SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000600280002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 11, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 27, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
State Department review completed
Secret
1.27
March 27, 1975
No. 0082/75
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
March 27, 1975
US-USSR Joint Commercial
Commission To Meet. . . . . . .
Czechoslovak Suggests Mixed Package
of Reductions at MBFR Talks . . . . . . . . . . 2
Soviet Artist Comments
on the Cultural Scene . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Albania Warns of Soviet Meddling. . . . . . . . . 6
East German Politburo Member Dies . . . . . . . . 8
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US-USSR Joint Commercial
Commission To Meet
The US-USSR Joint Commercial Commission will
meet in Moscow on April 10 for the first time since
the demise of the 1972 trade agreement at the turn
of the year. The embassy suggests--and we agree--
that the Soviets will probably be more confident
negotiators on this occasion than previously, act-
ing on the conviction that their bargaining posi-
tion vis-a-vis the US has improved considerably in
recent months.
Moscow will argue that the US is now the chief
beneficiary of bilateral trade, reversing the roles
of earlier sessions in which the Soviets tacitly
recognized that they had more to gain. The embassy
points out that the Soviets see the US as on the
defensive because it failed to deliver on the terms
of the trade agreement. They expect economic re-
cession in the West to spur the US to seek Soviet
orders and anticipate that competition for the So-
viet market from other Western countries will also
stimulate American trade concessions.
Despite what the Soviets may regard as a
stronger bargaining position, they remain keenly
interested in expanded trade with the US. Polit--
icall.y, Moscow values bilateral commercial ties
for their contribution to detente with the US; eco-
nomically, the Soviets continue to regard the US
as the preferred source of most capital goods and
technology.
March 27, 1975
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Czechoslovak Suggests Mixed Package
of Reductions at MBFR Talks
A Czechoslovak representative at the MBFR talks
made a strong pitch last week for a mixed package of
reductions that would include NATO tactical nuclear
weapons and "genuinely asymmetrical" cuts in Warsaw
Pact ground forces.
The Czechoslovak statement, made to
a US delegate, is at odds with the Warsaw Pact s
recent tendency to play down the air and nuclear as-
pects of MBFR. It was too well-rehearsed and detailed,
however, to have been accidental, and it is highly
improbable that the Czechoslovak official was acting
on his own initiative. Most likely, Moscow wanted
to float a trial balloon prior to the recess that
began on March 25. In so dosing, the Soviets may hope
to smoke out Western intentions concerning the in-
clusion of tactical nuclear weapons in subsequent
stages of negotiation.
According to the Czechoslovak. official, air man-
power and aircraft would have to be included in a
package with tactical nuclear weapons. He implied
that NATO might have to take deeper cuts in its air-
craft inventory than the East because of the alleged
superior quality of NATO's planes. On the other
hand, he specified that there could be genuinely
asymmetrical cuts in general forces that would re-
quire greater reductions for the Warsaw Pact than
would be the case if both sides reduced by equal per-
centages. He also :hinted that the Pact would agree
to disproportionately larger cuts in its tank force,
provided again that they were part of a suitable
package.
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The Czechoslovak said that the Warsaw Pact
would find some "indirect way" to handle the sen-
sitive problem of national subceilings, in return
for the West accepting the principle that air and
nuclear forces be included in the reductions.
Data on forces, he said, could be exchanged once
the West had agreed in principle to reduce air and
nuclear elements. The Western position is that
data exchange should be conducted parallel with a
discussion of principles.
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Soviet Artist Comments on the Cultural Scene
Renowned sculptor Ernst Neizvestny
a maverick but officially accepted artist w ose
monument for Khrushchev's grave was unveiled last
September, recently spoke to a US embassy officer
about the current status of Soviet cultural policy.
Neizvestny's remarks revealed that he was aware of
the regime's concern about its image abroad during
a time of detente, and the effect of this concern
on the domestic cultural scene. His views, which
may be shared by other official artists and many
dissidents, are in line with, and add new perspec-
tive to, current speculation about a "gradual lib-
eralization" of cultural policy (Staff Notes,
March 24).
Neizvestny said that the Western press had
"misinterpreted" his plans to leave the country. For
some time, he explained, he has wanted to leave Mos-
cow for a prolonged but not necessarily permanent
stay in the West, preferably in the US. He threat-
ened to emigrate if he did not receive a favorable
decision from the authorities, and then was tenta-
tively offered travel "with a Soviet passport," pro-
viding he signs a pledge not to make "anti-Soviet"
political statements while abroad. So far, he has
refused to sign the pledge, hoping that he can leave
with no strings attached.
Neizvestny said that despite his ouster from
the Artists Union and veiled threats following pub-
licity about his efforts to leave the country, he
has not been harassed. He ascribes his good for-
tune to his many "admirers," particularly those in
the Central Committee apparatus and even in the
leadership. He specifically named his "old friends"
V. V. Zagladin, deputy chief of the Central Commit-
tee's International Department, and V. S. Semenov,
deputy foreign minister. Neizvestny believes that
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candidate Politburo member and culture minister
Demichev also is favorably disposed to his travel
plans, but that Demichev faces opposition from
some in the cultural apparatus who fear problems
with other official artists if Ncizvestny is al-
lowed to leave on his own terms.
Expanding on the theme of the interplay of
domestic and foreign policy during detente, Nei-
zvestny said that the Central Committee's Interna-
tional, Department and some parts of its Cultural
Department--which share responsibility for foreign
cultural relations--tend to be "reasonable" in cul-
tural affairs, since one of their tasks is to avoid
tarring the Soviet image abroad. On the other hand,
those in the cultural bureaucracy and elsewhere in
the party apparatus who are responsible for internal
controls tend to ignore foreign policy considerations.
Neizvestny felt that at present the "reasonable" ele-
ments with international responsibilities and insight
had a slight advantage because of Soviet detente
policy.
Neizvestny believes that this functional rela-
tionship between the outward- and inward-oriented ele-
ments within the apparatus sheds more light on the
persistent ambivalence in cultural policy--and on the
current talk of "gradual liberalization"--than does
any attempt to assess the relative weight of "lib-
erals" and "conservatives" within the leadership.
For example, Neizvestny said that Demichev, who is
"no liberal," has responsibilities relating to for-
eign cultural contacts that make him sensitive to
foreign policy considerations. This, in turn, may be
influencing Demichev to steer a more flexible course
even on strictly internal cultural matters.
March 27, 1975
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Albania Warns of Soviet Meddling
Tirana has published an article strongly hint-
ing that Moscow has recently tried to suborn un-
specified individuals in the Albanian party's
leadership, possibly including ousted defense
minister Balluku.
The article, which appears in the current is-
sue of the Albanian party journal, was written by
Fiquet Shehu, a member of the Central Committee
and the wife of Premier and Defense Minister Mehmet
Shehu. Mrs. Shehu lashes out against foreign ene-
mies (read, Moscow) that attempt to undermine Al-
bania from within. Now that it is no longer easy
for them to operate openly, she writes, these ene-
mies are using "our own people, people who hold a
party card and who oppose us by waving the party
flag but who, in fact, intentionally distort its
teachings. As shown by experience, they would like
to recruit for their service...cadre with authority
in high positions in the party and state." The
article cites as examples such arch enemies as Liri
Belishova, who was purged for her pro-Soviet sym-
pathies following Tirana's break with Moscow in
1961.
Anti-Soviet diatribes are standard fare for
Albanian propaganda., but this latest article is
probably intended to heighten the vigilance cam-
paign that began last summer with the ouster of
defense minister Balluku. The reasons for Balluku's
fall have never been spelled out, but there is
evidence that he criticized the Chinese and per-
haps even advocated rapprochement with the Soviets.
Few developments alarm Tirana as much as re-
ports of Soviet machinations in the Balkans, and
the article may be a reaction to revelations of
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Soviet meddling in Yugoslav internal affairs.
Now that the second cominformist case in six
months has come to light in Yugoslavia, the Shehu
article may presage more purges in all segments of
Albanian society as the xenophobic Hoxha regime
attempts to stamp out real or imaginary internal
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East German Politburo Member Dies
The death on Wednesday of Herbert Warnke, a
Politburo member and chief of the East German
trade unions, clears the way for party leader
Honecker to bring another loyal supporter into
the top leadership.
Although the search for a successor could lead
outside the trade union organization, Wolfgang
Beyreuther, Warnke's deputy, probably has the in-
side track. In addition to extensive trade union
experience, the 47-year-old Beyreuther has served
in the Free German Youth (FDJ) organization. Hon-
ecker played a leading role in building the FDJ and,
since becoming party chief in 1971, he has promoted
a number of individuals who got their basic party
training in the youth organization.
Beyreuther has risen rapidly under Honecker.
He became a candidate member of the Central Commit-
tee and Warnke's deputy shortly after Honecker came
to power, and in 1973 was promoted to full Central
Committee membership.
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