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CIA-RDP79T00827A000800030003-4
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RIPPUB
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K
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30
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December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 7, 2000
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3
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Publication Date: 
March 22, 1967
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BRIEF
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Approved For B~lease 2000/08/15 :CIA-RDP79T~0827A000800030003-4 CSIPRES 33RI3;FING Industry Committee, U.S. Civil Defense Council Sheraton-Park hotel, 2660 Conn Pentagon Auditorium 5A1070 2:30-4:3(1 STATINTL 2:40-3:15) Virgil L. Couch Visual Aids Support, (phonetic) STATINTL Approved For Release 2000/08/15 :CIA-RDP79T00827A000800030003-4 Approved For Ruse 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79Tf~48~7A000f$00030003-4 22 Marc Brie ing I held better begin by admitting that I do not propose to live up to the programinotes, and cover t}re "cultural, economic, ideological, polt~tical, educational and other significant aspect:;" of the world's 120-odd countries in half an hour. But if we are going to have trouble, be it brush-fire or thermonuclear, of a nature which will make this country take a hurried look at the status of its civil defenses, it is a safe bet ghat from almost any and every trouble spat you can trace the origin back to the Communists in Russia, in Chi^ na~or iri Cuba. So what I propose to do is to examine the political, economic, and military status in each of these three countries, and then,as and if time permits, take a very c}nick look around the world at some of the places cohere the Communists might cause major turmoil. One word on security; Some of the material I will be using is classified SECRET, and the classification may appear any some of the maps and charts--and yet much of it may sound very much like what you Nava read i.n the papers. The explanation is that the classification SECRET applies to the fact that--these are the judgments of the U.S. government intelligence services, and are being expressed by a repxesen- tative of the Central Intelligence Agency. Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CI~RDP79T00827A000800030003-4 Approved For Rai~ease 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T0~27A000800030003-4 Military I. The armed forces of the Soviet Union have been engaged for several years in a dynamic program of research and development, looking for some kind of a breakthrough that might end the nuclear stale- mate and swing the balance of power ~.n Soviet favor. A. They have not achieved any such breakthxrough, and we have no indication that they may be on the verge of one. B. They are, however, making improvc;ments acrossi the board, in their strategic offense capabilities, in defensive posture, and even in gc;neral purpose forces. C. They remain behin the United States in the number of warheads each can deliver on the territory of the other. 1. There is, however, a new deployment program under way for ICBM's which represents a Soviet attempt to catch up numer~ical~y. D. At t}ie same time, as you may have seen in the accounts of Secretary McNamara's congressional testimony, the Soviets are deploying a defensive system around Moscow, designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles. 1. }9e do not consider this a very effective system. It can be fooled, and it can be overwhelmed. Also, insofar as defenses intended primarily to intercept ballHistic missiles are concerned, we know of none anywhere in the Soviet Union except at Moscow. Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T00827A000800030003-4 . 1 Approved For R?iease 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79TaG827A000800030003-4 2. The rest of the country is stall concerned wit}- defending itself adequately against manned bombers, and air-to-surface stand-off missiles like our HOUND DOG. E. But I think the important conclusion to be drawn from everyt}-ing we know about the Soviet military establishment is this: F. T}-e Soviets continue to increase their military budget, their effort to achieve a major breakthrough, and the general improvement of military posture. 1. Over the next few years, these improvements are going to give the Soviet leaders increasing confi- dence that they are creating an effective deterrent, in the form of a military es1;a}alishment which could undergo nuclear attack, and still come throggh with enough punch left to destroy a significant portion of the population and resources of the United States. 2. We do not believe that the Sc-viets themselves expect to be strong enough--even over the next 10 years-- .~.. .,..r. ..-- ..ww.,,.s to consider the deliberate ir-itiation of a war against the United States. 3. Such growing confidence in t}-eir offensive and defensive capabilities, however, is one of t}ie factors which could lead to disastrous miscalcula- tions when two countries are trying to face each other dawn at the brink of a war which neither may want . 4. Lt makes it necessary to maintain a continuing Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T00827A000800030003-4 Approved For R~ease 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79TQ,p~827A000800030003-4 watch on the men who now lead the Soviet Union, their abilities, and their policies. Soviet Leadership I. The men who threw Khrushchev out 2-1~2 years ago have-now }iad time to establish their policies, their relationships, and their way of doing business. A. What has emerged is essentially a collective leadership. 1. The standing of tt~e Party Secretary General, Leonid Brezhnev, has been growing steadily. He appears to be first among ec}uals, or--as Orwell said--some are more ec}ual than others. 2. But decisions are apparently reached by com- promise, and implemented with caution. 3. This avoids the erratic initiatives Khrushchev was noted .for, and reduces the chances of making major mistakes. ~Ie.v-~ B. The present leaders are a of mixed interests and authority. They have held together remarkably well, and they have done it with undramatic, middle- of-the-xoad policies. The guiding principle appears to be "Don't rock the boat." C. But this collective rule-by-committee has two weaknesses. FIRST, behind the outward appearance of collective leadership, a subtle struggle for power and position continues. S};COND, rule-by-committee has an inherent tendency Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T00827A000800030003=4 Approved For R~ease 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79TgQ~827A000800030003-4 to duck or postpone the hard decisions. For example, such highly political problems as economic reform and critical resource allocation have not been resolved. a. The present Kremlin leadership system works, but it has not yet demonstrated the long-run durability needed to make the hard decisions, and to avoid the drift toward the one-man rule of the Stalin and K}~rushchev eras. II. I want to point out that a policy of "not rocking the boat" in no sense implies any weakening of the major thrust of Soviet foreign policy, whitli remains the expansion of Russian influence beyond the borders of the Soviet Union. ~CJ~ A. The Cold War didri~t"end with the Cuban missile crisis, the fall of K}irushchev, the nuclear test ban treaty, or 'the Sino-Soviet dispute. B. Rather, it has changed-its character and its tactics. It is more political, more subtle:, more gradual. The goals remain the same. C. The low-keyed style under Brezhnev and Kosygin is probably better suited to the Cold War and the nuclear stalemate,as they now stand~,than the flamboyance of Khrushchev. Brezhnev and Kosygin are inching forward along tested lines of policy, to reduce our power and our influence wherever they can do so. ll. They are moving in the same direction their predecessors did, and they are perhaps moving more Approved For ReiJ~as~ 20010/08/15: CIA-RDP79T00827A000800030003-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79TO~QS27A000800030003-4 Soviet Economy I. The Soviet economy is an example of the temporizing by the present Kremlin leadership. The same problems are still there; reforms are being attempted only gradually, and cautmausly. For instance, the Soviet Union is already in the second year of the current Five-Year Plan period, and the Plan has not yet been put in final form and approved. (CI}ART, COMPARATIVE GNP GROW TI}) A. The Soviet economy is somewhat less than half the size of ours. The Soviet Gross National Product in 1966 was about 45a of U 5. GNP. 1. The Soviet growth rate last year was 7.50, but that was thanks to the biggest grain crop in Soviet history. The average aver the preceding five years was 4.50, and the outlook from now through 1970 is for about 4 t.o 5.5o annual growth. (C}~AR'f, ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE IN GNP) 2. Incidentally, the new leadership is too realistic to continue Khrushchev's boasting about overtaking the United States, and this chart shows why: 3. Even wren the Soviet percentage of growth matches ours, it is a percentage of a, much smaller base, so that the absolute increase in GNP in Russia is muc}r smaller. As a result, they have not been reducing the absolute gap between the two economies. If anything, the gap is widening. Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T00827A000800030003-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79TO~,L427A000800030003- (CfiART, US AND SOVIET GNP BY END USE) B. It is not that easy, however, to dismiss the Soviet economy as an element of nationa]. power. Their economy is smaller than ours, but: for defett~se purposes they get a lot more toile;age out of it. 1. The Soviet pppulation is about 20% bigger than ours, but the consumer has to be satisfied with about one third. of the goods that our economy produces for the consumer. 2. fay this allocation of the Gross National Product, the Soviets come close to matching out defense expenditures with an economy barely half the size of ours. 6Vhatever the economic problems and economic performance in the Soviet Union, the Soviet economy will continue to provide the military establishmexrt with w}tatever the Kremlin considers essential j'or national security. (C}IART, SOVIET DEFENSE EXPENBITURES) II. Soviet expenditures for defense and space were fairly stable from 1962 t}trough 1965, but they increased about 7 percent in 1966, and we expect the} krill rise another 4 percent this year. A. The announced budg~tafor 1967--14.5 billion rubles-- is the biggest since World i9ar TT. B. The announced budget, however, includes only about 60 percent of the actual military expenditures. 6Ve estimate the real total for 1967 will be about Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T00827A000800030003-4 Approved For Rase 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79TQ~$27A000800030003-4 19.8 billion rubles, which will t~uy as much defense in the Soviet Union as about $54 billion would buy us in this country. Soviet Relations with U.S.- I. I want to touch briefly on just two facets of Soviet foreign policy--tiiri~' relations with the United States, and the Sino-Soviet dispute. II. In public, the Soviet spokesmen are taking a hard line that any improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations is going to be virtually impossible as long as we are attacking their Communist .brethren in North Vietnam. A. This is not only a very useful bargaining position for them, but they are practicalAy farted to take this position because the Chinesf; Communists are accusing the Kremlin of working with the United States against North Vietnam Ii. In fact, however, there has been some progress on issues not affecting Vietnam--for instance, the recent civil air and space agreements, and the indications that it may be possible to agree on a nuclear non-proliferation treaty. ~~e ~~ ~~~~~ C. In private, Soviet- leaders have tthat they want to avoid any showdown with Washington aver the Vietnamese issue. D. They are, of course, delighted to see major portions of our farces tied down in Vietnam, but they also Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T00827A000800030003-4 Approved For R?i~ease 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79TO,Q,~27A000800030003-4 realize that they are going to have to keep their lines of communication with }Vashington open and working, if they want any meanin?;ful progress an the issues that really concerr- them--European security, arms control, Germany, and East-West trade. The Sino-Soviet Dispute I. As for the status of the Sino-Soviet dispute, relations between Moscow and Peking have hit rock bottom, and we do not expect to see any improvement as long as the present leaderships remain in control at each end of the line. A. The Chinese have been doing their best in recent weeks to goad Moscow into a final break of diplomatic relations. 1. The Chinese have eased up a bit in their virtual siege of the Soviet Embassy in Peking, but they have already demonstrated that t}iey have to power to forceaelrery last Russian out of Peking whenever they decide to do so. I3. Moscow is trying to hang on, and document the record so that the Chinese can be blamed if it comes to a final break. C. At stake is the supply line to North Vietnam. Moscow and Peking are each trying to prove that it is the major support of the North Vietnamese, and the other is just sitting on its hands, if not actually hindering t}ie war effort. Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T00827A000800030003-4 Approved For Ruse 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79TQp~27A000800030003-4 D. The point is that the port of Ilaiphong, w~iatever the headlines may say, is not a maZor_factor in the supply of weapons to North Vietnam. 1. title know what goes into I}aiphang. Ships }gave brought in half a dozen helicopters, and they may }lave brought in an occasional shipment of small arms or ammunition for them. Oil and gas and some trucks, of course, are shipped in by sea. 2. But the weapons, and the bulk: of the war materiel generally, have come in overland, across China. 3. To a great degree this is because of Soviet reluctance to risk a confrontation with the United States on the higl~~ seas. 4. This is precisely what t}ie Soviet Union wants to avoid, and it is precisely the situation that the Chinese want to bring about. E. Moscow has charged that the Chinese are diverting, delaying, sabotaging, stealing, and even re-labeling Soviet war material passing tllrotigh China to Vietnam. D. The Chinese, on the other hand, have charged Moscow with "cowardice" f~+r re~'using to ship by sea. Peking probably believes that in a pinch, the Soviets would still refuse, and Peking could then tell the world Communist parties that Russia had abandoned the North Vietnamese rather than face up to American sea power. Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T00827A000800030003-4 Approved For Ruse 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T9~G~27A000800030003-4 COMMUNIST CHINA Cultural Revolution I, L+et's take a quick look at the upheaval that has beWl~rocking Communist China since last summer. A. You have all seen pictures of sw~~rms of Chinese teen-alters on the march, holding little red books from which they q~ant quotations of h9ao Tse-tong. B. This is what is known as "Mao's thoughts." believe it is even available in paperback in this country now, if you want to be culturally revolting yourself. C. In China today, Mao's thoughts are credited with almost miraculous power, although for t}-e most part they are a collection of tired old cliches like "All power comes out of the barrel of a gun," or "Be resolute, fear no sacrifice, and surmount every difficulty to win victory." 1. Peking Radio says fighter pilots shouted Mao's thoughts over the intercom as they started a dog-fight, and wire t}ierefore able to shoot dovan a Chinese Nationalist aircraft. 2. A forestry conference in Peking concluded that the study of Mao would enable the forestry service to grow better trees. 3. And according to their news agency, a worker in Lanchou who broke an arm, a leg, and several ribs in a fall on the job refused sick leave, because Approved For Relea~ecQO~O~i08~CIAx~D~01~8~-44(~0~0~43~OQ~# pain.~o Approved For Rq~ase 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79TQ,Q,~27A000800030003-4 D. Even the Russians, who have been known to quote Marx and Lenin, find A9ao's thoughts a bit silly. Pravda cited the case of a Chinese who remarked that if a man didn't know how to clim}a a pole, Mao's thoughts wouldn't help him do it. EIe was denounced and purged, of course, because everybody in China knows that "a study of Chairman Mao's thoug}its gives immediate results." II. To us, it sounds ridiculous, but for the Chinese it is in deadly earnest. A street mob rE;cently forced the Chinese Chief of State, Liu Shao??chi, to recite Mao quotations from memory, and ridiculed him when he fluffed a line. This fanatical idolatry of hiao is the keystone of the cultural revolution. A. Mao, at 73,~_is aging, sick, and more and more inflexible. He is clearly concerned that his Communist party is losing the revolutionary zeal of its early days, and cannot be relied upon to keep China on the right track after he is gone. 1. The teen-aged millions of thE; Red Guard are supposed to re-kindle that z~:al with their unbridled and uncritical enthusiasm. B. To Mao, then, the cultural revolution is prirn~rily a drive to re-shape the Communist: Party, or to replace it with a more reliable, more fanatical, younger version. Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T00827A000800030003-4 1 ], ~~i-~ Approved For RSe~ease 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79TQG~827A000800030003-4 C. But for the men w}io are competing to succeed Mao, it has become a naked struggle for power and for survival. III. The prime mover for several months was Defense Ministex Lin Piao, who is riow Mao's designated successor. A. As soon as Lin was proclaimed the heir-apparent last August, he began moving against any potential rivals. 1. fIis immediate targets were the two men who }lave been at the top of the party machinery, Chief of State Liu Shao-chi, and the party secretary-general, Teng Fisiao-ping. B. SubsecYuent developments suggested that Lin Piao lost the initiative to Premier Chou Fn-lai, who might be described as a force for moderation if there is such a thing in Communist China today. 1. Lin hasn't made a major public speech since early November, and he dropped out of public view in late Nove er. 2,! Lin is not , and he may have had to take one of his periodic and protracted rest cures. 3. 49e have also had indications that the Chinese Army has been less than monolithic in its support of Mao against the opposition, and this might have been blamed on Lin Piao. C. In any event, Chou rn-lai has been the dominant figure in Peking in recent weeks. Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T00827A000800030003-4 1~ Approved For R~FEase 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T~27A000800030003-4 1. Chou has been making the speeches, negotiating with recalcitrant provincial party basses, urging the Red Guards back to school, and asking t}ie workers and farmers to get on with their jobs and bring things back to normal. 2. It even seems to have been Chou who has been ordering Lin's troops to crack down on both unruly Red Guards and angry workers who have clashed with the Red Guards. D. 6+1e don't know the full story, but we suspect that A4ao and Lin may in fact have had a very close shave in December or January. 1. They charged a number of provincial party bosses and some key military figures with plotting to overthrow Mao. 2. Enough of these leaders have disappeared from public view, or have bean fired, to indicate that the apposition which lined up against ~1ao and Lin, and against the excesses of the cultural revolution, was forrriidable. 3. It did not give up without a struggle. For several weeks after the turn of the yeary~ there were disorders, strikes, and riots in many of China's major cities. IV. The opposition now appears to have br-,en largely suppressed, although it may have been necessary to make concessions to some of the relative madexates like Approved ~~P1R~1@ag@~2d~'08~Y: ~~l-~~7y9T]07}A0000(~~04(#3~? ~ 3 ~~~ Appr ~ C}d RT r CRe~e~O~e ?~~OA~/~Q~~~~ ~~CIA-RDP79T9~827A000800030003 A. There is little doubt that many party officials fell victim to the purge. 1. This chart gives you an idea of the casualties at the very top of the Chinese leadership. ~"'9 ~?' _ Z. Dawn at the lower you can see a group of 15 vice premiers. These a.re the men who, under Chou En-lai, keep the government functioning. 3. The purge hit them so hard that at one point, there were only six of them, ~in addition to Chou and Lin Piao,jwho had nat fallen victim to the Red Guards and their wall posters. Chou had to appeal repeatedly that these six be their work. left alone and allowed to get. on with ~. B. If peace has been restored, it is a very tenuous peace. Despite Chou's appeals, despite the fact that the children are supposed to be back in school and t}ie administration in the har-ds of a three-way, army party Red Guard coalition, wall posters are again going up attacking three ~ of the six remaining vice-premiers--those most concerned with the Chinese economy. V. This may, of course, be an indirect attack on Chou-- a new attempt by the elements around Mao and Lin Piao to achieve their goals. There is a legacy of mistrust and bitterness among the surviving leadeY?s from the recent events, which makes it highly probable that the turmoil Approved ~~ R~iea~~r?~l~(0$/rk~m: Ei~-d~~7~9~nQfl827A000800030003-4 1 Approved For R~ease 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T6~827A000800030003-4 A. T}~e long-range effect of the cultaural revolution remains up in the air, but there are three points we can be fairly sure of rIRST, until Mao goes and a new leader has taken over firmly, China's leaders are going to be divided and in conflict. They will find it difficult to agree to any new policy line, so we do not expect any radical departures from existing policies. SECOND, for some time to come, t;he Chinese Communists will probably suffer from a cultl~ral revolution Izangover that could limit their capacity to engage in foreign adventures. and TI}IRD, whoever wins, we can see no reason to expect any dilution of Peking's implacable hostility toward the United States. ofF Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T00827A000800030003-4 ~ 5 ~~ Approved For Ruse 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T0G$27A000800030003-4 ChiCom Military I. Turning to the C}iinese Communist military threat, as far as conventional forces go, we can dispense with the subject in short order. A. When the Sino-Soviet split began,, in 1960, the Chinese Communist military establishment amounted to a sub-standard World War II army, a large but inferior air Force, and a Navy ccrosisting largely of submarines that didn't ventures outside coastal waters . B. The army amounts to about 2,300,000 men, with more than 100 infantry divisions and a dozen armored yr artillery divisions. 1. It is short on armor, heavy ordnance, meah}anized transport, and fuel. C. The Navy has the world's fourth largest submarine fleet--about 35 conventional torpedo-attack subs-- but irv? seagoing experience with them. D. The air force, ec{uipped largely with old MIG-15s and MIG-17s, was outfought by the Chinese Nationalist airforce during t}ie Taiwan Strait: crisis. II. To summarize, the air force and the navy have primarily defensive missions. The Army has the: capability to ovexrun any of its mainland neighbors, in the Far Fast --Russia excepted, of course--hut only as long as it does not encounter significant opposition from a major power. Advanced Weapons IIT. Before the Sinv-Soviet dispute began, the Soviets were Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T00827A000800030003-4 is Approved For Rq,{~ase 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79TQp827A000800030003-4 trying to remedy these short-comings and provide the Chinese with advanced weapons. ]:n 1960, the Soviets withdrew their }1elp, and as i'ar as we have been able to determine, they have not renewed it. A. Nevertheless, over the past three; years the Chinese Communists have begun di>playing advanced ~~a~mxi~ weapons. 1. They have achieved this only through overriding priorities which have raised hob with the rest of the economy, but they have done it on their own, with the major achievement of course the development of a nuclear capability. B. At present, the Chinese nuclear weapon capability is crude and limited by our standards, but by far Eastern standards it is a major contribution to STATINTL STATINTL C}iinese Communist mili~.ary prestige. C. Analysis 250 of these one hand. (MAP, MISSILE COVERAGE OF ASIA) that the Chinese can probably already package a nuclear device for delivery by their handful ~f aging ~~ medium bombers. 1. They may be working on one tl-iat could be delivered by a light jet bomber. They have about Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T00827A000800030003-4 ~?. Approved For Reuse 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79Tt~827A000800030003-4 IV. We believe that the Chinese can probably begin deploying a medium-range missile with a nuclear war-head this year. A. This map shows the area that could be covered from Chinese mainland launchers with a 1,000-mile missile. 1. The implications for the Par bast, Southeast Asia, India--even for the Soviet Union--are B. VVe also believe that they might be able to deploy their first crude intercontinental ballistic missiles in the early 1970's. 1. It is possible that they might launch a small space satellite some time late this year. factories C. Chinese ~^~w~ are also beginning to turn out advanced fighter aircraft, to supplement the aging and obsolescent M:IG-1S's and MIG-?17's. 1. They have already produced er-aggh MIG-19's so they were able to spare same for Pakistan. 2. The MIG-19 isn't a match for the latest fighter types, so we expect the Chinese may 50011 begin producing their own version of the MIG-21. 3. Also, cae would not be surprised by the appearance of a Chinese copy of the Soviet BADGER jet medium bomber. D. ffhey have assembled one copy of a Soviet ballistic missile submarine, although they may not yet have developed a missile system for it. And theyy are Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T00827A000800030003-4 ~~ Approved For Ruse 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T~827A000800030003-4 building PT boats that can carry guided missiles. V. What are they going to do with these modern weapons as they become operational, and more rnamerous? Nell, there has been a lot of belligerent talk from the Chinese over View trm, but we think there are probably only three circumstances in which the Chinese Communists would feel obliged to intervene there: with military force: A. One would be in the event of U.S.. air strikes against China itself. Ii. The second would be a major U.S. invasion of North Vietnam. C. And the thir would be the threat of imminent collapse of the North Vietnamese government. VI. This analysis, of course, is based to some extent on a rational, Chinese assessment of their national interests. I think it is wise to point out that this juncture t}iat there is nothing in the: recent track record of ~lao Tse-tung to guararetee ghat his decisions are going to be based on rational assessments. 19 Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T00827A000800030003-4 Approved For R~ease 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79Tgp~827A000800030003-4 ~MAI', CUBA) I. Fidel Castro, in Cuba, has been endowed by the Soviets with t}ie strongest military establish~tment in Latin America. A. Morale is good, especially among the officers. The armed forces are loyal to Fidel Castro. They are fully capable of maintaining internal order, and they could defend Cuba. against anything short of a large-scale invasion backed by U.S. help . B. They have about 150 Soviet surface-to-air missile launchers, covering the areas sho4an by the circles on the map. They have tactical surface-to-surface missiles, patrol boats armed with missiles, and MIC-21 jet fighters,~aif~ia some of them with all-weather capabilities. 1. Ovex the past six months, there has been a considerable increase in Soviet military shipments. 2. Except for the new MIG's and another six missile patrol boats, however, these shipments have consisted of replacements and spare parts. 3. They started a new wave o# rumors about offensive missiles, because there have been a lot of missiles for the surface-to-air launchers. These missiles have now been in Cuba for their Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T00827A000800030003-4 20 '-~`1 ~ Approved For Refuse 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79TQp827A000800030003-4 normal s}self life, and they have to be replaced. C. I want to assure you that we use every useful watch intelligence asset to keep a close t~s on Cuba. Once every month we assess all tl~e reports, and all the rumors, match it up against the best intelligence we have, to reach a judgment on whether there are offensive weapons on the island which could be used to attack the United States. 1. The rumors keep coming in, but the assessment remains negative. ...~.~.~ II. Castro's threat to the United States is not a direct one. Ilis threat is to stability in Latin America. (MAP, LATIN AMERICA) A. A couple of years aga the Soviets worked out an agreement with Castro that all Communist efforts in Latin America would be channeled through the orthodox Communist parties in the various countries. 1. The orthodox Communists today are still willing to support a so-called ~9ar of National Liberation, or stage a revolution, when they judge there is a chance for success. 2. But they b~~aexexz~ax also believe that when the odds are against insurrection and insurgency, they should use opportunities for subversion and political action---what they call the "peaceful road to power." B. In many countries of Latin America, there are Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T00827A000800030003-4 ~~ Approved For F~4ease 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79Tf1a827A000800030003-4 dissidents rho have left the regular Communist Party, forming their own, pro-Chinese and more militant wing, faction, or separate party. 1. There are also left-wing extremists w}ro are Communists--either not Moscow-style or Peking-style,--and who are more militant ' than the orthodox party. An example is the Movement of 'the Revolutionary Left, or MIR, ..~- Z. These militants favor instant revolution. The MIR launched a guerrilla war in Peru two years ago, with Cuban support, training, funds, and weapons,--and some from the Chinese as well. They Have been virtually wiped out. C. Moscow, especially since the Cuban missile crisis, considers suc}1 insurrections too wasteful, and too alarming to the West, when there isn't a reasonable chance for success. That's why Moscow tried to III. Now Castro has junked the agreement. Ile ;.ontinued all along to train and arm guerrillas for other Latin American countries, and support them with propaganda. For the past year or so, despite the agreement, he has supported them in armed action---in Venezuela, in Colombia, in Guatemala, where he considers the time is ripe for action. A. The Cubans are also trying to develop or expand Approved For F~1~~~~~Od00~?8~t5s: C~A?~D~P~rT,00-84hi~Q0.0~80~403~0~00 ~ 2 ~~7 Approved For Ruse 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79TOi1~27A000800030003-4 again, and in Panama. ~OtS~~ B. In most of these countries,~"i:~ e~.ther working with dissident Communist parties and non-Communist extremists of the left--like the guerrillas of llouglas Bravo in Venezuela--or,~u~h as in Guatemala, with individuals in the local Communist leadership who agree with him rather than Moscow, and want a more militant policy. IV. 6Vhat is his motive? Well, it must be a strong one; in his latest speech, he went so far as to say that the Soviets, by dealing with the governments in Latin American countries where there are guerrillas in the field, are betraying the revolution and helping to suppress it. Castro isn't even talking to the Chinese Communists these days, but t}iere are times when he sounds like them. A. For one thing, to Castro~revoluti.on appears to be a way of life. He apparently has a token contingent of Cubans in North Vietnam, and will probably send more if the North Vietnamese ask him to. 1. Ile has trained revolutionaries from Africa, and has sent several hundred Cubans to the former French Congo to train the militia for the leftist government there. E3e had. instructors with the revolutionaries in the j~ormer Belgian Congo for a while. B. Specifically, however, Castro wants another Communist take-over in the Western EIemis here. EIe a arently Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T00~27A00080003~~03-4 ~ 3 Approved For Fuse 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T9G827A000800030003-4 fears that unless, as he has so often predicted, his Cuban revolution becomes an example for other Latin American Communists, his own dynamism and m}~stic{ue in Cuba could atrophy and eventually lose its effect. 1. He has an economic mess on h_~s hands at home, and even if he gets a record sugar crop this year, world sugar prices aren't going to make Cuba prosperous. IIe needs successes abroad to rally the people at home. C. Castro sees his best chancegat present in Venezuela, Colombia, and Guatemala. [3ut there are plenty of other opportunities which will arise elsewhere in Latin America, as long as the Communists can turn economic mis~~ey and public dissatisfaction into vulnerabilities for the established governments. U. Tliis is what makes such a vital l~rograrn out of counter- insurgency, which will be discussed later this afternoon. Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T00827A000800030003-4 2 ~ Approved For F~e~ase 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T9G827A000800030003-4 Finally, we mig)xt just take a very quick swing around the world for some thumbnail summaries of the spots where we have trauble or potential trouble. (MAP, FAR EA5T) Thailand: As T}7ailand becomes increasin?;ly important to our position in the Far East, you can expect the Chinese and Vietnamese Communist:; to do everything they can to intensify the small-scale; insurrection they have going here. Fortunately, t:he government is stable, alert, and determined, anct has taken ad r~~~ta~e of the help we have offered in counter-insurgency training and planning. Indonesia: The military leaders here have just about completed the job of sidelining President Sukarno. Now they face a monumental ji~b~ in tr~ring to overcome the horrible economic mess and the debts Sukarno left behind. India: The recent elections cut the ruling Congress Party dawn to its thinnest parliamentary edge since independence, and cost the government its majority control of the state governments in f3 of the 17 states. India is going to need massive food imports for at least the next several years. Fortunately, the Commwiists are split into two bickering parties. (~~~4AP, MIDDLE EAST) Approv$dr~~~e}~}~Ot0~08A~: ~~i~~~19~~2~'~~~~Ol~'~364 2~J STATINTL STATINTL Approved For Ra~ase 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T0~27A000800030003-4 The so-Balled Northern Tier is so rocky that you can barely call it an alliance. Greece acrd Turkey, who are supposed to t:ie the Northern Tier to NATO, have bean at each otl~e:r's throats and close to war over Cyprus. Off and on for the past two years t}~ey have been trying to negotiate a solution, Tur ey, in a ition, ias eveloped a streak of which has rec{uired a review of practically all of our bilateIIal agreements with Ankara. An attempt to im~pove relations with Russia went so far recently as to produce a state visit by Kosygin. It was a somewhat chilly visit, but it was the first time a Soviet premier has ever visited Turkey. Tn ~r~~ra~r Pakistan, the other anchor whiuropeans, or at least Gy'hites of )uropean stack. As long as this situation exists, there are going to be Africans either waving guns at the frontiers, or waving speeches in the United Nations, trying to force the major powers to step in and clear the way for majority African rule. Sanctions, by the way, are not going to work against Rhodesia as long as South Africa and the Portuguese African colonies help Rhodesia to evade the full force of the sanctions. T}Le rest of Africa, by and large, consists of new nations where the African lcadershi}a is a paper-thin veneer. Tl-e Chinese Communists and the Russians are competing to develop influence over .>ome of these men; the tVestern powers are doing their beast to support and sustain t}ie rest; and if their two sei:s of African leaders-- a handful of men--kill each other ofi' or ne~ztralize each other, below them there is nothing. There are only a handful of viable economies at present on the entire continent. Africa, then, is going to provide trouble spats for years to come. Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP79T00827A000800030003-4 ~,~