SOVIET UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A000900120001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 20, 1967
• Content Type: BRIEF

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DDI BRIEFING NOTES 20 June 1967
Military
USSR, with highest military expenditures of
post-war period, engaged in dynamic R&D program in
search of some breakthrough which might alter balance
of power in Soviet favor.
No breakthrough in evidence, but across-the-board
offensive and defensive improvement is giving Sovs
growing confidence they have an assured destruction
capability which can inflict severe losses on people
and resources of United States.
We don't think Soviets--even in next 10 years--
will consider themselves strong enough to sit down
and consider initiating a global thermonuclear exchange
with U. S.; nevertheless, the more confidence they have,
the closer they will be willing to go to brink.
They are now engaged in deploying a third generation of
hardened, dispersed
OX ICBM's which could put them close to numerical
equality in launchers (excluding Polaris) in 1971.
224 1st- and 2nd-generation
ca.500 SS-11 completed or under construction.
ca.180 SS-9 11 it It if
ca. 900 operational in mid-1969.
SS-11 is "city-buster" rather than big pinpoint
weapon for knocking out hardened targets.
Anti-ballistic missile system is being deployed, but
only around Moscow;
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Other system (TALLINN) being deployed to some
sites so far across USSR,
looks more like long-range SAM.
Military improvement is general: new fighters,
new Polaris-type nuclear subs, new tactical rockets
and artillery, even two new helicopter carriers, either
for assault or ASW.
Military leaders are not giving up their priority
on critical resources; one result is continuing
inability of USSR to put the necessary effort into the
overall economy to regain the growth rate of the 1950's.
Political:
Men who ousted Khrushchev have evolved a system of
collective decision-making which has worked so far by
ducking or postponing the hard decisions, resisting
major departures. No evidence yet that the existing
machinery can take the hard decisions in its stride or
overcome natural drift toward one-man rule. Brezhnev
is at least first among equals, with indications that
struggle for power, factionalism,continues behind scenes.
Foreign Policy
We believe the low-key style of the present leadership
is better suited to present circumstances than Khrushchev's,
and continues Cold War in more subtle, more gradual, more
effective manner. Long-range goals remain the same.
On Vietnam, Soviets probably (1) sincerely feel they
must support fellow-Communists against U.S.imperialists;
pr~iFiel~sb8/ ?~91AL1~8~009DOB1 that
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USSR is collaborating with US to sell out the Vietnamese;
and (3) are probably delighted to see large portion of
U.S. strength tied down in Far East.
But they have indicated in a number of ways that
they do not want a showdown with U.S. over Vietnam at
expense of more vital Soviet interests--e.g., Europe,
disarmament, trade,--for which they must keep their
lines to Washington open and available.
Sino-Soviet Dispute
The Sino-Soviet dispute is real, not phoney, and
their relations are presently at rock-bottom. We do
not see any prospect for improvement in their relations
short of a major change in leadership in either Moscow
or Peking. Brezhnev, Kosygin & Co. have maneuvered
their way out of the impasse in which Khrushchev's
blunt tactics left them, now have China almost com-
pletely isolated in the Communist world.
Each country is concentrating on building a record
to blame the other for a final rupture of relations if
and when it comes, largely on the issue of support for
Vietnam. Soviet aid at present goes almost entirely
overland as far as military hardware is concerned.
Chinese would probably like to confront Soviets with
necessity of sea sh*pment, figuring Moscow will not risk
confrontation with U.S.Navy off Haiphong, Peking could
then accuse Soviets of cowardice.
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COMMUNIST CHINA
In China, the "Cultural Revolution" is now almost
a year old, has riddled-the leadership, implanted
lasting suspicions and fears among the survivors,
cut back the economy. It has settled into alternating
periods of renewed drives by Mao and Lin Piao against
their enemies in the party leadership, and periods of
relative "moderation" when authority has to be turned
over to Chou En-lai, speaking for the government machinery
and backed by the army, to restore some semblance of
order and authority over the provinces. Army has proven
less than monolithic in loyalty to Lin Piao, seems to
back Chou in disciplining the Red Guards whenever it
appears the controls are set at "moderation."
Of 25 men in new Politburo last August, only four
other than Mao, Lin and Chou are untouched by purge today.
This tends to discourage any new policy lines, may also
deter foreign adventures. But whoever wins out, we do
not expect any reduction in hostility to U.S.
Military
When Soviets discontinued aid in 1960, Communist China
was left with conventional armed forces which amounted to
an airforce inferior in quality to ChiNats and rapidly
becoming obsolescent, a navy capable of nothing more than
coast defense, a sub-standard World War II army. Its
strength lay in numbers--2,300,000 in army, capable of
overrunning any mainland neighbor, Russia excepted, but
only in absence of significant opposition from a major power.
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Over the past three years, however, Chinese Communists
have more than made up for loss of Soviet help, emerged with
own family of advanced weapons, entirely on their own.
CHIC-6 shows they can package thermonuclear weapon for
delivery by their handful of aging medium bombers, or by
surface-to-surface missile as in CHIC-4. We believe they
can begin deploying operational nuclear MRBM this year.'
1,000-n.m. missile can threaten all of Japan and Philippines,
a good share of Indonesia, all of Southeast and South Asia,
and eastern and southern USSR as far as Caspian.
We believe they could deploy their first crude ICBMs
in the early 1970's.
They have turned out enough Chinese copies of MIG-19
(capacity at least 20 per month) so they could spare some
for Pakistan; we expect they may soon begin producing their
own versions of MIG-21 and BADGER jet medium bomber.
They have put together one copy of a Soviet submarine
which can launch three 350-mile ballistic missiles, but we
do not have any indications that they have produced a missile
for this system yet.
Communist China is thus driving, with an overriding priority
which leaves the rest of the economy virtually stagnant, for
status as a major military power.
Despite all the belligerent talk about support for Hanoi,
however, we think there are probably only three circumstances
in which the Chinese would feel obliged to intervene there
with this growing military capability:
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1) U.S. air strikes against China
2) A major U.S. invasion of North Vietnam
3) Imminent collapse of North Vietnamese government.
------This, of course, postulates a rational assessment
of Chinese interests, a shaky assumption in Mao's current
condition.
Since American combat troops went inln middle of 1965,
--we have taken initiative away from Communists as
far as main combat forces are concerned
--we have prevented them from massing to launch
an offensive
--we have inflicted heavy casualties: 1966, 56,000
Communists KIA, 20,000 defected.
Yet current Order of Battle credits enemy with more
men than ever: more than 300,000, including 141,170 ,ia+n force-
operating under eight division headquarters, with 22
North Vietnamese and 12 Viet Cong regiments.
Indications are that Communist command--exercised
almost completely by identified North Vietnamese generals--
has decided it is too costly as a general rule to fight
major military engagements against superior allied fire
power and close air support.
But--as they have around DMZ--they will still put together
major concentrations whenever they feel that the target, the
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weather, the strategic/tactical situation, or our own
dispositions justify the risk.
Otherwise, they will re-emphasize classic guerrilla
warfare--and in particular they will probably try to
concentrate on smashing the pacification elements.
Security for the job of the rural development teams is
becoming a full-time job for the South Vietnamese Army.
One general summary can be applied to the fighting,
the pacification, and the political situation in South
Vietnam. There are encouraging aspects, but there are
no easy solutions, and there is a long, long way to go.
As for negotiation prospects, Hanoi still takes the
basic stand that we must cease all bombing in order to
find out what their answer may be, and their leading
spokesmen still insist that any settlement must be on
the basis of Hanoi's Four Points, which stipulate the
withdrawal of all U.S. forces, and a voice for the
NFL in the government of South Vietnam.
As far as we can tell, Hanoi probably recognizes
that it cannot win in the South by force of arms or by
terrorism, but is counting on war-weariness in the U.S.,
and the pressure of world public opinion, to take the U.S. out
of the war.
THAILAND
Thailand is paying for its pro-Western stance by
increasing incidence of guerrilla warfare--now running
about an incident a day, and widespread.
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they believe they have started suppressive operations and
civic action early enough to handle the job themselves with
no more help from us than occasional helicopter lift.
They may be right, but there are many remote regions where
there is little government presence, little government
loyalty. Guerrillas do not get much support from the
people, is but they are getting increasing support from
China and North Vietnam.
LAOS
The fighting in Laos doesn't hit the headlines, but it
continues: more than 1,600 engagements in 1966. RLG and
Meo guerrillas make a little headway in rainy season, lose
it again to North Vietnamese in dry season. There are some
15,000 North Vietnamese troops--plus or minus depending on
season--in Laos, holding half the country, main task is to
hold and operate Ho Chi Minh corridor.
CAMBODIA
Prince Sihanouk believes that over the long run the
Communists--and Peking in particular--are going to dominate
Southeast Asia. His main aim therefore is to take out
insurance both for his own future and that of his country.
He has recently obtained assurances from the North Vietnamese
and the Viet Cong that they will respect the integrity of
Cambodia within the borders claimed by Cambodia.
Sihanouk's thinking is also conditioned by historic
hostility between Cambodia on one hand, Thsiland,nd Vietnam
on other, and exile operations against him alternately
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supported and tolerated by Saigon and Bangkok.
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Sihanouk considers both Thailand and South Vietnam
under U.S. control, and therefore blames U.S. for their
actions and attitudes.
Evidence is that Sihanouk is opposed to Viet Cong
operational use of Cambodian territory for refuge,
regrouping, and logistics, but he does not have control
over much of the border area and is powerless to prevent
violations.
INDONESIA
Until recently, 100,000,000 Indonesians, with
extensive potential resources and important strategic
geography, were sliding surely into grasp of Peking,
thanks to a strong Communist party tolerated by Sukarno
out of his conviction Chinese Communism was wave of
future.
Badly timed, bungled, and unnecessary coup attempt
giave army
leads a chance to turn the tables. Today
Indonesian Communists are shattered, and General Suharto
has almost completed cje.Lioate and time-consuming job of
taking away all of Sukarno's power.
But Indonesia is to all intents and purposes bankrupt and
prostrate economically. It owes more than $2.5 billion,
East and West. Just to put economy on a survival basis will
take years of careful planning, tight control, international
cooperation on re-skedding debts, and heavy infusions of
financial help.
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Congress Party down to thinnest parliamentary edge
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since independence; majority control in only 8 of 17
state governments.
Continuing drought, inability to raise agricul-
tural production, mean India will need massive food
imports for at least next several years. (Suez closure,
Calcutta disorders may combine to produce actual famine
conditions temporarily in scattered localities in
immediate future.)
Externally, apprehensive re Chinese on Himalayan
frontier, no progress toward solution of Kashmir and
other disputes with Pakistan.
PAKISTAN
Ayoub, since he dismissed his pro-Peking Foreign
Minister, has made a few limited moves to repair his
relations with U.S., but they will remain conditioned by
Pakistani view that we let them down during fighting
with India.
I RAN
The Shah of Iran was also shaken by the way arms aid to
Pakistan was cut off during the Kahhmir fighting. He
is convinced that Nasir and radical Arab States have
designs on Iran around the Persian Gulf, and has been
wondering if he, too, shouldn't diversify his arms sources.
As a result, he arranged a deal for about $110 million
in military hardware from the Soviet Union, and expanded
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economic relations with the Communist Bloc as well.
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P
The Shah is reported to be "ecstatic" over reports
that the international oil consortium working Iranian
fields, moving to meet Middle Eastern disruptions, plans
to increase Iranian production by 27 percent. Actually,
an increase of that size is probably beyond the capability
of Iranian facilities, and the Shah will wind up being
disappointed now matter how substantial the increase is.
Iran has w worked out a long-term deal under which
the Soviet Union is to build pipelines for natural ga.S
now being burned off at Iranian wells; the pipelines are
to be paid for by export of natural gas, which is also to
finance a list of industrial aid projects.
Pakistan, Iran and Turkey form the so-called "Northern
tai iy,s 5-L
Tier," which--first in Baghad Pact and then in CENTO--wome f
to screen the turbulent Middle East from the Communist bloc.
Like Pakistan and Iran, however, Turkey is also seeking to
improve relations with the Communists in an effort to achieve
more leverage and greater independence.
In Turkey's case, Cyprus plays the role Kashmir does
for Pakistan--U.S. is damned if it does, damned if it doesn't.
Ever since U.S. moved to head off a Greek-Turkish military
showdown over Cyprus, our relations with Ankara have been
in trouble.
1) Turkey has required an extensive review of
practically all our bilateral agreements.
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VOW I-EW
2) Turks have been increasingly sensitive and
negative on operations likely to irk Soviets---
Black Sea naval 25X1
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visits, joint maneuvers, etc.
3) Violent left-wing anti-American propaganda,
sporadically inflamed to mob violence by
Turkish extremists, is tolerated by government.
5) Kosygin got cool public reception on his recent
state visit to Turkey, bift it was the first time
a Soviet premier had ever visited Turkey.
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CYPRUS
The Cyprus issue appears to be as far from solution as ever.
Quiet Greek-Turkish talks have made some headway from time to
time, but they have broken down repeatedly because of Greek
government crises which justified Turkish doubts that the
Greek negotiator could speak for Greece, let alone'sell
any agreement to Archbishop Makarios. Makarios for his part
tries to undermine any possible Greek-Turkish solution, is
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trying to develop his own forces. independent of Greek command,
with weapons from Czechoslovakia.
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GREECE
Greece itself is the western terminus of the
disruption that plagues what was supposed to be the
strong NATO-CENTO-SEATO cordon stretched along the periphery
of the Soviet Bloc. It is clear that the men who made the
April 21 coup moved without the foreknowledge orcconsent
of the King or the top military commanders. It is equally
true that the coup probably was the only means of forestalling
election victory by political elements likely to be non-aligned
or neutralist in sentiment at best, pro-Communist at worst,
and opposed to the Monarchy and hence to stability.
But it is difficult to see how or when the present
regime is going to restore democracy and at the same time
preclude a return to that same political threat, given the
popular support for the forces around the Papandreous.
THE MIDDLE EAST
We are in for a protracted period of impasse, tension
and crisis in the Middle East. For the moment at least,
the total Arab defeat and resultant bitterness appears to
have strengthened rather than weakened the leadership of
Nasir and the other radicals--and left the principal
moderate, King Husayn Jordan, in the shakiest position
of all.
1) Arabs, buoyed by Soviet propaganda, still refuse
to accept existence of Israel.
2) They count on pressures exerted through control
of oil facilities, closure of Suez.
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Soviets can replace aircraft, and in time tanks,
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Israelis, on other hand
1) appear determined to hang onto what they have
taken, regardless of world pressures, until
Arabs come to conference table and work out
a more permanent modus vivendi than a mere
cease-fire or armistice.
U.S. will find that
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Other pressures for settlement:
1) Continued Israeli mobilization disrupts economy;
so far they have demobilized one-third to one-fourth
of total strength.
2) Egypt loses about $20 million a month in Canal
revenue, about $10 million a month in tourism,
Sinai oil.
so that the Royalists and supporting tribes,
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Yemen
In the Yemen, the Egyptians have pulled out enough strength
fare likely to resume their offensive. They
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have been held in check only by Egyptian presence
AFRICA
Two main factors affecting events in Africa:
A) The "White Redoubt"--Republic of South Africa,
Portuguese Africa, Rhodesia. Determined to hang on, will
not be brought down by sanctions.
B) The thin veneer of leadership in newly indepen-
dent African countries. Barely enough in most countries
to afford a workable government and opposition;' remove it
and there's nothing left but chaos.
Soviet-Chinese Rivalry
Emerging Africa is a battleground in Sino-Soviet dispute,
but this rarely offers any benefit to us. Communists have
extensive presence in Tanzania, Somalia, Mali, Guinea,
former French Congo, and Algeria in North.
Nigeria
Nigeria, most populous country (50 million) is falling
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apart without any need for Communist manipulations. British
left Nigeria with possibly strongest hope in Africa for
stable, intelligent government, economic viability, but
religious
it has been pulled apart by tribal and .oafoxzioxaf
differences. There are more than 200 separate tribal
groupings in Nigeria among the major divisions into
Moslem Haussas in the North, Christian Ibos in East,
pagan Yorubas in West. Ibos are most advanced, best
trained, have oil, but are badly outnumbered, bitterly
resented.
North Africa
North Africa is affected by the division of new
African states into radicals and moderates. This
rivalry, along with border issues, occasionally
brings Algeria close to hostilities with Morocco,
and to a lesser extent Tunisia. Algeria receives
extensive arms aid from USSR.
The Horn
In the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia has been a force
for stability and moderation, but the Emperor is aging,
and the succession outlook offers little prospect for
continued stability. Ethiopia is plagued by internal
dissidence in Eritrea, border warfare with Somalia.
The Somalis are similarly keeping the border with
Kenya in a state of unrest, claiming large Somali tribal
areas in both Kenya and Ethiopia should be part of Somalia.
Just to keep entire area in a state of unrest, the
8veicPF&lR iW3PMklZt3JAJR[ i X91. 0 120Al gdence
in the Negro South bordering on civil war.
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EUROPE
Europe is neither a police state nor a denied area,
and there are few major issues that you cannot explore
at length in the overt information media, so our time
is probably better spent on other areas.
In Latin America, dominant factor is Cuba--not
as direct threat to U.S., but as locus of infection
for the rest of Latin America
Soviets have given Cuba strongest military establishment
in Latin America.
--Considerable shipping increase over past-l0
months, but this is replacement, resupply, not
major new weapons.
--Our constant watch by all available intelligence
methods and sources remains negative on strategic
offensive weapons in Cuba, but we cannot be positive
in absence of on-site inspection.
Soviets in 1964 got Castro agreement to work only
through orthodox Communists.
Castro fears his revolution will lose its dynamism if
other Latinos don't follow suit. He has renounced the 1964
agreement, openly accuses Moscow of betraying Communism by
maintaining or improving relations with LA countries where
guerrillas are in the field.
. He is working with militant Communist or other left-wing
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Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, and Bolivia, often over
the violent protests of the orthodox Communist parties-
in those countries.
Castro, March 13 speech:
"If, in any nation, those who call themselves
Communists do not know how to fulfill their duties,
we will support those who behave like real Communists
in the struggle, even though they do not call themselves
Communists."
Havana broadcasts about 175 hours a week to Latin
America and affords guerrilla training to left extremists
of varying affiliations, in order to develop the basis
for guerrilla warfare in countries at present free from
insurgency.
Where there is active insurgency, Cuba will provide
funds, propaganda support, training, and on occasion
weapons and even leadership.
Venezuela
Venezuela has taken its case against Cuban instigation
of insurgency to the O.A.S., inflamed by the latest incident
on May 8th when Venezuelan guerrillas escorted by Cuban
military personnel were intercepted while attempting to
infiltrate with weapons and cash.
. There are two guerrilla groups in the field in
Venezuela, one headed by dissident Communist Douglas Bravo,
the other representing the M.I.R., or Movement of the Revo-
'lut onary Left. MIR leader Americo Martin was recently
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Bravo operated at times from a sanctuary in the
University of Caracas until the government suspended
academic autonomy and moved in to clean up the campus.
The University had also been a major base and sanctuary
for urban terrorists.
Colombia
There are also two guerrilla groups in the field
in Colombia. The Army of National Liberation, a purely
Cuban creation, operates north of Bogota in the Santander
area, raiding towns and police stations, robbing banks,
occasionally attacking trains.
The F.A.R.C., or Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia, operate in the mountains south of Bogota,
where the Colombian Communist Party over the years
established sufficient leadership over the perennial
banditry of the area so that half a dozen areas came to
be known as Communist enclaves.
The Colombian military has made some inroads in
these areas by a combination of counter-insurgency operations
and civic action, but in many remote areas the government
presence is virtually non-existent.
Guatemala
Cuba has been giving assistance and guidance to Guatemalan
guerrilla and terrorist groups for more than three years.
left-
Initially this aid went mainly to the XOX-extremist "13th of
November" group of Yon Sosa.
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More recently, Cuba has confined its aid to the
F.A.R., the military arm of the orthodox Guatemalan
Communist Party.
At the same time it has been backing F.A.R.
militants against old-guard moderates within the
orthodox leadership who question whether open
insurgency offers the best path to power in Guatemala.
Bolivia
Early this year, guerrilla warfare broke out in
the mountainous southeastern area of Bolivia. Evidence
indicates that there is a force of about 60 well-trained,
well-equipped guerrillas, including some Cubans and other
Latin American nationals. So far, the army has been
unable to suppress the guerrillas, and President Barrientos
apparently believes the job cannot be done without outside
help. He has asked U.S. for more military equipment,
more training, more support genwrally.
Long-range plan is to complete training of a special
counter-insurgency unit which would then be deployed to
suppress the guerrillas, but this will take time.
Danger is that meanwhile (a) another reported guerrilla
grouping in north may begin activities (b) students and
dynamite-wielding tin miners may reinforce the southeastern
guerrillas.
Barrientos lacks the broad political support base to
ride out and surmount such challenges.
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Other Guerrilla Potential
Guerrilla potential also exists in Panama, Ecuador, Peru
Brazil, Dominican Republic. So far, however, nothing
significant has developed.
Panama, because of Canal and US presence, high on
Castro's priority list. About 150 Panamanians,
mainly students, have been trained in party
activities or guerrilla warfare, sabotage, in
Cuba, USSR, Communist China.
Ecuador's long history of political instability
should afford fertile ground for insurgency,
but apparently the various would-be insurgency
groups suffer just as much from tku perpetual
disorganization, factionalism, and poor leadership
as the rest of the Ecuadoran body politic.
In Peru, Castro's assets for insurgency were severely
set back by government's suppression of guerrilla
activity in June, 1965. Leaders are dead, in jail,
or in exile, but Cubans are working to reorganize
remnants and reestablish funding and communication
channels.
Limited number of Dominicans, mainly from leftist "14th
of June" movement, and Communist Dominican Popular
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paramilitary training. Government security forces
have recently picked up a number of Cuban agents
in Dom.Rep., and have cracked down on several
apparent efforts by MR14J groups to take to the
hills and launch new guerrilla warfare.
--Danger of guerrilla warfare in Dom.Rep. is
secondary at present, however, to the question
of whether Balaguer can maintain a sufficiently
viable working relationship with the military,
the conservatives, and the moderate leftist forces
to prevent a new polarization of Dominican
political forces and give the democratic process
a chance to work.
ILLEGIB
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