LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000600230001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 26, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Latin American Trends
State Department review completed
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126
March 26, 1975
No. 0502/75
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
March 26, 1975
Cuba: Castro and the Nonaligned .
Controversy Jeopardizes Canadian
Sale of Nuclear Reactor to
Argentina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Chile: Altamirano Reinterprets
the UP's Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Colombia: Church, State, and
Political orthodoxy . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Ecuador: Subtle Change in the
Ball Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
ICFTU's Latin American Regional
Organization May be Restructured . . . . . 16
Trinidad-Tobago: Labor Problems
Easing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Panama: The People's Party -
A Party in Limbo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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Cuba: Castro and the Nonaligned
Havana sees serious problems arising in the
nonaligned movement, judging from the speeches of
the Cubans who addressed the meeting of the move-
ment's coordinating bureau in Havana last week.
Although the Cuban spokesmen voiced their criticism
of unnamed members of the movement in tactful terms,
it is clear that the Castro regime is disillusioned
and may even be reconsidering its participation in
the movement.
Fidel Castro's speech at the final session of
the conference on March 19 closely paralleled Foreign
Minister Roa's at the opening session two days earlier.
This suggests that in the interim little was accom-
plished in solving what the Cubans perceive to be one
of the movement's most pressing problems: the damage
being done to its unity by the failure of the oil-
producing members to use their recent profits to as-
sist the nonproducers. Both Castro and Roa diplo-
matically underscored the "unavoidable duty" of the
countries "which have at hand financial surpluses as
a result of their oil incomes" to alleviate the
economic situation in which the underdeveloped coun-
tries now find themselves. Although the two Cuban
speakers condemned "imperialism's" use of this very
issue to disrupt nonaligned unity, they nonetheless
acknowledged by their remarks the validity of the
concept obligating the oil producers.
The issue is a particularly sensitive one for
Castro :because the health of the Cuban economy is
linked so closely to the flow of oil from foreign
sources. Havana imports over 95 percent of its oil,
mostly from the USSR. What especially galls Castro
is the oil producers' reinvestment of profits in the
US and West Europe; he called strongly for a redirec-
tion of these funds to the underdeveloped world in
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the form of credits for development projects. He
warned that "to the extent that surplus funds are
invested in the developed capitalist world, the oil
countries' interests inevitably will be identified
with the interests of imperialism" and--perhaps re-
calling his own confiscation of foreign holdings--the
funds themselves will become "the hostages of impe-
rialism."
Castro also warned that "some oil countries, the
weakest demographically and militarily, are seriously
threatened by an imperialist aggression." He charged
the US with training troops for military actions in
the desert and cautioned the oil producers not to rule
out US military intervention undertaken in desperation.
Although this appears to be mainly a useful propaganda
line, it probably reflects a. genuine concern of the
Cuban leadership that the US might resort to military
action to ensure its oil supply.
The focusing of so much attention on the responsi-
bility of the oil producers to aid their less fortunate
neighbors indicates that Havana has no intention of
sweeping the issue under the rug. Castro may view the
oil producers' wealth as a potential significant alter-
native to continued heavy economic dependence on the
USSR, and he may interpret the failure of the oil pro-
ducers to heed his call for aid as a sign that a door
is being closed on an important opportunity for his
regime. He has not given up hope altogether, however,
and undoubtedly will continue to press the issue when
the nonaligned meet in Peru later this year.
The US was given rather light treatment in Castro's
address. In view of the audience, he could have used the
event to direct a barrage of barbs and brickbats toward
Washington. His failure to do so may have been caused
by his desire to avoid distracting attention from his
main theme--criticism of the nonaligned oil producers
--but he may also have chosen to moderate his speech in
deference to Secretary Kissinger's remarks in Houston
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on March 1. Castro does not want to appear to be eager
to move toward reconciliation with the US but he clear-
lv does not want to torpedo the idea altogether.
NOTE: The item in the March 12, Z975 issue of the
Trends, "SA-3s for Cuba?" should be classified
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Controversy Jeopardizes Canadian Sale of Nuclear
Reactor to Argentina
Canada's sale of a nuclear power reactor to
Argentina is threatened by a dispute over addition-
al safeguard arrangements.
The deadlock in the negotiations reportedly
developed because of Ottawa's insistence that strict
safeguards be applied to the technology Canada will
furnish Argentina, along with the reactor and the
natural uranium to fuel it.
In addition to the safeguards provided for by
the international Atomic Energy Agency, Argentina
is said to be willing to accept special safeguards
on the equipment and material that Canada proposes
to sell. The Peron government, however, is resist-
ing Canadian efforts to put safeguards on all nuclear
material Argentina subsequently processes--even mate-
rial from other sources--as long as Canadian technology
is used.
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Chile: Altamirano Reinterprets The UP's Failure
On September 9, 1973, two days before the over-
throw of the popular unity (UP) government by the
armed forces, Socialist firebrand Carlos Altamirand
told a party rally that "the plotters are not van-
quished with words, but with the workers' strength,
the communal commandos, and the industrial cordons."
Party members responded with shouts of "fight, fight,
enough conciliation." They apparently took Altamirano
seriously, and it cost some of them their lives. The
party suffered devastating damage in the overthrow;
since then it has made only minimal progress toward
recovery.
Altamirano, however, managed to evade military
and police patrols and flee the country. He surfaced
in Havana in January 1974 and has since travelled ex-
tensively--mostly in Communist and third world coun-
tries--explaining what went wrong in Chile and trying
to unite exiled opponents of the military government.
In recent remarks his explanation of why the popular
unity coalition failed has changed significantly.
Altamirano's original thesis was that the UP's
defeat was caused by its unwillingness to use force
against its enemies. A year ago, for example, he
told an Italian newspaper that "the UP's choice of
the political-institutional method...ought never to
have meant renunciation of the possibility of armed
action." Speaking to an Italian Socialist Party rally
"for a free Chile" two weeks ago, however, Altamirano
cited the UP's failure to broaden the coalition--a
move his Socialist faction opposed at the time--as a
serious mistake. He also voiced regret over his
party's failure to remember the lessons that Lenin
taught in his State and Revolution and Extremism,
the Infantile Disease of Communism.
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Lenin's works on the aberrations of embryonic
revolutionary movements counseled pragmatism, com-
promise, recognition of the limits of one's own
strength, and care in the use of rhetoric lest it
provoke enemies before one is ready to deal with
them. According to Lenin, allies are to be sought,
used, and discarded on a strictly opportunistic
basis, since the revolutionary party's ideological
purity is not jeopardized as long as it keeps its
ultimate goals clearly in mind.
Marxists who repent ignoring Lenin's teachings
are often really saying they are sorry for not having
heeded Moscow's advice. Altamirano's latest visit to
the Soviet Union was in February, and his references
to Lenin could mean that he is seeking Moscow's en-
dorsement as de facto leader of the Chilean left in
exile. There are however, other explanations for his
new line. These include: the fact that Altamirano's
extremist image has hurt his standing among the exiles,
most of whom regard armed struggle as an unviable
strategy; the decimation of the violence-oriented Move-
ment of the Revolutionary Left by government security
forces; and the fact that Socialists, both in Chile
and in exile, are beginning to rally around Clodomiro
Almeyda, the recently released and exiled former foreign
minister and leader of the Socialist party's moderate
wing.
CORRECTION
Chi : Changes in the Army Hierarchy (March 19 Trends)
General Augusto Lutz is deceased and should not
have appeared on the top ten list. General Carrasco
should have been listed as CO, V Army Division.
Generals Palacios, Carrasco, and Toro should each be
moved up a notch. General Nilo Floody--CO, III Army
Division, Concepcion--is the tenth ranking general.
General Garay is number eleven in the hierarchy.
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Colombia: Church, State, And Political Orthodoxy
On two occasions since his inauguration last
August, President Lopez has challenged the Catholic
Church and lost. One of the principal platforms of
his campaign for office had been the introduction of
civil marriage and, by implication, divorce. One of
the first bills he sent to the congress was a draft
law to recognize civil marriage. Despite Lopez'
two-to-one election. victory and his party's virtually
total control of the congress, the legislators quiet-
ly shelved the bill.
More recently, the President appointed a 29-year-
old divorcee to the governorship of tiny Risaralda
Department. This provoked an immediate protest from
two Risaralda bishops that the appointment was "of-
fensive to Christian: sentiment." Other members of
the Colombian church hierarchy and spokesmen for
other conservative groups added their criticism.
Lopez attempted to stand by his nominee by refusing
to accept her withdrawal. Last week, however, she
definitively fled from the spotlight, arguing that
the controversy was disrupting her private life.
Lopez's apparent inability to introduce reforms
that fly in the face of church tradition--perhaps
even his lack of total commitment to such retorms--tends
to substantiate a recurrent claim made by political
outsiders in Colombia. They argue that the Liberal and
Conservative parties, represent the country's political
main line, that they are virtually indistinguishable
from one another in their essential conservatism, and
that no outside group can hope for more than a wafer-
thin slice of the political pie.
In the case of policies and appointments that are
essentially anti-church, it is likely that Lopez is
considerably more liberal than the main line. But the
rest of his party is not, and Lopez undoubtedly has
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:known that all along--just as he could probably have
,predicted the outcome of the civil marriage bill and
the disputed gubernatorial nomination. Perhaps this
is Lopez' gesture to the many student, youth, and
women's organizations that worked. diligently for his
election.
A. readership poll conducted by Bogota's liberal
El Tiempo showed 71 percent against the church's
stand in the governorship controversy. Official and
private statistics show a decline in church weddings
and attendance in general. Increasing numbers of
Colombians are traveling to other jurisdictions (the
nearest being Ecuador), where civil marriage is legal.
Nevertheless, the Liberal-Conservative establishment
remains disinclined to take on the church in Colombia,
and again invites, as it did during 16 years of lack-
luster coalition government, antiestablishmentarian
competition. It is difficult to imagine what more
Lopez could do to shore up the collapsing political
edifice of Colombia's populist third-party leader,
Maria Eugenia Rojas de Moreno. F7
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Ecuador: Subtle Change in the Ball Game
The civilian opposition to President Rodriguez'
military government :Loosed a surprisingly strong
media salvo last week. This is the first to be heard
from anti-government forces since the coup attempt
by General Galo Latorre fizzled on March 11. It is
also the first significant press attack on the three-
year-old regime.
Respected editorialists Julio Prado and Benjamin
Ortiz, among others, zeroed in on events surrounding
Rodriguez' recent trip to Algeria, Romania, and
Venezuela. They were particularly incensed about the
closing of schools and public offices on the day of
Rodriguez' return to the country, and the encourage-
ment of students and civil servants to welcome the
President home with a grand waving of small flags
(thoughtfully provided by the government). The col-
umnists found only slightly less onerous Rodriguez'
promotion to major general in absentia, and the in-
explicable budgeting of $600,000 for the 10-day jour-
ney.
The initial furor regarding the "spontaneous"
demonstration marking Rodriguez' triumphant return
home is likely to fade in time in comparison with
the promotion and budget issues. The latter appears
to be a very cautious suggestion of corruption in high
office--a charge heard often in Ecuador, but not yet
leveled at the present government. The promotion issue
will probably be the longest-lived, however.
Responding to the media attack, particularly that
of columnist Prado, the minister of defense took half-
page advertisements in most of the country's dailies
defending his promotion of Rodriguez and rather reck-
lessly challenging the critics to a debate. Prado
immediately accepted, insisting that the public inter-
est would best be served by televising the event and
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laying down no ground rules. Now, of course, if there
is no debate, the opposition can refer ad infinitum
to the exchange. On the other hand, if there is a de-
bate, the defense minister is likely to fare poorly.
Although the coup attempt earlier this month never
got off the ground, it evidently was a significant turn-
ing point in what passes for politics in Ecuador these
days. This is not likely to inspire the military to
return the government to civilian hands. It may, how-
ever, :Fuel the growing sentiment within the armed forces
that Rodriguez should step down and another officer, un-
doubtedly from the army, should try his hand.
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ICFTU's Latin American Regional Organization May
be Restructured
An International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (ICFTU) delegation composed of the organiza-
tion's President, Secretary General and top offi-
cials of the Mexican and certain West European af-
filiates--are winding up a two-week "special mission"
to Latin America. The main purpose of the trip is
to discuss the policies and future of ICFTU's Inter-
american Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT)
with Latin American affiliates.
ORIT has been in a deep crisis for some time as
a result of financial and administrative problems
coupled with widespread member dissatisfaction over
the organization's policies and general ineffective-
ness. In particular, there are sharp differences
between ICFTU and ORIT regarding Chile. Various
European trade union leaders believe that ORIT has
shown insufficient concern over the coup and subse-
quent developments. There has been considerable pres-
sure on ICFTU to either reorganize or disband ORIT
and the leaders of the Mexican, Colombia, Venezuelan,
and Argentine affiliates agreed last December to
work toward the creation of a new regional organiza-
tion.
During their visit to Caracas, the ICFTU dele-
gation held substantive talks with local trade un-
ionists and a consensus was reached that the Latin
American democratic trade union movement badly needs
restructuring in order to give it a new impetus. To
this end, it was agreed that representatives of the
key ORIT labor cent:rals---Canada, Mexico, Colombia,
Venezuela, and the US--would get together before the
ICFTU World Congress in Mexico in October in order
to discuss what form the hemispheric organization
should take. It was implicit during the discussion
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that the end result of this process might be a sim-
ple reform of ORIT, and a replacement of its present
leadership, rather than the creation of an entirely
new organization.
The Venezuelans had been in the forefront of
those pushing for a new organization and their readi-
ness to retain the ORIT structure may result from the
fact that the Mexicans have paid up their back dues
and an expectation that a Venezuelan would take over
the Secretary Generalship as a part of a prospective
reorganization.
ICFTU and the Venezuelans also agreed that it is
essential that the AFL-CIO and the Canadian union
organization should continue to participate in the
hemisphere labor organization.
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Trinidad-Tobago: Labor Problems Easing
Both the government and the three unions whose
strikes almost completely paralyzed the sugar and
oil industries have taken steps to defuse the situa-
tion. The government has agreed to meet one of the
oilworkers' demands, although the important wage
issue remains unresolved. In return, the oil work-
ers permitted deliveries of fuel and gasoline to
service stations other than Texaco--with which they
are engaged in a contract dispute---in order to ease
the severe shortage.
On Saturday, Governor General Sir Ellis Clarke
held an unannounced meeting with leaders of the three
unions,and both sides apparently were pleased at the
results. Prime Minister Eric Williams seems deter-
mined not to get personally involved in the dispute.
While he thus avoids risking his own prestige, the
unions may end up with far more benefits than they
would have if he had taken the case for not meeting
all labor's demands to the people.
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Panama: The People's Party - A Party in Limbo
Panama's Communist party--the People's Party
--is the only political organismion that has been
allowed to function under the Torrljos government.
For this reason it is worth attention, despite
having only a few hundred members and a lackluster
political track record. The Latin American Trends
offers a synopsis of a recent asseosment of the
party by US Embassy political officer Robert Homme.
Since its founding in 1943, the People's Party
has had only modest influence and even less popular
appeal. Panamanian politics has been more a chron-
icle of personalities than of ideologies, dominated
by political parties designed primarily to serve as
the personal vehicles of their leaders. This highly
personalistic system, and the ruling elite's abhor-
rence of communism, precluded active party partici-
pation in Panama's political development. Faced with
these constraints, Communist objectives were--and
largely still are--directed at influencing political
trends rather than winning public office.
The causes at hand were traditional socio-economic
inequalities and resentment over Panama's position in
relation to the United States. This manifestation of
nationalism was shared with all political parties, how-
ever, and the Communists never monopolized the canal
issue.
The party's attempts to exploit the disaffection
of groups suffering from social and economic inequal-
ities led it to concentrate on students, workers, and
the poor. These efforts had only limited success.
Both the rural and urban poor, to the extent they were
susceptible to politics, were drawn instead to the
authoritarian demagoguery and aggressive nationalism
of the charismatic Arnulfo Arias.
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The party, which was outlawed in 1953, did not
benefit from the early surge of Panamanian support
for the Castro revolution. During the canal riots
in 1964, party members were reported to have partici-
pated actively in the disturbances and to have attempt-
ed to organize and lead the anti-American campaign.
Again, however, their success was limited. Nation-
alistic resentment of theCanal Zone and the US pres-
ence there was not a Communist cause alone, and the
government retained control of events.
When the military junta seized power in 1968, the
party, which had been underground since 1953, found
itself in an even worse way. The junta, in the hope
of gaining domestic acceptance and quick US support,
proclaimed itself anti-Communist and, for good measure,
exiled party leaders and jailed sympathizers. Faced
with the unpleasant choice between futile covert op-
position and frustrating inactivity, the party decided
to gamble on Torrijcs. It supported him as a "national
revolutionary" and declared him a "progressive military
leader."
An abortive conservative-backed coup attempted in
December 1969 convinced Torrijos that he needed the
widest possible support, so the following year he made
his deal with the party. Discrimination against party
members was ended, Communists with needed talents and
experience were permitted to work for the government,
party members were allowed to travel abroad, and most
important for the party, it was permitted to operate
as an organization and to compete for leadership
among the public. Torrijos also agreed to approve
selected demonstrations by organizations under Commun-
ist influence or control and to permit some party
publications. In exchange for what amounted to an
exemption from the government's ban on all political
parties, the Communists committed the party to give
active support to the government's actions and policies.
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The party also promised to remain in close touch with
the government and to accept guidance and instructions.
This relationship has continued despite numerous
trials. The party has made good use of its special
status to rebuild its organizational structure, and
has placed over 200 members and sympathizers through-
out the government bureaucracy, particularly in the
ministries of labor, agriculture, and education. The
party regained much of its traditional influence among
students and dominated the principal student organiza-
tion, the Federation of Panamanian Students. Last
year, however, Torrijos pulled many of the party's
student leaders into his own personal camp and thus
gained control of the student federation. In the labor
field, the Communists dominate the National Confedera-
tion of Panamanian Workers. The party also has worked
closely with the government's agrarian reform program
and has gained a substantial following among peasants.
The party's main dilemma is that in order to gain
these advantages, it has become totally dependent on
the good will of Torrijos. When it has attempted to
take advantage of the relationship, the general has
quickly cracked down. He also has a penchant for co-
opting talented and ambitious Communists. Such report-
ed former Communist activists and sympathizers as Labor
Minister Rolando Murgas and Marcelino Jaen, head of the
National Legislative Commission--who is also Torrijos'
brother-in-law--while still clearly holding leftist
views, are to all appearances loyal to Torrijos. They
do not appear to submit to party discipline or hold the
party leadership in much regard.
The party also is in danger of being outflanked on
the left. Small radical student groups, principally
the Revolutionary Student Front, condemn the party's pro-
Torri;jos stance. Peking-line groups, while still min-
uscule, could eventually challenge the party for young
recruits.
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The party's principal opportunity to advance its
participation in Panama's affairs would be a crisis
that forced Torrijos to seek its assistance. It pos-
sesses the ability, under such circumstances, to mar-
shall sizable public demonstrations of support. In
the near term, the issues with most. crisis potential
are the economy and the canal treaty negotiations.
Thus far the Communists have supported him on both
issues. Any government moves against the country's
vested economic interests would win quick Communist
backing, and the party would attempt to push Torrijos
toward greater control of the economy.
Torrijos should have no trouble selling the party
on a "compromise" canal treaty, and it will help him
get the approval of students, labor, peasants, and the
media. Should a new agreement provoke a public back-
lash of major proportions, however, Torrijos may well
find himself losing his captive Communist constituency.
While at present the People's Party is keeping its bets
on Torrijos, should his position ever become untenable,
the party would quickly become yesterday's ally.
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