(UNTITLED)
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00827A000800030003-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
30
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 7, 2000
Sequence Number:
3
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 22, 1967
Content Type:
BRIEF
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CIA-RDP79T00827A000800030003-4.pdf | 1.07 MB |
Body:
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CSIPRES 33RI3;FING
Industry Committee, U.S. Civil Defense Council
Sheraton-Park hotel, 2660 Conn
Pentagon Auditorium 5A1070 2:30-4:3(1
STATINTL 2:40-3:15)
Virgil L. Couch
Visual Aids Support, (phonetic)
STATINTL
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22 Marc Brie ing
I held better begin by admitting that I do not
propose to live up to the programinotes, and cover
t}re "cultural, economic, ideological, polt~tical,
educational and other significant aspect:;" of the
world's 120-odd countries in half an hour.
But if we are going to have trouble, be it
brush-fire or thermonuclear, of a nature which will
make this country take a hurried look at the status
of its civil defenses, it is a safe bet ghat from
almost any and every trouble spat you can trace the
origin back to the Communists in Russia, in Chi^ na~or
iri Cuba.
So what I propose to do is to examine the political,
economic, and military status in each of these three
countries, and then,as and if time permits, take a
very c}nick look around the world at some of the places cohere
the Communists might cause major turmoil.
One word on security; Some of the material I will be
using is classified SECRET, and the classification may
appear any some of the maps and charts--and yet much of it may
sound very much like what you Nava read i.n the papers.
The explanation is that the classification SECRET applies
to the fact that--these are the judgments of the U.S. government
intelligence services, and are being expressed by a repxesen-
tative of the Central Intelligence Agency.
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Military
I. The armed forces of the Soviet Union have been
engaged for several years in a dynamic program
of research and development, looking for some kind
of a breakthrough that might end the nuclear stale-
mate and swing the balance of power ~.n Soviet favor.
A. They have not achieved any such breakthxrough, and
we have no indication that they may be on the
verge of one.
B. They are, however, making improvc;ments acrossi the
board, in their strategic offense capabilities, in
defensive posture, and even in gc;neral purpose forces.
C. They remain behin the United States in the number
of warheads each can deliver on the territory of
the other.
1. There is, however, a new deployment program under
way for ICBM's which represents a Soviet attempt
to catch up numer~ical~y.
D. At t}ie same time, as you may have seen in the accounts
of Secretary McNamara's congressional testimony, the
Soviets are deploying a defensive system around Moscow,
designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles.
1. }9e do not consider this a very effective system.
It can be fooled, and it can be overwhelmed. Also,
insofar as defenses intended primarily to intercept
ballHistic missiles are concerned, we know of none
anywhere in the Soviet Union except at Moscow.
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2. The rest of the country is stall concerned wit}-
defending itself adequately against manned bombers,
and air-to-surface stand-off missiles like our
HOUND DOG.
E. But I think the important conclusion to be drawn
from everyt}-ing we know about the Soviet military
establishment is this:
F. T}-e Soviets continue to increase their military budget,
their effort to achieve a major breakthrough, and
the general improvement of military posture.
1. Over the next few years, these improvements are
going to give the Soviet leaders increasing confi-
dence that they are creating an effective deterrent,
in the form of a military es1;a}alishment which could
undergo nuclear attack, and still come throggh with
enough punch left to destroy a significant portion
of the population and resources of the United States.
2. We do not believe that the Sc-viets themselves expect
to be strong enough--even over the next 10 years--
.~.. .,..r. ..-- ..ww.,,.s
to consider the deliberate ir-itiation of a war
against the United States.
3. Such growing confidence in t}-eir offensive and
defensive capabilities, however, is one of t}ie
factors which could lead to disastrous miscalcula-
tions when two countries are trying to face each
other dawn at the brink of a war which neither
may want .
4. Lt makes it necessary to maintain a continuing
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watch on the men who now lead the Soviet Union,
their abilities, and their policies.
Soviet Leadership
I. The men who threw Khrushchev out 2-1~2 years ago have-now
}iad time to establish their policies, their relationships,
and their way of doing business.
A. What has emerged is essentially a collective
leadership.
1. The standing of tt~e Party Secretary General,
Leonid Brezhnev, has been growing steadily.
He appears to be first among ec}uals, or--as
Orwell said--some are more ec}ual than others.
2. But decisions are apparently reached by com-
promise, and implemented with caution.
3. This avoids the erratic initiatives Khrushchev
was noted .for, and reduces the chances of making
major mistakes.
~Ie.v-~
B. The present leaders are a of mixed interests
and authority. They have held together remarkably
well, and they have done it with undramatic, middle-
of-the-xoad policies. The guiding principle appears
to be "Don't rock the boat."
C. But this collective rule-by-committee has two
weaknesses.
FIRST, behind the outward appearance of collective
leadership, a subtle struggle for power and
position continues.
S};COND, rule-by-committee has an inherent tendency
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to duck or postpone the hard decisions. For
example, such highly political problems as
economic reform and critical resource allocation
have not been resolved.
a. The present Kremlin leadership system works, but
it has not yet demonstrated the long-run durability
needed to make the hard decisions, and to avoid the
drift toward the one-man rule of the Stalin and
K}~rushchev eras.
II. I want to point out that a policy of "not rocking the
boat" in no sense implies any weakening of the major
thrust of Soviet foreign policy, whitli remains the
expansion of Russian influence beyond the borders
of the Soviet Union.
~CJ~
A. The Cold War didri~t"end with the Cuban missile crisis,
the fall of K}irushchev, the nuclear test ban treaty,
or 'the Sino-Soviet dispute.
B. Rather, it has changed-its character and its tactics.
It is more political, more subtle:, more gradual. The
goals remain the same.
C. The low-keyed style under Brezhnev and Kosygin is
probably better suited to the Cold War and the nuclear
stalemate,as they now stand~,than the flamboyance of
Khrushchev. Brezhnev and Kosygin are inching forward
along tested lines of policy, to reduce our power
and our influence wherever they can do so.
ll. They are moving in the same direction their
predecessors did, and they are perhaps moving more
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Soviet Economy
I. The Soviet economy is an example of the temporizing
by the present Kremlin leadership. The same problems
are still there; reforms are being attempted only
gradually, and cautmausly. For instance, the Soviet
Union is already in the second year of the current
Five-Year Plan period, and the Plan has not yet been
put in final form and approved.
(CI}ART, COMPARATIVE GNP GROW TI})
A. The Soviet economy is somewhat less than half the size
of ours. The Soviet Gross National Product in 1966
was about 45a of U 5. GNP.
1. The Soviet growth rate last year was 7.50, but
that was thanks to the biggest grain crop in
Soviet history. The average aver the preceding
five years was 4.50, and the outlook from now
through 1970 is for about 4 t.o 5.5o annual growth.
(C}~AR'f, ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE IN GNP)
2. Incidentally, the new leadership is too realistic
to continue Khrushchev's boasting about overtaking
the United States, and this chart shows why:
3. Even wren the Soviet percentage of growth matches
ours, it is a percentage of a, much smaller base, so
that the absolute increase in GNP in Russia is
muc}r smaller. As a result, they have not been
reducing the absolute gap between the two economies.
If anything, the gap is widening.
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(CfiART, US AND SOVIET GNP BY END USE)
B. It is not that easy, however, to dismiss the Soviet
economy as an element of nationa]. power. Their
economy is smaller than ours, but: for defett~se
purposes they get a lot more toile;age out of it.
1. The Soviet pppulation is about 20% bigger than
ours, but the consumer has to be satisfied with
about one third. of the goods that our economy
produces for the consumer.
2. fay this allocation of the Gross National Product,
the Soviets come close to matching out defense
expenditures with an economy barely half the
size of ours.
6Vhatever the
economic problems and economic performance in the
Soviet Union, the Soviet economy will continue to
provide the military establishmexrt with w}tatever
the Kremlin considers essential j'or national security.
(C}IART, SOVIET DEFENSE EXPENBITURES)
II. Soviet expenditures for defense and space were fairly
stable from 1962 t}trough 1965, but they increased about
7 percent in 1966, and we expect the} krill rise another
4 percent this year.
A. The announced budg~tafor 1967--14.5 billion rubles--
is the biggest since World i9ar TT.
B. The announced budget, however, includes only about
60 percent of the actual military expenditures.
6Ve estimate the real total for 1967 will be about
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19.8 billion rubles, which will t~uy as much
defense in the Soviet Union as about $54 billion
would buy us in this country.
Soviet Relations with U.S.-
I. I want to touch briefly on just two facets of Soviet
foreign policy--tiiri~' relations with the United States,
and the Sino-Soviet dispute.
II. In public, the Soviet spokesmen are taking a hard
line that any improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations
is going to be virtually impossible as long as we are
attacking their Communist .brethren in North Vietnam.
A. This is not only a very useful bargaining position
for them, but they are practicalAy farted to take
this position because the Chinesf; Communists are
accusing the Kremlin of working with the United States
against North Vietnam
Ii. In fact, however, there has been some progress
on issues not affecting Vietnam--for instance,
the recent civil air and space agreements, and
the indications that it may be possible to agree
on a nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
~~e ~~ ~~~~~
C. In private, Soviet- leaders have
tthat they want
to avoid any showdown with Washington aver the
Vietnamese issue.
D. They are, of course, delighted to see major portions
of our farces tied down in Vietnam, but they also
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realize that they are going to have to keep their
lines of communication with }Vashington open and
working, if they want any meanin?;ful progress
an the issues that really concerr- them--European
security, arms control, Germany, and East-West trade.
The Sino-Soviet Dispute
I. As for the status of the Sino-Soviet dispute, relations
between Moscow and Peking have hit rock bottom, and
we do not expect to see any improvement as long as
the present leaderships remain in control at each end
of the line.
A. The Chinese have been doing their best in recent
weeks to goad Moscow into a final break of
diplomatic relations.
1. The Chinese have eased up a bit in their virtual
siege of the Soviet Embassy in Peking, but they
have already demonstrated that t}iey have to power
to forceaelrery last Russian out of Peking whenever
they decide to do so.
I3. Moscow is trying to hang on, and document the record
so that the Chinese can be blamed if it comes to a
final break.
C. At stake is the supply line to North Vietnam. Moscow
and Peking are each trying to prove that it is the
major support of the North Vietnamese, and the other
is just sitting on its hands, if not actually hindering
t}ie war effort.
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D. The point is that the port of Ilaiphong, w~iatever the
headlines may say, is not a maZor_factor in the
supply of weapons to North Vietnam.
1. title know what goes into I}aiphang. Ships }gave
brought in half a dozen helicopters, and they
may }lave brought in an occasional shipment of
small arms or ammunition for them. Oil and
gas and some trucks, of course, are shipped
in by sea.
2. But the weapons, and the bulk: of the war materiel
generally, have come in overland, across China.
3. To a great degree this is because of Soviet
reluctance to risk a confrontation with
the United States on the higl~~ seas.
4. This is precisely what t}ie Soviet Union wants
to avoid, and it is precisely the situation
that the Chinese want to bring about.
E. Moscow has charged that the Chinese are diverting,
delaying, sabotaging, stealing, and even re-labeling
Soviet war material passing tllrotigh China to Vietnam.
D. The Chinese, on the other hand, have charged Moscow
with "cowardice" f~+r re~'using to ship by sea.
Peking probably believes that in a pinch, the Soviets
would still refuse, and Peking could then tell the
world Communist parties that Russia had abandoned
the North Vietnamese rather than face up to American
sea power.
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COMMUNIST CHINA
Cultural Revolution
I, L+et's take a quick look at the upheaval that has
beWl~rocking Communist China since last summer.
A. You have all seen pictures of sw~~rms of Chinese
teen-alters on the march, holding little red books
from which they q~ant quotations of h9ao Tse-tong.
B. This is what is known as "Mao's thoughts."
believe it is even available in paperback in this
country now, if you want to be culturally revolting
yourself.
C. In China today, Mao's thoughts are credited with almost
miraculous power, although for t}-e most part they
are a collection of tired old cliches like
"All power comes out of the barrel of a gun," or
"Be resolute, fear no sacrifice, and surmount every
difficulty to win victory."
1. Peking Radio says fighter pilots shouted Mao's
thoughts over the intercom as they started a
dog-fight, and wire t}ierefore able to shoot dovan
a Chinese Nationalist aircraft.
2. A forestry conference in Peking concluded that
the study of Mao would enable the forestry service
to grow better trees.
3. And according to their news agency, a worker in
Lanchou who broke an arm, a leg, and several ribs
in a fall on the job refused sick leave, because
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D. Even the Russians, who have been known to quote
Marx and Lenin, find A9ao's thoughts a bit silly.
Pravda cited the case of a Chinese who remarked that
if a man didn't know how to clim}a a pole, Mao's thoughts
wouldn't help him do it. EIe was denounced and purged,
of course, because everybody in China knows that
"a study of Chairman Mao's thoug}its gives immediate
results."
II. To us, it sounds ridiculous, but for the Chinese it
is in deadly earnest. A street mob rE;cently forced
the Chinese Chief of State, Liu Shao??chi, to recite
Mao quotations from memory, and ridiculed him when he
fluffed a line. This fanatical idolatry of hiao is
the keystone of the cultural revolution.
A. Mao, at 73,~_is aging, sick, and more and more
inflexible. He is clearly concerned that his
Communist party is losing the revolutionary zeal
of its early days, and cannot be relied upon to
keep China on the right track after he is gone.
1. The teen-aged millions of thE; Red Guard are
supposed to re-kindle that z~:al with their
unbridled and uncritical enthusiasm.
B. To Mao, then, the cultural revolution is prirn~rily
a drive to re-shape the Communist: Party, or to replace
it with a more reliable, more fanatical, younger version.
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~~i-~
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C. But for the men w}io are competing to succeed Mao,
it has become a naked struggle for power and for
survival.
III. The prime mover for several months was Defense
Ministex Lin Piao, who is riow Mao's designated successor.
A. As soon as Lin was proclaimed the heir-apparent
last August, he began moving against any
potential rivals.
1. fIis immediate targets were the two men who
}lave been at the top of the party machinery,
Chief of State Liu Shao-chi, and the party
secretary-general, Teng Fisiao-ping.
B. SubsecYuent developments suggested that Lin Piao
lost the initiative to Premier Chou Fn-lai, who
might be described as a force for moderation if
there is such a thing in Communist China today.
1. Lin hasn't made a major public speech since
early November, and he dropped out of public
view in late Nove er.
2,! Lin is not , and he may have
had to take one of his periodic and protracted
rest cures.
3. 49e have also had indications that the Chinese
Army has been less than monolithic in its support
of Mao against the opposition, and this might
have been blamed on Lin Piao.
C. In any event, Chou rn-lai has been the dominant
figure in Peking in recent weeks.
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1. Chou has been making the speeches, negotiating
with recalcitrant provincial party basses,
urging the Red Guards back to school, and
asking t}ie workers and farmers to get on with
their jobs and bring things back to normal.
2. It even seems to have been Chou who has been
ordering Lin's troops to crack down on both
unruly Red Guards and angry workers who have
clashed with the Red Guards.
D. 6+1e don't know the full story, but we suspect that
A4ao and Lin may in fact have had a very close shave
in December or January.
1. They charged a number of provincial party
bosses and some key military figures with
plotting to overthrow Mao.
2. Enough of these leaders have disappeared from
public view, or have bean fired, to indicate
that the apposition which lined up against ~1ao
and Lin, and against the excesses of the
cultural revolution, was forrriidable.
3. It did not give up without a struggle. For
several weeks after the turn of the yeary~ there
were disorders, strikes, and riots in many of
China's major cities.
IV. The opposition now appears to have br-,en largely
suppressed, although it may have been necessary to
make concessions to some of the relative madexates like
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A. There is little doubt that many party officials
fell victim to the purge.
1. This chart gives you an idea of the casualties
at the very top of the Chinese leadership.
~"'9 ~?' _
Z. Dawn at the lower you can see a group
of 15 vice premiers. These a.re the men who,
under Chou En-lai, keep the government
functioning.
3. The purge hit them so hard that at one point,
there were only six of them, ~in addition to
Chou and Lin Piao,jwho had nat fallen victim
to the Red Guards and their wall posters. Chou
had to appeal repeatedly that these six be
their work.
left alone and allowed to get. on with ~.
B. If peace has been restored, it is a very tenuous
peace. Despite Chou's appeals, despite the fact
that the children are supposed to be back in school
and t}ie administration in the har-ds of a three-way,
army party Red Guard coalition, wall posters are
again going up attacking three ~ of the six remaining
vice-premiers--those most concerned with the Chinese
economy.
V. This may, of course, be an indirect attack on Chou--
a new attempt by the elements around Mao and Lin Piao to
achieve their goals. There is a legacy of mistrust and
bitterness among the surviving leadeY?s from the recent
events, which makes it highly probable that the turmoil
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A. T}~e long-range effect of the cultaural revolution remains
up in the air, but there are three points we can be
fairly sure of
rIRST, until Mao goes and a new leader has taken
over firmly, China's leaders are going to be
divided and in conflict. They will find it difficult
to agree to any new policy line, so we do not expect
any radical departures from existing policies.
SECOND, for some time to come, t;he Chinese Communists
will probably suffer from a cultl~ral revolution Izangover
that could limit their capacity to engage in foreign
adventures.
and TI}IRD, whoever wins, we can see no reason to
expect any dilution of Peking's implacable hostility
toward the United States.
ofF
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ChiCom Military
I. Turning to the C}iinese Communist military threat,
as far as conventional forces go, we can dispense
with the subject in short order.
A. When the Sino-Soviet split began,, in 1960, the
Chinese Communist military establishment amounted
to a sub-standard World War II army, a large but
inferior air Force, and a Navy ccrosisting largely
of submarines that didn't ventures outside coastal
waters .
B. The army amounts to about 2,300,000 men, with
more than 100 infantry divisions and a dozen
armored yr artillery divisions.
1. It is short on armor, heavy ordnance,
meah}anized transport, and fuel.
C. The Navy has the world's fourth largest submarine
fleet--about 35 conventional torpedo-attack subs--
but irv? seagoing experience with them.
D. The air force, ec{uipped largely with old MIG-15s and
MIG-17s, was outfought by the Chinese Nationalist
airforce during t}ie Taiwan Strait: crisis.
II. To summarize, the air force and the navy have primarily
defensive missions. The Army has the: capability to
ovexrun any of its mainland neighbors, in the Far Fast
--Russia excepted, of course--hut only as long as it
does not encounter significant opposition from a major power.
Advanced Weapons
IIT. Before the Sinv-Soviet dispute began, the Soviets were
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trying to remedy these short-comings and provide
the Chinese with advanced weapons. ]:n 1960, the
Soviets withdrew their }1elp, and as i'ar as we have been
able to determine, they have not renewed it.
A. Nevertheless, over the past three; years the
Chinese Communists have begun di>playing advanced ~~a~mxi~
weapons.
1. They have achieved this only through overriding
priorities which have raised hob with the rest of
the economy, but they have done it on their own,
with the major achievement of course the
development of a nuclear capability.
B. At present, the Chinese nuclear weapon capability
is crude and limited by our standards, but by far
Eastern standards it is a major contribution to
STATINTL
STATINTL
C}iinese Communist mili~.ary prestige.
C. Analysis
250 of these one hand.
(MAP, MISSILE COVERAGE OF ASIA)
that the Chinese can probably already package a
nuclear device for delivery by their handful ~f aging
~~ medium bombers.
1. They may be working on one tl-iat could be
delivered by a light jet bomber. They have about
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IV. We believe that the Chinese can probably begin
deploying a medium-range missile with a nuclear
war-head this year.
A. This map shows the area that could be covered
from Chinese mainland launchers with a 1,000-mile
missile.
1. The implications for the Par bast, Southeast
Asia, India--even for the Soviet Union--are
B. VVe also believe that they might be able to deploy
their first crude intercontinental ballistic
missiles in the early 1970's.
1. It is possible that they might launch a small
space satellite some time late this year.
factories
C. Chinese ~^~w~ are also beginning to turn out
advanced fighter aircraft, to supplement the aging
and obsolescent M:IG-1S's and MIG-?17's.
1. They have already produced er-aggh MIG-19's
so they were able to spare same for Pakistan.
2. The MIG-19 isn't a match for the latest fighter
types, so we expect the Chinese may 50011 begin
producing their own version of the MIG-21.
3. Also, cae would not be surprised by the appearance
of a Chinese copy of the Soviet BADGER jet medium
bomber.
D. ffhey have assembled one copy of a Soviet ballistic
missile submarine, although they may not yet have
developed a missile system for it. And theyy are
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building PT boats that can carry guided missiles.
V. What are they going to do with these modern weapons as
they become operational, and more rnamerous? Nell, there
has been a lot of belligerent talk from the Chinese
over View trm, but we think there are probably only
three circumstances in which the Chinese Communists
would feel obliged to intervene there: with military
force:
A. One would be in the event of U.S.. air strikes
against China itself.
Ii. The second would be a major U.S. invasion of
North Vietnam.
C. And the thir would be the threat of imminent
collapse of the North Vietnamese government.
VI. This analysis, of course, is based to some extent
on a rational, Chinese assessment of their national
interests. I think it is wise to point out that this
juncture t}iat there is nothing in the: recent track
record of ~lao Tse-tung to guararetee ghat his decisions
are going to be based on rational assessments.
19
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~MAI', CUBA)
I. Fidel Castro, in Cuba, has been endowed by the
Soviets with t}ie strongest military establish~tment
in Latin America.
A. Morale is good, especially among the officers.
The armed forces are loyal to Fidel Castro.
They are fully capable of maintaining internal
order, and they could defend Cuba. against anything
short of a large-scale invasion backed by U.S.
help .
B. They have about 150 Soviet surface-to-air
missile launchers, covering the areas sho4an by
the circles on the map. They have tactical
surface-to-surface missiles, patrol boats armed
with missiles, and MIC-21 jet fighters,~aif~ia some
of them with all-weather capabilities.
1. Ovex the past six months, there has been a
considerable increase in Soviet military
shipments.
2. Except for the new MIG's and another six
missile patrol boats, however, these shipments
have consisted of replacements and spare parts.
3. They started a new wave o# rumors about offensive
missiles, because there have been a lot of
missiles for the surface-to-air launchers.
These missiles have now been in Cuba for their
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normal s}self life, and they have to be replaced.
C. I want to assure you that we use every useful
watch
intelligence asset to keep a close t~s on Cuba.
Once every month we assess all tl~e reports, and all
the rumors, match it up against the best intelligence
we have, to reach a judgment on whether there are
offensive weapons on the island which could be used
to attack the United States.
1. The rumors keep coming in, but the assessment
remains negative.
...~.~.~
II. Castro's threat to the United States is not a direct
one. Ilis threat is to stability in Latin America.
(MAP, LATIN AMERICA)
A. A couple of years aga the Soviets worked out
an agreement with Castro that all Communist
efforts in Latin America would be channeled
through the orthodox Communist parties in the
various countries.
1. The orthodox Communists today are still
willing to support a so-called ~9ar of
National Liberation, or stage a revolution,
when they judge there is a chance for success.
2. But they b~~aexexz~ax also believe that when
the odds are against insurrection and insurgency,
they should use opportunities for subversion
and political action---what they call the
"peaceful road to power."
B. In many countries of Latin America, there are
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dissidents rho have left the regular Communist
Party, forming their own, pro-Chinese and more
militant wing, faction, or separate party.
1. There are also left-wing extremists w}ro are
Communists--either
not Moscow-style or
Peking-style,--and who are more militant '
than the orthodox party. An example is the
Movement of 'the Revolutionary Left, or MIR,
..~-
Z. These militants favor instant revolution.
The MIR launched a guerrilla war in Peru two
years ago, with Cuban support, training, funds,
and weapons,--and some from the Chinese as
well. They Have been virtually wiped out.
C. Moscow, especially since the Cuban missile crisis,
considers suc}1 insurrections too wasteful, and too
alarming to the West, when there isn't a reasonable
chance for success. That's why Moscow tried to
III. Now Castro has junked the agreement. Ile ;.ontinued
all along to train and arm guerrillas for other Latin
American countries, and support them with propaganda.
For the past year or so, despite the agreement, he has
supported them in armed action---in Venezuela, in
Colombia, in Guatemala, where he considers the time
is ripe for action.
A. The Cubans are also trying to develop or expand
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again, and in Panama. ~OtS~~
B. In most of these countries,~"i:~ e~.ther working
with dissident Communist parties and non-Communist
extremists of the left--like the guerrillas of
llouglas Bravo in Venezuela--or,~u~h as in Guatemala,
with individuals in the local Communist leadership
who agree with him rather than Moscow, and want a
more militant policy.
IV. 6Vhat is his motive? Well, it must be a strong one;
in his latest speech, he went so far as to say that
the Soviets, by dealing with the governments in Latin
American countries where there are guerrillas in the
field, are betraying the revolution and helping to
suppress it. Castro isn't even talking to the Chinese
Communists these days, but t}iere are times when he
sounds like them.
A. For one thing, to Castro~revoluti.on appears to be
a way of life. He apparently has a token contingent
of Cubans in North Vietnam, and will probably send
more if the North Vietnamese ask him to.
1. Ile has trained revolutionaries from Africa,
and has sent several hundred Cubans to the
former French Congo to train the militia for
the leftist government there. E3e had. instructors
with the revolutionaries in the j~ormer Belgian Congo
for a while.
B. Specifically, however, Castro wants another Communist
take-over in the Western EIemis here. EIe a arently
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fears that unless, as he has so often predicted,
his Cuban revolution becomes an example for
other Latin American Communists, his own
dynamism and m}~stic{ue in Cuba could atrophy and
eventually lose its effect.
1. He has an economic mess on h_~s hands at home,
and even if he gets a record sugar crop this
year, world sugar prices aren't going to make
Cuba prosperous. IIe needs successes abroad to
rally the people at home.
C. Castro sees his best chancegat present in
Venezuela, Colombia, and Guatemala. [3ut there
are plenty of other opportunities which will arise
elsewhere in Latin America, as long as the Communists
can turn economic mis~~ey and public dissatisfaction
into vulnerabilities for the established governments.
U. Tliis is what makes such a vital l~rograrn out of counter-
insurgency, which will be discussed later this
afternoon.
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Finally, we mig)xt just take a very quick swing around
the world for some thumbnail summaries of the spots
where we have trauble or potential trouble.
(MAP, FAR EA5T)
Thailand: As T}7ailand becomes increasin?;ly important
to our position in the Far East, you can expect
the Chinese and Vietnamese Communist:; to do everything
they can to intensify the small-scale; insurrection
they have going here. Fortunately, t:he government
is stable, alert, and determined, anct has taken
ad r~~~ta~e
of the help we have offered in counter-insurgency
training and planning.
Indonesia: The military leaders here have just about
completed the job of sidelining President Sukarno.
Now they face a monumental ji~b~ in tr~ring to overcome
the horrible economic mess and the debts Sukarno
left behind.
India: The recent elections cut the ruling Congress
Party dawn to its thinnest parliamentary edge since
independence, and cost the government its majority
control of the state governments in f3 of the 17 states.
India is going to need massive food imports for at
least the next several years. Fortunately, the
Commwiists are split into two bickering parties.
(~~~4AP, MIDDLE EAST)
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The so-Balled Northern Tier is so rocky that you can
barely call it an alliance.
Greece acrd Turkey, who are supposed to t:ie the Northern
Tier to NATO, have bean at each otl~e:r's throats and close
to war over Cyprus. Off and on for the past two years
t}~ey have been trying to negotiate a solution,
Tur ey, in a ition, ias
eveloped a streak of
which has rec{uired a review of practically all of our
bilateIIal agreements with Ankara. An attempt to im~pove
relations with Russia went so far recently as to produce
a state visit by Kosygin. It was a somewhat chilly
visit, but it was the first time a Soviet premier has
ever visited Turkey.
Tn ~r~~ra~r Pakistan, the other anchor whiuropeans, or at
least Gy'hites of )uropean stack. As long as this situation
exists, there are going to be Africans either waving
guns at the frontiers, or waving speeches in the United
Nations, trying to force the major powers to step in
and clear the way for majority African rule.
Sanctions, by the way, are not going to work against
Rhodesia as long as South Africa and the Portuguese
African colonies help Rhodesia to evade the full force
of the sanctions.
T}Le rest of Africa, by and large, consists of new
nations where the African lcadershi}a is a paper-thin
veneer. Tl-e Chinese Communists and the Russians are
competing to develop influence over .>ome of these men;
the tVestern powers are doing their beast to support and
sustain t}ie rest; and if their two sei:s of African leaders--
a handful of men--kill each other ofi' or ne~ztralize each
other, below them there is nothing. There are only a
handful of viable economies at present on the entire
continent.
Africa, then, is going to provide trouble spats for
years to come.
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