SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000600180002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 24, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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CONTENTS
March 24, 1975
Sino--Soviet Border Talks Remain Stalled. . . . . . 1
Hungarian Party Congress Results . . . . . . . . . 2
Soviet Cultural
Policy Still Ambivalent . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
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Sino-Soviet Border Talks Remain Stalled
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The Sino-Soviet border negotiations evidently
have made no progress since the return of chief
Soviet negotiator Ilichev to Peking in mid-February
as both sides adhere to their past positions. Ac-
cording to the Soviet counselor in Peking, the
major obstacle to progress continues to be the
Chinese demand that the USSR remove its forces
from those areas designated as disputed by Peking.
Since the border talks began in 1969, Peking
has demanded that the USSR remove its forces from
areas contiguous to the so-called disputed regions.
Peking has insisted that Soviet forces withdraw
some distance from several areas, including a
large segment in the Pamir Mountains bordering on
southwestern Sinkiang and, apparently, at least
one small tract of land bordering on northern
Manchuria. Although Moscow has offered to turn
over more than 400 of the border river islands,
.Peking has rejected this offer and still considers
many river islands to be part of the disputed ter-
ritories.
Moscow has consistently rejected this pre-
condition to formal negotiations, regarding it
as, in Brezhnev's words, "absolutely unacceptable."
Moscow evidently sees no prospects for progress
in the border talks until this condition is re-
moved, or at least drastically modified. In the
meantime, the talks continue, according to the
Soviet counselor, on a twice-weekly basis as both
sides exchange drafts dealing with minor points
March 24, 1975
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Hungarian Party Congress Results
The Hungarian party Congress ended on Satur-
day with an enthusiastic endorsement of Kadar's,
continued leadership.
Personnel shifts in the Politburo show the
"moderates" losing ground, but the relative politi-
cal'inexperience of the newcomers could mean they
will be more responsive to Kadar's lead in the
short run. Lajos Fe.her and Rezso Nyers, the advo-
cates of economic reform who had suffered career
setbacks a year ago, were removed from the Polit-
buro. Only one conservative, Gyula Kallai, was
ousted.
Gyorgy Aczel, a close adviser to Kadar and a
moderate on cultural policies, lost political
ground last year, but he was retained on the Polit-
buro. Aczel's protege, Miklos Ovari, the party sec-
retary for cultural affairs, was one of four new-
comers to the body. Ovari, who reportedly has a
strong interest in Italian and French literature,
has been described as a passive man, reluctant to
take the initiative.
The other newcomers to the leadership presum-
ably were selected more because of their involvement
in key policy areas than because of their political
leanings. Gyorgy Lazar is chief of the planning
office and deputy premier in charge of Hungary's.
CEMA account; Lajos Marothy heads the Communist
youth organization; and Istvan Sarlos is leader of
the People's Front. The selection of Marothy, who
is in his early 30s, underscores Budapest's concern
with its youth problem. Lazar reportedly is a tal-
ented economist, highly regarded by departed Polit-
buro member Nyers, and not inclined toward politics.
March 24, 1975
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One apparent loser in the changes is party sec-
retary Arpad Pullai, who is responsible for party
and mass organizations and has been active in for-
eign affairs. He gave up the foreign affairs ac-
count: to new party secretary, Andras Gyenes, and
now that the heads of two mass organizations are on
the Politburo, his other responsibilities are also
circumscribed.
Speeches during the Congress reiterated Buda-
pest's moderate policies, but left little doubt that
the regime is still committed to improving central
economic controls and to increasing attention to
ideology in the media and culture. The personnel
changes suggest that orthodoxy will be especiall
strong in the economic sphere.
March. 24, 1975
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Soviet Cultural Policy Still Ambivalent
The unsettled atmosphere in cultural affairs
noted by Western observers since the turn of the
year is persisting, with no sign that a resolution
is near (Staff Notes, March 14).
A Soviet artist, who is a member of the es-
tablishment with close ties to the unofficial art
community, has told the US embassy that an unnamed
official of the CPSU Central Committee Culture
Department recently approached the unconventional
artists "on a personal basis" with a plea that the
group mitigate its demands and keep a low profile.
The official reportedly said that candidate Po-
litburo member and culture minister Demichev has
plans for "gradual liberalization" of culture,
that Demichev has met with strong opposition from
doctrinaire elements in the party leadership and
in the artistic unions, and that the unofficial
artists should, therefore, "go slow" lest their
activity prove counterproductive.
According to the source, the artists feel that
the Soviet could be using a ploy to make them give
up plans for a comprehensive exhibit of their
works--now reportedly postponed until April--but
that there was a "fifty-fifty" chance that the
plea was genuine. They think that while Demichev
is slightly more "liberally" inclined than his pred-
ecessor in the culture ministry, the prospects for
his "gradual liberalization" plan--if, indeed, it
exists--are poor. The artists are split on whether
to be conciliatory or adamant, but the majority
apparently believes that they must persevere in
their demands for recognition, in their use of the
Western press to publicize their cause, and in their
probing of the regime's intentions (Staff Notes,
March 20).
March 24, 1975
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In the most recent example of bold initiatives
to test the cultural waters, Leningrad's unconven-
tional. artists have petitioned the authorities to
form an officially recognized "society" of avant-
garde painters. By staying within Soviet legal.
.boundaries, the organization could become a vehi-
cle which the regime could use to channel the
activities of both the unofficial artists and those
members of the official artists unions whose un-
conventional works cannot now be officially ex-
hibited.
These developments will probably encourage
further division within the artists' ranks on what
tactics to pursue, and add to speculation about the
future course of cultural policy. There have been
abundant signs of a pragmatic loosening in cultural
affairs since Demichev's assumption of the culture
ministry, but it is premature to view them as evi-
dence of any plans for "gradual liberalization."
The official public line on cultural conformity has
been harder than ever, perhaps reflecting the party's
perception of an unsettled situation that stems in
part from the leadership's failure to fill the vac-
uum left by Demichev's removal as party secretary
for propaganda, culture, and party indoctrination.
The apparent flux and indecision in cultural,
and possibly wider ideological, policy does not
necessarily point to a struggle in the leadership
over "liberalization." It is possible, however,
that there are differences of approach and emphasis.
Demichev may see some advantages to taking a more
enlightened, albeit institutional, approach to the
issue of cultural nonconformism, while other leaders
may wish to stand pat so as to avoid showing any
signs of public compromise with the West on the
ideological front.
March. 24, 1975
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Soviet-Gambian Relations
Gambian President Jawara has just concluded a
long-planned but twice-postponed visit to the So-
viet Union. He received high-level treatment, in-
cluding meetings with Prime Minister Kosygin, Pres-
ident Podgorny, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR
Council of Ministers Mazurov, and Minister of Fish-
eries Ishkov.
A fishing agreement between the Soviet Union
and the Gambian government was signed on March 18,
I'The delegation's chance
ot succeeding may have improved with the conclusion
of the fishing accord.
March 24, 1975
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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