MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000400070002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 5, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 19, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
2UITT HOUE
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
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February _L a
State Department review completed
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
United Arab Emirates: Charting a Middle Course
in Foreign Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Mozambique-China: Seeking New Support .
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Charting a Middle Course in Foreign Relations
The foreign policy of the three-year-old United
Arab Emirates is largely conditioned by the federa-
tion's fragile nature, according to a recent assess-
ment of the US embassy. The UAE's cautious foreign
policy moves reflect the leadership's intention to
avoid foreign antagonisms that might threaten the
,new state or obstruct further integration of the
?seven-member federation.
Sheikh Zayid, President of the UAE and ruler
of Abu Dhabi, the most important member state, sees
'the federation's oil wealth as enabling him to cut
a swath in Arab and international circles, and to
I cultivate Palestinian groups and the more radical
Arab states that might be interested in subverting
$the UAE. Since the formation of the UAE, Zayid has
lavishly dispensed foreign aid, with the front-line
Arab states receiving first priority, followed by
,other needy Arab countries and Islamic states such
as Pakistan and Bangladesh. The UAE's foreign com-
~mitments in 1974 totalled more than $2 billion, $870
:million of which was disbursed, according to the US
embassy's reckoning.
The fact that the UAE's foreign assistance is
derived almost solely from Abu Dhabi's oil revenue has not
inhibited the six other ruling sheikhs from complain-
ling to Zayid about his generous aid outlays. They
argue that the oil revenues could be more usefully
expended on development within the federation. Pres-
sure on Zayid to take a hard look at foreign aid
disbursements has been intensified by recent cutbacks
in oil production and softening in prices, prompted
by over-supply of petroleum on the international
`market. Regardless of what decision Zayid makes on
the general level of foreign aid, he will probably
continue to make generous handouts to Egypt and
Syria.
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UAE policy in the Persian Gulf and Arabian
Peninsula is formulated with awareness that the
federation can ill afford to antagonize Iran and
Saudi Arabia, the dominant powers in the area.
Zayid is not upset by Iran's claim that it should
have primary responsibility for security in the
.Persian Gulf. He has refused to criticize the
Iranian military presence in Oman and gave no sup-
sport to the moribund proposal by some Arab leaders
!of replacing the Iranians with a pan-Arab force.
JZayid also gives economic as well as discreet
!military aid to the sultanate of Oman and the mod-
erate military regime in North Yemen to strengthen
them against the subversive efforts of Marxist-
oriented South Yemen.
Zayid is restrained by the Saudis from follow-
ing through on some of his bolder foreign policy
initiatives. During the past few years, Zayid has
made tentative moves to accede to Soviet requests
for a diplomatic exchange, but each time he has
been dissuaded, almost certainly by protestation
from Riyadh. Concern about offending King Faysal
also has prompted Zayid to move cautiously in his
efforts to cultivate Iraq.
UAE-Saudi relations improved considerably last
summer when the two sides resolved their territorial
dispute and Saudi Arabia belatedly recognized the
federation. Although relations continue to be
generally friendly, the UAE resents Saudi Arabia's
habit of criticizing some UAE domestic policies.
The Saudis, for instance, find fault with Zayid's
dependence on a number of foreign Arab advisers,
including some Iraqis, to help him formulate policy
on oil matters and foreign affairs. In the opinion
of the embassy, there is some danger the Saudis may
overplay their hand and jeopardize their position
in the UAE by offending the ruling elite's national-
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Mozambique-China
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Seeking New Support
A delegation representing the Front for the
Liberation of Mozambique--the nationalist group that
dominates the territory's transitional government--
was set to depart yesterday on an extended aid-seek-
ing mission to China and North Korea. One major
objective of the delegation, which is headed by
Front President Samora Machel, is to obtain increased
military assistance from Peking, one of the Front's
principal suppliers during the long insurgency
against Portugal.
I IMachel hopes
to arrange an expanded inese training program that
will assist the Front, to change over from a guerrilla
to a conventional military force. Machel is anxious
for the Front's troops to make a favorable impres-
sion when attention is focused on the country at
the time of independence in June.
Machel reportedly discussed his military aid
requirements with officials of the Chinese embassy
in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, earlier this month. The
Chinese are said to have agreed to provide anti-
aircraft and artillery weapons sometime before
independence. They also reportedly agreed to aug-
ment their instructional team at the Front's main
training camp in southern Tanzania and to provide
officer training in China.
Now that the Front, for practical purposes, is
in power in Mozambique,for.eign military assistance
is likely to be delivered directly to the terri-
tory rather than through Tanzania as was the case
during the insurgency. Last month, the Soviets de-
livered a shipment of small arms and ammunition at
the port of Beira. The Chinese probably will follow
suit.
Feb 19, 1975 4
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