COMMUNIST CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A000400080004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 1999
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 12, 1966
• Content Type: BRIEF

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DC1 BRIEFING
COMMUNIST CHINA
12 September 1966
I. The internal political scene in Communist
China has been marked by turmoil and disarray
for many months now. All of the indications
are that the situation is still unstable,
and there may be further upheavals.
A. For the past month, mobs of rampaging
teenagers of the so-called Red Guard hav.
kept the coun-::ry in a state of disord2r
1. They have been roaming the streets
of all major Chinese cities,
harassing sly:Tected enemies of the
regime and occasionally beating them
up.
2. There have been a few reports of
extensive violence and bloodshed,
but for the most part the Red Cnares
appear to be a disciplined and well-
controlled organization.
3. In the past week their activities
have subsided somewhat.
B. The destructive antics of these teepagers
have tended to divert public attenticn
from far more important developments
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within the party leadership. It appears
to us that the top power structure of the
party is undergoing its most massive
shake-up in the history of the Chinese
Communist regime.
(BRIEFING BOARD, CHICOM LEADERSHIP)
II. Last month, massive demonstrations in Peking on
the 18th and 31st of August featured what
appears to be a new line-up of the party's
top policy-making body, the politburo.
A. Mao Tse-tung still dominates the leadership,
but Defense Minister Lin Piao has taken
the place of Mao's long-time deputy,
Liu Shao-chi.
1. Liu has been the titular chief of
state. There has been no announce-
ment that he has lost that position,
and he is still a member of the
politburo, but he has been dropped
ignominiously from second to eighth
place.
B. As for Mao himself, we are not sure just
how much control he still exercises over
day-to-day events, or how long he will last
1. He was completely out of public view
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last winter and spring for nearly
six months, and we are convinced
that he was seriously ill for at
least part of that period.
2. Peking propaganda has been working
hard to portray Mao as a healthy
man--capable, for instance, of long
swims in the Yangtze river. Foreign
visitors who saw him this summer,
however, say that he did not look
well at all.
3. A competent medical doctor who saw
Mao has reported that he had the
appearance of a man recovering from
a serious illness or an operation.
Mao's new deputy, Lin Piao, is not in much
better health.
A. Lin is one of the youngest men in the polit-
buro at 59, but he has been ill for much
of the past 30 years, probably with
tuberculosis.
1.
This would still mean that he must
limit his working hours, rest a great
deal, and take long vacations, in order
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2. His life expectancy is probably not
much more than five years.
IV. Mao, however, appears to have chosen Lin to be
his successor in spite of Lin's frailty. We
think this must reflect Mao's growing mistrust
of other elements of the leadership.
A. Perhaps the most significant aspect of
the recent changes has been the break-up
of the group of leaders which had been
running the party machinery for the past
decade.
1. Liu Shao-chi was the leading member
of that group.
2. Many other members have been demoted
or dismissed, including Peng Chen,
another senior politburo member and
the Mayor of Peking; the party pro-
paganda chief, Lu Ting-i; and the man
responsible for the secret police,
Lo Jui-ching.
B. Military leaders close to Lin, and govern-
ment figures like Chou En-lai have risen
in importance.
V. For many years now, it had appeared to us that
the leaders of the party machinery--men like
Liu Shao-chi--enjoyed Mao's full trust.
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A. They not only had a long record of personal
loyalty to Mao; their radical approach
was also in accord with his.
B. This situation presents us with a puzzling
contradiction, tspecially in regard to
its policy implications:
1. Mao is apparently intent on pushing
through a radical program to reshape
Chinesc society. It appears to be so
radical that the party rank-and-file
could not be trusted to carry it out.
The Red Guard had to be created.
2. There is, therefore, no satisfactory
explanation for Mao's willingness to
turn against his old comrades who
appeared to share his radical views.
3. The government administrators and
economic specialists who have been
retained or even promoted--men like
Chou En-lai, Chen Yun, and Li Fu-chun--
are the relatively moderate members of
the politburo.
4. Yet these moderates are now the nen
who presumably will be helping Mao and
Lin Piao to implement the radical program.
VI. As I have said, the situation appears to be highly
unstable. The events of the past ten months must
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have intensified the antagonisms and mistrust
among those leaders who have survived the
purge.
A. The possibility has increased that when
Mao finally does go, the succession will
be disorderly, and marked by factional
struggles and bloody purges.
B. It is also far from clear whether or not
the new leaders are going to institute
any major changes in domestic or foreign
policy.
C. There has, however, been no change in the
basic hard-line nature of the men at the
top. As a result, we foresee no abrupt
change in Peking's policy of implacable
hostility toward the United States.
FOREICN POLICY)
I. In general, the Peking leaders have been so
pre-occupied with troubles at home that they
have been marking time on foreign policy.
Vietnam
On Vietnam, Peking con. hues to repeat its
familiar hard line. At the same time, the
Chinese are carefully avoiding any expansion
of their commitment to hel:) the North Viet-
namese.
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A. The first U. S. attacks on North Vietnam'p
POL storage facilities on Tune 29th pro-
vided a short-lived barrage of propa-
ganda.
1. Peking tried to convey the impression
that China was more determined than
evak to assist Hanoi in resisting
this new escalation.
2. But the Chinese declarations of
"resolute support" for the Vietnamese
did not exhibit the ring of enthusi-
asm that had marked similar state-
ments on the 'subject a year ago. The
emphasis was on self-reliance by the
Vietnamese.
B. Peking, however, appears to be just as
determined as ever that the North Viet-
namese must continue the war.
1. After the September 7th meeting of
the U.S.and Chinese Communist ambassa-
dors in Warsaw, the Chinese Ambassador
released a statement attacking what he
called the "U.S. peace talks swindle."
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2. Ambassador Wang reiterated Peking's
adamant opposition to negotiations on
Vietnam, and asserted once again that
China--"the great rear area"--would
support Hanoi's struggle against the
U.S. to the end.
Sino-Soviet Relations
III. The Sino-Soviet dispute has flared up again,
but there is no indication that this marks a
significant change in relations between the
two countries.
A. Mass demonstrations by Red Guards outside
the Soviet Embassy in Peking on August
29th and 30th were evidently intended
as a reply to a Soviet diplomatic note
delivered on August 26th which had pro-
tested earlier "acts of hooliganism" com-
mitted by the Red Guards in the vicinity
of the embassy.
1. The Chinese took care, however, to
prevent the thousands of people who
took part in the demonstrations from
getting out of hand and damaging the
Soviet Etbassy.
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2. This suggests that Peking is not willing
to push the Soviets too far.
B. Peking's most recent blast at Moscow was a
People's Daily article on September 8th
which accused Moscow of collaborating with
the U.S. to "sell out the Vietnamese."
1. The article called the Soviets "rene-
gades," "termites of the working class,"
and "scum in the revolutionary ranks."
Pakistan
IV. Peking has continued to supply military assist-
ance to Pakistan, including MIG aircraft, tanks
and artillery. China's willingness to provide
this equipment demonstrates the value Peking
puts on its ties with Rawalpindi.
A. The Chinese apparently see this aid as the
price they must pay to keep alive a marriage
of convenience which is based largely on a
common antipathy to India.
1. They believe that their military aid
will increase the tension between
Pakistan and India.
B. The Chinese also know that their support
causes strains between Ayub and the
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United States, and complicates Soviet
efforts to follow up the Tashkent declara-
tion and increase Moscow's influence in
the sub-continent.
North Korea
V. China has lost considerable ground to the
Soviet Union in North Korea.
A. The Korean Communists, long among Peking's
staunchest supporters, have been edging
toward Moscow recently. They are in-
creasingly critical of certain Chinese
policies, particularly those dealing with
Vietnam.
B. Peking and Pyongyang have avoided attacking
each other publicly by name, but the
growing coolness in relations was pointed
up at the ceremonies in July marking the
fifth anniversary of the Chinese-Korean
treaty of friendship and mutual assistance.
C. Pyongyang's clearest and most explicit
public declaration of independence from
Peking came on August 12, when Nodong
Sinmun endorsed Moscow's call for united
bloc action on Vietnam.
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1. The North Korean paper scolded those
who criticize a party's "independent
attitude" as "neutralism" or "op-
portunism"--an obvious jab at the
Chinese Communists.
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(MILITARY POTENTIAL)
I. To take a brief look at Communist Chinese
military potential--There is considerable
evidence that China is trying to develop
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advanced weapons just as fast as it can.
A. Communist China lags far behind the
industrialized nations of the world
in major fields of science and technology.
The Chinese are not going to have these
advanced weapons systems ready overnight,
no matter what priority they give them.
B. Nevertheless, the Chinese have been able
to detonate three nuclear devices and
undertake the development of a medium-
range ballistic missile.
1. They have done this by allocating
a major share of all scientific
resources to the weapons programs.
2. This has seriously retarded the
growth of a strong technical base
for the broader needs of the economy.
II. The Chinese military modernization program
still in its early stares.
A. For several years to come, the milita-.-y
power of Communist China will derive
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primarily from the numerical strength
of its enormous ground forces--about
3,000,000 men--and its tremendous reserves
of manpower.
B. The army has demonstrated its ability
to move and fight with primitive transpor-
tation and logistic support.
C. If the Chinese were not faced with major
opposition from a great power, they could
probably quickly overrun any of their
mainland neighbors in Southeast Asia or
Korea.
D. If it came to all-out warfare against any
modern military machine, however, the
Chinese would be badly hampered by short-
ages of armor, helvy ordance, mechanized
transport, and POL.
II. The Chinese Air Fo7ce and Navy are oriented
primarily toward d-fenze.
A. The bulk of the j3t fighter force consists
of 1,600 MIC-15s snd MIC-17s which were
obtained 10 years ago or even earlier.
1. In the pa3t two years, however, the
Chinese have begun assembling MIC-19s
in a Shenyang aircraft plant which
was supnlied by the Soviet Union
before 1960.
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2. As a result, the Chinese Communists
have not only been able to supply
MIG-19s to Pakistan, but have
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increased their own holdings of this
high-performance, twin-engine jet
from 150 aircraft to about 350.
B. The Chinese are continuing to place a high
priority on the coastruction of submarines.
1. The Chinese Communist Navy now has
26 submarines of the medium-range
W or R-cU.ss. Two or three new units
will probaby be built each year for
the next fev years.
Deployment ]11 outh China
IV. Because of the possibility of Chinese involve-
ment in the Vietnamese war, we of course watch
the South China border area very carefully for
any signs of a ground force build-up there.
A. There are already about 480,000 troops
in South China, f)t, they have been thereA
for some time, alm only about 100,000
are near the North Vietnamese border.
1. There has been no evidence so far
of any significant build-up.
B. Peking has, howevcr, sent a considerable
force of engineer and support units into
North Vietnam.
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1. These units are there to help maintain
Hanoi's lines of communication with
China and the Soviet Union.
2. We don't know exactly how many are in
North Vietnam, but we estimate some-
where between 25,000 and 45,000.
3.
Needless to say, we watch their activ-
ities as closely as possible.
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DCI BRIEFING FOR
VIETNAM
12 September 1966
I. The Free World forces in South Vietnam are
continuing to maintain the pressure on the
Communists which has so far prevented the
development of a major Viet Cong offensive
during the monsoon season.
A. We have been able to launch a series
of successful "spoiling operations"---
attacks in force into areas where the
enemy has been trying to concentrate
forces for large-scale actions.
1. These operations have not only
kept the Communists off balance,
but have inflicted heavy casualties.
2. One good example was Operation
Hastings, carried out in July in
northern Quang Tri Province. U. S.
Marines and South Vietnamese regulars
attacked units of the 324-B Divisinn
of the North Vietnamese army, which
had infiltrated directly across the
Demilitarized Zone.
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3. In an operation continuing from July
7 to August 2, the allied forces
killed 882 men--by actual body count--
and many more were probably killed by
tactical air strikes. The North
Vietnamese units were forced back into
the demilitarized zone.
B. This action, of course, did not destroy the
North Vietnamese division, which has possibly
7,000 men. As a matter of fact, our latest
intelligence indicates that the 324-B division,
together with other North Vietnamese units,
is again concentrating in and immediately
south of the Demilitarized Zone for another
attempt to launch operations.
1. Operation Hastings, however, demonstrates
how the allied tactics have been able to
disrupt the Communist timetable.
2. These spoiling operations have been
successful largely because the allied
forces have such great mobility, and
because of the constant improvement in
the intelligence on enemy dispositions
and moves.
C. Since late July, there have been no engagements
as extensive as Hastings.
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1. The allied forces, however, have been
maintaining the pressure with 10 to 15
operations a day in battalion strength
or greater.
2. These probing operations have led to
a number of small but sharp engagements
which have cost the Communists an average
of about'1,550 men killed per week.
D. In most of the encounters this spring and
summer, the enemy has not chosen to stand
and fight, as he did in the 1a Drang Valley
battle in Pleiku Province last November.
The Communists have been taking heavy casualties---
the body count for the first eight months this year
already exceeds the 35,400 killed in 1965.
A. The rate of infiltration from North Vietnam,
however, is also greatly increased. Apparently
the Viet Cong are also calling up a larger
number of their regional guerrillas for the
main forces.
1. The Communist main force now has more
than 106,000 men in combat units-158
battalions.
2. This includes about 50,000 men in regular
formations of the North Vietnamese army.
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3. We believe that there are 19 North
Vietnamese and 13 Viet Cong regiments.
B. Many of the 158 enemy battalions operate as
independent battalions, or in even smaller
units. There are, however, at least
which are
capable of pulling battalions and regiments
together for concerted Communist attacks on
a major scale.
C. This means that the enemy retains a signi-
ficant capability for large-scale operations,
as well as a high level of small actions
against isolated outposts and smaller allied
units.
D. There is no indication that there has been
any radical change in the overall Communist
strategy. That is to attack in force wherever
the terrain and other factors are strongly to
their advantage, and where they believe they
can achieve victories at the smallest pessible
cost.
(SOUTH VIETNAMESE POLITICAL SITUATION)
I. As for the political situation in South Vietnam,
the miliary government of Premier Ky continues
to maintain the relatively stable position it has
enjoyed since overcoming the Buddhist "struggle"
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movement last spring.
A. Most recently, of course, the election held
last Sunday has been the center of attention.
The outcome appears likely to enhance the
stability of the regime.
B. The identities of those elected to tY
constituent assembly have no particular
bearing; the significant facts are that
more than five and a quarter million people
registered to vote, and that more than
80 percent of those registered actually
cast their ballots.
C. This would appear to be an excellent
performance in the light of a call by the
more militant of the Buddhist leaders for
a boycott, and threats by the Viet Cong
against candidates and voters.
1. Incidents of terrorism and harassment
by the Viet Cong were five times as
high on Election Day as on a normal
day. In general, however, the voting
took place without serious incidents.
2. There may have been some padding of the
rural vote, but observers throughout
the country found no evidence of
official coercion, fraud, or other rigging.
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D. The government, of course, made an
all-out security effort to prevent Viet
Cong disruption of the election, but the
voter turn-out at least indicates that
in areas where there is a government
presence there is less fear of the Viet
Cong, and probably less sympathy for their
cause.
E. As for the failure of the Buddhist appeal
for the faithful to abstain from voting,
it points up the weakness in secular
matters of the militants around Thich Tri
Quang who at present control the policies
of the Buddhist Institute.
II. There are some internal strains within the
military government which might ultimately
cause trouble as the time approaches for the
installation of an elected government under the
new constitution now to be drafted.
A. These strains, however, in large part do
not reflect a refusal by the military to
go along with the constitutional process.
1. They reflect instead the rivalry of
some senior military commanders with
Premier Ky, and their fear that Ky
might dismiss them.
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2. There have also been indications of
some complaints by some junior officers
objecting to alleged corruption of their
superiors.
3. None of these strains, however, appear
so serious or so widespread as to
threaten Ky's position at this time.
(NORTH VIETNAM)
I. As for North Vietnam, the Hanoi leaders appear as
determined as ever to continue the war. They have
rejected all attempts by third parties to get
negotiations started.
The level of air strikes against North Vietnam has
expanded considerably during the past several
months.
A. The major targets are North Vietnamese lines
of communication, and their POL facilities.
B.
The North Vietnamese continue, however,
be able to move enough men and supplies
through Laos into South Vietnam to maintain
the operations of the Communists in the South.
We have obtained more and more evidence in recent
months of the extent to which Hanoi is running--
and taking part in--the war in South Vietnam.
A. Captured documents and the interrogation of
prisoners have now identified the man who
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is running the entire Communist war effort
in South Vietnam. He is Nguyen Chi Thanh,
( *NNGWEEN CHEF, TAHN ) a politburo member
of the North Vietnamese Communist Party.
1. Thanh is a general i71-7171?N-Rth Vittna-
mese Army, and has been its political
commissar. He left North Vietnam to
take over operations in the South early
in 1965.
2. His two principal deputies are also
both generals in the North Vietnamese
Army, and members of the central
corn-
mittee of the North Vietnamese Commu-
nist Party.
3. One of them, the military deputy, is
Tran Van Tra, who used to be deputy
chief of staff of the North Vietnamese
Army. Now, under the alias of Tran Nam Trung,
he is listed as chief of the military
affairs committee of the so-called
National Front for the Liberation of
South Vietnam.
4. The deputy who runs the Communist political
organization in South Vietnam is General
Tran Do.
B. That is a good sample of how little identification
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the National Frc.nt for the Liberation
of South Vietnam actually has with the
people of South Vietnam.
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12 September 1966
DCI BRIEFING FOR
SOVIET POLICIES IN ASIA
T. Moscow's new leaders have significantly improved
Soviet fortunes in Asia.
A. Moscow has modified its tactics in the Sino-
Soviet dispute and reasserted itself in Viet-
nam, in order to regain ground lost to China
during the Khrushchev years.
B. The Brezhnev - Kosygin regime has replaced
Khrushchev's collision course with China,
adopting a more subtle, non-polemical, and
reasonable style. This has provided a strik-
ing contrast to China's increasingly belliger-
ent and dogmatic approach.
C. Moscow's new tactic has been vindicated, most
recently by what you might call the North
Korean "declaration of independence," and by
the growing strains between the Japanese Com-
munists and Peking.
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Premier Kosygin's trip to Hanoi in February of
1965 was the first step in Moscow's attempt to
reclaim its past influence in North Vietnam.
A. Since then, the Soviets have worked to en-
hance their "revolutionary" image and to re-
build their presence in Vietnam by giving
Hanoi sizable quantities of economic aid and
by bolstering Hanoi's defensive capabilities.
B. Th p USSR, while working for a larger role in
sh4ping events in Vietnam, has at the same
time displayed relative caution and restraint.
In particular, it has taken care not to risk
a direct confrontation with the US.
III. The Soviet leadership will undoubtedly favor a
negotiated settlement, if and when Hanoi does.
A. As long as the North Vietnamese continue to
demonstrate their opposition to peace talks,
however, Moscow is unwilling to take any
initiatives itself--for example, in its ca-
pacity as a co-chairman of the Geneva Con-
ference.
B. The USSR is going to be very careful that
the influence it has just acquired in Hanoi
is not again lost to the Chinese. As a result,
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the Soviets will seek negotiations only when
they are explicitly asked by Hanoi to make
such a move.
IV. The Soviets are winning points in the Communist
world by capitalizing on China's intransigence
and increasing dogmatism. Moscow is also work-
ing in the non-Communist world to secure greater
influence at Chinese expense.
A. Moscow has demonstrated its intent to provide
an effective counterweight to China in Asia,
particularly during the past year.
1. Soviet "good offices" at Tashkent last
January revealed real Russian apprehen-
sion that further discord in South Asia
would be exploited by Peking.
2. The Soviets recently also expressed a
readiness to renew aid to the volatile
Prince Sihanouk in Cambodia, in an ef-
fort to offset Chinese inroads in Phnom
Penh.
B. The dramatic setback to Chinese prestige in
Indonesia could also turn out to be a plus
for Moscow, even though the posture of the
new leadership in Djakarta has been against
Communism no matter what its origin.
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1. The Soviet leaders may be concerned that
the Indonesian military leaders are turn-
ing too far toward the West. They are
probably pleased, however, that Indonesia's
pro-Peking drift has been halted, and that
the pro-Chinese voice of the big Indonesian
Communist Party has been silenced.
2. The Kremlin probably hopes that it has
enough leverage to keep Indonesia relatively
neutral through the sizable Soviet invest-
ment in the Indonesian military. This ac-
counts for more than one billion dollars
of the Indonesian foreign debt.
3. Privately the Soviets were probably also
pleased with the end of the Malaysian
"confrontation." This frees Moscow to
establish its own presence in Malaysia
and Singapore. Recent trade talks in
Singapore bear this out.
V. The Soviet interest in establishing strong in-
fluence in Hanoi has to a certain extent limited
similar efforts in a number of countries, par-
ticularly Laos.
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A. This was revealed most recently during the
trip to the USSR of the Laotian King and the
neutralist Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma.
1. Moscow initially displayed interest in
good relations with Vientiane. However,
the Prime Minister's very cool reception
in Moscow made it apparent that the So-
viets were unwilling to risk alienating
Hanoi.
2. The North Vietnamese, speaking through
Pathet Lao propaganda outlets, had become
increasingly abusive of the neutralist
leader and his government.
3. Moscow has frequently protested support
given the US effort in Vietnam by both
Laos and Thailand.
B. Vietnam will continue to be the fulcrum of
Soviet policies in Southeast Asia.
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