RUMANIA'S NATIONAL COMMUNIST COURSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A002900310001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 20, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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Confidential
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Rumania's National Communist Course
Confidential
20 November 1967
No. 1397/67
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'WARNING
This document ro~~tains information affecti~:~ the national
defense of the United States, ~t~ithin the mc~,inin~ of Title
L8, sections 7~J3 and 794, of the US Code. as amended.
[ts transmission o:r ry an unauthorircd ~~crson is prohi~~ited by law.
GROUP 1
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
20 November 1967
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Rumania's National Communist Course
Summary
During the past two years, Rumania's militant
policies of independence of both the Communist and
nonWCommunist worlds have been accentuated by the
regime's nationalistic Communist leaders. Under
the "second generation" Communist leadership of
Nicolae Ceausescu, the regime has repeatedly shown
its determination to ignore Communist solidarity
in pursuit of its national objectives. Bucharest's
insistence upon freedom of action in foreign af-
fairs and equality of Communist parties in fact as
well as in theory has frequently clashed with the
policy line adopted by Moscow and its allies.
The Rumanians have sought exposure to the West
in search of political, economic, and technological
benefits. Bucharest has recognized West Germany,
remained neutral in the Arab-Israeli crisis, and
has maintained a steady stream of visitors to the
West, particularly to the US.
Note:. This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
and coordinated with the Office of Economic Research
and with the Office of National Estimates.
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Having achieved its major foreign policy goals,
the regime probably will avoid further undertakings
that would risk possible Russian overreaction. How-
ever, as the limits of permissible divergence are
extended by practice, the Rumanians can be expected
to define in even more independent terms their re-
lationship to the Communist and non-Communist worlds.
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"Generally speaking, only life
is the supreme judge, and only
practical results can confirm
the correctness of a political
line or position."
Party ideologue
Paul Niculescu-Mizil
24 July 1967
1. The success of Rumania's nationalist pol-
icies in recent years demonstrates that a small
state can exercise considerable leverage in assert-
ing its particular interests against the broader,
more generalized interests of a great power. Nearly
four years ago, in April 1964, the Rumanian regime
published its "declaration of independence" against
the backdrop of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Ru-
manian leaders have since exploited at every oppor-
tunity this and-other Russian political difficulties
to achieve their own ends, showing in the process
that it is not necessary to dance to the Soviet tune.
The obverse of Bucharest's policies and actions to-
ward the USSR is seen in its receptivity to the
"bridge-building" policies of the Western powers.
As Rumania has increased its economic and political
contacts with Western Europe, it has acquired ad-
ditional maneuverability far its efforts to dis-
engage from Moscow. Gradually, by providing Bucha-
rest with an alternative to dependence on the USSR,
these contacts have become one of the mainstays of
Bucharest's independent policy.
"Life demonstrates that a people
that is deprived of a part of
its national prerogatives ceases
being free and sovereign, a fact
that jeopardizes its very social
development. Disregard of this
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reality conflicts with the aspira-
tions of the peoples, with the ob-
jective laws of social development,
produces the powerful reaction of
the population, and rouses the en-
tire nation to fight."
Party Chief Ceausescu
24 July 1967
2. The driving force in the recent evolution
of Rumanian policy, both foreign and domestic, has
been nationalism, The leadership has drawn heavily
upon Rumania's traditionally strident brand of this
complex of beliefs and myths, and has portrayed it-
self as the defender and logical continuer of all
that is "best" in that tradition. Ceausescu often
resurrects passages from speeches given many years
ago at the League of Nations by Rumania's outstand-
ing foreign minister after World War I, Nicolea
Titulescu, to create a sense of historical conti-
nuity. In these references to the past, Ceausescu
particularly emphasizes the role of the nation-state
and the importance of national sovereignty, By
such devices, Ceausescu associates his regime with
those Rumanian pre-Communist experiences that were
and continue to be popular with the party and the
people. The people's Latin heritage, the impor-
tance of the nation-state, and the role of small
versus large nations in world affairs are three
themes that have parallels in both the pre-Commu-
nist and the Ceausescu periods.
3. Unlike most other Communist regimes, the
Ceausescu .regime professes to see no contradiction
between these nationalistic themes and those of
proletarian. internationalism. Indeed, Ceausescu
argues that every country building socialism is
contributing to socialist and proletarian interna-
tionalism. Rumania's independent initiatives, there-
fore, are ideologically "correct."
The Ceausescu Leadershi
4. Ceausescu became party chief in March 1965
upon the death of Gheorghiu-Dej. He was Dej's choice,
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and he took over the reins of the party and state
at a most propitious time. Dej had set Rumania
firmly on the path to greater economic and politi-
cal autonomy, plans already had been made for the
ninth party congress, revised party statutes were
being drafted, and a new national constitution was
awaiting approval. Thus, Ceausescu had an oppor-
tunity to put his personal stamp on the party's
and on the nation's future economic and political
policies.
5. Ceausescu's efforts have been dramatic in
the sphere of foreign policy, but he has also placed
many of his supporters in key posts in the leader-
ship of the country. The Rumanian party is now un-
der the command of "second generation" Communists
to an extent exceeding all others in Eastern Europe.
These leaders are for the most part small townsmen
ever conscious of their national heritage. The de-
scendants of peasants, they retain the strong na-
tionalism of the peasantry.
6. The Ceausescu team is thus much more na-
tionalistic in outlook than leaders from the older
generation, such as Emil Bodnaras, Chivu Stoica, and
Gheorghe Apostol. These men, along with Ceausescu
and Premier Maurer, formed the power elite that ini-
tially ruled after Dej's death, but they have since
been .pushed out of the picture by Ceausescu. The
"second generation" leadership escaped the strict
discipline imposed on Dej's generation by the 5oviet-
led Comintern, and does not owe its accession to
dower directly to the Soviet Union as did that of
Aej, which assumed power when the country was occu-
pied by Soviet forces.
Party Unity
7. Long one of the most homogenous parties in
Eastern Europe, the Rumanian party has maintained
a high degree of unity since 1957. It has done this
despite the shunting aside of the older leaders by
Ceausescu and apparent recent Soviet efforts to sub-
vert the leadership. Last May, Ceausescu sharply,
if indirectly, criticized the Soviets for "contacts
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CENTRAL CC1MMfTTEE of tine RUMANIAN CC?MMUNtST PARTY
Key Personatit'res
CEAUSESCU, Nicolae
MAURER, Ion Gheorghe
NICULESCU-MIZIL, Paul
CEAUSESCU, Nicolae
MAURER. Ion Gheorghe
NICULESCU-MIZIL, Paul
VERDET, Ilie
STOICA, Chivu
BIRLADE.~NU, Alexandru
BODNARAS, Emil
APOSTGL, Gheorghe
DRAGHI~:;I, Alexandru
SECRETARIAT
CEAUSESCU, Nicolae
DALEA, Mihai
DRAGHI~I, Alexandru
GERE, Mihai
MANESC.`U, Manea
MOGHIOROS, Alexandru
NICULESCU-MIZIL, ?aul
PATILINE:T, Vasile
RAUTU, Leonte
TROFIN, Virgil
APOSTOL, Gheorghe
BERGHIANU, Maxim
BIRLA,DEANU, Alexandru
BODNARAS, Emil
BORILA, Petre
CEAUSECU, Nicolae
DRAGAN, Constantin
DRAGHICI, Alexandru
BANC, losif
BLAJOVICI, Petre
COLIU, Dumitru
DANALACHE, Florian
FAZEKAS, Janos
MAURER,. Ion Gheorghe
M0GHI0R05, Alexandru
NICULESCU-MIZIL, Paul
RADULESCU, Gheorghe
RAUTU, Leonte
STOICA, Chivu
VERDET, Ilie
VOITEC, Stefan
GERE, Mihai
LUPU, Petre
MANESCU, Manea
POPA, Dumitru
VILCU, Vasile
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outside the organized framework" and warned that
"under such circumstances, each party is fully en-
titled to take every measure it ronsidersnecessary
so as to ensure its political and organizational
unity, the implementation of its political line "
The Rumanian parliament's session last July--the
first time all members of the party's elite body,
the Permanent Presidium, have delivered speeches
on the same occasion since July 1965--illustrated
this unity as well as the pre-eminence of Ceausescu's
appointees vis-a-vis the "old guard."
8. Ceausescu's appointees generally are men
of his own generation, outlook, and inclination.
This appears particularly true in his appointments
to top positions in economic or technical areas of
responsibilitym Ceausescu favors the development
of the technocratic and specialist classes, The
party?s pre-emine.ce in directing the administra-
tion of technology, scientific research, and the
economy is, however, unquestioned, Ceausescu's
principal lieutenants will perform a similar role
under a proposed economic reform, and a regional
territorial reorganization. However, any such far-
reaching proposals are bound to, and indeed prob-
ably already have, caused disagreements within the
leadership and uncertainty among local officials.
9o Of the numerous supporters Ceausescu has
promoted, Ilie Verdet and Paul Niculescu-Mizil ap-
pear especially favored, and both now are Presidium
members. They presumably were placed in that body
to counter the weight of the veterans who had risen
with Gheorghiu-Dejo Both clearly carry more in-
fluence with Ceausescu than any member of the "old
guard" except Premier Maurer,
loo Maurer ranks second only to Ceausescu in
the hierarchy at this times He seems to have the
complete confidence of the party chief as the re-
gime s leading foreign policy advocatem At the re-
cent parliamentary session, for example, Ceausescu
praised Maurer for his meetings with Presidents
Johnson and De Gaulle, although he omitted any ref-
erence to Maurer's recent "secret" talks with Chinese
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Premier Chou En-lai. The premier's honored position
as last to speak at the parliamentary meeting, and
the party's recent resolution praising Maurer's con-
tribution to Rumania, further attest to his high
standing.
Foreign Policy
"Certainly, the causes which
have led to the present state
of affairs are deep and par-
ticularly complex. There is
no doubt, however, that a ma-
jor factor in their constant
deterioration is that the old
practice of interference in
the internal affairs of other
parties of other socialist
states, the tendencies to im-
pose points of view from the
outside, name-calling, and re-
sorting to accusations and con-
demnations have not been aban-
doned."
Scinteia editorial
28 February 1967
11. With increasing frequency, Ceausescu's
foreign policies have clas'zed with those of Moscow
and its allies. Since early this year, the re-
gime has been particularly insistent upon its free-
dom of action in foreign affairs and has pressed
ahead with at least equal vigor in formulating a
"new type" of interparty relations,
12. The regime's "declaration of independence"
in April 1964 has become the cornerstone of its pol-
icies. This declaration states that the "principles"
of "national independence and sovereignty, equal
rights, mutual advantage, comradely assistance, non-
interference in internal affairs, observance of ter-
ritorial integrity, socialist internationalism,..
form the immutable law...ofthe entire world social-
ist system" and the "only basis of unity."
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13. The pragmatic application of these prin-
ciples has become a hallmark of the Ceausescu re-
gime, but this pragmatism has been accompanied by
emphatic reiterations of the regime's close adherence
to Marxist-Leninist doctrineo In so justifying its
actions, Bucharest has made it difficult for its al-
lies to take it publicly to task for emphasizing its
own national interests to the detriment of unity in
the Communist camp.
14. In interparty relations, Bucharest has
stressed that all national parties are coequal and
therefore can not be subjected arbitrarily to gen-
eral policy lines. Although this doctrine has been
endorsed by all Eastern European capitals and by
Moscow--it was embodied in the declarations of the
1957 and 1960 conferences of Communist parties--the
Rumanians evidently doubt whether their allies, and
especially Moscow, mean what they say. Recent ar-
ticles in the Rumanian press have contained thinly
veiled references to Soviet attempts to influence
Ceausescu's party leadership, and attest to Bucha-
rest?s mistrust concerning party relations with Mos-
cow .
15. In evidencing a desire for detente on terms
more acceptable to the West than to Moscow, the re-
gime has sought to demonstrate that it is not tied
to a reliance on Communist solidarity to the extent
that its allies are for ensuring its own survival,
It welcomes exposure to Western ideas in order to
gain the political, technological, and scientific
benefits of expanded relations with the industrially
advanced countries of the non-Communist worlds
"Unnatural is the fact that meth-
ods and practices in contradiction
with the standards of equal rights
and noninterference in internal
affairs, standards deriving from
the very nature of socialist inter-
nationalism, should occur in rela-
tionships between socialist coun-
tries o"
Premier Maurer, 25 ~Tuly 196'7
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16. The Rumanian regime's independent foreign
policy has won Bucharest grudging admirers but few
friends among its European allies. Its relations
with Moscow have suffered as Soviet-Rumanian party-
state interests have coincided less and less, and
the leadership seems to have concluded that this
trend will continue in the future. Elsewhere, the
regime has impaired its relations with Poland and
East Germany by its recognition of Bonn and its ob-
vious desire to expand this relationship. East
Germany and Czechoslovakia, the other advanced in-
dustrial-states in the region, are also annoyed by
Rumania's increasing efforts to find capital equip-
ment and machinery in the West. Its relations with
Hungary are vexed by the issue of the Translyvanian
irredenta. Only with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, its
Balkan neighbors, does Bucharest have good relations.
Its relations with Albania vary from correct to cor-
dial, depending on atmospherics in the Communist
world.
1'7. In being "reascnably unreasonable" with
the Soviet Union, Bucharest has chosen to differ
primarily about those issues which offer hope of a
resolution favorable to its national interestso
The regime has demonstrated this tactic by charac-
terizing as anachronisms both NATO and the Warsaw
Pact, by establishing diplomatic relations with
West Gemany, by remaining neutral in the Arab-Isra-
eli war, and by boycotting the all-European Commu-
nist parties' conference at Karlovy Vary last April.
Each of these policy moves proceeded from a realis-
tic evaluation of its potential for success, and
each was clearly motivated by national rather than
bloc interests.
18, The Warsaw Pact, in theory a mutual de-
fense organization, increasingly has become a device
for political consultation, largely because of Ru-
manian insistence. Rumanian dissatisfaction with
the pact reached a peak early in the summer of 1966
over the issue of Moscow's desire to integrate the
various national armies more closely within the pact
structured Bucharest's resistance to this idea
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apparently helped thwart Moscow's plansa Bucharest
has refrained from any open commentary on the is-
sue since then, although it almost certainly also
opposed the recent appointment of Soviet General
Yakubovsky to command the pacto
19m Bucharest's recognition of Bonn last Jan-
uary also meant that the Rumanian "deviation" had
breached the limits of acceptable behavior for mem-
bers of the socialist family on the hypersensitive
German question. While the Rumanians could and did
argue that Moscow had had its ambassador in Bonn
since 1955, this unilateral Rumanian action had such
important ramifications for bloc unity that Moscow
joined with the East Germans and Poles to delay rec-
ognition of Bonn by other East European regimeso
20. Bucharest introduced a new element of dis-
cord with its allies by adopting a self-serving
"neutral" position on the Arab-Israeli warn Alone
of the Eastern European countries, the Rumanian re-
gime refused to sign the bloc statement on 9 dune
following the Moscow meeting which it attended, and
would not break diplomatic relations with Israel.
21. A chronic irritant in Rumanian-Soviet re-
lations periodically inflamed by Bucharest is the
Rumanian irredenta of Bessarabia and Northern
Bukovina, now, respectively, a part of Soviet Moldavia
and the Ukrainee Bucharest continues to use the ir-
redenta as devices with which to embarrass Moscow
and to try to keep it off balance politically.
22. Bucharest and Moscow also appear to have
differences over renewal of their bilateral mutual
friendship and assistance treaty. Signed in :E'eb-
ruary 1948 and slated to be renewed automatically
for five years next February unless renegotiated,
the treaty contains a mutual military assistance
clause that Bucharest finds excessively restrictive.
It appears probable that Bucharest will in time
grudgingly renew this treaty in some form.
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"There is one correct, sure, prin-
ciple-minded,. and efficient way
to discuss problems of common in-
terest and to exchange views, in-
cluding problems containing diver-
gencies: This is the way of di-
rect contact of party to party,
of leadership to leadership."
Scinteia editorial
28 February 1967
23. Despite these conflicts with its European
allies, Bucharest continues to engage in frequent
bilateral party and state exchanges with them and
to give equal attention to Moscow and Peking, Bucha-
rest's initial support of Moscow in the 5ino-Soviet
dispute has become progressively less evident as the
regime has pursued its independent course,
24, Sino-Rumanian relations, for their part,
have yet to recover fully from Premier Chou En-tai's
attempt to use his visit to Rumania in June 1966 to
attack the USSR. Both Peking. .and Bucharest appear
to have exerted considerable effort to paper over
their differences, The Rumanian press, for example,
has yet to mention the Cultural Revolution, and Pre-
mier Maurer has visited China three times during the
past year, once shortly after his meetings with Presi-
dents Johnson and De Gaulle last summer.
25, Rumania's relations with North Korea and
North Vietnam remain good, Bucharest continues to
give only token military support to Hanoi and its
handling of the war in its propaganda media is gen-
erally in low key. With Pyongyang, Bucharest has
shown support for its efforts to enter the United
Nations.
Interparty Relations
"Unity does not mean reduction
to the same denominator...it
does not mean uniformity,"
Scinteia editorial
28 February 1967
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26. In interparty relations, the Rumanians
have repeatedly and publicly stressed the greater
utility of bilateral contacts over multilateral
ones? particularly since the first of this year?
In defining the conditions necessary for its par-
ticipation in multiparty meetings in an article
in Scinteia late February, the regime observed
that the Rumanian party requires "propitious con-
ditions " which take into "consideration the par-
ticularities of the situation and of relations
among parties, the existence of a climate of mu-
tual trust, esteem, and respect conducive to con-
radely and principle-minded talks."
27. Aside from these conditions, the party
also is deeply concerned mover the potential of
multiparty meetings for formalizing the intra-
Communist split and for the assertion of Soviet
hegemony over the Eastern European Communist states.
It particularly objects to what it considers to be
the Soviet practice of establishing a general
party line through the use of majority rule. The
Rumanian party believes instead that all multi-
party meetings should from the outset agree to an
"exchange of views," and accept as generally bind-
ing only those conclusions unanimously agreed to.
"Each Communist Party has the
legitimate right to participate
in an international meeting if
it considers it necessary and
useful, as it also has the le-
gitimate right not to particip-
ate. Internationalist solidar-
ity is not contingent upon par-
ticipation or nonparticipation
in a conference. It has a much
more profound content, which is
manifest in the identity of goals
of the Communist parties..."
Party Chief Ceausescu
in Scinteia
7 May 1967
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28. It was within this frame of reference that
Rumania boycotted the all-European Communist parties'
meeting at Karlovy Vary last April. In objecting to
the conference's "aim, character, and proceedings,"
the Rumanian party took a major step toward the Yugo-
slav position and away from its other allies. In
doing so, Bucharest clearly gave precedence to its
self-interest, stating that it would not attend a
European security conference that would discuss the
German question.
29. Rumania's decision to boycott the Karlovy
Vary conference makes it questionable that it will
participate in future multilateral meetings. The
regime probably will assess each invitation care-
fully within the context of what it increasingly
calls "new type" relations and "world realities."
The Rumanians, thus, almost certainly intended their
presence at the Soviet 50th anniversary celebrations
as an illustration of the distinction they draw be~-
tween participating in ceremonial interparty gather-
ings and formal ones.
Relations with the West
30. Rumania has sharply stepped-up its contacts
with the West, particularly Western Europe. In ad-
dition to recognizing Bonn, the regime became the
first in Eastern Europe to recognize the Greek mili-
tary junta and the first to establish consular rela-
tions with Spain. It also has concluded consular
agreements with Italy and France, and has markedly
increased its exchanges with non-Communist "progres-
sive" parties throughout Western Europe.
31. Rumanian-US relations have improved steadily
during? the past year even though the war in Vietnam
continues to be an inhibiting factor, but one the re-
gime generally has played down. Premier Maurer's
meeting with President Johnson late last June was a
high point in this development. Maurer is the first
Eastern European premier to confer with a US Presi-
dent, and the regime widely publicized the event.
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32. The regime also has very sharply increased
the sending of scientists, technicians, and educators
to the US. Late last January, for example, the re-
gime decided to send 23 ranking economic and indus-
trial officials to the US for lengthy study visits.
It also has exhibited generally improved cooperat-
tion with US officials and has indicated an interest
in resuming negotiations for a consular convention
in the "not too distant future."
Rumania at the United Nations
"The concept according to which
mankind's destiny lies solely in
the hands of the big powers does
no longer correspond to the new
conditions of social development.
Reality demonstrates that the
settlement of international dis-
putes can no longer be decided
only by the big powers, as this
depends nowadays on the active
cooperation of all states of the
world. "
"By acting with vigor and mili-
tancy in defense of their le-
gitimate interests and rights,
the middle-sized and small coun-
tries can considerably influence
the course of events..."
Party Chief Ceausescu
24 July 1967
33, Bucharest's quest .for enhanced interna-
tional prestige has been assisted by the election
of Rumanian Foreign Minister Manescu to the presi-
dency of the current United Nations General Assem-
bly last September. The first Communist govern-
ment official to hold the office, Manescu began his
acceptance speech by stressing that the confidence
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placed in him was "clearly
addressed to his country"
and emphasized the role of
"small- and medium-sized
nations" in international
affairs. Although the
president never votes in
the assembly, the resource-
ful Manescu will be in a
good position to initiate
new proposals through the
Rumanian delegation as
well as possibly to in-
fluence events through
his easy access to Sec-
retary General Thant.
The Outlook
68536 MANESCU, Corneliu
RUMANIAN MINISTER of FOREIGN AFFAIRS
and CURRENTLY PRESIDENT of UN GA
"It is a historic reality, an
essential aspect of the entire
social development that the na-
t1Dn far from having exhausted
its possibilities, has an out-
standing important role to play
in the ascending progress of
human society,"
Leonte Rautu addressing
the Rumanian parliament
25 July 1967
34. Rumania has achieved the major foreign pol-
icy goals that it has pursued so avidly since the
first of the year. Bucharest probably will now be
more concerned with consolidating its advances in ex-
ternal affairs, during which period the regime's
leaders will probably focus much more attention on
domestic policies. There remains, moreover, no ap-
parent innovation in foreign policy that Bucharest
could contemplate undertaking-with equanimity that
would achieve benefits commensurate with the poten-
tial political risks of a possible Russian over-
reaction.
-15-
CONFIDENTIAL
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 Approved For Rel~se 20~1~~(~ ~i~~[~~~9T00`8l~A002900310001-0
35. In the immediate future, therefore, Bucha-
rest will probably await new opportunities to assert
further significant independence within the Commu-
nist world, Such opportunities may arise in connec-
tion with its promotion of the Group of Nine--an~infor-
mal association of small European states seeking
detente and cooperation in Europe--or as the time
for re-evaluation of the Warsaw Pact and its rela-
tions to NATO. (1969) approaches . In the meantime,
the regime will continue gradually to strengthen its
relations with the West and attempt to play a lead-
ing role in promoting European detente, possibly
through the United Nations.
36. Rumania, along with Yugoslavia, is a lead-
ing exponent of pragmatic Communism in Eastern Eur-
ope. As East-West contacts expand and ideological
and political diversity become more pronounced, how-
ever, other Communist regimes in Eastern Europe can
be expected selectively to adapt to their conditions
the policies developed by the two Balkan innovators.
Gradually, what is now considered revisionist and
nonconformist will become the accepted norm. Thus,
in time, the stage will be set for Bucharest to ex-
ert itself once again to establish new and broader
policies redefining in even more independent terms
its relationship to the Communist and non-Communist
worlds.
-16-
CONFI DENTIAL
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Confidential
Confidential
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 Memo Control Form CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Releas~20044@~~A?~0826~ik002900310001-0
^ NOTICE NO 118_-6~~ COVER SHEET ^ DISSEM AUTHORIZATION
Due D/OCI Review
6
7
MEMO NO 1397/67 DATE 20 NOV 19
Dates: Dissem20 NoV 1967
SUBJECT: Rumaniars National Communist Course
REQUESTED OR ORIGINATED BY: self-initiated
25X1A
ASSI GRAPHICS Photos,
cur
DISSEMINA ION
quotations
COORDINATE
OUTSIDE OCI OFR nNF
^ Preliminary (DDI, D/OCI, and their staffs)
^ Category Recommended to D/0
? Category~.r.Finally Authorized By
^ Specified Other YES ^ Release to
Washington
Cat. E (Routine internal and external) YES Release
Cat. D (Routine internal CIA only)
Cat. B (Subcabinet and internal CIA)
Cat. A (Elite--External top officials only and internal CIA)
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 SECRET
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DISTRIBUTION LIST
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
DDI REPRESENTATIVES OVERSEAS
OCI Special Paper Notice No.
Control No. .~ ~L ~,
25X1 C
DAate
~G .~ .) -
Subject:
Category: ~~ Released
3-67
Authorized by:
25X1A
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SE CR.~ T
DISTRIBUTION LIST
INTELLIGENCE MEh40RANDU!41
CATEGORY E - Rt~i~TINF
OCI St>.~~ ,.; i i'.i;,c~t fVt,t ic?~ ~`u.____ 118-67 ~t;c~ntrc;:l !~?C,, 1397/67
SirI3~1F.~"1:~,W~un~ pTa.~-i.ona.l 1"'nmmz~ni~t .o~r~e_. -r~.zr~'20 November 1967
1 N"1 E~. i; yv.a i~
1~ DllI i --12 D/OC:1 l:i -l i I)DI STAFF 1 ti --22
DCI EXE'Ca DIR. 54
DDCI 50 D/ONE 55-63
EXEC. RE('f. 51-53 pDB 64
67,68 Di':vrIPE
69 Go COUNS.
70 I~G.
25X1A 71 O;~Ix~I ^
72-7.4 DD;'S&T
75 OSP, DD/S&T -1.
76-88 DDP (R .I/DI) (COLLATERAL) -13
xx(~~3~~x~:x~~XxxxX~
89
DIR/PPB
-1
90,91
ONE
-2
92
ONE Reading Room
-1
97-101 D/OSI
-5
I02 ,10 ~ D/OCR (SR/OCR )
-2
104
CSB/OCR (SR/OCR)
(COL.)
-1
105-108
DIR/NPIC
-4
109
D/OSI3.
_1
EXTERNAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
mit -5
The Vice President -1
Gen. 1laxwcl.l Taylor -1
BUDGE
C~-- l~
TREASURI' USIA
ow er- MaTs -1
USIB (Distribution Points)
25X1A State (COLLATERAL)-15
X~~If~~X~,~~~~~XX~~
170
11.1
112
1.13
114 , ].15
1.16,1.1?
118 , 119
120,121
122
123-126
12?
128
129,130
131,132
STATE
OD/OC I STAFF 23 , 24 MCO
PTO 65,66 ZNDICO
OPSCEN
OPSCEN FOR CSDO
DDS/IRS
-1
NMCC (OPSCEN)
-1
DDI/RS
-1
SA/R
-1
CA/EUR
-2
CA/MEA
25X1A
-2
CA/WH
-2
CA/FE
-2
CD/W
t
1
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-
CS/PRES
-4
ADMIN (VM)
-1
-1
Or g. iv.
-2
Orig. Br.
-2
25X1A
DEFENSE
and-
-1
AID ACDA NASA
Gaud -1 Foster -1 Ha fern -1
DIA (COLLATERAL) -55 Sullivan (FBI) -1
~X(X~~~~~~l~XX~ N I C -1
Brown (AEC ) -1
NON-USIB (Intelligence Distribution Points) 25X1A
~~~xx~ x~~g~xxxx~l~
Special In~t.ructions; Distribution authorized
To be released by ~n NnvPmhPr lAR7
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 Approved For'Re-Laase 2001/~1~~~?'~IA-RDP79T0
ORIG:
DNIT:
EXT:
.PATE:
CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
(classif7icaTio#ln~
v ~" 1 3J ., is i`i '1~ .1 .~.
gar ?~~v~ R~:L~,as~:n
12
,
3
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9
5
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INDEX ~ DESTROY ~ RETURN TO .BRANCH
NO INDEX ~ FILE IN CS FILE NO.
25X1 C
25.X1 C
r'~?~s: ~fl?.It:t~I~~C; Y?~~;I CnFT.I:S OF t{I~`~4t~Rr'1ti~ll,?~T '~(J. 3~i7JE~7 Cl~? 2~J :t~~}'41'?"'~~`.3Ez.
1~~7~ ~vTiTL~~ ''T3.Ut+4A~?IAfS ~(.'~TIC~~?.~iL Gt3URSE." SU~{~~~ARY ?'~~LLU'~~5;
l . DC.?~?I?'3G T~?G PAST T~~tO YEARS , RUMANIA' S ~~I LITA;'~7' PaLICI~S ~3~'
I'~I)g:I~isnIl}IiN(:I OF BClT1-l TlE ~.:~'}a~~1tJi+?iST A:ti?D iti?t~~t-CCt~~~>tt3~s'IST ~nRLLS ?-IA~'?:
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t3?~d13~?? T~ ?tS~~C:~~:~13 E~ETM~~?~ATI~3~d'` CCl?~'~U4IST L~AL~E~ZSHIP a~ ~IICbLAE
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tit~~~ ~;?}~i;~U'1I:~T SQLI?}A?2ITY Ids FU?ZSUIT flI= ITS ~dATI`:)i~AL 03J~flTIVuS.
T~~l~;?iARS'T' S IN,SIS'I'F~aC~: T3PC~~V F~tl:d:?}0~4 flF ACTIC~PJ TN FflRET~?~ A~FAI~:s
A~t?:~ t~l~U~1f>I`~'~' ~~F' CtJ~~ht?TtvT."~T' ~`'.~~RTI:~:i II~d FACT AS ?ti~~~~i,L ~AS I~ 'T?-?L;~J1?Y ??~l5
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A3FIT',S.
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t:`4.'J:.iiYJ.d.%.iJ Il~:~t ial.:r.s~~ri:rt E t;i,i~Ar~iiscav iic.vai...u 1...
CITE pIREC70R
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassiflcation
(~~pRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
.
.
,
25X1A
AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER
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S E C R E T
PACE TW?
A~iD f-iA5 ~#AINTAINED A STEADY STREAd`d t3F VISIT?RS 'TRH THE WEST,.
PARTICULARLY TC TFfE US.
3. HAVING AC~~iEVED ITS MAJOR Ft~R>rIG?J PE7LICY GaALS, THE
REGIME FRQ;BAf3LY WILL AVOID FURTfIER UNDERTAKINGS TffAT WOULD RISK
F
POSSI~3LE RUSSIAN OVER3CTION. ~f(7WEVER, 11S THE LIMITS OF PEf2-
MISSIBLE DIVERGENCE ARE EXTENDEi~ BY PRACTICE, Tf~E ~tUMANIANS CAN
BE EXPECTED TQ DEFINE IN EVEN hipRE I~3DEPENDENT TERMS TfiEIR
RELATLNS~iIP TO THE COMMUNIST AND- NON-Caid~fMUNIST WCtRLDS.
END QF MESSAGE
25X1A
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