(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A001000060004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 5, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 10, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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10 Oct 1967
Memo D/OER
prom -CCI STATINTL
1. Review of Hardy hearing leaves following
questions in need of answer, to backstop Director
in Q&A *portionaz
A. Do Chinese Communists at present (or in recent past)
provide any significant portion of military
North Koreans?
B. estion was asked about Japanese trade with US
and f iComs respectively; DCI, using Basic Intel-
ligence pactbook, cited Japanese exports and im
ports alike 7% with "Communist countries," 36%
exports and imports with "Korth America."
Would like to substitute: In 1966 percent of
Japan's total trade was with Co=aunist-M3nr as com- P~m pared to % with the United States. is more iia's-
point of v ew , owever, trade with Japan
ficant, representing % of total Chinese trade. Japan,
in fact, last year rep aced the Soviet union as China's
principal trading partner. (Correct?)
Could somebody phone me those answers as soon as
they are available, as DCI is waiting for our review
of the briefing record.
Thanks,.
x 7610
STATINTL pod 9380
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10 October 1967
The USSR, Communist China,
the Origins of the Korean ar
All available evidence points to the conclu-
sion that the Soviet Union planned and directed the
Worth. Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950.
The North Korean regime was a purely Soviet creation
and a full-fledged Soviet satellite. Its armed
forces were organized, trained, and equipped, entirely
by the USSR. Soviet control was assured by the
presence of Soviet advisers at all levels of the
North Korean Army and government. Many key North
Korean party and government officials, moreover,
had been Soviet citizens or served in the Soviet
Army during World War II. Purges and demotions be-
tween 1945 and 1950 had eliminated those Koreans
who had returned from China or w aree oriented toward
the Chinese Communist Party.
Stalin's decision to launch the Korean venture
a p~eare to have been prnpted, on the one hand, by
his paranoiac suspicion that the US intended to re-
store Japan as a strong military power in northeast
Asia and, on the other, by his confidence that the
North Koreans could score a quick victory without
provoking American intervention.
By late 1949, the US had made clear its readi-
ness to by-pass Soviet obstructionist tactics and
conclude a separate peace treaty with Japan. Stalin,
therefore, was determined to slam the door against
what he viewed as an emerging US-Japanese anti-Soviet
alliance by seizing the entire Korean peninsula--the
historic Japanese gateway to the Asian mainland. In
early 1950, Soviet propaganda was filled with alle-
gations that the US planned to 'revive Japanese mili-
tarism and imperialism.'
Stalin unquestionably anticipated a quick and
easy conquest of South Korea. ROK forces were
markedly inferior to those of the North in manpower,
pme~nt, and training. North Korean espionage,
itary probes, and subversion had further, reduced
South Korean effectiveness. American forces had been
withdrawn from South Korea in mid-1949 and the Soviet
strategists undoubtedly discounted the possibility
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of a US military response. Stalin's confidence in
an easy victory had been strengthened by public
statements by American leaders in 1949 and early
1,90 which left South Korea ouside the US "defense
perimeter" in the Pacific.
The Chinese Comsnanists almost certainly had
advance knowledge of the North Eoreaf attack. Both
the details of this plan, and the broader question
of the threat of a resurgent Japan, probably were
discussed by Mao and Stalin during the Chinese lead-
er's ten-week visit to Moscow in early 1950. The
Chinese evidently shared Soviet concern over the
prospect of a close alliance between the US and
a re-crated Japan. Peking echoed Moscow's attacks
against the US *plot* to revive Japanese militarism.
The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, signed in Feb-
ruary 1930, was specifically directed against the
revival of Japanese imperialism and the resumption
of aggression on the part of Japan or any other
state that may collaborate in any way with Japan
in acts of aggression."
In addition to similar propaganda lines, evi-
dence of Chinese knowledge and approval of the So-
viet plan for a swift North Korean strike against
the February a1950 included the return to North Korea
the Chi-
of Koreans who had served in n
Here Communist Army--at a time when the North Korean
forces were beginning the transition to a war foot-
ing. It is highly unlikely, however, that the Chi-
nese leaders foresaw serious risks of becoming in-
volved in the war. They apparently shared Stalin's
judgment that the US would have no choice but to
acquiesce in a quick and decisive North Korean
victory.
The Chinese were anxious to deny Korea to Ameri-
can and Japanese power, for they regarded the penin-
sula as a forward shield protecting their vital
industrial centers in Manchuria and the political
center of North China. In the spring of 1950, how-
ever, the Chinese moist leaders were preoccupied
primarily with plans for the conquest of Taiwan and
and the consolidation of their power
ern and central Chinas--areas in which anti-Communist
guerrillas were still active. The Chinese, there-
fore, hoped that a swift North Korean victory and a
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a the
c8
nstrati? n of Auterican inaction ~would ~hasten
-
-
llapse or Chinees ..a.- ___ - -
,us opening the way for the early "liberation" of
Taiwan.
when the unexpected Anerican military interven-
nu-ists' calculations and
C
amm
tion shattered the
confronted them with the imminent ~dos~~tnnOfdthe
North Korean regix, a to bring the Chinese into the war. Peking's decision
to intervene was based on the Chinese loaders' own
e
view of the threat to their security ~posed
presence of a powerful enemy
Tho Chinese, of course, exploited the rgenCY to
extract large-scale military assistance from the
soviet Union, but the decisiOr to intervene appears
to have been basically a Chinese decision.
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NOTE DDI:
1. Herewith copy of Hardy transcript. DCI
specifically asked that you and I go over it per-
sonally to make sure that he was answering correctly
in his ad lib sections---as far as substantive content
de-
is concerned--after whewswtoCbehrecordedlon policy questions.
termine
STATINTL a) notes that subcommittee staff
would not care to have it known around
Community that we got our hands on, text to
review it, prefer that. transcript not be shown
to anybody but DCI---hence limit those we have
STATINTL to consult or call in,. len the to
g
STATINTL
for his part goes to ma]oz
concea from committee that we have s made a
copy.
n_ +-, R
rter
epo
forces which - will have re-inserted.
3. I have been over transcript and checked it out
against briefing text, leaving following ad lib and Q&A
sections: (paperclipped at start) AA. 673 line 1 to 695/23
A. p.696 line 25 to 698/24
*B. p.702 linw 20 to 706/6
*C. p.711 line 16 to 712/8
*D. p.719 line 1 to 720/4
*E. p.724 line 19 to 731/7
F. p.734 line 3 to 744/22
O. p.748 line 12 to 757/3
H. p.759 line 4 to end of transcript.
4. In those marked above with an asterisk, i suggest
there is nothing we need to check out. On remainder, my
suggestions are attached.
STATINTL
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AA. Page 673,line 1 to page 695, line 23.
DCI will probably want to consider wording of p. 678,
lines 1-14. P. 680, starting at line 11, DCI might wish
to reduce this to flat statement along lines: I am not
the person to answer that question for you.... State De-
partment has a very strong feeling that commitment of
Natiofialist Chinese forces in South Vietnam* would be
a poor thing to do politically. The Chinese Nationklists
do have excellent armed forces." P. 688, lines 4-13,
another section for DCI's review.
F. Page 734,line 3 to page 744, line .
DCI will want to review refs to U.S. diplomatic
policy, 734,linex 21, to 735 line 3,and p.737, lines 4-9.
Capanese trade figures, bottom of p. 735 and top of
736, were pulled from Basic Fact Book; OER might wish
to make answer more precise and more responsive (e.g.,
Japanese trade with U.S. and with Communist China, rather
than with "North America" and "Communist Countries." I
thought myself Japn share of chiCom trade was considerably
more significant, approaching it from ChiCom rather than
from Japn percentage, but didn't have it readily avbl.)
I don't believe our Japanese analysts would differ
with DCI's answers on Japanese attitudes 741/14 to 744/22.
G. Page 748 line 12 to page ?57 line 3.
I can't vouch for answer p. 749 line 25 that all
military aid to North Korea comes from Soviets.
Page 759, line 4 to end.
Page 760, lines 4 to 12: which way did the Burmeaa Road
t(go, and which way did Vinegar Joe go?
Page 761, lines 4 to 6: It might be advisable to moderate
ref to importance of Malaysian troops inasmuch as OBI Factbook
credits them with army of only 28,400, one of smallest in area,
and they are quite dependent on Commonwealth (Aust.&NZ) backing.
Page 764, lines 6-17, DCI again referring to Agency's
non-role in policy.
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