CHILE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A002200010001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 29, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 5, 1970
• Content Type: BRIEF

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DCI BRIEFING FOR
6 NOVEMBER NSC MEETING
I. Mr. President, Salvador Allende, the Chilean
Marxist, has now taken office as President in
that country with virtually no significant
opposition to hold him in check, and with a
cabinet dominated by the Communists and his
own even more extreme Socialist Party.
II. Allende was a narrow winner in the three-way
presidential elections on September 4, when
his Popular Unity coalition got him 36.6 percent
of the vote.
A. The orthodox pro-Moscow Communist Party of
Chile put together the Popular Unity coalition,
chose Allende as the candidate, and provided
the organizational base for his election.
B. Allende himself belongs to the Socialists,
a Marxist, nationalist party with a strong
faction committed to violent revolution rather
than the parliamentary road to power favored
by the Moscow-line Chilean Communist Party.
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1. The Socialists, in fact, earlier this
year appeared to be ready to jettison
Allende. He has been the perennial
Marxist candidate, but the extreme left
wing of the Socialist Party mistrusts
Allende, because he has not been a firm
supporter of violent revolution, but has
favored alliances with the Communists
with a view to parliamentary victory.
2. This leftwing faction--which could gain
control of the Socialist Party in coming
months--feels that Allende, under Commu-
nist tutelage, would move cautiously to
turn Chile into a Communist state. In
contrast, they believe that the current
situation is favorable for a massive,
radical, and violent consolidation of
power.
III. Chilean election law provides that when no presi-
dential candidate receives a majority, the president
will be chosen in a run-off by both houses of Con-
gress meeting jointly.
A. The forces which might have opposed Allende
in that Congressional vote on October 24
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were not only fragmented, but were left
leaderless before the Congress met.
1. Radomiro Tomic, the candidate of outgoing
President Eduardo Frei's Christian Demo-
crats, recognized Allende on the heels
of the popular vote as president-elect,
because of his plurality.
2. In a special Christian Democratic congress,
Tomic and other left-wing leaders overrode
moderate elements who wanted at a minimum
to obtain Allende's firm commitment to
democratic processes. The party leadership
voted to support Allende.
3. Conservative former president Jorge
Alessandri, who had trailed Allende by
only 40,000 in the popular vote, at first
planned to make a strong fight in the
run-off, but on October 9--after the
Christian Democratic caucus--he asked his
supporters not to vote for him.
IV. The Allende forces, even before the run-off, were
moving quickly and forcefully to ensure his
inauguration and to consolidate control.
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A. Methods ranging from soothing persuasion to
terrorist threats were used effectively to
make his presidency appear palatable--and
inevitable.
1. His supporters exerted major influence
on the information media, either maneu-
vering their way in, or simply declaring
their authority in the name of the
forthcoming regime.
2. Allende and his close associates contacted
many important Chileans in political,
economic, and such professional fields as
education, to reassure them that cooperation
would pay.
3. Grass-roots support for Allende was whipped
up by some 8,000 Popular Unity Committees
in factories and neighborhoods, organized
originally as campaign forces for Allende's
popular election. These groups, largely
controlled by the Communist Party, will
apparently be kept in being and expanded
to provide local propaganda, control, and
intelligence.
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B. On October 24, 195 of the 200 legislators in
the full Congress showed up. (Allende himself
did not vote, and four others were ill.)
1. Allende got 153 votes--74 of them from
the Christian Democrats. Their 19 sena-
tors and 55 national deputies followed
party orders to vote for Allende.
2. Alessandri got 35 votes from the National
Party.
3. Seven members of the Congress abstained.
V. Even before the election, there had been speculation
that as a last resort the Chilean military would not
permit a Marxist government to take office.
A. Many high-ranking officers had expressed
opposition to Allende, and a few had told
United States officials that as a Marxist,
he would not be allowed to become president
if he should win.
B. When Allende won his plurality, a number of high
officers--including troop commanders and the
head of the Air Force--were casting about for
ways, means, and support to prevent a Marxist
government.
1. This group included General Vicente Huerta,
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commandant of the carabineros, who has
now been replaced.
2. A number of them still expressed optimism
that Allende would be defeated in the Con-
gressional run-off.
C. To sum up the situation between the election on
September 4 and the inauguration on November 3,
there were some important elements in both the
military and political establishments which
perceived that Allende should not be allowed
to bring a Marxist regime into office.
Also present, there was an array of power
factors which--if it had been united and totally
committed to a plan--could have prevented
Allende's assumption of the presidency.
1. As the situation developed, however, the
faction which controlled the Christian
Democratic Party was determined to reach
an accommodation with Allende, and would
not consider an ad hoc political alliance
with the National Party to stop him.
2. The military, for its part, was committed
to support the constitutionally-elected
president, both by its non-political
tradition, and through the firm conviction
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and explicit policy of the Army commander-
in-chief, General Rene Schneider.
3. Those diverse groups of military and
political leaders who did wish to prevent
an Allende presidency at no time acted in
concert nor demonstrated the courage to move.
D. This immobilism can be attributed in a consid-
erable degree to the existing climate of public
opinion. The Chilean people had been softened
up and conditioned for six years to an
acquiescence with revolutionary language, not
only coming from the Communists and Socialists,
but generated by the ruling Christian Democrats
themselves.
1. The Chilean government had permitted the
Soviets and the local Marxists to carry on
their political action and propaganda activi-
ties unhindered. The anti-Communist psycho-
logical curtain was thus destroyed.
2. As a result, the Chileans viewed the coming
of Allende with apprehension and unease, but
not with the repugnance and gut concern which
could have led to action.
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E. Essentially, each element in the power structure--
the political and the military--looked to the
other to provide the leadership, but no leader
with the clout to bring it off was willing to
step forward at the crucial moment.
1. Among the military, the negative attitude
of Army commander Schneider was a blocking
factor, whether it stemmed from dedication
to the constitution, or a reported prefernce
for Allende. It influenced General Carlos
Prats, who became Army commander when
Schneider was assassinated. In early stages,
some officers had considered Prats the best
potential leader against Allende.
F. Retired Army General Roberto Viaux, who had led
an earlier abortive military revolt to improve
the position and perquisites of the military, was
actively seeking support for a coup attempt.
G. Most of the senior active officers, however,
feared the risks involved in the communication
and coordination essential for choosing a leader
and ensuring support from their fellow officers
and troops.
1. As the deadline for action approached, the
cooperation of troop commanders in the
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was not assured. Divisions among leading
officers became more evident, for example
by the calls which several admirals paid
on Allende.
H. Schneider's assassination unified the military,
but it unified them against any likelihood of
a coup to keep Allende from office.
1. The presumption--and the public consensus--
is that it was instigated by the extreme
right wing.
VI. Allende announced his cabinet a few days before
his takeover.
A. Allende himself--and probably the Communists--
would prefer for the time being to project a
non-radical image.
B. Let us make no mistake, however: This is a
hard-line, militant cabinet. It reflects the
determination of the Socialists to assert their
more radical policy from the start. The Commu-
nists have countered by holding out for the key
economic and patronage ministries. In satisfying
both, Allende has wound up with a cabinet clearly
dominated by these two parties at the expense of
the other members of the coalition.
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C. The Socialists have four posts, including the
top. Interior and Foreign Ministries.
1. Jose Toha, a Socialist who is very close
to Allende and who is strongly anti-American,
will be Minister of Interior. This makes him
first in line of succession to the presi-
dency inasmuch as Chile has no vicepresident.
2. Toha will control all police and investi-
gative forces, as well as the chief execu-
tives of the 25 provinces.
3. Allende is reported particularly concerned
over assuring control of the well-armed
national police, the carabineros, a disci-
plined paramilitary force of 25,000 volun-
teers which is better trained and slightly
larger than the Army.
4. The Foreign Ministry goes to Clodomiro
Almeyda, a leader of the more radical wing
of the Socialists. A dedicated Marxist
theoretician, Almeyda has close relations
with both Havana and Peking.
5. Other Socialists in the cabinet are the
Minister of Housing and the Secretary-General
of the Government.
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D. The Communists got the ministries of finance,
public works, and labor, and in addition they
control the important Ministry of Economy and
Development, which will probably be the focal
point for Allende's first major reform moves.
1. The new minister, Pedro Vuskovic, is iden-
tified as a "leftist independent," but
he has
the full confidence of the Communist leader-
ship, and may well be a secret member of the
party.
2. Vuskovic, formerly an economist on the United
Nations staff, has been the chief economic
adviser in three of Allende's four presiden-
tial campaigns.
E. The seven remaining cabinet posts were divided
among the other four parties which make up the
Popular Unity coalition.
1. The new Minister of Mines is a left-wing
member of the non-Marxist Radical Party,
Orlando Cantaurias. He is close to Allende
and will have a key role in the promised
takeover of the copper industry.
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2. The new Minister of Agriculture, Jaques
. Chonchol, represents the unified Popular
Action Movement, a small group of dissident
leftwing Christian Democrats. Chonchol
earlier served as a United Nations agri-
cultural adviser to Fidel Castro, and broke
with the Christian Democrats last year after
playing a major role in Frei's controversial
agrarian reform program.
F. In most of the secondary cabinet posts, where
the ministers are not Marxists, they will be
bypassed and real power will be in the hands
of the second-rank Communist or Socialist
officials.
VII. As for the potential opposition, the Christian
Democrats remain the largest single party.
A. The leadership at present, however, is dominated
by Tomic and other left-wingers.
1. There are moderate elements with rank-
and-file support, but they are too weak
in party caucusses to stem the leftward
drift unless Frei gives them active
leadership.
B. The Chilean conservatives at present are
weakened by the responsibility imputed to
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rightists for the assassination of General
Schneider.
1. Many of the influential members of the
National Party have withdrawn from its
ranks or left the country. There is
continuing conflict with the Christian
Democrats. Also, the economic pressures
that Allende will certainly bring to bear
against the elements the National Party
represents is likely to drive the party
to the wall.
C. Chileans generally do not attach great
weight to the Congress and the political
parties, and will hardly look to them to
protect their interests.
1. Many who could transfer holdings abroad
or count on foreign employment have left
the country.
2. Businessmen who cannot leave are likely
at the outset to accept the vague assurances
Allende has given privately and in public,
and accommodate as best they can.
3. A substantial number of Chileans who oppose
Allende continue to believe--probably mis-
takenly--that they will have an opportunity
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to vote him out of office in a new
presidential election in 1976.
4.. Party affiliation is not a strong factor
among Chilean voters, and the progressively
leftward trend of their preferences was a
major factor in Allende's victory this year.
VIII. Allende's attainment of the presidency with only
about one third of the country's vote climaxes
a highly successful political career of nearly
35 years.
A. The man knows how to achieve his ends. He
knows the political forces of the country
inside and out. He has a thorough familiarity
with the governmental and economic structures
he plans to revolutionize,in the course of
building the socialism he claims will solve
Chile's many serious problems.
1. He is tenacious and singleminded, but
he knows how to dissemble his determi-
nation with a flair for maneuvering,
a quick wit, and an instinct for when
to reassure and when to challenge.
2. He has also demonstrated in the past
that he is adept at remaining in command
of a quarreling coalition by playing off
rival forces against each other--
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a balancing act he will have to rely on
to set his own pace for change when the
Socialists want to proceed full tilt
with the proclamation of a Marxist Chile'
while the Communists call for a more
deliberate construction of the foundations.
B. We do not expect an immediate flood of radical
constitutional revisions to consolidate his
political and economic control. The consti-
tution already gives the president broad powers
of executive decree--recently enlarged by the
Frei government. With the next congressional
elections set for 1973, he has ample time to
obtain the legislation he may need without
triggering opposition by hasty and alarming
demands.
C. We expect that his first economic moves will
be aimed at control of the major mining, indus-
trial and financial enterprises that he con-
siders essential to his plans.
1. These assets, combined with the substantial
foreign exchange reserves he inherits
from the outgoing government, will
put his regime in good financial shape
at the outset.
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2. Recent high copper prices and extensive
recent U.S. investment in expanded copper
production in Chile are additional bonuses
for the new regime, although world copper
prices have been dropping, and there are
indications that supply is approaching
demand.
3. He and his main economic advisers are
concerned, however, about the deterioration
of the internal economy since his election.
D. He has described inflation as the most urgent
problem of the moment.
E. His program for socialism will be facilitated
by the already preponderant role of the Chilean
government in nearly every field of economic
activity. The private enterprise system has
already been distorted by 30 years of rapid
inflation and government intervention.
IX. In the international economic field, we expect that
Allende, at the start at least, will move with
caution and with considerable regard for the
realities. He has asserted his interest in foreign
capital and technology as long as "the benefits
are mutual."
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A. Understandably, foreign investors will be wary
of a professedly Marxist regime, and new foreign
credits will be harder to come by.
B. Allende and his representatives have reiterated
in public and in private their hopes of retaining
Chile's traditional hard currency markets in
Western Europe, Japan, and elsewhere for their
copper, iron, and other exports, as well as
plans for expanding into Communist markets.
1. We know that Fidel Castro has advised
Allende to keep Chile's copper sales
in hard currency.
C. U.S. private assets in Chile total about one
and a half billion dollars, of which slightly
less than half consists of Chilean government
notes issued for nationalization, holdings of
public bonds, and long- and short-term loans.
1. We estimate the book value of direct U.S.
investment at $800 million., although re-
placement would be considerably higher.
More than half--$480 million--is in mining
and smelting.
2. As of September 10, U.S. investors had A.I.D.
current investment insurance against ex-
propriation amounting to $293 million,
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and standby coverage for another $355
million.
X. As for foreign relations, many governments are
skeptical of Allende's aims, but anxious to avoid
an appearance of prejudging him.
A. The pleas he has made so far for inter-
national understanding would appear to be
contradicted by the appointment of the
radical Clodomiro Almeyda as Foreign
Minister.
1. Almeyda is so far to the left that
his admiration for the Chinese Commu-
nists and the Cubans in the past has
placed him in opposition to Moscow.
B. Several Latin American governments, in-
cluding in particular Argentina, are
deeply concerned over the possible effect
of the Allende government on political
stability inside their own countries.
_ in late October Allende promised
representatives of revolutionary guer-
rilla groups in Latin America that
Chile would become a center of support
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for them as soon as he is firmly in
control.
C. There is every indication and every reason to
expect that--whatever Allende may say or in-
tend--the forces around him will use every
opportunity to exacerbate relations with the
United States.
1. The personal emissary Allende sent to
our Embassy in Santiago said there was
little the new president could do to
curb the constant attacks on the United
States in the Chilean press.
D. As for the Soviet Union, Moscow is showing
caution in dealing with the new government.
In turn, the Chilean Socialists will want
to avoid excessive dependence on Moscow, and
the Chilean Communists --for the sake of their
domestic appeal--will exercise restraint in
promoting closer ties with Russia.
1. The USSR extended a credit of $57 million
to Chile in 1967, none of which has been
used. Chilean economic problems, however,
will inevitably create the opportunity for
Moscow to use this for leverage with the
new Marxist government.
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