LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000700230002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 9, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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No Foreign Dissem
TL\LL JEIThE
Latin American Trends
SOJRCED
Secret
April 9, 1975
No. 0504/75
106
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No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad
Background Use OnZy/ControZZed Dissem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 1 1652, exemption category:
? 513 (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
April 9, 1975
Brazil: Annoyed with Argentina . . . . . . 1
Argentina: Peronist Economic
Policies Under Attack . . . . . . . . . . 2
Argentina-Brazil: An Embarrass-
ing Incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Colombia: New Problems with
Guerrillas . . . . . . . . .
Bolivia's Banzer: How to
Stay in Office? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Chile: The Washington Hot Box
Gets a New Face . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Panama: "A Hemispheric Religion" . . . . . 10
Cuba No Longer to Support Peru's
Claim to 200-Mile Limit . . . . . . . . . 12
Caribbean Multinational Fleet . . . . . . . 13
Honduras: First Action Under
New Agrarian Reform Law . . . . . . . . . 15
Grenada: Working Both Sides of
the Street . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Cuban Chronology for March 1975 . . . . . . 17
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Brazil: Annoyed with Argentina
Little has been heard lately of the mutual antag-
onism that characterizes the traditional rivalry
between Brazil and Argentina. To a large extent this
is because Brazil, which has pulled far ahead in eco-
nomic growth and political stability, seeks to pro-
ject a magnanimous image and attenuate Argentine jeal-
ousy. Moreover, Argentina's body politic is so rent
with dissension and terrorism that it can hardly mount
a serious challenge to Brazil at this time.
Last week, however, two incidents evoked expressions
of Brazilian irritation with Argentina. In Tokyo the
Brazilian delegate to a meeting on natural resources
walked out of a session in protest because a "certain
country" had turned what were supposed to be technical
discussions into a "political debate." The "certain
country" was Argentina, which has long protested as-
pects of Brazil's plans to dam Plata Basin rivers for
hydroelectric projects.
Argentina's expulsion of a Brazilian journalist
from Buenos Aires also drew harsh comment, in the form
of a Jornal do Brasil editorial. The Rio de Janeiro
newspaper, which sometimes reflects official views,
criticized the Argentines for singling out the Brazilian
reporter, who, it says, was only one of several newsmen
with access to information on an alleged anti-government
plot in Argentina. The editorial goes on to cite the
incident as a particularly noteworthy example of govern-
ment meddling with the freedom of the press.
Brazilians have considerable disdain for the chaotic
Argentine situation and have probably found it difficult
to refrain from gloating publicly over the neighboring
country's discomfiture. Last week's irritation, however,
does not appear to presage any general deterioration in
relations, which have been rather good in recent months.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
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Argentina: Peronist Economic Policies Under Attack
The mounting pressure on Mrs. Peron to change
her top advisers has been accompanied by an upsurge
in public criticism of official economic policies.
During the past few months several parties, includ-
ing one member of the electoral coalition that re-
turned the Peronists to power, have published
critiques and recommendations.
The strongest attack has come from the govern-
ment's former ally, ex-president Arturo Frondizi,
who heads the small but vocal Movement for Integra-
tion and Development. Although Frondizi says he
intends to remain within the coalition in order to
initiate change, he condemns the present government
for its "preoccupation over retaining a fragile sta-
bility" and its failure to fulfill the "great ex-
pectations accompanying the victory of March 1973."
The sharp language of Frondizi's criticism sug-
gests little chance of a reconciliation between his
group and the conservative Peronist leadership. He
characterizes the budget deficit as "incurable,"
describes the rate of inflation as "the highest in
the decade," and attacks the investment law for
"having isolated Argentina." This last point alone
separates Frondizi as an internationalist from the
mainstream of Peronism which has always contained a
strong strain of xenophobic nationalism.
Another critic of the government, former Minister
of Economy Alvaro Alsogaray, has also issued an in-
dictment of the current situation. Alsogaray's big-
business orientation is unlikely to attract major
political support, but his comment that "Peron's
shadow has impeded realistic discussion of economic
problems for the last 30 years" is a trenchant casti-
gation of Peronist ideology and rhetoric.
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Other condemnations predictably have come from
the two major opposition parties, the Radical Civic
Union and the Popular Federalist Alliance. Neither
group's remarks, however, are as telling as the views
expressed by Frondizi and Alsogaray.
Although all parties have decried the country's
economic instability,only two--the Popular Federalist
Alliance and the Movement for Integration and Develop-
ment--mention the need to boost agricultural production.
Government control of farm prices that favor urban
Peronist supporters has been a major factor in the
continuing stagnation of Argentine agriculture--the
largest earner of foreign exchange.
While the government is obviously vulnerable to
criticism at this time, Mrs. Peron's administration
lacks the leadership and flexibility necessary for
major economic reform. (CONFIDENTIAL)
April 9, 1975
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Argentina-Brazil: An Embarrassing Incident
Police in southern Brazil reportedly arrested
Argentine Social Welfare Minister Lopez Rega re-
cently for traveling with armed bodyguards. 25X1C
Mrs. Peron's con i ant
was he d or several ours in a small town jail
until federal authorities in Brasilia secured his
release.
The reason for Lopez Rega's trip is unknown,
although he could have been on private business. He
sometimes goes to Brazil to participate in mystical
macumba rites, but this would not explain his pres-
ence in the province of Rio Grande do Sul, where the
people are predominantly of European origin.
The Brazilian Foreign Ministry has apparently
succeeded in appeasing the Argentine government with
profuse apologies for the action. (SECRET/NO FOREIGN
DISSEM)
April 9, 1975
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Colombia: New Problems With Guerrillas
A report that Colombia's three insurgent groups
are arranging a merger has appeared in El Tiempo,
Bogota's prestigious Liberal Party daily. The state-
owned radio network reported the first joint guer-
rilla operation alleged to reflect the merger on
April 7.
The two largest groups--the pro-Moscow Revolu-
tionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the pro-
Havana National Liberation Army (ELN)---have maintain-
ed occasional liaison for several years. There have
been indications that they have cooperated in several
operations, particularly during the period about two
years ago when government forces were putting great
pressure on the ELN's urban support network. The ELN
is also suspected of maintaining some sort of loose
relationship with the much smaller pro-Peking People's
Liberation Army (EPL).
The FARC, by far the largest and best funded of
the groups, has been relatively inactive for many years.
Its parent organization, the Colombian Communist Party,
has encouraged the group to train and recruit, but to
refrain from overt operations for fear of jeopardizing
the party's legal status. Nevertheless, some FARC
activists have sought to put their extended training
to practical use and may have lent support to ELN mili-
tants who were isolated by the government's pressure on
the ELN's support net. Carrying their cooperation one
step further, FARC guerrillas may also have participated
in ELN operations in more than just a support capacity,
since activity under ELN cover, in effect, would presum-
ably be inoffensive to party leaders.
Thus, it seems quite likely that the FARC and ELN
have established a cooperative relationship, although
"merger" may be too strong a word. It is considerably
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less likely that the EFL figures significantly in any
new insurgent structure. Ideological differences
would be unlikely to permit all of Colombia's guerril-
las to function well under a unified leadership. The
security services may now be faced, however, with ELN-
FARC activists who can operate with considerable im-
punity in the field and who are supported through
FARC channels. These channels are more secure than
the ELN support network ever was and are also somewhat
shielded by the legality of the Communist Party.
There is also a possibility that the security
services are exaggerating existing contacts between
guerrilla groups in order to build the government's
case for a strongly reinforced law-and-order stand--
possibly including a state of siege. In any event, any
increase in cooperation between insurgent organizations
would suggest a parallel rise in the level of insurgency
shortly thereafter. (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
April 9, 1975
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Bolivia's Banzer: How to Stay in Office?
President Banzer is still searching for a scheme
to generate popular support for his government. So
far, however, his advisers have been unable to devise
a plan that would not require the participation of
political parties, whose activities are currently pro-
scribed.
Banzer reportedly favors a recently proposed
national investment program that would enable Bolivian
workers to own stock in the government. There is con-
cern among Banzer's aides, however, that the program
would be a financial flop, thereby having the opposite
effect of stimulating public dissatisfaction.
Since the abortive coup in November 1974, there
has been no organized attempt to challenge Banzer's
authority. His government however, is on a shaky
financial footing, and his popularity appears to be
at its lowest point since he took office nearly four
years ago. (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM
ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
April 9, 1975
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Chile: The Washington Hot Box Gets a New Face
The recent designation of Chile's OAS ambassador,
Manuel Trucco, as ambassador to the US should help to
alleviate one of Chile's more serious public relations
problems.
The previous ambassador, Major General (Ret.)
Walter Heitmann, possibly did more harm than good in
the post. Heitmann was probably the most rabid anti-
Communist in the government and his military back-
ground never prepared him for the possibility that
someone might question what was said. He had diffi-
culty coping with the diplomatic environment that
saw frequent criticisms of Chilean policies. He never
could quite understand how anyone could not agree with
what he perceived as an obviously correct position and
was quick to dismiss opposing points of view as having
been corrupted by the distortions of international
Marxism.
Santiago recognized that Heitmann was only compli-
cating its already seriously damaged international posi-
tion and had been seeking his replacement for some time.
Several persons turned the job down, fearing damage to
their careers.
While Trucco lacks the charisma and youthful dy-
namism that would have been helpful from a public re-
lations standpoint, he is an experienced scrapper who
knows the ropes. An anti-Communist but not dogmati-
cally so, he possesses the attributes of pragmatism
and an ability to take into consideration all facets
of a problem to make realistic political assessments.
Although he has never held public office, the ambas-
sador is more a politician than a diplomat and his
views are far more liberal than those of the present
government. His absence for several years from active
participation in Chilean politics, however, has ap-
parently made him acceptable to the junta.
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He holds a master's degree in economics from
Georgetown University and is well acquainted with
inter-American relations and the US political pro-
cess, having lived in this country for several
years while serving with the OAS and the Inter-
American Committee on the Alliance for Progress.
He will continue to hold the OAS ambassadorship
until a replacement is found. (SECRET/NO FOREIGN
DISSEM)
April 9, 1975
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Panama: "A Hemispheric Religion"
General Torrijos is continuing to collect for-
eign dividends from his March summit meeting, but
some liabilities are showing up at home. Torrijos
has told the press that the three-day conference
demonstrated that Panama's aspiration to gain
sovereignty over the canal is being transformed
from a national "religion" to a hemispheric one.
The presidents of Colombia, Costa Rica, and
Venezuela formally affirmed their support for
Panama's goal at the meeting, and, along with
Torrijos, drafted a letter to President Ford urging
that a prompt agreement be reached. Colombian
Foreign Minister Lievano delivered the letter this
week.
The four leaders also sent a letter to the
other Latin American chiefs of state calling for
pledges of support to Panama. Mexico's President
Echeverria was the first to respond favorably to
this appeal.
Torrijos claimed that his three guests committed
their countries' votes to Panama in the selection of
the Latin American member of the UN Security Council
this fall. This campaign may not succeed; however,
Panama does seem to have at least postponed the elec-
tion of Argentina for this slot.
Although the pro-government Panamanian press is
playing up the summit meeting as a triumph for Torrijos,
some voices of criticism are also being heard. Ultra-
nationalists are complaining thatTorrijos' commitment
to grant Colombia and Costa Rica special rights after
a new treaty is signed represented an infringement on
Panama's sovereignty. One of Torrijos' treaty negoti-
ators, Carlos Lopez Guevara, who has played an impor-
tant role in defending to the public the government's
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handling of the issue, has indicated privately that
he shares these misgivings about the "concessions."
He fears that they will arouse suspicions that other
"concessions" will be made in the negotiations with
the US. Opposition groups such as the National
Council of Private Enterprise are likely to use just
such arguments.
Now that Torrijos has marshalled considerable
international support for his handling of the negotia-
tions, he will dedicate much of his time to working
for domestic unity on the issue. The secretary general
of Panama's Communist party was pressed into service
in this campaign as soon as he returned from exile in
Moscow. Archbishop Marcos McGrath is effectively
presenting the government's case in Panama as well as
in the US. Torrijos himself appears to be waiting
until the completion of a draft treaty before taking
center stage to convince the Panamanian people that
the pact is a giant step toward total Panamanian
control of the canal. (CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN
DISSEM)
April 9, 1975
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Cuba No Longer to Support Peru's Claim to 200-Mile
Limit
Cuba apparently has decided to end its support
for Peru's position on the 200-mile territorial sea.
Cuban Vice Prime Minister of Foreign Relations Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez reportedly informed Peruvian Foreign
Minister de la Flor of this decision during de la
Flor's visit to Havana on March 19.
Cuba's withdrawal of support can be viewed as
another example of responsiveness to Soviet pressure.
Moscow has long been displeased with the Cuban posi-
tion on the 200-mile limit, and Admiral V.N. Alekseyev
is said to have voiced Soviet concern during a visit
to Havana in January.
Havana's willingness to go along with Moscow also
reflects Cuba's own interests. Cuba backed the Peruvian
claim to a 200-mile limit at the Law of the Sea con-
ference last August because of both its relationship with
Peru and its image as a revolutionary third-world power.
Havana realizes, however, that as a fishing nation Cuba
would suffer from the widespread application of the
concept. Furthermore, the 200-mile limit can clearly
not apply to Cuba and its neighbors in the Caribbean
and the Gulf of Mexico, given their relative proximity.
The Peruvian foreign minister reportedly reacted
calmly to the loss of Cuban support but the shift will
surely be an irritant in Cuban-Peruvian relations in
view of the importance that Peru--and especially
President Velasco--attaches to the issue. To minimize
the potential damage, Rodriguez told de la Flor that
although Cuba would vote against the 200-mile limit
in principle should it be voted on at the current LOS
conference in Geneva, Havana would neither actively
oppose Peru's claim nor make public its new position.
(SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND
USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
ril 9, 1975
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Caribbean Multinational Fleet
Central American and Caribbean governments are
seriously considering a Mexican proposal to establish
a multinational merchant fleet to foster regional eco-
nomic development. A technical meeting--to discuss
purchases, finance, schedules, tariffs, and organi-
zation--is scheduled in Mexico in mid-April and a
ministerial-level meeting is expected to follow in
May.
Seventeen area countries, including Venezuela
and Colombia but excluding the United States and most
British, French, and Dutch dependencies, have been
invited to participate. According to Mexican officials,
who recently concluded a series of visits to enlist
support for the proposal, most of the countries have
shown enthusiasm for the project. Cuba plans to be an
active participant.
If plans crystalize, a company to manage the fleet
will be formed with an initial capital of $10 million
with no participating government controlling more than
15-20 percent. Both Cuba and Mexico have promised
technical assistance. By the end of this year four to
six ships would be acquired and additional vessels
chartered. Practical difficulties may delay implementa-
tion, as coordination with existing national fleets and
rival shipping associations could prove difficult.
Initially, the fleet would concentrate on intra-regional
trade and later move to services with foreign countries
--principally the United States.
Area rivalries and antagonisms already have surfaced
and could restrict the number of participants or nullify
the project. Many of the smaller, less developed coun-
tries that will attend the April conference have serious
questions concerning the motives behind Mexican and
Venezuelan participation. Some suspect that a regional
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fleet would benefit only the area's larger maritime
nations--Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Cuba--and
serve to extend their influence.
Panama is fearful it would lose some of the sub-
stantial fees ($9 million yearly) it currently re-
ceives for providing flag-of-convenience registrations
to Western shipping companies and would be opposed to
reducing tolls when or if the Panama Canal reverts to
local jurisdiction. The Dominican Republic seems to
prefer a consortium of private owners over, multistate-
ownership and might also press for a subsidy, perhaps
in the form of reduced rates, for poorer nations join-
ing in the project. Some governments, such as those
in Nicaragua and Guatemala, which have a long history
of antipathy to the Castro government, may be leery
of Cuban participation.
Sponsors of the Caribbean fleet claim that it
will not compete with but merely supplement existing
shipping services. Nevertheless, many foreign ship
operators foresee increased competition for the $2
billion in freight charges spent annually to carry the
region's trade. Most of the cargo ships that service
the area are managed by foreign multinational firms
operating Japanese, Dutch and Italian-flag ships. They
operate under foreign-controlled freight conferences,
which set rates and schedule sailings.
Foreign operators fear that cargo reservation
legislation already in force in Mexico, Venezuela, and
Colombia will be extended to ensure cargoes for the
regional fleet. These laws provide that up to 50 per-
cent of seaborne trade must be carried by local merchant
shipping. Furthermore, the participation of Cuba could
pose a conflict with US laws calling for retaliation
against countries that trade with Cuba and send their
ships to Cuban ports. (CONFIDENTIAL)
April 9, 1975
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Honduras: First Action Under New Agrarian Reform Law
The first implementation of the Agrarian Reform
Law promulgated on January 14 was announced on April
3. The state will take over 22,400 hectares owned
by the Standard Fruit Company, and will grant $75,000
for property restoration. The government may also
organize cooperatives to maintain employment.
The take-over had been in the planning stage for
several weeks, even though it was announced after the
recent changes in the government hierarchy. This may
be an indication that the newly assertive reformist
officers intend to quicken the pace of existing social
reform programs, rather than initiate new revolution-
ary schemes.
Lt. Colonel Mario Maldonado Munoz, head of the
National Agrarian Institute since mid-February, ap-
pears to be one of the project's primary architects.
Maldonado appears to be an influential member of the
Supreme Defense Council, which is now exercising
national leadership.
The action affecting the Standard Fruit property,
known as Isletas, is in response to a conflict over
whether the company would rehabilitate the facilities,
which were devastated by Hurricane Fifi last September.
The government turned down Standard's joint-venture
proposal,which would have minimized reinvestment losses.
Ignoring government and union demands, the company laid
off over 600 workers and has since been dismantling the
facilities and threatening more layoffs. A settlement
must still be negotiated, but the Hondurans will most
likely offer a satisfactory compensation. Standard,
the largest single landowner in the country, intends
to continue operations on its other properties, which
total about 250,000 acres. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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Grenada: Working Both Sides of the Street
Last week the Grenadian government received a
goodwill delegation from the Democratic Peoples
Republic of Korea. Piqued at another failure to
obtain a bilateral aid commitment from the US (see
Staff Notes, April 2, 1975), Prime Minister Eric
Gairy may have requested North Korean economic as-
sistance and formal diplomatic relations.
In similar circumstances last fall, after re-
peated attempts to secure US bilateral aid, Gairy un-
leashed a series of thinly veiled threats, telling
US officials that Grenada was "...small but could be
very loud" within the UN and other international fora.
He continued, saying that "Grenada has the same vote
in the UN as does the US. If you turn us down, we
will go elsewhere." Less than two weeks later, Grenada
and the Peoples Republic of China established diplomatic
relations.
Grenada apparently has not received Chinese aid,
but Gairy may be in a better bargaining position with
the North Koreans who would like his support in the
UN. Even the threat of a deal between Gairy and the
North Koreans will probably stimulate the Republic of
Korea, which already has diplomatic relations with
Grenada, to propose its own aid program in the bidding
for Gairy's fickle friendship. (CONFIDENTIAL)
April 9, 1975
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Cuban Chronology for March 1975
March 1: Soviet Naval Visit Announced. (Charac-
terized in Cuban press as "unofficial.")
Cuban Minister of Health, Dr. Antonio
Gutierrez Muniz, arrives in Mexico City
for second Latin American meeting on
population control.
Prime Minister Castro discusses trade
relations with Mexican Foreign Relations
Undersecretary Ruben Gonzales Sosa.
March 5: Cuba frees six Colombians prior to the
reestablishment of diplomatic relations.
Cuba and Romania sign exchange and pay-
ments agreements for 1975.
Uruguayan Communist Party leader, Sec.
Gen. Rodney Arismendi, arrives in Havana.
Cuban and Bulgarian academies of Science
sign cooperation agreement.
Representatives from the Chilean Social-
ist and Radical Parties arrive in Havana.
Radio Havana announces creation of Indus-
trial Development Ministry.
March 6: Peruvian Economic and Finance Minister
General Amilcar Vargas Gavilano meets
with Cuban Ambassador to Peru, Antonio
Nunez Jiminez.
Havana and Bogota announce reestablish-
ment of relations in a joint communique.
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March 8: Le Monde director Jacques Fauvet meets
with Castro in Havana.
March 10: Delegation of Polish Union of Socialist
Youth arrives in Havana.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez heads Cuban dele-
gation to ECLA meeting in Bogota.
Deputy Chairman of USSR Council of Minis-
ters V. N. Novikov receives Cuban Ambas-
sador Severo Aguirre del Cristo in the
Kremlin.
March 10- National Association of Small Farmers
11 holds national plenum in Havana.
March 11: Finnish Foreign Trade Minister Jermu
Laine arrives in Cuba.
Cuba and Venezuela formally name ambas-
sadors.
Cuban and West German Communist Parties
hold official talks in Havana.
March 13: Mexicana de Aviacion resumes regular
flights to Cuba.
March 14: Cuba, USSR sign construction cooperation
agreement.
Kim Il-song receives Cuban Ambassador to
North Korea Angel Ferras.
Cuba and Finland sign scientific agreement.
March 15: Cuba and USSR sign scientific-technical
cooperation agreement.
A portion of the venceremos brigade ar-
rives in Havana from the US.
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March 17- The Coordinating Bureau of the Non-
19 Aligned Nations meets in Havana.
March 17- Pedro Miret leads Cuban delegation to
24 Eleventh Hungarian Socialist Workers
Party Congress in Budapest.
March 18: Talks begin in Havana with representa-
tives of East German chemical industry.
March 19: A Canadian delegation of businessmen
arrives in Havana.
Cuban Housing and Agriculture Delegation
arrives in Kingston, Jamaica.
Cuban-Japanese sugar talks begin in Tokyo.
March 20- Interview with Carlos Rafael Rodriguez
23 published in La Stampa.
March 20: Spanish Trade Delegation arrives in Cuba.
Polish Peace Committee arrives in Cuba.
March 21- UNIDO meeting in Lima. Cuban delegation
26 headed by Joel Domenech, Basic Industry
Sector.
March 21: Director of National Tourist Industry
Vivian Coll announces intention of GOC
to construct 62 hotels throughout the
country.
Canadian newspapers report $100 million
line of credit extended to National Bank
of Cuba.
Czechoslovakia and Cuba sign protocol on
food exchange in Prague.
April 9, 1975
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March 22: Cuban Foreign Trade Minister and Mexican
Industry and Commerce Secretary Jose
Campillo Sainz meet in Havana. Opening
of Mexican exposition in Havana.
A UJC delegation arrives in Sofia,
Bulgaria.
March 24: National Association of Small Farmers
(ANAP) Plenum begins in Havana.
March 25: Cuba and Nepal establish diplomatic re-
lations.
March 26: Mexican and US press carry story "Oil
Trading Deal Set by Cuba, Mexico, Soviet,
and Venezuela."
March 27: Delegation of Committees for the Defense
of the Revolution headed by Maria Teresa
Malmierca arrives in Baghdad, Iraq.
Cuban Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade German
Amado Blanco arrives in Peking.
Algerian Education Minister Abdelkrim
Benmahmoud arrives in Havana.
March 28: Cuba, Jamaica sign construction coopera-
tion agreement in Kingston.
Luis Gonzalez Marturelos is named ambas-
sador to the Somali Democratic Republic.
March 29: A Panamanian delegation headed by Prof.
Berta Torrijos de Arosemena (sister of
General Omar Torrijos), arrives in
Havana.
Bulgarian Foreign Minister Petur Mladenov
arrives in Havana.
April 9, 1975
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March 30: The 1975 Cuban-Soviet Trade Agreement
is signed in Moscow.
March 30- Preparatory meeting for International
31 Conference of Solidarity with Puerto
Rico held in Havana. (SECRET)
April 9, 1975
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Secret
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