SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000700180001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 7, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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EE LNIRYLE
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
Secret
1b2
April 7, 1975
No. 0087/75
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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
April 7, 1975
Jewish Emigration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Tito Speaks in Kosovo . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
.Hungarian Economic Delegation
in Moscow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Soviets Woo Argentina with
Additional Credits . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
French Police Arrest Serb
Emigres in Assassination Investigation . . . 6
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Jewish Emigration
Approximately 875 Jews emigrated from the So-
viet Union in March; this is the lowest monthly
total in more than three years. The number of
emigrants has been dropping steadily since the turn
of the year. The first quarter total for 1975--
just over 3,000--is nearly 50 percent below the
comparable figure for 1974.
The Soviets are apparently reducing the flow
by discouraging applications, rather than by in-
creasing outright refusals. They have mounted a
psychological campaign emphasizing the problems emi-
grants will face in Israel and the West, while making
it clear that would-be emigrants will have a tough
row to hoe before they can get out of the USSR.
Applications for emigration remain subject to loss
of employment and other forms of harassment, as
well as to the considerable expense of obtaining
exit permits.
At the same time they are cutting back the
total number of emigrants, the Soviets are apply-
ing the carrot and the stick to Jewish activists.
Recently, several have been allowed to emigrate,
for example, but two others have been sent into
exile for a brief Moscow street demonstration.
Moscow's policy may be to get rid of the most ar-
ticulate Jewish activists, particularly those who
are well known in the West, and to intimidate the
others.
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Tito Speaks in Kosovo
On his visit to Kosovo from April 3-5, Presi-
dent Tito reassured local officials that Belgrade
intends to help ameliorate problems in the under-
developed province. He also called again for
stabilization in the Balkans through improved Yu-
goslav relations with Albania.
Tito's primary purpose was clearly to quell
speculation following a small student demonstration
last December that there were serious problems in
Kosovo. He pointed out that the economic develop-
ment and political stability of Kosovo was linked
to Yugoslavia's over-all fate. Tito criticized
the northern republics for objecting to special
federal aid to the less-developed southern regions
and specifically promised that the government in
Belgrade would soon increase aid to the Kosovo.
Tito also warned against unspecified foreign at-
tempts to exacerbate problems in Kosovo. In a
typically bold move on Friday, Tito also took his
case directly to Pristina University--the site of
the December disturbances.
Although Tito concentrated on local problems,
he did make a special plea for improved relations
with neighboring Albania. Warning that third
parties would try to drive a deeper wedge between
Albania and Yugoslavia, he argued for the under-
standing of his countrymen regarding Albania's
occasional regression into anti-Yugoslav polemics.
Tito said he believes the Albanian leadership wants
to improve relations with Yugoslavia and thus sta-
bilize this important sector of the Balkans.
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Hungarian Economic
Delegation in Moscow
A top-level Hungarian economic delegation, led
by Premier Fock, arrived in Moscow on April 7. The
rank and composition of the delegation--which osten-
sibly will open an exhibit on Hungary--suggest that
it is prepared for major talks with the Soviets on
bilateral cooperation in industrial development.
Aside from Fock, the "party-government" dele-
gation includes fellow Politburo member Karoly Nem-
eth, party secretary for economic policy; deputy
premier Matyas Timar, who oversees industrial de-
velopment; and the minister of heavy industry.
The group will be joined later by the minister of
foreign trade and a deputy foreign minister.
The Hungarians may have gone to Moscow to work
out details of the Soviet credits and concessions
recently granted to Budapest to help offset the bur-
den of higher prices for Soviet raw materials.
Budapest is eager to prune back some of its' less
efficient industrial sectors and to increase out-
lays for priority sectors. The talks could touch
on Hungarian problems in modernizing its aluminum
industry, expanding the chemical industry, and
meeting its obligation to help construct the Oren-
burg gas pipeline in the USSR.
April 7, 1975
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Soviets Woo Argentina with
Additional Credits
In 1974, Moscow extended, through new open-ended
agreements, at least $215 million in credits to
Argentina--the largest sum it has granted any coun-
try in Latin America except for Cuba and Chile
under Allende's rule. The Soviets are particularly
interested in large scale hydroelectric power proj-
ects. Here, the Soviets offer attractive fi-
nancing which Western governments find difficult to
match, and are willing to work within consortia.
For instance, Moscow has made bids on several proj-
ects, and will supply and install 14 turbines for
the Saito Grande hydroelectric project. The Peron
government has recently given Moscow its approval
to begin a feasibility study and to do design work
on the Parana River Dam projects. Such large-scale
investment projects as Salto Grande and the Parana
will not only enable Moscow to show what it can do
but will also eventually help to minimize the on-
going trade deficit the Soviets have with Argentina.
April 7, 1975
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Moscow is not neglecting the rest of South
America while it pursues its Argentine policy. The
Soviets have maintained an active political interest
elsewhere, notably in Peru, although economic coopera-
tion there does not nearly match the credits extended
to Argentina. In addition, Moscow has been holding
talks on further economic cooperation with Brazil
and has expressed an interest in Venezuelan oil.
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French Police Arrest Serb Emigres
in Assassination Investigation
According to a Tanjug report on Friday, the
French police have arrested two Serbian emigres
(Chetniks)--and are looking for a third--in con-
nection with the shooting of a Yugoslav diplomat
in Lyon on March 31.
The arrest of the Serbs comes as a surprise
because a Croat emigre had claimed responsibility
and had even presented the Croats' political justi-
fication on a local French television show. The
Croats now appear to have taken advantage of the
opportunity for propaganda purposes. It is ex-
tremely unlikely that Serb and Croat emigres co-
operated in the terrorist action because of their
mutually antagonistic nationalist views.
April 7, 1975
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Secret
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