DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000300050001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 4, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Developments in Indochina
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February 4, 1975
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DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA
February 4, 1975
Salami Tactics Advocated for South. . .
SOUTH VIETNAM
New Military Region 3 Commander
A Political Roundup . . . . . . . . . .
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Slow Pro
gress on Boundary . . . . . . .
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Unsettle
d Situation in Ban Houei Sai. .
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Much Smoke but Little Substance
on Reserve Moves
Several of Hanoi's seven reserve divisions in
North Vietnam appear to be stirring, but the evidence
is not yet convincing that any combat units have moved
south or that they will indeed cross into South Viet-
nam.
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Still At Home
While each of these actions could point to a
change in status or a major move 25X1
1 -4 there is no evidence that any ot em have
ac ua relocated.
February 4, 1975
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While no units have been detected shifting,
this does not necessarily mean that units have not
moved. Information on troop movements is less
reliable than earlier in the war, and in any large
commitment of forces, a few North Vietnamese units
probably could transit the infiltration corridor
February 4, 1975
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Salami TiActics Advocated for the South
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A recent, unattributed article in the North
Vietnamese army paper, Quan Doi Nhan Dan, has pro-
vided further evidence on Communist plans for the
present dry-season campaign.
The article calls for "coordinated" local of-
fensives, with political and military forces play-
ing varying roles of importance, depending on the
situation in each area. The emphasis seems clearly
to limit the scope of these offensive actions. The
article states that the key military element should
be the "local forces," occasionally supplemented by
main force units. It also notes that such coordi-
nated political and military attacks should take
place only "in a certain area and within a fixed
time."
The concept of a "coordinated offensive" seems
based on a recognition that Saigon, faced with seri-
ous supply constraints, will not be able to defend
all the areas under its control. In this respect,
the article is realistic in assessing the present
balance of political and military forces in South
Vietnam. It decries as a mistake attacks on areas
where Saigon is strong and in a position to maul Com-
munist forces, calling instead for strikes only in
those regions where there is a good chance of making
gains.
As well as expanding the Communists' area of con-
trol, the "coordinated offensive" seems designed to
keep South Vietnamese regular army units tied down
and unable to carry out "pacification" operations
against important Communist base areas. The writer
emphasizes the importance of "consolidating the lib-
erated areas"--a phrase which indicates the impor-
tance of protecting base eas while preparing for
larger scale offensives. 25X1
February 4, 1975
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New Military Region 3 Commander
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Lt. General Nguyen Van
Toan has been assigned as the
new Military Region 3 (MR-3)
commander and will reportedly
assume the position on Febru-
ary 5.
General Toan will replace
Lt. General Du Quoc Dong, who
was appointed commander of MR-
3 only last October. The loss
of Phuoc Long Province and the
failure of his forces to retake
the top of Ba Den Mountain last
month undoubtedly contributed
to his downfall. Dong had been
under criticism from much of
the regional staff almost from
the day he took over as com-
mander.
The choice of General Toan
to succeed Dong was a difficult
decision for President Thieu.
Toan was accused of corruption
throughout his tenure as 2nd
Division commander (from 1967 Lt. General Nguyen Van Toan (1.
to 1972) and subsequently as commander of MR-2; he was
relieved of the MR-2 assignment last October during the
same shake-up that brought Dong to MR-3.
Nevertheless, General Toan has an admirable mili-
tary record, and Thieu may feel he is the man best
qualified for the job at a time when new Communist
initiatives are expected around Saigon. Toan is prob-
ably the most aggressive of the candidates available,
and Thieu undoubted) feels that this is the auality
February 4, 1975
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A Political Roundu
Political opposition groups are still having
difficulty agreeing on common issues tics.
The report that
Buddhist a o is oppositionists had jointly
sponsored a resolution in the Senate was incorrect.
Although such a resolution was presented at a
meeting in Saigon on January 26, it was never
offered for formal consideration in the legislature
or jointly sponsored by Catholic oppositionists.
Moreover, the Buddhist National Reconciliation
Force last weekend refused to back Father Thanh
and the Catholic anti-corruption movement's second
';public indictment" against President Thieu for
"high crimes against the state and military."
The appearance of Father Thanh's "indictment"
in nine Saigon newspapers led the government to
confiscate the editions that carried the story.
Saigon's actions in arresting 15 journalists this
week and in shutting down five newspaper offices
was not related to the confiscation episode, but
based on government evidence connecting the jour-
nalists to the Viet Cong.
President Thieu is obviously prepared to
accept the bad publicity that such actions will
inevitably generate in order to deal with what he
considers potentially ser;pus threats to his
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The government is currently also having prob-
lems with the Hoa Hao religious sect. Recent gov-
ernment actions against the Hoa Hao have apparently
February 4, 1975
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been motivated by Thieu's concern that the group
might try to negotiate a local truce with the
Communists. Another religious sect--the Cao Dai--
had already publicly expressed an intent to do
so, and the government was worried that if such
independent actions were tolerated, Saigon's
authority in the countryside would be seriously
undermined. Moreover, the Communists could point
to such actions as further support for their
claims of being a viable governmental alternative
to the Thieu regime.
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The Hoa Hao have consistently opposed the
Communists, and their areas have been among the
most secure in the country. Defense of Hoa Hao
lands and property has been handled largely by
indigenous security units loosely organized into
an "army." While they lack heavy weapons and could
not.be considered a major military force, the Hoa
Hao nonetheless have amassed a large number of
small weapons and have armed several thousand of
their claimed 3 million members. Moreover, the
government has traditionally allowed the Hoa Hao
to operate fairly freely in their own areas,
contributing to the Hoa Hao sense of independence
and autonomy. Attempts to disarm the Hoa Hao have
reportedly been resisted by force.
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February 4, 1975
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Slow Progress on Boundary
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Field representatives of the coalition govern-
ment's Joint Central Commission, after establish-
ing seven cease-fire markers in December, have
reverted to their customary slower pace. One marker,
at Ban Poung in the far northwest, was implanted
during January.
Fourteen of the 27 markers called for in the
protocol to the cease-fire agreement are now in
place, but they establish zones of influence across
only about 250 miles of the Laotian countryside.
The 13 markers yet to be located will separate the
forces of the two sides along a front more than
500 miles long.
On January 28, one of the commission's joint
mobile teams was supposed to be sent to the Phou
Soung - Na Nan area in Xiangkhoang Provirice'to'
locate the first of six markers to be established
in that province. The Phou Soung marker will be
near the junction of Route 13 (a major all-weather
road that connects the twin capitals of Vientiane
and Luang Prabang) and Route 7 (the main road
serving the strategically important Plaine des
Jarres).
Negotiations on this marker may proceed rela-
tively rapidly. A large number of refugees re-
portedly have decided to return to their native
village in this general region, and are awaiting
formal demarcation of the cease-fire line. The
Pathet Lao want the refugees to return and may
facilitate a quick settlement.
Agreement on the location of the five re-
maining stakes, however, will be more difficult.
The rugged terrain to the south and southwest of
the Plaine des Jarres was some of the most bitterly
February 4, 1975
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Laos: Temporary Ceasefire Boundary Markers
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contested territory in the fighting, and both sides
will be reluctant to yield any of it. As has oc-
curred in areas of southern Laos and at iongsa; i.n
the northwest, small-scale skirmishes could well
break out as each side tries to improve its posi-
tion before final emplacement of the cease-fire
stakes.
A joint mobile team is also scheduled to be-
gin demarcation of the area along Route 13, the
major north-south highway in Laos, between Thakhek
and Paksane, in the central panhandle. The section
between the two cities has been under Communist
control since the cease-fire and closed to general
traffic. It is also an area where until fairly re-
cently, North Vietnamese troops were building::and
repairing roads to help the local Pathet Lao
strengthen their control over the area. The proto-
col calls for two markers to be established in this
area: one at Khoua Soung Hong and another at Kouan
Pha Vang. The Pathet Lao apparently now feel that
their position in the area is strong enough to move
ahead with demarcation. Once the two stakes are
planted, the Communists will probably open Route 13
between Thakhek and Paksane; this would please local
farmers and students who have been calling for such
a move.
More Markers Needed?
In addition to the 27 temporary cease-fire
markers specified in the protocol, at least 2
more may be needed to assure complete and formal
separation of the forces of the two sides. In
southern Laos, the line separating the two zones
extends to Ban Boun but not beyond. Another marker
needs to be established on the border with either
Thailand or Cambodia. The Pathet Lao will probably
press to have the line run from the Ban Boun marker
due west to the Thai border. There is a government-
controlled enclave south.of Ban Boun, however, and
the Vientiane side undoubtedly will demand at least
some access rights to it.
February 4, 1975
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A similar situation exists in the extreme
northwest, where the line of separation runs to
the Ban Poung marker but not beyond to the Thai
or Burmese border. Unlike the situation in the
south, however, the non-Communists have little
influence beyond Ban Poung. If the line is even-
tually extended, it will probably run southwest
from Ban Poung to a point on the Thai border just
north of the provincial capital of Ban Houei Sai.
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February 4, 1975
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Six weeks have passed since military disorder
broke out in and around the non-Communist controlled
provincial capital of Ban Houei Sai, in remote north-
western Laos, and the situation still has not re-
turned to normal. Rebellious Royal Lao Army and
Pathet Lao troops who forcibly occupied the town
on December 24 are still active throughout the area.
The non-Communists have failed to re-establish an
effective political or military presence, and unless
they are prepared to write off the area, they must
soon take decisive steps to reassert authority and
control.
Pathet Lao Activities
Pathet Lao troops are believed to be still
occupying a number of Mekong River villages in the
non-Communist zone which they seized at the time the
town of Ban Houei Sai was occupied. They are also
militarily active in the town itself, although their
presence is less visible than during the initial
stages of the uprising.
Small Pathet Lao propaganda teams continue to
operate throughout the Ban Houei Sai area. Making
house-to-house "calls," they claim that Pathet Lao
troops joined in the rebellion in late December at
the request of dissident Royal Lao Army leader
Captain Changsouk to provide "security" for his
rebel troops. They attempt to build up Changsouk
as a "new revolutionary leader," and portray him as
the only man on the scene who dared to stand up to
the "corrupt elements" who formerly controlled the
civil and military apparatus in the provincial cap-
ital.
February 4, 1975
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Lao Communist political "administrators" also
are active in and around Ban Houei Sai, and appear
to be on the verge of filling the leadership vacuum
left by the non-Communists. These political oper-
atives are conducting household surveys throughout
the area, have established a dispensary in one vil-
lage and a granary in another, have put restrictions
on the movements of villagers, and have attempted
to entice refugees to resettle in the Pathet Lao
zone. Moroever, with the help of representatives of
the coalition government's Joint Central Commission
who were dispatched to Ban Houei Sai to help nego-
tiate rebel demands, the Pathet Lao have succeeded
in opening up road and river traffic between the
provincial capital and various Communist-held areas
in northwestern Laos.
Non-Communists at Loose Ends
Ranking non-Communist officials--master prac-
titioners of the art of self-deception--profess to
believe that the situation in the Ban Houei Sai area
is somehow returning to normal of its own accord,
and that little if any effort on their part is re-
quired. Nothing could be further from the truth.
The most disturbing aspect of the present state
of affairs in Ban Houei Sai is the complete absence
of non-Communist civilian administrators. Not one
of the civil servants who fled at the outset of last
year's occupation has yet returned or been replaced.
The non-Communists did attempt to find a replacement
for the governor of Houa Khong Province whose ouster
the Ban Houei Sai rebels demanded, but their choice--
the notoriously corrupt and recently fired governor
of Khammouane Province in central Laos--generated a
highly negative local reaction, and he has been dropped
from consideration. The post remains unfilled.
General Vannaseng, the northwest military re-
gion deputy commander, represents the only element
of cohesion the non-Communists have in Ban Houei
February 4, 1975
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Sai, and he is slowly restoring some semblance of
Royal Lao Army command in and around the town.
Royal Lao Army units, nearly all of whom scattered
to the four winds at the first sign of trouble in
the area, are now at-only one half to two thirds of
their authorized strength. Almost half of their
inventory of some 1,100 M-16 rifles is unaccounted
for. Some of the missing weapons have probably been
sold to buyers in Thailand and Burma, and others are
almost certainly in Pathet Lao hands. Vannaseng did
manage to negotiate the return of two artillery
pieces and several recoilless rifles which the
Pathet Lao took from Ban Houei Sai during the early
stages of the rebellion.
Vannaseng has attempted to reach some sort of
understanding with the rebellious Royal Lao Army
forces who participated in the uprising. He has
appointed rebel leader Changsouk to be one of the
two deputy commanders of the Ban Houei Sai military
subdivision, and he has agreed to permit Changsouk's
forces to remain in the ca ital--at least for the
time being.
February 4, 1975
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