SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000600350002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 31, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000600 5
T6p 0002 e
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
DOS review(s) completed.
25X1
Top Secret
25X1
March 31, 1975
Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00865A0006003 7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000600350002-7
Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000600350002-7
 Approved ForIRelease 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T0086*000600350002-7
SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
CONTENTS
March 31, 1975
Moscow Strengthens Ties with Portugal. . . . . . 1
The Pendulum Swings on Soviet Nonconformists 2
Ceausescu Goes to the Ramparts . . . . . . . . . 4
Crime in Soviet Industry . . . . . . . . . . 6
USSR: Zhiguli Owner and Entrepreneur. . . . . . 8
Communist Conferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Polish Economic Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Approved Fol - A000600350002-7
 Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T008651A000600350002-7
Moscow Strengthens Ties With Portugal
Moscow is trying to strengthen its ties with
Portuguese leaders, even at the risk of arousing
West European suspicions of Soviet intentions in
Portugal.
The Soviets gave unabashed front-page coverage
to Portuguese Labor Minister Costa Martins, who was
in Moscow last week for what would normally have been
a routine visit. Costa Martins, whose membership in
the Armed Forces Movement was clearly the chief rea-
son the Soviets unrolled the red carpet, met for three
hours with Soviet Premier Kosygin. The Soviet Premier,
speaking "on behalf of the Soviet leadership," ex-
pressed solidarity with the Portuguese government and
the Armed Forces Movement. Costa Martins subsequently
told the press that Kosygin had promised that Soviet
aid to Portugal would be forthcoming. Moscow has been
notably reluctant to give the Portuguese, including
Communist leader Cunhal, reason to believe that large
doses of economic aid are a live possibility.
The aid question was probably one of the topics
raised by Portuguese Communist Party Secretary Pato
when he met with Soviet Party Secretary Katushev in
-Moscow last week. Pravda's account of this meeting
gave little hint of how the talks went.
Moscow's public coverage of the abortive March 11
coup and its aftermath suggests that it has few qualms
about how the situati
on there is evolving. Against
this are reports circulating in Lisbon and elsewhere
that the Soviets are fearful that the Portuguese po-
litical situation is changing too quickly and that
Moscow is doing what it can to counsel moderation.
Such reports could be true; they also, however, help
Moscow to deal with expressions of concern it has re-
ceived from the West Germans, the Italians, and others
regard-in" Dor+-.,--l
March 31, 1975
25X1
25X1A
'Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000600350002-7
 Approved For ReI4
The Pendulum Swings on Soviet Nonconformists
Over 100 painters from several Soviet cities
reportedly held an exhibit of their unconventional
works in seven Moscow apartments over the weekend,
amid heavy surveillance and threats by the KGB.
According to Western press reports, the artists
had been warned earlier that the show would be
considered "anti-Soviet," but they went ahead any-
way with what they described as a "prelude" to a
long-planned public exhibit this spring. The
prospects for official approval of their appli-
cation for an exhibition hall, pending since late
February I I are un-
likely to be improved by their o action this
weekend, which the authorities may well view as a
provocation.
Probes such as these of the regime's inten-
tions at a time when cultural policy is still un-
settled may be engendering growing "corrective"
action. Prominent dissident Roy Medvedev was re-
cently warned against continuing the publication
of his new underground journal 20th Century as
well as against his other dissident activities.
This is the first time in three years that the
regime has focused. on Medvedev, a Marxist-reformer
The pressure against Medvedev came just be-
fore the disruption by police last week of Passover
services at Moscow's synagogue, a surprisingly
harsh move that Jewish sources link to the regime's
efforts to discourage emigration. Two young Jews
were reportedly sentenced in Moscow on March 31 to
five years in exile for their participation in a
recent pro-emigration demonstration in front of
the Lenin Library. The same day, stubborn dissi-
dent Anatoly Marchenko was sentenced to four years
March 31, 1975
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Releajse 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000?00350002-7
 Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000600350002-7
in exile for violating his parole, although his
persistent efforts to emigrate directly to the US
may be the real cause of his troubles. Moreover,
Slavophile dissident Vladimir Osipov, arrested last
fall for his renewed samizdat activities, has been
moved---according to dissident spokesman Andrey
Sakharov--to a Moscow psychiatric institute for
pre-trial investigation.
These and other recent developments suggest
that the regime believes its recently more pragmatic
approach to some aspects of nonconformism is being
misinterpreted and that the public tests of its
tolerance during a time of flux in cultural policy
have gone too far. If so, its recent moves may
indicate a decision to crack down on dissidents
of various shades, or at least tamp down their most
visible public activity.
25X1
March 31, 1975
Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000600350002-7
 Approved For Re
Ceausescu Goes to the Ramparts
Ceausescu's nationalistic speech of March 28
was a calculated retort to the bloc's recent im-
plicit criticisms of Bucharest's independent ways.
The speech, together with other Ceausescu activi-
ties, suggests that Bucharest is again under pres-
sure from Moscow to mend its errant ideological
views, particularly on the role of the nation in
the Communist system and on multilateral party con-
ferences.
Ceausescu's speech took place amid increased
calls for ideological confirmity. Such calls have
become more numerous since the conference of sec-
retaries for ideology, culture, and international
affairs held in Prague in early March. The Ro-
manians delivered a calculated snub to both the re-
cent Hungarian congress and to the Prague gathering
by sending the lowest delegations in the Soviet
bloc.
Ceausescu used the 30th anniversary of Romania's
higher party school as the occasion to deliver re-
marks that, although pointed, fell short of his
stinging best. He made his points obliquely, crit-
icizing those who, "denying or underestimating the
role of the nation, equate a pre-occupation for de-
velopment and assertion of the nation with national-
ism, and subsequently label this so-called national-
ism as anti-Communism." These words clearly reflected
Bucharest's ire at the resolution adopted at the re-
cent Hungarian party congress calling for a vigorous
repudiation of "chauvinist, nationalist, and anti-
Soviet views, which are particularly dangerous for
the unity of socialist countries and the interna-
tional Communist movement."
March 31, 1975
25X1
Approved Fot Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T0Q865A000600350002-7
 Approved For R41ease 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO00600350002-7 25X1
In defending Romania's national communism,
Ceausescu asserted that:
--"Legitimate diversities on the
path to socialism will always be
:Labeled anti-communist by a few.
--"The Romanian party must make an
active contribution to the correct
analysis of revolutionary changes.
Marxism-Leninism is not a dogma
set once and for all."
--"Those who label so-called national-
ism as anti-communism are both wrong
and are doing an injustice to inter-
national communism. Such false ac-
cusations lead to a lessening of con-
cern for equality among states."
Events preceding Ceausescu's speech also re-
flect Bucharest's irritation with its Pact allies.
Ceausescu gave a nationalistic interview to an AP
correspondent in Bucharest on March 25, and followed
up with talks with Todo Kurtovic, the Yugoslav party's
secretary for agitation and propaganda, on March 28.
The two sides "reasserted the wish...to intensify the
exchange of views between the two parties in the ideo- 25X1
logical domain," includin "ideological activity on
an international plane."
March 31, 1975
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00865P,000600350002-7
 Approved For Relo
Crime in Soviet Industry
On March 26, Ekonomic)ieskaya Gazeta published
a strong statement by H. A. Viktorov, Deputy Min-
ister of Internal Affairs, on his ministry's war
on crime in Soviet industry. The article indicated
that a new MVD "university" will play a major role
in combating industrial theft.
Viktorov begins his article by noting that
"shortcomings" in the economic system allow "dis-
honest people" to pursue their criminal activities
and then proceeds to enumerate. these deficiencies.
The catalogue of shortcomings that facilitate the
theft of state property includes the setting of ar-
tifically high norms for natural losses and expendi-
tures of raw materials within the production process;
carelessness; a multiplicity of prices for similar
categories of goods; "economically unfounded" price
differences in state procurement.; personnel policies
which allow "compromised" employees to occupy posi-
tions of trust, and non-uniformity of receipt, req-
uisition and order forms. These deficiencies not
only encourage theft but also channel more goods at
higher prices onto the illegal market.
To combat crime in industry, Viktorov proposes
that People's Control Committees assume a more active
role. He believes that because they are independent
of economic ministries the committees will be more ef-
fective than internal control mechanisms. Internal
control mechanisms are unreliable, the author says,
and cites the example of a plant in Kirgizia where
in four years local inspectors discovered only one
irregularity--a salary overpayment of 3 rubles. Yet
on the same day this crime was discovered, goods
valued at 12,000 rubles were stolen by employees.
To help meet the problem, Viktorov notes that
the MVD is adopting a new sophisticated approach. A
March 31, 1975
Approved For Releose 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00865A0p0600350002-7
25X1
25X1
 Approved Fc
new MVD "university" has been established to train
personnel to find weak spots in the system. The
school will train individuals in law enforcement
techniques as well as in economic and agricultural
theory. Almost as an after-thought, Viktorov claims
that "positive results" in combating economic crime
occur only where party organs "carry out systematic
effective work" in raising the moral consciousness
and responsibility of workers.
Viktorov's article is the most authoritative
to appear on the subject of industrial crime in re-
cent years. The establishment of a new MVD school
to help deal with the problem is an indication of
the magnitude of industrial theft and the determina-
tion of the ministry to solve the problem.
25X1
March 31, 1975
Approved For - A000600350002-7
 Approved For
USSR: Zhigul:i Owner and Entrepreneur
The private car owner in rural USSR is only
one step away from being an entrepreneur and could
become nouveau riche in one growing season if he
also has a private plot for growing melons, toma-
toes, and other money crops. Even without a plot
of his own, an enterprising car-owning teacher, ac-
countant, or other professional who has a new Zhi-
guli and trailer, and time to pick and peddle, can
buy wholesale in the country and hawk sales on busy
street corners. Or, more lucratively--and less
visibly--he can sell produce to restaurants.
Details of such unsocialist behavior have be-
gun to appear in the Soviet press, suggesting it is
sufficiently widespread to attract official atten-
tion. The press also reports instances of private
plots. being turned into plantations with green
houses and irrigation systems to increase surplus
crops, which are legally marketable at cooperative
markets.
With prospects of personal enrichment en-
hanced by the acquisition of a private car, the
fraudulent purchase and illegal use of automobiles
have been increasing. The press reports that in
one village, 44 cars were bought under assumed
names, some by out-of-towners posing as resident
farm workers but with such real-life titles as
chief of a city planning office and member of a
city prosecutor's office. Soviet officials are
worried about the trend toward entrepreneurship
because they fear it could lead farmers and pro-
fessionals to quit their regular, "socially use-
ful" jobs.
25X1
25X1
March 31, 1975
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000600350002-7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000600350002-7
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000600350002-7
 Approved For
Communist Conferences
A Soviet diplomat in Belgrade has told a US
official that the Berlin conference of European
Communist parties will probably be "untied" from
the European Security Conference and that a ma-
jority o the parties favor holding the meeting
in May.
25X1
25X1
This scheduling would not deviate from Mos-
cow"s public commitment made last year to hold the
conference "no later than mid-1975." The Soviets
have frequently stated privately, however, that the
European Communist conference in Berlin should come
after the completion of CSCE. Moscow may now fear
that CSCE will not be ended this summer, and does
not want to delay the Communist party meeting until
the fall because of its interest in moving toward
a world Communist party meeting.
There is some logic to this, but--the statement
of the Soviet diplomat in Belgrade notwithstanding--
the evidence suggests that the Soviets have made no
firm decision to push for a European Communist party
meeting in May. The Soviets recently told
that the European meeting wou
come after . There is also some question whether,
at this late date, Moscow could speed up the careful,
even desultory, step-by-step movement toward the
Berlin conference without in the process compromising
its efforts to get as broad-based a meeting as possible.
Among the more reluctant of the Communist parties
have been the Yugoslavs, who have made a particular
March 31, 1975
25X1
25X1
Approved For R41ease 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T008654 000600350002-7
 25X1
25X1
Approved For
point in recent weeks of stressing that their par-
ticipation in the European conference is by no means
ensured. The Soviet diplomat's suggestion that the
conference could be held in May may have been in-
tended to place pressure on Belgrade to drop its
reservations.
What is clear is that the Soviets have intensi-
fied the buildup for a world Communist conference.
At the recent Hungarian party congress several East
European party leaders dutifully declared that the
time was "ripe" for such a meeting, and the subject
was also discussed at the meeting between Brezhnev
and his East European counterparts in Budapest. No
firm date or place was settled on, but the Soviets
are reportedly aiming for late 1975 or early 1976,
March 31, 1975
25X1
Approved For Relase-2004/07/25 ! G+A R^ OSC5A000600350002-7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000600350002-7
Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000600350002-7
 Approved For
Polish Economic Problems
25X1
According to accounts in Polish newspapers, the
Politburo and the government presidium held a joint
session on March 25 to discuss efforts to "perfect"
(read, reform) certain aspects of the country's
economic-financial system. Although Warsaw has not
yet announced any organizational changes, we cannot
exclude the possibility that some corrective actions
have already been taken. Numerous personnel changes
within various economic ministries over the last six
months may be the prelude to wider. changes.
There is no doubt that economic priorities and
policies are causing concern within the leadership,
and the recent meat and butter shortages, which now
appear to be under control, are apparently only one
aspect of the problem. In a speech to the parliament
on March 26, Prime Minister Jaroszewicz assessed the
regime's policy of heavy foreign indebtedness and the
high rate of investments in surprisingly defensive
terms. He also emphasized that strains can be ex-
pected to accompany a policy of dynamic growth.
Jaroszewicz appeared to be addressing not only spe-
cific criticism from the public, but also from within
party and government circles.
We agree with the embassy's assessment that, to
date, there is no evidence of the formation of political
March 31, 1975
25X1
Approved For Release 9004107198 ? CIA-Rn1279T00865n000600350002-7
 Approved For Releo
factions that are seeking to use economic policies
and problems against the leadership. If the current
discussions are accompanied by more short-term crises
such as last month's shortages, however, individual
25X1
25X1
25X1
March 31, 1975
25X1
Approved For Releas 600350002-7
 25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000600350002-7
Top Secret
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000600350002-7