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Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 4, 2008
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Publication Date: 
July 21, 1967
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00826A002400200001-7.pdf116.86 KB
Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79T00826A002400200001-7 21 July 1967 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT . The Status of the UN General Assembly Debate 1. After two interruptions this week to give the Soviets more time to try to develop agreement on the text of a substantive resolution, the Gen- eral Assembly is meeting again at 1500 today. Agreement on something more than a procedural res- olution is possible but still unlikely. The US hopes that the special assembly will end today or, at the latest, tomorrow, 2. The Soviets, having asked for the special assembly session, are very reluctant--for reasons of face and their Arab interests--to have it ter- minate without adopting a major substantive res- olution. Additionally, they may be worried that further conflict will occur unless Israel with- draws r that the situation in a Suez Canal area was o great con- cern and that if the Israelis tried to cross the canal the Soviets would be directly involved. He said that the USSR was consequently eager to get effective UN action. He allegedly said that what is needed is a new and much larger UN Emergency Force, possibly of 17,000 men. 3. To gain a resolution incorporating with- drawal, the Soviets have become increasingly willing to make concessions to the Western position--although some of the alleged "compromises" they have offered have been totally unacceptable to the US. On the other hand, they will not back a compromise resolu- tion in open debate unless they can carry the key State Dept. review completed. Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79T00826A002400200001-7 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79T00826A002400200001-7 0 0 Arab states with them, and Algeria and Syria in par- ticular have declined to compromise. The stumbling block has been Arab refusal to accept termination of a state of belligerency as one element of a settle- ment. 4. On 19 July Ambassador Goldberg and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko were able to work out two possible texts to get around the belligerency problem. They provide for the withdrawal of Israeli forces, acknowledgement of the right of all states in the area to maintain an independent national existence and to live in peace and security, and "renunciation of all claims and acts inconsistent therewith"--i.e., belligerency. They request the Security Council to continue examining the situation with a sense of urgency, working directly with the parties and utilizing a UN presence, to achieve a solution of all aspects of the problem, including the refugee question and freedom of transit through international waterways. 5. If the Soviets could obtain Arab agreement to such a resolution, it would probably be tabled today. If, as seems more probable, they cannot, the only likely assembly action would be on a procedural resolution sponsored by Austria, Finland, and Sweden. The exact text of this is still being negotiated, but it will probably recommend that the Security Council urgently resume its consideration of the problem, ask the secretary general to forward the records of the assembly to the Security Council, and state that the assembly would reconvene as and when necessary. E. DREXEL GODFREY, JR. Director of Current Intelligence Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79T00826A002400200001-7 Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79T00826AO02400200001-7 4e Approved For Release 2008/06/04: CIA-RDP79T00826AO02400200001-7