WESTERN EUROPE CANADA INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000600150001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 21, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
No Foreign Dissem
Western Europe
Canada
International Organizations
Secret
No. 0158-75
March 21, 1975
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BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
? 513 (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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WESTERN EUROPE - CANADA - INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with
occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
Ankara Will Delay Retaliation Against
the US . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Controversy Jeopardizes Canadian Sale of
Nuclear Reactor to Argentina . . . . . . . . 4
Foreign Policy Debates in Denmark and Sweden . 5
British Prime Minister Wilson Faces Hurdles
Before EC Referendum . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Soviet Proposal May Bring Progress on
:Important CSCE Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Ban on Church-sponsored Rally in Madrid
Strains Church-State Relations . . . . . . 11
March 21, 1975
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Ankara Will Delay Retaliation Against the US
Ankara reportedly will delay
for at least another month any retaliation
for the halt in US military assistance,
but pressures are growing for at least
a token gesture against the US.
As a result of Secretary Kissinger's
visit to Ankara in mid-March, Foreign
Minister Esenbel is reportedly hopeful
that some steps will be taken to restore
the aid program by the end of April.
Esenbel does not believe thay any
action will be taken against US military
installations before that time, according
t
Undoubtedly intending to impress
the US with the gravity of the situation
and exert pressure for a restoration
of aid, Esenbel took a similar line
in a conversation with Ambassador Macomber
on March 19. He said he was deeply
disturbed by the postponement of any
congressional legislation to restore
US military assistance to Turkey.
He tried to correct what he said was
a false impression that Turkey was
being "softened up" and that the danger
of retaliation against the US was
passing. The Foreign Minister emphasized
that the only reason retaliation had
not been taken in recent days was
the confidence the Turkish leadership
had in US assurances that the cutoff
legislation would be reversed.
March 21, 1975
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Esenbel said that Former Prime Minister
Ecevit had warned that the US government
was becoming too complacent and recommended
closing a US installation and moving against
it. Esenbel said that he had resisted
the suggestion but is convinced that the
forces favoring such retaliation cannot
be held off much longer.
The Turkish General Staff, although
concerned and angered by the arms embargo,
had decided against closing down US bases
as a response.
that the decision was mace at a meeting
of the General Staff on March 14, at which
the recent visit of Secretary Kissinger
to Ankara was reviewed. The senior officers--
and President Koruturk--reportedly remain
fundamentally opposed to the expulsion
of the US bases or the withdrawal of Turkey
from NATO. The Staff is aware that its
short-term problems of acquiring critical
spare parts and its longer-term plans
for modernization of the Turkish armed
forces cannot be met by any other source
but the US. Even though West German military
aid is about to be restored, it is viewed
as insufficient.
that the Turkish government wi ac on
the basis of the decisions of the Turkish
General Staff and the President, not the
public statements of either the Foreign
Minister or the Prime Minister, both of
whom have hinted at retaliation.
The press, meanwhile, continues to
play up stories that some installations
will be closed temporarily pending a resumption
of US aid. Prime Minister Irmak is quoted
as stating that "after waiting for one
month, we will put into effect the measures
we are going to take." He is also quoted
as stating, "if US aid is not resumed,
a review of our participation in NATO
will be a definite necessity."
March 21, 1975
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Such public statements may be intended
for domestic consumption and designed
to put pressure on the US. Ambassador
Macomber notes that the US might have
a bit more time now that prospects are
somewhat brighter for a new government
being formed in Ankara. (Secret No Foreign
Dissem/ Background Use Only)
March 21, 1975
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Controversy Jeopardizes Canadian Sale of
Nuclear Reactor to Argentina
Canada's sale of a nuclear power reactor
to Argentina is threatened by a dispute over
additional safeguard arrangements.
The deadlock in the negotiations reportedly
developed because of Ottawa's insistence that
strict safeguards be applied to the technology
Canada will furnish Argentina, along with the
reactor and the natural uranium to fuel it.
In addition to the safeguards provided
for by the International Atomic Energy Agency,
Argentina is said to be willing to accept special
safeguards on the equipment and material that
Canada proposes to sell. The Peron government,
however, is resisting Canadian efforts to put
safeguards on all nuclear material Argentina
subsequently processes---even material from other
sources--as long as Canadian technology is used.
The policy struggle in Ottawa over safeguards
versus reactor sales was highlighted by the
recent statement reportedly made by an official
of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, a governmental
corporation charged with marketing nuclear reactors,
technology and materials abroad. The official
reportedly said that overreaction by Canadian
politicians to the 1974 Indian explosion of
a nuclear device--which used material from a
Canadian-supplied reactor--has made it all but
impossible to sell Canadian nuclear products.
(Secret No Foreign 'Dissem/Controlled Dissem)
March 21, 1975
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Foreign Policy Debates in Denmark and Sweden
Annual foreign policy debates held in Den-
mark and Sweden on March 18 and 19 respectively
did. not produce any dramatic surprises.
The Danish debate provided the first
glimpse of the new Social Democratic govern-
ment's foreign policy. Foreign Minister
Andersen's presentation reaffirmed the
traditional tenets of Danish foreign policy--
the commitment to NATO, membership in the
EC and in the UN.
Deviations from the traditional line
were evident in Andersen's treatment of
Indochina policy and the Danish relationship
with the EC. Andersen said that Denmark
intends to expand contacts with all parties
involved in the Indochina conflict including
the PRG, and support observer status for the
PRG in international forums. The Danish
government may increase contacts between
Foreign Ministry officials and PRG infor-
mation officers, but probably will not
duplicate French and Swedish moves to
increase the status of PRG information
offices in Paris and Stockholm.
Andersen emphasized political coopera-
tion among EC countries, which until now has
taken a back seat to economic cooperation.
In fact, the Danish government has actively
opposed political union in the past.
The Swedish foreign policy statement
did. not address the current controversy over
Swedish neutrality although it was given some
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exposure in the debate that followed. The
Soviet Union, Finland, and some Swedish
leftists have criticized the government for
joining the International Energy Agency and
for Swedish participation in the competition
for replacement of the F-104, which they
claim are violations of Swedish neutrality.
In the rather lackluster debate, the government
reiterated its claim that neither action is
a violation of Sweden's "active neutrality"
and that the strict application of neutrality
demands case by case decisions. (Confidential)
March 21, 1975
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British Prime Minister Wilson Faces Hurdles
Before EC Referendum
Anti-EC sentiment within the Labor Party
will test Prime Minister Wilson's ability to
hold his party together and convince the electorate
to vote to stay in the EC.
Wilson recently has suffered several setbacks
to the scenario he appears to have developed
for the campaign leading to the EC referendum
scheduled for late June. Earlier this week,
seven of the 23 ministers in his cabinet voted
against having the government recommend that
Britain stay in the EC.
This show of strength, along with the
attempt by Wilson to establish rules of conduct
for cabinet members during the campaign, apparently
encouraged the dissenting cabinet officials
to rally opposition to the government's recommendation.
Their motion already has been signed by 140
members of the Labor party's members in parliament,
including two dozen ministers and whips, and
a majority of Labor members is expected to
sign the motion eventually. Despite the opposition
of these Laborites, the government with the
help of the Tories and Liberals should be able
to secure passage of legislation providing
for the referendum.
The next hurdle--and perhaps the most
important one--faces Wilson next week when
the leftist-dominated National Executive Committee
of the Labor party meets to discuss its pre-
referendum strategy. Well over half of the
committee's 29 members are sponsoring a motion
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that would recommend to the special Labor Party
conference scheduled for mi.d-May--but which
will probably be held earlier--that the party
campaign for Britain's withdrawal from the
EC. Although Wilson. has beenataare that the
executive committee and the Labor Party itself
are opposed to EC membership, he was hopeful
that the party conference would refrain from
taking a stand for or against.
Although Wilson had little choice but
to renegotiate Britain's terms of membership
in the EC and to hold the referendum if he
hoped to hold the Labor Party together, he
was well aware that, such a scenario was risky.
Over the next few weeks he and other respected
cabinet moderates, such as Callaghan and Healey,
undoubtedly will try to convince conference
members not to support the executive committee's
motion. If they fail, and if the electorate
opts to pull out of the EC against Wilson's
advice, there may be calls for Wilson's resignation.
There are, however, no other Labor Party leaders
with Wilson's ability capable of working with
both wings of the party. (Confidential No
Foreign Dissem)
March 21, 1975
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'S'oviet P'roposa'l May Bring Progress on
I'mpo'rtant' 'S'CE' I's'sue
A new Soviet proposal may provide the
basis for a compromise on the prior notifica-
tion of military maneuvers, perhaps the most
troublesome issue remaining at the European
security conference.
The Soviets have consistently resisted
the desire of some West Europeans and neutrals
to give CSCE a military content. Although
several military "confidence-building measures"
were put on the agenda, only the one dealing
with the prior notification of military maneu-
vers has seemed to have a chance of emerging
in a form that would have much practical effect.
The Soviets have staunchly resisted a measure
that would apply to military movements not assoc-
iated with maneuvers, and the West no longer
seems inclined to insist. The two confidence-
building measures that have already been approved
are minor, dealing with exchange visits of
military personnel and bilateral and voluntary
exchanges of observers at maneuvers.
The Soviet delegation chief and other
Soviet representatives in Geneva have said with-
in the last week that they could accept prior
notification of both national and multinational
maneuvers to all CSCE participants, providing
the notification is given "on a voluntary basis."
The Soviets have added that even though the
measure would be voluntary, they would feel them-
selves under a "moral and political obligation"
to comply. They have hinted that if the West
would agree to make the measure voluntary,
Moscow would be willing to make its provisions
more specific.
March 21, 1975
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Western delegates have reacted to the
Soviet proposal positively but cautiously.
They welcome the willingness to include
national as well as multinational maneuvers
and to notify all. CSCE participants. Many of
them even seem inclined to agree to make the
measure voluntary if the area to be covered
and the size of maneuvers that will require
notification can be made more specific. Most
of the Western delegates are now awaiting
instructions from their governments.
Even though the West may eventually go
along with the Soviet proposal, some of the
delegates in Geneva are well aware that making
the measure voluntary could make it meaningless.
The Dutch representative thought that such a
measure would represent nothing more than "what
we could have done if we stayed home." The Cana-
dian representative asked why, if the Soviets
do not intend to withhold notification, they
wish to make the measure voluntary. The West
German representative requested that the Soviets
agree to make explicit the point that the meas-
ure would be "morally and politically binding."
The neutral participants were more critical
of the new Soviet. approach, but even they seemed
ready to try to strike a compromise. Only the
Romanian representative flatly rejected the
Soviet proposal and threatened to hold up the
work of the conference if the Soviets are not
more forthcoming. (Confidential No Foreign
Dissem)
March 21, 1975
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25X1A
Ban on Church-sponsored Rally in Madrid
Strains Church-State Relations
The cancellation by the security police of
a church-sponsored assembly last weekend has
prompted protests from some priests and laity,
who may try to defy the government's ban tomorrow.
The long-planned assembly was to have
brought together some 1,500 clergy and laity
on the weekends of March 15-16 and 22-23, with
Cardinal Tarancon, head of the Spanish Bishops,
presiding. The police justified the "suspension"
with a statement that some extremist political
elements planned to use the meetings to promote
hostile reactions against the government.
Police concern may have had some basis in
fact. A priest involved in the assembly preparations
told a US embassy officer that a substantial number
of leftist priests and laity had proposed to use
the conference to criticize the government's
suppression of human rights in Spain. The source
claimed, however, that no altercation would have
occurred, as a primary interest of the participants
was to avoid giving the government an excuse
to intervene.
The cancellation prompted various protest
actions, including a refusal by priests to say
mass in some 24 Madrid parishes last Sunday,
and a protest by the National Commission on Justice
and Peace, headed by Christian Democratic leader
Ruiz Gimenez.
Cardinal Tarancon's reaction was unexpectedly
mild, criticizing the government actions but
also taking the priests to task for failing to
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carry out their clerical duties. Activist
priests are increasingly disillusioned with
Cardinal Tarancon's leadership and are threatening
to try to hold the aborted assembly with or
without the Cardinal.
The cancellation follows several recent
church criticisms of the Franco regime that
have strained relations, including a petition
calling for the release of political prisoners.
Church-state relations will be strained even
further if the ban on the assembly is defied
or if the government overreacts to the Cardinal's
relatively mild criticism. (Confidential)
March 21, 1975
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