The requirement for transportation within
Hanoi has also been reduced by the evacuation of
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all people not engaged in essential activity. Large
numbers of people normally rely on bicycles, tricycles,
and ox carts for transportation. Thus, essential
passenger and intra-city freight transportation is
being maintained.
12. The air strikes have been successful in de-
stroying,or damaging key rail and highway bridges
and interdicting important rail yards and sidings,
linking Hanoi with the rest of the country, but North
Vietnamese repair efforts, aided by Chinese Communist
engineering units, have been adequate to maintain
traffic. Virtually all the major bridges on the rail
lines leading into Hanoi from the north and east have
been bypassed, and in some cases, more than one type
of bypass is employed. A bypass to the damaged Hanoi
railroad highway bridge, for example, was in service
within a month of the attack, and the orginal bridge
was completely repaired within six weeks.
13. Although the bombing of the rail system has
produced some adverse effects, the system still has
the capability of transporting sufficient quantities
to support North Vietnam's economy and war effort.
Rail transportation into Hanoi continues. Although
it is disrupted occasionally, it is never completely
stopped. The important roads and waterways leading
to Hanoi have been attacked repeatedly, causing some
difficulties in transport operations but repairs and
countermeasures have effectively maintained traffic
movements. In general, the combined rail, road, and
water transport system into Hanoi has ample capacity
and provides a flexible network for the movement of
supplies. If any one mode is interdicted, the others
are available to ensure the continuation of traffic.
14. Available electric power supply in the Hanoi
area currently is estimated at 20,000 kw to 25,000 kw.
Since late in May, as a result of bomb damage to 3
of 7 boilers, the Hanoi powerplant has been operating
at about one-half its rated capacity of 32,500 kw.
25
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supp],y'is sufficient to cover 40 percent to 50 per-
cent of normal demands.
15. Normal pre-strike power demands for the city
of Hanoi and vicinity ranged from 50,000 kw to 60,000 kw.
This demand was furnished by the Hanoi powerplant,
and by power drawn from the main transmission network
through the Dong Anh substation north of the city.
All of the main powerplants feeding the network and
the Dong Anh substation are out of operation. In
each case, restoration of these facilities to partial
operation will require three months or longer. The
installation of additional diesel generating equipment
could supplement the available power supply but there
is little prospect of significantly improving Hanoi's
power capacity before late summer.
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The dispersal of the population
and of some industry has reduced the normal pre-
strike demand for power. It is likely, therefore,
that the regime is still able to staisfy all
essential power demands in Hanoi.
17. Morale, defined in terms of the discipline
of the people, their confidence in the regime, and
their willingness to endure hardship, appears to be
holding up in Hanoi.
e people are 25X1C
adequately fed and clothed and that their general
attitude ranges from enthusiasm for the war effort
to one of resignation to enduring further hardships.
There have been no reports of open opposition to the
regime.
18. The regime's efforts to keep up the level of
morale has been abetted in Hanoi by the evacuation
of all non-essential people, leaving primarily young
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society most enthusiastic about the war and most
responsive to regime propaganda.
19. The evacuation of old folks and children to
the countryside has, however, placed a considerable
strain on the younger people who have to commute as
best they can from Hanoi to the relocation areas in
order to see their families. The main burden of
establishing the evacuated people in relocation
centers and of housing and feeding them appears to
have fallen on the evacuees themselves. The regime
reportedly has done little to aid in this problem.
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North Vietnam's Political Attitude
21. Authoritative statements by North Vietnamese
leaders in recent weeks have shown no change in
Hanoi's attitude toward a political settlement of
the war or in its determination to pursue the war
until a settlement is reached on its terms. The
DRV Foreign Minister, Nguyen Duy Trinh, was quoted
by an Austrian Communist newsman-on 2 July as
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reiterating the stand he originally spelled out in
January 1967 that North Vietnam would agree to talks
if the US unconditionally ends its air strikes and
all other acts of war against the DRV.
22. Other reports from sources who have talked
with North Vietnamese and Liberation Front officials
in various world capitals confirm that the current
line out of Hanoi is the same as it has been for
the last six months. In Paris, for example, the
DRV press representative recently told 25X10
that the only condition neces-
sary to ring about peace negotiations was a stop
25X10 to the bombing of North Vietnam. In mid-June the
DRV ambassador to Czechoslovakia affirmed that the
cessation of the bombing remains the only precondi-
tion for negotiations. On 26 June, a Liberation
Front official in Zurich told 25X10
that the only way the war in Vietnam can end is i
the US adheres completely to Hanoi's four points:.
23. Hanoi's propaganda treatment of the war in
South Vietnam remains the same as usual, boasting
of alleged victories and confidently predicting
ultimate success for the Communist forces. Regime
statements continue to predict a further buildup
of US forces but affirm the ability of the "libera-
tion forces" to cope with the anticipated increase.
24. In short, it.appears to be business as usual
in Hanoi. There is, however, fairly good evidence
that a foreign policy review is currently taking
place in North Vietnam. A number of DRV diplomats
have been noted returning home in recent weeks,
suggesting that the regime. wishes to consult with
them and to give them some instructions. No hint
has been given as yet, however, as to the substance
of this review. In past years, similar gatherings
of DRV diplomats have been noted but no firm correla-
tion can be made between such recalls and major
policy changes on the part of North Vietnam.
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