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December 14, 2016
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December 24, 2002
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June 9, 1966
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00827A000300030001-1.pdf1.56 MB
Approveckgo Release 2003/04/ DDI BRIEFING NOTES THE SITUATION INC DP79T0tilt7A000300030001-1 AND TEE SOVIET PRESENCE ON THE ISLAND I. Fidel Castroes recent fulminations appOr to result from deepening personal frustrations over the regime's continuing inability to surmount basic economic and administrative problems. A. The administrative purge of a number of medium- level officials in the ministries of foreign af- fairs, foreign trade, and CUBANA airlines was designed to restore dynamism to Castro's regime and to revive revolutionary enthusiasm. It may have had the opposite effects however. 1. The March 7 to March 11 trial of Kmjor Rolando Cubela? sentenced for plotting to assassinate Castro, probably had the same goal as well as the aim of deterring other wcu14 hotter's. 2. Armed Forces Vice Minister Amelia an was dis- missed on March 17. DIA review(s) completed. he had long been in disfavor with the regime. Several top military commands have been routinely reshuffled since the first of the year; the principals involved were not 25X1 Approved. e Release 2003/04/17SEURETP79TOWTA090300030001 -1 cashiered and retain t air Fr as po- litical bureau members of Castro's Communist Party. In his speech on March 13 at Haim= University., Castro hurled new lusting at Pskino4and'charged that the Chinese leaders, in their old age, have confused Harxism-Leninism with fascism. The at- tack was essentially a reiteration of Castro's earlier statements and came exactly one year atter his first criticism of China. 1. For the first time Castro has denounced 0- ident Hduardo Frei of Chile and his Christian Democratic Party. a. He said that in Chile "the only way to win the revolUtionary struggle will be by armed struggle," and he denounced Frei as a coward, a liar, and a reactionary. Ha- vana radio has begun beaming a special propaganda program to Chile attacking Frei and his government. ? In early May, Castro renewed old charges of "softness" against President Tito and .the "so-called League of Yugoslav Communists." c. These attacks reflect the same militancy Cuba displayed at the January Tri-Continent Conference and indicate that Castro is 25X1 011 IOLA-Mu 25X Approved SORelease 2003/04/17 : CI ? losing interest in coexistence and cm* promise in the hemisphere. C. The state of alert declared througpout Cuba on May 27 was ostensibly a Cuban reaction to A18 moves, the most outstanding of which was the killing of a Cuban soldier by a sentry at the Guantanamo Naval Base on May 21. That Castro believed the US was planning to attack is questionable, but there is little doubt he was concerned over recent Cuban exile threats and alleged assassination operations. However, Castro probably artificially escalated the crisis to divert public attention from pressing economic difficulties. 1. The soldier was shot and killed by the US sentry after penetrating the Guantanamo bass -perimeter during a reconnaissance of a newly laid minefield. At least three other penetra- tions of the base perimeter occurred between May 21 and May 31--at the direction of tkik Cuban Government. Additional incidents are possible and would provide the Castro regime with further "justification" to demand greater sacrifices of the people. 2. The alert also probably was intended to test the efficiency of the Cuban defensive system, ir , ? SEC!? ' 00827A000300030001-1 Approved FkoReleas 7navatu1jt2. thLanP7crin 4/IA000300030001-1 25X provide realistic training for armed forces personnel, flush out "counterrevolutionaries" unfortunate enough to misjudge the reasons for the alert, and make the USSR reaffirm its support for the Castro regime. II. Despite Castroes deepening frustrations, his position in Cuba remains pre-eminent. A, The large and efficient military and security forces under Raul Castro are strong and loyal to the regime. We think they are more than adequate as a defense against insurrection or invasion--barring substantial US assistance, S. The 50,000 members of the Cuban Communist Party are drawn from an elite core of Castro's most militant supporters. They form the regime's inner bureaucracy. 1. Last October Castro announced the formation of a political bureau, a secretariat, and five standing coonntotts within a 100-man central committee. 2. The party controls provincial and local affairs, education and indoctrination, and the mass organizations. 3, About one fifth of the party members and two thirds of the central committee members are from the Cu- ban armed forces. C. Factionalism in the regime appears to be at its 10w. est level since Castro came to power. 5X1 APPrdv 5X1 orn6ET Approves:Vow Release 2003/0MMIllk-RDP79T01107A000300030001-1 Nearly the entire top civilian and ell tary leadership is included in the central committee. a. About 20 prominent "old" Communists have gained added stature through membership. b. There are no adherents of w!, economics policies of Che Guevara on the central com- mittee D. Despite these factors contributing to the regime's stability, there is no doubt that the over-all political climate in Cuba has shifted somewhat in the past year. An air of uncertainty is prevalent in Havana which?if not checked--could lead to further disenchantment. III. Castro recognizes that he has no alternative to continued large-scale aid from the Soviet Union. As a result, he has continued to move closer to Moscow, and has cooled toward the Chinese. A. The ?eter 1065 visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to Cuba and Raul Castro's six-week visit to the USSR and Eastern Europe in Ottober and November were probably generally aimed at reviewing Soviet-Cuban relations. B. Castro probably no longer views all of Latin America as on the brink of revolution. He now limits clandes- tine Cuban support and concentrates it where revolu- tionaries are most active. Nevertheless, Cuban propaganda on behalf of armed revolution since the RBET Approved FoltoRelease.2003/04/17 actET79T00840000300030001-1 4 25X1 January Trii.Continent Conference has reached a level of intensity not seen since 1963. 1. Venezuela, Guatemala, and Colombiaare Castro's three principal targets. 2. In addition. Cuba has sent military personnel to help insurgents in the Congo, and to train other African revolutionaries in Brazzaville. V. Ernesto "Che" Guevara, the former minister of industries, and the regime's foremost revolutionary, left the Cuban political scene in the spring of 1965. Bo may also have left Cuba. A. Guevara may be carrying out the pledge attributed to him by Castro to assist other revolutionary movements. B. Guevara's eclipse stemmed from differences with Castro over basic questions relating to the development of the Cuban economy, and to the attitude Cuba should take toward revolutionary activity elsewhere in the hemisphere. V. Cuba's economic performance remains spotty, and the long- range outlook is uncertain. A. The 1965 sugar harvest of about 6 million tone sur- passed the yearly harvest of the pre-Castro yearsi 1. This demonstrated the effectiveness of wide eco- nomic and administrative reforms applied during 1965. `, Approved FoNglease 2003/04/17 : CIS ?TOO82Z000300030001 -1 The 1900 harvest probably will be 05.ig1itly under 4.5 million tons--2 million tons short of the goal. Severe drought iota been blamed by Castro for this shortfall. 2. The outlook for future sugar earnings i$ clouded by continuing harvesting and mi11i problems, and by uncertain world sugar prices. 2. General economic mismanagement continues, although some improvement has been made. . Shortages in certain food and consumer goods prob- ably will become worse in 1900, but Castro can con- tinue to rely on large-scale Soviet assistance. SECRET Approved F, 'orr. dleas 0300014 ? 2 5X 1 I Approved elease 2003/04/SEMVP79TOOWA000300030001-1 VI. The Cuban military situation has maimed it for the last couple of years. A. There are over 100,000 men on active duty with the Cuban armed forces and about 83,000 in the ready. reserves. The numberm,And level of ability of the reserves will increase over the years because of the system of three year obligatory military service which was instituted in December. 1963. Last week, the Cubans launched a year-long program designed to up- grade the combat readiness of the reserves. B. The Cubans are increasing their proficiency in using their sophisticated air defense system, but they could not cope with a raid by many aircraft using advanced evasive and decoy techniques. C. There are presently 23 missile sites grouped around major target preftm on the island; most are located in the western third of Cuba to protect Havana and its key military installations. D. Cuba also has 4 cruise missile sites and 12 KOMAR cruise missile boats; the missiles for both systems have a limited range of 40 nautical millet or less, however. - *IA tfrAirtA:isotla 444141410 ? : 1 Approved Flaokelea e 2003/048FMTRDP79TOOWA000300030001-1 In addition. the !AtiP,6444,4 *No, we a full ormalt4! and eelf?-propolled suns, 3IIG fighteret asttimitismidt guns, and other arms from Russia and other Cossunist countries. VII. The Soviet presence Le Cuba is limited to a few thousand military technicians and economic specialists. A. Since the last slimier militant withdrawals in the summer of 1904, the level of Soviet military manpower in Cuba ban remained fairly constant. Current strength is es- , timated at between 1.000 and 2.000 men. a major redia tion from the approximately 22,500 Soviets in Cuba in October 1962. The Soviet military element in Cuba in essentially a Military Aid and Advisory Group, concerned primarily with training and technical support for Cuban forces. . A few shipments of Russian military goods are sent each year. to Cuba; these are largely replacement parts and ammuniticm. Sam, CS the replacements are new surface- to.air missiles (SAMS). The shelf life u. aueut six years for the present missiles is expiring. Sow ob- servers confuse the new SAMS with strategic missiles. - ' 2'X 4 Approved For RatiIlise 2003/04/17 : Q,1A-FDP70:100827AgOV00,0.30001-1 SEGiki C. There re some 2,800 to 3.000 Soviet economic pecialista in Cuba, participating to 0,wide variety of activitiesraneingiWoo agopatanee to Cube 'a sugarindustry to4etroleoa eaPloratiop. , , It should belnoted that the Cubans are frequently 25)(1 reported' to loos' than,happy lath the patronizing at itude and lackuluster performance of some of their Russian advisors. D. The US82 now accounts for about SO percent o Cuba's foreign trade. This year, the U$SR will continue to supply critical consumer goods, mg In* Aup fuelsand industrial equipment and raw It-probabli will Send about 700,000 tone of grain includinuSS million dollars worth of Canadian wheat bought with *come Soviet hard.currency reserves. 1. Cuba's cumulative debt ler Soviet trade credits,alone now totals about MO milli 2. The VS82 also has supplied 41400 million in ecoOomic development credits and several hundred mlllton dollars North of militak* equipment on credit. 3. We estimate it costs the 'Soviet Union ?Thr'? s dollars a dayto keep the Castro regime afloat -.10. .4proved For Ritiopitse 2003/04/17 : CIA-RpP79T008271000300030001-1 25X1 B. Despite this heavy Russian investment and the .Cubans marked dependence on their Soviet providers, the geecewsliavana marriage to Tar fiom satisfactory for both partners. 1. Citstroln May Day speech contained several thinly...veiled anti-Russian barbs Cuban Communist Party secretary Armando Mart's speech at the Soviet party congress last arch was notably out of tune with other oDeschei because of its hard.line militancy; it was not veil received by either the Soviets or the East European Communists. 2. CSstre undoubtedly rehafeo under the increasing proscriptions of the "advice" from Moscow...advice which has become such more insistent since the advent of the new leadership in Moscow. The Suasion* are ? demanding a better performance on the Cuban doosstls sees. sad greater COW% support for Russian international policies than? - formerly. At times, the nusotas4lams intermits are far apart, particularly on Questions involving "challenging" the US and other "imperial iit" powers in Vietnam and Latin America. ? ? - ? , ? ? ? tt: 0001A 25X1 Approved N Release 2003/04/17 ? GJA-RDRI9TOOWA000300030001-1 LJflII F. From time to time, articles appear in the press alleging that strategic Soviet missiles are still in Cuba. Ws do not dinning Much out of hand. Cuba. I. mould like to examine in some detail on article which app.ared in the C Gables of Vlorida on 3 March to illustrate the methods us um. to check out such item. Approved For titooktas 12003/04/17 : eau 25X1 Tho 0000looloo of the investigation was ,that all ,of the information on which the article was based came from missile mad Let publications, talks with unreliable Cuban refugees, and the Interim Report Pabllahed by the SubftCcomittee al the Senate Oervioes Committee on ROY 9, 19034 od mrho Cuban Military Ruildup"..m relating to the 1962 buildup which led to the crisis that October, In short* the article...and ail ? emiIar rtteles misleading information We maintain a continuing watch over the possibility of strategic missile"' in Cubit, ,utillaing all of our resources o full of outdated or 1 = 4 "....-mi.WP4igtAoVVVVS?tbNdiafiaiefaareka4"atabgtitib* 4 Approved nu,Release 2003/0att ilt4RDP79TOOWA000300030001-1 61= 25X1 6. A joint team of CIA and DIA Late g experts meets once a month, and more often if necessary. to assess the military posture of Cubs with special attention to the possibility that strategic weapons might still be on the island. a. The report for April specifically concluded that: "Cuba's prevent missile inventory is confined to ? defensive and tactical weapons . There are no strategic weapons or ? foreign troop units in Cuba at this time. While we recognise that some ? strategic weapons could be dellverately concealed or clandestinely reintroduced ? on the Island, it is our judgement that , this has not taken place." b. Our report for the month of may contained nothing to alter the previous month's conclusion; moreover, have seen nothing, suspicious so tar in June pertaining to strategic missiles in ,Cuba. .14. ' 25X1 5X1 Approved Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79710007A0003000300011-1 SEM have *lac) soticod numerous press articles alleging tin' new Soviet-financed, suit i. int ln* Ztshtcl port;in nay," to ? i44.esbosrin. op.ratioM. A Lou tz'oa all ourees does not ties at ftehlas sr connot4 solely vith Castro's ambitious plan to sake Cubs into a, or14 lander in flab exports. n in ebvioul. boson. that Cubs 6 could use its large fishing fleet to support ? ubversive elements in neighboring Caribbean ountries. iailhviy, vs have no information to bear au frequent allegations that Soviet submarines are active in Cubes enters'. ? ?25X