VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A000400060002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 29, 1966
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved'or R
DIA review(s)
completed.
State Department review completed
79T00827A000400060002-6
29 August 1966
VIETNAM
Just a few notes to bring you up to date on
developments in Vietnam since
briefing:
The military situation has changed very
little. The allied forces are still keeping
the initiative, with major "spdthling operations"
which keep the enemy off balance and have so far
prevented any major monsoon offensive by the
Communists.
These operations have inflicted heavy
casualties on the Viet Cong and the North Viet-
namese troops working with them, but the enemy
strength continues to grow, largely through
infiltration.
We now estimate that the Communist Main
Force amounts to more than 105,000 men, of whom
about 45,000 are in regular formations pf the
North Vietnamese Army. This main force is now
organized in 32 regiments, 19 of them PAVN--North
Vietnamese, that is. They can operate and have
operated in organizations as high as the division
level. Our spoiling operations are designed to
keep such concentrations from being able to launch
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offensive operations.
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American strength in Vietnam has now xnazkar passed
300,000. Other countries---mainly Korea and to a lesser
extent Auttralia--have sent 35,000 men, and South
Vietnam has 700,000 men under arms. That adds up to
more than 1,000,000 men.
The Communist main force is backed up by something
more than 100,000 guerrillas and more than 50,000
support personnel, so that altogether they may have
a quarter of a million men. The trouble is that the
old textbooks on suppressing guerrillas suggest that
as long as you have to defend fixed points and the
guerrilla doesn't, you need a superiority of 10 to 1.
We have four to one. It may be, however, that our
superior mobility and air power will make the
difference.
In the North, press accounts recently have
given the impression that we are losing many more
aircraft. Actually, there has been no significant
change in the rate of loss, which compares favorably
with both the Korean War and World War II. We have,
however, been flying many more sorties as the weather
has improved, and attacking more heavily defended
targets.
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On the political front, attention right now
centers on the election of a constttiutional assembly
scheduled for two weeks from yesterday--September 11.
The campaign has now started, and so has the
opposition, from both the Viet Cong and the
more militant leaders among the Buddhists.
The Viet Cong are stepping up terrorism, in
addition to such obstruction as confiscating voter
registeration cards. We expect they may resort to
c onsiderable violence, including assassination, to
disrupt the election itself.
The leaders of the Buddhist Institute have called
on their followers to boycott the elections, and we
have reports that they may come up with some more
devious maneuvers as the election approaches. For
one thing, they are said to have a plan to start a
rumor on election day that Thich Tri Quang has died,
and that all faithful Buddhists should go to the
pagodas to mourn him rahher than vote.
About 70 percent of the registered voters
cast their ballots in provincial and regional elections
in May of 1965. There wasn't as much at stake in that
election, so there was no active opposition by the
Buddhists or the Viet Cong. This time, if as much
as 50 percent of the electorate votes, it would be
a good psychological victory for the Saigon regime,
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 "we VAW
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for any Saigon government since the early days of the
Ngo Dinh Diem regime when Diem had just taken over
by plebiscite from Emperor Bao Dai.
Neither the Communists nor the Buddhists want
the present regime to be able to claim that kind of
public support, and the next two weeks may provide
some violent disorders to prevent it.
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 v
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S AMS
6 Sept 66 FIRED TO DATE 733
AIRCRAFT KILLS 30
confirmed-20
probable- 10
RATIO 24.4 to 1
134 sites, est. 20-25 bns
FY 66 av 29/mo
July 192
3 a/c 2 drone
Aug 203
9 a/c 3 drone
AIRCRAFT losses total as of yesterday--US over NVN
MAIN FORCE VC 61,414
PAVN 44, 900
(13 rgts) 86 bn
(19 ) 72 b n
106,314 32 rgt 158 bn
6 Div HQ
COMBAT SUPPORT,MF(VC) 17,553
nconfirmed 16 400)
-(u
PARAMILITARY
V
103,600---
UNCONFIRMED: MAIN FORCE 22 ,9500 VC, 2,500 PAVN
PL 604
ARMED POL CADRE 40,000
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 Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000400060002-6
FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM 6 September 1966
CONFIRMED UNCONFIRMED
Combat Combat Support combat Combat PERSONNEL
MAIN FORCE Personnel Battalions Personnel Personnel Battalions TOTALS
VIET CONG 61,414 86 17,553 2,950 9 81,917
2,500 9 47,400
Sub
Total 106,314 158 17,553 5,450 18 129,317
below
PARAMILITARY 103,600 battalion 40,000 16,400 -- 160,000
level
NOTES: More than one half of the 158 confirmed combat battalions listed are now organized into
32 regiments, of which 13 are Viet Cong and 19 are PAVN. in addition, most of these regi-
ments are suspected of being controlled by six division headquarters.
The PAVN personnel listed above are those organized only in the corresponding PAVN units.
Those North Vietnamese organized in Viet Cong units are listed as Viet Cong personnel.
The 40,000 paramilitary support personnel are armed political cadres.
Army
Navy
Marines
Air Force
Paramilitary
GROUND FORCE BATTALIONS AIR SQUADRONS, COMPANIES
Armor, Engineer PERSONNEL
Infantry Artillery Other Support Strike Helicopter Other TOTALS
157 26 63
280,422
16,204
6,870
6 4 7 13,906
388,497
RVN
TOTALS 162 26 63 6 4 7 705,899
UNITED STATES
Army 39 26 2/3 20
Marines 18 9 1/3 12
Air Force --- -- --
Navy --- -- --
Coast Guard --- -- --
US
TOTALS
OTHER FREE
WORLD TOTAL 10
32
48 21 185,400
8 11 3 55,636*
32 -- 24 43,104
16 -- 2 1/2 20,628*
437
SUS naval -air and marine units afloat are included in unit listings above, but not in personnel
total.
Battalion strengths: VC - from 250-700; PAVN - 400-500; ARVN - 350-400; US Army - 800-900 (Airmobile
Division--800); USMC - 1,200-1,500.
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Appro Fbr baa / 4Ie 4iR[ftkbotYBi2,idM40OU6002-6
best evidence yet obtained that high-level North
Vietnamese party and military personalities are serv-
ing as the leaders of the Communist political and mili-
tar apparatus in South Vietnam, has been provided
by no recently de-
fected to ;out Vietnamese au ies.
The defector, who has furnished reliable infor-
mation on a variety of subjects, was in a position to
obtain the information he has provided on the leader-
ship .
He confirmed rumors which have been circulat-
ing for more than a year that North Vietnamese polit-
buro member Nguyen Chi Thanh is the number one
Communist in South Vietnam. Thanh serves as head
of both the political and military departments of the
Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), according
to the source. COSVN has long been known to be the
headquarters for the Communist war effort in South
Vietnam.
also disclosed that the head of COSVN's military
operations. staff is North Vietnamese a Wneral Le
The source also confirmed that Tran Nam Trung,
who is openly listed by the National Front for the :: ibera-
tion of South Vietnam as chief of its military affairs
committee, is actually North Vietnamese Brigadier
General Tran Van Tra. His true position, according
to the source, is deputy commander to Nguyen Chi
Thanh. Tra is listed by the North Vietnamese as an
alternate rr:.ember of their party central committee.
The deputy chief of COSVN's political office,
according to the defector, is Tran Do who is also
listed by the North Vietnamese as an alternate mem-
ber of their party central committee. The defector
Trong Tan.
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26 Aug 66 2
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Chinese Communist Air Order of Battle
The Chinese Communist air order of battle is
shown opposite and below.
Or Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-F9DP7 T00827AOOnannnannn7-a
LT/PROP
LT/PROP
Li'/PROP
LT/PROP
LT/1ROP
MED/TURBO-PROP
WD/ JET
NEE/TURBO-PROP
LT/TURBO-PROP
IIELICOPTEII
C-46
C-47
CAB
LI-2
COACH
IL-12
CRATE
IL-14
COOT
IL-18
COOKPOT
TU-124
VISCOUNT
COKE
AN-24
HOUND
MI-4
00
1 Sepfrmber 1966
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