DCI BRIEFING FOR EX-PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A000300120002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: BRIEF

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DCI BRIEFING FOR EX-PRESIDENT EISENHOWER
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NATO
Do Gaulle's
North Vietnam POL Strikes
South Vietnam Situation Report--to be updated Thursday
The Chinese Communist Leadership
Yugoslavia: Party Problems ;%
Warsaw Pact ff /
Cyprus
Indonesia
Rhodesia
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DCI BRIEFING
North Vietnam POL (revised)
South Vietnam Situation Report (revised)
Chicom Leadership (no change)
Yugoslavia (revised)
Warsaw Pact (revised)
NATO (revised)
France: DeGaulle's Trip (no chap e)
Cyprus (no change)
14 July
JM 1966
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a
14 July 1966
EISENHOWER BRIEFING
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14 July 1966
Vietnam Situation
The overall political picture in South Vietnam today is
generally brighter than it was a month or so ago when the
Ky government was fighting for its life with the Buddhist
but trouble spots have not entirely vanished.
Premier Ky has reasserted government authority over, the
rebellious northern provinces of I Corps, although there
are still occasional murmurs of defiance. A few leaders
of the "struggle" movement are still at large.
By alternating tactics of toughness toward Buddhist ex-
tremists, and conciliation toward the moderates, the gov-
ernment has for the present isolated Tri Quang from his
sources of potential power, and brought about at least
a temporary suspension of Buddhist opposition through
the authority of Thich Tam Chau, the more moderate chair-
man of the Buddhist Institute.
Ky's concessions to Chau do not seriously impair his gov-
ernment's freedom of action, but are designed rather to
enhance Chau's stature among Buddhist diehards. One
concession was the release of low-level prisoners taken
by the government during the course of the recent struggle
movement.
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More important "struggle" movement leaders, such as the
former mayor of Da Nang, Dr. Nguyen Van Man, and those
with suspected Viet Cong ties, remain in custody, and
will probably stand trial.
Disunity is still prevalent at the Institute, however.
On July 13, Tam Chau announced he would not be active
in Institute affairs for several months.
The Ky government has also taken a number of steps de-
signed to broaden its representative base and to launch
the country toward a semblance of representative govern-
ment.
In addition to adding 10 civilians to the ruling mili-
tary Directorate, the government has established a 79-man
Civilian and Military Advisory Council to make recom-
mendations on non-military questions.
The government is now pretty solidly committed to an
eventual representative government chosen by popular
election. An election law to govern the selection of
a national constitutional assembly on September 11 has
been promulgated, and individuals and some groups are
now busily filing nominees in order to meet the July 11
deadline for:applications. So far, however, the Buddhists
have not withdrawn a decision to boycott the election.
VIET-2
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The assembly, to consist of 108 elected delegates and
nine others chosen as representatives of the minority
tribes, is charged solely with drafting a constitution.
A new government may not emerge before mid-1967.
Despite its stronger position, the Ky government still
faces serious hurdles.
One problem is the bickering and rivalries that still
persist among the principal leaders themselves.
A cabinet reshuffle, frequently delayed because of objec-
tions raised by certain Directorate generals, was an-
nounced on July 13. A second deputy premiership for cul-
tural and social matters was formed under Nguyen Luu
Vien, a southern Buddhist, not associated with the Bud-
dhist Institute. General Nguyen Bao Tri was named Min-
ister of Information and Chiev. Hoi, reportedly to give
Ky and Chief of State Thieu some control over the forth-
coming election process.
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The Military Situation in South Vietnam
Intensified and sustained allied spoiling operations
along the South Vietnam/Cambodia border have thus far
delayed or disrupted an anticipated Communist summer
monsoon offensive in the central. highlands and north of
Saigon.
Border surveillance operations in Pleiku and Kontum Prov-
inces are particularly indicative of the effectiveness
of the US/Vietnamese "preventive action" campaign. Since
mid-May, these long-term ground sweeps have resulted in
more than 1,100 Communist troops killed and have dis-
rupted the north-eastward movement of a North Vietna-
mese division into South Vietnam's high plateau region,
Similarly, aggressive allied operations against major
Communist buildups in the central coastal plain and in
the provinces due north of Saigon have denied Viet Cong
forces access to sorely-needed rice supplies in Phu Yen
Province, and evidently thwarted a planned enemy offen-
sive in the Binh Long province area.
These and other recent allied successes have forced the
Communists to adopt a hit-and-run attack posture, empha-
sizing actions against isolated, lightly defended Vietna-
mese outposts.
VIET-4
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(P Saravan'
SAIG6)
a BC
SOUTH VIETNAM
CURRENT SITUATION
0 25 50 75
0 25 50 75 IT- Kilometer=
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14 July 1966
NORTH VIETNAM POL FACILITIES BOMBED
Attacks on. North Vietnamese petroleum storage facilities
have made continued operation of the economy and prosecu-
tion of the war in. the south more difficult and costly.
Bombing of these facilities has denied North Vietnam:
(1) nearly 50 percent of the pre-raid capacity in, princi-
pal bulk petroleum storage facilities; (2) the use of cer-
tain of the facilities at Haiphong, the only important
terminal for receiving oceangoing tankers; (3) the use of
the entire Hanoi facility, the country's second-largest
petroleum storage center and most important hub for in-
ternal distribution; and (4) some 50-60,000 tons of
petroleum products.
The enemy has sufficient petroleum storage capacity and
stocks to permit continuation of both civil and military
operations--including infiltration--for more than five
months. Additional imports and the reduced use by non-
essential consumers could extend this period.
The six petroleum storage installations hit on 29 and 30
June had a total capacity of 1.33,000 metric tons of pe-
troleum--approximately 80 percent of the estimated national
principal bulk storage capacity of 165,000 metric tons.
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The execution of .the strikes appears to have been excel-
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lation in the urban areas of North Vietnam.
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It is estimated that Hanoi can. continue to import enough
petroleum to keep its fleet of trucks moving adequate
quantities of supplies down, the roads to South Vietnam,
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Hanoi's propaganda reaction to the POL strikes has been to
reaffirm its determination. to continue the fight and, in
addition., an. ominous new note has been. added--the threat
of trial and death sentences for captured US airmen..
The latest word from Hanoi, carried by the official Czech
news agency, is that trials may be held on either 20 July--
the anniversary of the 1954 Gen.eva Agreements--or on 4
August--the second anniversary of the Tonkin Gulf in.cident.
According to US estimates, at least thirty-five US air-
men are in the han.ds of the North Vietn.amese. More than
160 pilots are missing and many of these may have been.
captured.
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Presentation Staff
14 July 1966
The Chinese Communist Leadership
We believe that China has entered a transition period
(Mow Tsuh-dung)
even before Mao Tse-tung's final departure. Mao's ab-
sences from the public scene are growing longer and longer,
sug, ':j_ng recurring illnesses. He has appeared only
twice since November.
(Mow Tsuh-dung)
Mao Tse-tung probably remains the dominant leader, and
can probably impose his will, but at least since Novem-
ber he has not had the sure sustained control he wants.
It is possible, moreover, that ambitious colleagues are
pushing Mao to turn over more and more of the party ma-
chinery and the authority to make domestic and foreign
policy decisions.
The relative standing of Mao's immediate lieutenants is
far from clear. Disclosures already made point to a
(Dung Shyow-Ping)
power play by Teng Hsiao-ping, the powerful general se-
cretary of the party. Teng has been working with or using
(Pyow)
Lin Piao, whose place in the army would make him a use-
ful ally. Teng probably built the case that led to the
recent ouster of Peng Chen, a rival in Mao's inner circle
of advisers.
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The situation is still fluid, but not as much as it
was a month or two ago. The Peking People?s Daily an-
nounced on 1 July that the struggle was over. The
paper described recent events as an attempt by "counter-
revolutionary" plotters to seize the leadership of the
party, army, and the government.
If stability has been restored, it may well prove tran-
sitory. It is doubtful that the situation will fully
stabilize until Mao finally departs and a successor
consolidates his position.
We do not expect to see abrupt shifts in domestic or
foreign policy while the struggle goes on. All the con-
tenders for the leadership are hard-line Chinese Com-
munists, and quick changes are unlikely.
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COMPOSITION OF THE SECRETARIAT, THE EXECUTIVE ARM OF THE CHINESE
COMMUNIST PARTY, AS OF 9 JULY 1966
? = Under a cloud or removed
Name and Last
date of Appearance
Teng:Hsiao-ping
9 July 1966
? Peng Chen
29 March 1966
Wang Chia-hsiang
October 1965
Tan Chen-lin
9 July 1966
Li Hsueh-feng
9 July 1966
Li Fu-chun
9 July 1966
Li Hsien-nien
9 July 1966
? Lu Ting-i
March 1966
Politburo member; one of Mao Tse-tung's inner
circle of advisers; removal as 1st Secretary of
Peking Party Committee announced on 3 June 1966
Regional specialist; 1st Secretary of the North
China Bureau of the Central Committee; identi-
fied as 1st secretary of Peking on 3 June 1966,
replacing Peng Chen
Alternate politburo member; former director of
the propaganda department of the Central
C'r,mmittPe. removal revealed 9 July 1966
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Tao Chu
9 July 1966
Yeh Chien-ying
9 July 1966
Liu Lan-too
1 July 1966
? Yang Shang-kun
November 1965
Hu Chiao-mu
October 1965
1st Secretary of the Central South Bureau of the
Central Committee; appointment to secretariat
and as director of the propaganda department of
the Central Committee revealed 9 July 1966
Senior military officer; appointment to secretariat
revealed 9 July 1966; possible replacement for
Lo Jui-ching as Chief of Staff
1st Secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the
Central Committee
Director of the administrative office of the secretariat;
Mao Tse-tung's personal aide
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Presentation Staff
14 July 1966
YUGOSLAVIA: PARTY PROBLEMS
President Tito has set in motion the most drastic shake-
up of the Yugoslav regime since 19540with his 1 July
ouster of his heir apparent party secretary Alexander
Rankovic (Rank-o-vich).
A broad reshuffling of government and party officials
is probable as conservative elements who shared the
outlook of Rankovic are ousted.
Already Koca Popovic (Ko-cha Pop-o-vich) has been elected
by a special session of parliament to replace Rankovic
as vice president of the republic. Popovic has been
serving as chairman of a party commission with foreign
relations and prior to this appointment served as
foreign minister for twelve years.
Tito's action against his long-time colleague and old
comrade, apparently taken reluctantly, was most likely
the first step in a wide-ranging purge of those who have
opposed implementation of economic and social reforms;
younger and generally more liberal party officials will
probably be brought into authority,
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Rankovic's removal was based on charges that he had
misused his influence over the secret police to hinder
implementation of regime policies and to enhance his
power. Tito apparently had become alarmed at some of
the activities and methods Rankovic was using.
Rankovic seemed to be looking ahead to the day when
he would legally replace the 74-year-old dictator and
was attempting to ensure an unopposed succession.
Any such wide-scale shake-up of the party is likely to
exacerbate existing nationality rivalries, particularly
between the Serbs and Croats. Rankovic's essentially
conservative outlook had backing from his fellow Ser-
bian Communists who resented the regime's economic pol-
icies that benefited the more developed republics of
Croatia and Slovenia.
The entire question. of Tito's successor has been thrown
into doubt: neither of the two remaining party secre-
taries, Kardelj (Kar-Dell) nor Vlahovic (Vla-Ho-vich),
ha s a strong power base; other possible successors
include Crvenkovski (Sir-ven-Kov-ski), who chaired the
party commission that investigated Rankovic, and To-
dorovic (To-Dor-o-vich), who has been elevated to re-
place Rankovic.
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14 July 1966
No new ground seems to have been broken by the partici-
pants in the Warsaw Pact meetings; probably none of the
participants was entirely satisfied with the outcome.
Moscow's main aims were (1) to strengthen and re-
organize the pact, and (2) to obtain joint statements
on European security and Vietnam.
The Rumanians, in particular, and probably some of the
other Eastern European countries regarded the Russian
intentions concerning the pact as dangerous to their
freedom of maneuver and independence in bloc affairs.
The final communiqu4`1s brief, vague, and only reference
to this issue suggests that it remains unresolved; that
at best, the contending parties agreed to disagree.
The impression is left that Rumanian opposition to Rus-
sian demands may have been successful.
Over-all, the pact summit meeting, despite months of pre-
paratory discussion and several prior intrabloc consul-
tations, would appear to have brought forth a mouse.
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The USSR could, however, take satisfaction in obtaining
the backing of its European allies for the USSR position
on Vietnam.
The pact's statement on European security largely reit-
erated old bromides.
WARPACT-2
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14 Jury sir ign 5/off v
De Gaulle's visit went as predicted in terms of practical
accomplishments and non-accomplishments.
From De Gaulle's point of view, the trip sought to place
France in the forefront of nations seeking a European
settlement.
He did acknowledge during the trip that US still has a
role to play--in what he regards primarily a European
matter.
On. Vietnam, both sides called_again.for an. end to foreign
intervention and a return to the 1954 Geneva accords as
the basis for settlement. There is n.o indication, how-
ever, that agreement was made to launch a joint French-
Soviet "initiative" on. Vietnam.
Forms of future French-Soviet contact provided for in the
joint declaration issued after the trip are: (1) mutual
consultations on bilateral and multilateral relations, no
provision, yet for frequency and level; (2) establishment
of a Paris-Moscow "hot line"; and (3) creation. of a joint
commission to oversee fulfillment of scientific and eco-
nomic agreements signed during the visit.
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The scientific agreement provides for space cooperation
in the following areas: (1) space research which in-
cludes Soviet launching of a French satellite (with
"technical" matters still to be negotiated); (2) space
meteorology including parallel launching of sounding
rockets; (3) space communications envisaging continua-
tion of the Moln.iya satellite experiments and (4) visits
of French scientists to Soviet Academy institutes.
(Brezh-nyef)
rez nev, who clearly "led" the Soviet delegation.,
showed little flexibility on Germany. He said the exist-
ence of two German states must be accepted as the basis
for any East-West discussions on Germany.
The concept of a European Security Conference was raised
but not pressed by Brezhnev.
The chief gains for each side were:
Soviet: Acceptance as a "European. in good standing" and
the prospect of some access to Western technology under
the bilateral agreements signed.
FRANCE-2
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France: A demonstration. that steps toward detente in
Europe are possible without the US and without a sell-out
of West European.--particularly German--interests which
would cost them their preten.tion.s to West European leader-
ship.
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14 July 1966 Please return to f "_
Presentation Staff
Communal tensions on the island have risen. Presi-
(Mah-Kah-Ree-os)
dent Ma arios continues his efforts to: demoralize
the Turkish Cypriot community, and sabotage the Greek-
Turkish bilateral talks under way in Vienna.
As incidents have multiplied on both sides, Makarios
twice has clamped restrictions on the movement of
(Ni-Koh-Se-Uh)
Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia. Turkish Cypriot reaction
to the first ban was a further withdrawal from inter-
communal cooperation--a move toward the de facto parti-
tion desired by the Turkish Cypriot leadership.
Ankara's failure to back up its "ultimatum" on June 23
following the second ban has (1) convinced the Greek
Cypriots that Turkey will react militarily only if its
basic rights on the island are jeopardized, and (2)
possibly undermined the confidence of the Turkish Cypriot
community that Ankara really intends to protect Turkish
Cypriot rights.
Month-long UN mediation efforts have failed to resolve
a military confrontation over Greek Cypriot road con-
(Tree-Pih-Menee)
struction in the Trypimeni a ea,some 20 miles northeast
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Makarios reportedly will accept "demilitarizing" the
area. However, the Turkish Cypriots are holding out
for a number of observation posts to assure that Greek
Cypriots do not resume construction.
Both Greece and Turkey seem hopeful of success in the
current Cyprus talks, but neither has given any indica-
tion that it is willing to make significant concessions,
any attempt to impose a solution on Makarios will undoubt-
edly result in continued frustration.
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14---July 1966
INDONESIA
(Su-hart-o)
Army chief General Sumo?s power was significantly
strengthened by action of the Indonesian. Congress which
ended 6 July. In contrast President Sukarno's position
and prestige. suffered a further decline.
The congress: (1) reaffirmed Suharto's special execu-
tive powers gran.ted by Sukarno last March, (2) revoked
Sukarno's life presidency, (3) gave Suharto a mandate to
form anew cabinet by mid-August, (4) reaffirmed Suharto's
earlier ban on Indonesian. Communist Party and proscription
of "Marxism-Leninism", and (5) decreed that elections be
held in two years.
Suharto has indicated, that he will head -a new cabinet w rich
will include five density first ministers and 24 ministers.
In this capacity he will be "first amens equals-'LLand.probably-
will he named "deputy prime minister" while
Sukarno remains as the figurehead prime minister.
(Mahl-lik) (Jog-ja-karta)
Malik and Sultan of Jogjakarta--Suharto's major colleagues
in present cabinet--will remain but specific capacity as
yet undefined.
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Suharto has domestic job of controlling Indonesia's op-
portunistic political factions. Ultimately he may be
forced to retain. some authoritarian. elements of Sukarno?s
"guided democracy."
Government's most urgent problem is getting bankrupt
economy back on sound basis. Bilateral talks with creditor
nations are still under way to reschedule payments and get
aid. Indonesia is applying for readmission to International
Monetary Fund and World Bank.
Creditor nations agree that problem of Indonesia's inter
national debt ($2.5 billion) should be approached multi-
laterally. Meeting may be held this fall, but largest
creditor--USSR--cannot be expected to attend.
Suharto and his team have been trying to return. Indonesia
to a "free an.d active" foreign policy. They have resumed
friendly relations with West, they hope to be back in. United
Nations by September, and they have disengaged from Sukarno's
pro-Peking policy.
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14 July Phfi$%tjon Staff,
Britain and Rhodesia are still at loggerheads.
The British seem willing to give Rhodesia legal inde-
pendence under minority white rule provided: (1) Rho-
desians first return briefly to nominal British sover-
eignty and (2) promise steady advances for Africans after,
independence.
Rhodesia refuses to end rebellion until Britain spells
out clearly what kind of concessions are expected toward
Rhodesian Africans. Premier Smith and the Rhodesians ap-
parently are prepared to make some minor concessions to
Africans if the tempo of the advances of the Africans is
under control of the Rhodesian whites.
Britain thinks a few more months of economic sanctions
will soften the Rhodesians' stand. However, sanctions
are unlikely to have marked economic effects within that
short time. Most of the Rhodesian whites seem ready to
live at a lower economic level rather than surrender their
power to the African majority in the foreseeable future.
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Africans will not accept any settlement unless it guaran-
tees majority rule before independence. However, neither
the Rhodesian Africans nor the other African governments
has the power to upset any agreement between Britain and
the rebel regime.
Other African governments would be extremely bitter toward
the West if Britain "sold out" in Rhodesia. Several would
probably leave the Commonwealth.
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