SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000200130001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 22, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
guipp Kau~
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
State Department review completed
Secret
r
149
January 22, 1975
No. 0060/75
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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
January 22, 1975
Position of Soviets on MBFR Talks . . . . . . . . 1
Concern in Romania over
Bre zhnev' s Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Warsaw Pact Deputy Foreign Ministers
To Meet in Moscow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Polish Reassurance on Detente . . . . . . . . . . 6
Literary Russia Features Article
on Bre zhnev . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
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Position of Soviets on MBFR Talks
With the fifth round of the MBFR talks scheduled
to begin next week, chief Soviet delegate Khlestov
laid out the Soviet negotiating position in a recent
conversation with Ambassador Stoessel.
Khlestov claimed he was optimistic about the
talks and said the Soviets were still interested in
reaching an agreement. He declared that the talks
were "condemned to succeed," but gave no indication
of any new flexibility on the part of the Soviets.
Instead, he called for the US to put pressure on its
Allies to get the negotiations moving. While Khles-
tov may have been merely setting out the maximum So-
viet position in advance of the resumption of nego-
tiations, the tenor of his remarks suggests that
another lackluster round is in store.
Much of Khlestov's presentation reiterated
standard Soviet positions. As in the past, he
stressed the need to reduce West German forces from
the outset. This was an apparent backtrack from So-
viet willingness--expressed toward the end of the
last negotiating session--to countenance initial re-
ductions limited to US and Soviet forces. Khlestov
rather lamely explained that the earlier concession
had been made in the particular context of a Warsaw
Pact proposal for "symbolic reductions."
Khlestov noted that it was especially important
to resolve the Bundeswehr question this year, the
30th anniversary of the end of World War II. It ap-
pears, however, that the Soviets view this historical
factor as a ploy to win sympathy for their position,
rather than as a reason for them to make concessions.
When asked about the fundamental NATO objective
of seeking to reach a "common ceiling," Khlestov re-
peated the usual Soviet argument that Moscow could
January 22, 1975
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not accept an agreement that put it at a disadvan-
tage. He added that any reductions should consider
total "firepower," reflecting the Soviet position
that reductions limited to ground forces would be
unsatisfactory, but perhaps also suggesting that
the Soviets might eventually be willing to accept
unequal reductions of ground forces if accompanied
by cuts in air and nuclear elements.
Khlestov explained that the Warsaw Pact pro-
posal of November 1973 to reduce each side's forces
by approximately 15 percent was still alive and had
not been replaced by subsequent attempts to win ac-
ceptance of various concepts of token reductions.
January 22, 1975
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Concern in Romania
over Brezhnev s Status
The Yugoslavs and Romanians are "deeply con-
cerned" over the impact on them of a leadership
shake-up in the Kremlin.
In two separate conversations with his US coun-
terpart last week, the counselor of the Yugoslav em-
bassy in Bucharest said that on instructions from
Belgrade he had sounded out the Romanians on their
view of the Soviet political situation. The coun-
selor said that the Romanians fear either that
Kirilenko will succeed Brezhnev or that the Soviet
military will gain a dominant role in any post-
Brezhnev scramble for power. The Yugoslav embassy
believes that either the rise of Kirilenko or the
Soviet military would be a "nightmare" for Bucha-
rest, requiring Romania to adopt a more obliging
relationship in dealings with Moscow. A third anxi-
ety is that a Kremlin power struggle could restore
collective leadership, a phenomenon that could em-
barrass Ceausescu's conspicuously one-man show.
Political uncertainties in the Kremlin always
produce a bad case of heartburn in East Europe. The
fact that Belgrade would direct its embassy to query
the Romanians about the Soviet leadership almost cer-
tainly'shows Belgrade's healthy concern over the
post-Brezhnev era. The instructions also reflect a
keen awareness that the Tito-Brezhnev relationship
is the keystone of rapprochement with the Soviets.
There is little doubt that Bucharest is worried
about the political ramifications of Brezhnev's
health, but Yugoslav diplomats have a spotty record
of reporting on Soviet-Romanian relations. Ceau-
sescu and Brezhnev have sometimes argued heatedly,
but the Romanians still prefer to deal with a known
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quantity. Ceausescu thus probably finds himself in
the ironic position of wishing Brezhnev a full re-
covery.
If Brezhnev does not resume full activity, the
Romanians know that their selective defiance of the
Kremlin will have to be tuned to the limits of tol-
erance of either a collective or of a new boss in
the Kremlin. Bucharest almost certainly prefers a
collective if only because it would probably least
affect Romanian foreign policy initiatives.
The worst:: outcome for Romania would be a domi-
nant role for the Soviet military. Bucharest knows
that Moscow's marshals would brook little foot-
dragging in the Warsaw Pact. By contrast, Bucharest
could probably learn to live with Kirilenko. In
October 1964, when Brezhnev replaced Khrushchev, the
anguished Romanians were ascribing many of the same
tough qualities to him that they now ascribe to
Kirilenko.
Since the Romanian party congress last fall,
Bucharest has seemed intent on accentuating the
positive in its relations with Moscow. This could
prove a useful introduction to a new Kremlin leader-
ship. It would cost the Romanians nothing of sig-
nificance and would give them some bargaining time.
January 22, 1975
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Warsaw Pact Deputy Foreign
Ministers To Meet in Moscow
Deputy foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact.
states will meet in Moscow on January 29, accord-
ing to several East European officials. The ses-
sion was probably called to lay the groundwork for
the Pact summit scheduled for mid-May in Warsaw.
It may also take the opportunity to re-emphasize
Pact support for detente. Normally, these sessions
yield few public statements of any significance.
The participants may also discuss plans for
celebrating the 30th anniversary of the end of World
War 11 and review tactics at the European security
and force reduction talks. The Pact countries now
expect conclusion of the European security confer-
ence sometime this summer, and are pressing for dis-
cussions of the proposals they put forth at the
force reduction talks last fall.
This will be the first formal meeting of the
Pact deputy foreign ministers since 1970, and it
will kick off a round of political meetings com-
memorating the 20th anniversary of the alliance.
The May summit meeting of the Political Consulta-
tive Committee could well be preceded by a gather-
ing of foreign ministers.
At last year's summit it was generally agreed
to enhance the political character of the Pact, and
the Soviets may be trying to use the events of this
anniversary year to further the role of the Politi-
cal Consultative Committee and other Pact institu-
tions in foreign policy coordination. Renewed meet-
ings of the deputy foreign ministers could presage
efforts to transform the moribund office of the Pact
secretary general. (headed by a Soviet deputy foreign
i
i
m
n
ster) into a permanent multinational body for
January 22, 1975
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polish Reassurance on Detente
High-level Polish officials have recently
sought out US diplomats in Warsaw to emphasize that
they do not view Moscow's abrogation of the Soviet-
US trade agreement as a threat to detente. They
have also expressed some concern over the Soviet
leadership situation.
One official recently said that widespread
speculation in the West about a return to the cold
war was "nonsense" and that neither the Soviets nor
the Poles want to turn back from detente. He added
that although problems will continue, they should be
solved in the atmosphere of detente, not cold war.
Despite these assurances, Polish officials seem
concerned about possible short-term developments
within the Soviet leadership. A prominent party
press spokesman, who was in Moscow in December, said
that "something was going on in the Soviet hier-
archy," but that whatever leadership changes might
occur possibly in the next three to four months"
--the policy of detente or Soviet relations with the
US would not be affected. He also described the So-
viet military as the most skeptical force in the So-
viet Union, but added that the Vladivostok agree-
ment had apparently reassured Moscow's marshals.
According to the embassy, a number of well-in-
formed Poles believe that Brezhnev's health is fail-
ing and that he may be forced at some point to step
down. They quickly add, however, that this would
not affect detente. A prominent Polish journalist
recently said that the only event his colleagues
fear is an abrupt change .in. the Soviet leadership
that could lead to a period of uncertainty.
Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Olszowski arrived
in Moscow on Wednesday for periodic consultations.
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anxieties in Eastern and Western Europe that are
connected with Brezhnev's absence from the public
He will probably stress the importance of even fur-
ther assurances on Moscow's detente policies.
Although there is no evidence on the point,
the Kremlin may make an effort to reassure Olszowski
about Brezhnev's health and the state of the Soviet
leadership. Warsaw and Moscow share a confiden-
tiality that is probably unique among Warsaw Pact
members. This special trust has sometimes cast the
Poles in the role of carrying out particularly deli-
cate assignments for the Soviets. Given widespread
speculation on the Soviet leadership situation, the
Poles might thus be entrusted with trying to allay
eye.
January 22, 1975
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Literal Russia Features
Article on Brezhnev
The January 17 issue of Literary Russia fea-
tures a two-page panegyric to Brezhnev and his con-
tribution to the Soviet military effort in World War
II. The article is ostensibly about Lt. General
Anton I. Gastilovich, a corps commander in the Soviet
18th Army on the Ukrainian Front, but in fact it con-
centrates on Brezhnev's role as chief political com-
missar of the 18th Army..
Brezhnev is portrayed as a wise counsellor to
Gavrilovich on the conduct of various battles. He
was not only concerned with the material needs of the
soldiers, but he also shored up the troops' morale by
his inspiring personal example and his tireless appear-
ances and lectures. The article makes the particular
point that Brezhnev,.loved and admired by all, was a
true comrade in arms of the professional officers with
whom he served. Marshal Zhukov himself, according to
the article, urged Gastilovich to bring the young
Brezhnev (then a colonel) on board as his political
officer.
The author says Brezhnev was at the side of the
troops during the thick of the fighting and exposed
himself to constant danger with no thought for his
own safety. There is no claim, however, that Brezh-
nev was wounded or that he took an active part in the
fighting.
Appearing as it did amidst speculation concerning
Brezhnev's physical and political health, the article
is probably intended to keep Brezhnev's name before
the public and help scotch rumors that he is in polit-
ical trouble. It may also be an attempt to reaffirm
the party's close -ties with the military.
January 22, 1975
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