JOINT CIA-DIA TEAM REPORT ON THE MILITARY POSTURE IN CUBA AS IT PERTAINS TO STRATEGIC WEAPONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A000200110006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 19, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
19 April 196
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Joint CIA-DIA Team Report on The
Military Posture in Cuba As It
Pertains to Strategic Weapons
1. We are continuing to keep under review all
reports and rumors of strategic weapons and troops
in Cuba, as we have done since prior to the Octo-
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ere are no strategic weapons or foreign troop units
in Cuba at this time. While we recognize that
some strategic weapons could be deliberately con-
cealed or clandestinely reintroduced on the island,
it is our 'ud ment that this has not taken place.
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2. Cuba's present missile inventory is con-
fined to defensive and tactical weapons. The num-
ber o - (SAM) sites 25X1
otals 23 a e
me. e si es are eployed to defend
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ma'or o ulation centers and militar i to
missiles are in Cuba to support these sites. Some
of these missiles are being replaced as their shelf-
life of about six years expires.
3. Other tactical missiles and related equip-
ment possessed by the Cubans include:
(1) Four coastal defense sites equipped
with 50 KENNEL cruise missiles with a range of
about 40 nautical miles;
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siles;
(2) 100 more ground-to-ground KENNEL mis-
(3) six to eight Free-Rocket-Over Ground
(FRbG) launchers;
(4) twelve KOMAR cruise missile boats.
4. Soviet combat units as such returned to
the Soviet Union by mid-1964. We believe some 1,000
to 2,000 Soviet military technicians and advisers
are still in Cuba. They aid in the maintenance of
military equipment and the trainin of Cubans
throughout the armed forces
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Castro reportec y was worrie a
Moscow might not come to his assistance should
Cuba unilaterally shoot down a U-2 plane. More-
over, Castro-subsequently has been impressed with
forceful US actions in the bombing of targets in
North Vietnam and in sending troo s to the Domini-
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5. Fidel Castro and other high regime lead-
ers appear purposely to have avoided making an is-
sue of US reconnaissance flights over Cuba since
the fall of 1964. that ear
Castro intimated
that he would shoo own US reconnaissance flights
if legal remedies and negotiations did not bri
about their cancellation..
however, Castro said he ha o aye
action against the flights
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7. The CIA-DIA team will meet regularly on the
third Tuesday of each month to assess the military
posture in Cuba, focusing on the problem of strate-
gic weapons possibly still on the island. The CIA-
DIA team will convene for special meetings should
items of unusual interest bearing on this roblem
come before the intelligence community.
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