LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000800180002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 23, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
No Foreign Ditrem
gul~~ HOUE
Latin American Trends
SOURCED
Secret
107
April 23, 1975
No. 0506/75
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
April 23, 1975
Brazil: Reform In The Government
Party? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trinidad-Tobago: The "New
Colonialism" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Argentina: Politics Before
Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Argentina: Peronists Expel Campora . . . . 6
Grenada: The Opposition . . . . . . . . . . 7
Elections in the Netherlands
Antilles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Ramiro Valdes Appeals to Cuban Youth . . . . 11
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Brazil: Reform In The Government Party?
President Geisel has announced that he has no
intention of revamping the current two-party system
before the municipal elections in 1976. This state-
ment may have been designed to put an end to recent
speculation that Geisel--dissatisfied with the party's
showing in last November's congressional elections
--was preparing to change or even dissolve the party.
It is more likely, however, that the President's
announcement, by leaving open the possibility of
eventual political changes,was intended to signal his
displeasure over the party's electoral reverses and
its subsequent sluggish performance in congress. The
reference to next year's municipal elections is a
clear sign that Geisel expects the party to begin
working now to avoid a repetition of last year's losses.
Geisel probably hopes that the threat of extinction will
bring together the party's many factions.
Strong criticism has been leveled at the former
president of the party for supporting some candidates
who lacked strong local backing, although he was not
alone in misreading local political trends. Many party
leaders--perhaps through overconfidence--imposed candi-
dates over the objections of local party leaders, who
subsequently displayed little enthusiasm for campaign-
ing.
In any event, Geisel has made his dissatisfaction
known. He may be disappointed with the effects of that
knowledge, however, since the divisiveness that con-
tributed to the party's losses last year may well prove
unchangeable this year. (CONFIDENTIAL)
April 23, 1975
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Trinidad-Tobago: The "New Colonialism"
In a speech to members of his People's National
Movement on April 11, Prime Minister Eric Williams
sounded a warning about a "re-colonization" of the
Caribbean. Williams' theme was that certain wealthy
Latin American countries, mainly Venezuela and Mexico,
were trying to establish political and economic hege-
mony over the former British colonies in the Caribbean.
The Prime Minister claimed that unless this trend was
halted the Caribbean would soon lose its identity as
a region. He pointed, as an example, to how the
original idea of creating a Caribbean merchant fleet
had now been broadened to the point of including
Mexico and countries of Central and South America.
Williams had both historical patterns and per-
sonal ambitions in mind when he made the speech.
Trinidad has always considered the nearby English-
speaking islands to be in its orbit. Williams views
himself as-the senior statesman and principal architect
of integration among the English-speaking former colo-
nies. His country has accumulated considerable capital
because of high world prices for petroleum and sugar,
and the Prime Minister has ambitious plans to use these
funds to bolster Caribbean integration and increase
Trinidad's influence in the region. Williams envisions
providing direct economic assistance in some cases and
providing capital for loans through the Caribbean Devel-
opment Bank and Inter-American Development Bank in others.
His pet program is to provide fertilizer and technical
assistance to help make the Caribbean self-sufficient
in food.
The prime Minister is annoyed and frustrated by
the way,his plans have been overshadowed by similar
ideas from Venezuela and, to a somewhat lesser degree,
by Mexico. In his speech, Williams emphasized that he
does not even consider those countries to be members
of the Caribbean community, but sees them as outside
April 23, 1975
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powers with colonial ambitions. He recognizes that
Trinidad does not possess the financial resources to
compete with those nations, and that most of the Car-
ibbean countries are glad to get assistance from
practially anywhere. For example, Jamaica, Trinidad's
only economic rival in the English-speaking islands,
is increasingly turning to Mexico and Venezuela for
assistance with industrial projects, some of which
were planned to be carried out in conjunction with
Trinidad. Last week Jamaican Prime Minister Manley
visited Caracas to sign several trade agreements with
Venezuela.
Williams' speech was made to a group of party
loyalists, so it is possible that he intended it for
domestic political purposes more than as a statement
of foreign policy. He also did not hesitate to bend
the facts to fit his theory; the idea of a Caribbean
shipping venture apparently came from Costa Rica, not
from the Caribbean islands. If Williams really intends
to push the "re-colonization" line, he will have a
forum when the UN Economic Commission for Latin America
assembles in Trinidad on May 5.
The reactions of some Venezuelan and Mexican of-
ficials suggest that Williams' barbs did hit their
targets. A leader of the governing party in Venezuela
accused Williams of trying to damage Venezuela's image
in Trinidad, and the Mexican secretary of the presi-
dency denied that any imperialist ambitions were behind
his country's cooperation with Caribbean countries.
Nevertheless, Williams' complaints are not likely to
alter the Venezuelan and Mexican governments' policies
toward the Caribbean. (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
April 23, 1975
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Argentina: Politics Before Economics
Political pressures on Mrs. Peron's government
continue to stifle efforts to stabilize the domestic.
economy and bolster Argentina's sagging position in
the world market. If the administration continues
to give way to wage demands of Peronist labor unions
and to ignore the growing financial crisis in manu-
facturing and agriculture, serious economic deteriora-
tion will occur during the latter half of 1975.
Last week the English-language Buenos Aires
Herald, one of the few newspapers that dare to crit-
icize the government, commented that "there is still
no sign of austerity by the government or the people"
despite the fact that "the Argentine economy is in
crisis." In a sharply worded editorial, the publica-
tion deplored the decision of Labor Minister Otero to
allow workers at an oil refinery to work a six-hour
day at their current wage level. The editorial con-
cluded that "the current economic policy is as full
of holes as a sieve."
Although price control measures are now in effect,
inflationary pressures continue to be strong and the
rise in the cost of living will probably exceed 40 per-
cent this year. Most of the benefits of government-
sponsored wage hikes are being eaten away, and the
diversion of numerous consumer goods into the black
market is creating shortages and widespread public dis-
content.
An even more serious problem is Argentina's worsen-
ing balance of payments position--expected to produce
a $600-million deficit this year. The value of agri-
cultural exports, the largest earner of foreign ex-
change, has declined steadily in recent months. While
the devaluation of the peso last month has helped
strengthen the competitive position of manufactured
goods, it has done little to improve the prospects for
April 23, 1975
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grain and meat exports. The value of grain sales will
decline about 40 percent this year as a result of poor
harvests and lower prices in the world market. Beef
prices are also depressed and are not expected to im-
prove appreciably due to the world-wide recession and
the reduced demand for beef. .
The government's inability to cope with the present
situation has contributed to a growing mood of pessimism
regarding both the economy and the administration's
capabilities. Argentina will probably be forced to pay
a heavy price in terms of stagnating or declining pro-
duction in the months ahead. The consequent increases
in unemployment and losses in real income will exacerbate
political problems for Mrs. Peron's already shaky govern-
ment and could trigger a major crisis. (CONFIDENTIAL)
April 23, 1975
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Argentina: Peronists Expel Campora
Peronist leaders have formally expelled ex-
President Hector Campora from the party ranks. Al-
though he was Juan Peron's choice as a surrogate
chief executive when the Peronists returned to power
two years ago, he soon came under attack from con-
servatives for his willingness to execute policies
promoted by youth leaders and left-wing Peronists in
his administration. After being forced to step down
in favor of Peron, he was sent into unofficial exile as
ambassador to Mexico. Shortly after Peron's death,
he was replaced as ambassador and warned that his
life would be in jeopardy if he returned to Argentina.
This latest blow is an obvious act of retalia-
tion for Campora's expressions of support for the
recently formed "authentic" Peronists--the group that op-
posed the orthodox standard-bearers in provincial
elections in Misiones Province earlier this month.
While it is unlikely that Campora will ever again play
a major role in Argentine politics, his purge may
further persuade alienated Peronist youth that the
only effective political role is one of violent opposi-
tion to the present government. (CONFIDENTIAL)
April 23, 1975
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Grenada: The Opposition
Opposition groups in Grenada are maneuvering
to form a united front for the general elections
which must be held before March 1977.
The strongest opposition group, the moderately
conservative Grenada National Party (GNP), believes
that a GNP-led coalition might have a chance of top-
pling Eric Gairy, the authoritarian and sometimes ir-
rational prime minister. In early April the GNP an-
nounced that it had reached an accomodation with the
break-away United Peoples Party, and was seeking an
understanding with the New Jewel Movement (NJM).
The NJM began in 1972-73 as a small fringe group
with an ideological mixture of participatory democracy,
social welfarism, trade unionism, xenophobia, and armed
struggle. Since mid-1974, however, it has subordinated
militant underground-activity to more conventional po-
litical action and now professes that it will work with-
in the existing order to bring about change. As it has
moderated, the NJM has attracted new followers.
The GNP has demanded, as the price of coalition,
that the NJM renounce its goals of establishing people's
assemblies and nationalizing all banks. Last week the
NJM denounced the GNP's conditions but did not reject
the possibility of some sort of anti-Gairy alliance.
With this initial rhetorical thrust and parry now
on record, the two groups may still be able to develop
a common program. In 1973 the GNP endorsed a "People's
Charter" containing a legislative system similar to the
NJM's people's assemblies. The NJM's demand for bank
nationalization,which is directed against foreign owner-
April 22, 1975
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ship, not domestic private ownership, may be met with a
GNP program for greater Grenadian participation and re-
sponsiveness to local needs.
Prime Minister Gairy's reaction to an opposition
coalition, even one with little chance of unseating him,
would probably be heavy-handed. In turn, any pressure
that he might bring to bear on the NJM could easily con-
vince the group that it abandoned the armed struggle
prematurely and could lead other opposition groups to
opt for violence. (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
April 22, 1975
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Elections in the Netherlands Antilles
On April 25 voters on the small Dutch Caribbean
islands of Curacao, Aruba, and Bonaire will elect new
island councils. These bodies pass legislation af-
fecting each island jurisdiction, appropriate money
for local. purposes, and give a useful profile of
grassroots issues.
Curacao The leftist Workers Liberation Front,
under the leadership of Wilson "Papa" Godett is likely
to gain seats in the 21-member council. Godett's hopes
of gaining control of the council as leader of a coali-
tion could be aided by labor's endorsement of him and
the expected low turnout of opposition voters. He has
also apparently received foreign funding.
Labor unrest, unemployment, inflation, and a dra-
matic downturn in earnings from both tourism and the
oil-refining industry are made to order for Godett's
anti-capitalist "New Society" program. There is some
suspicion that if Godett achieved power, he might seek
an end to the federal structure or even independence
from the Netherlands. Two factors that made Godett
less attractive to voters wishing to protest economic
conditions are the US Export-Import Bank's approval of
a $48-million loan for the construction of a shipyard
on the island and the recent settlement of a teachers'
strike to the teachers' satisfaction.
Aruba Voters on Aruba will probably give the
People's Electoral Movement (MEP), under the leadership
of Gilberto Croes at least a working majority in the
new council. The MEP opposes continued Aruban associa-
tion with the central Netherlands Antilles government,
but it does not wish to cut the island's ties with The
Hague.
There is an element of racism in Aruban politics.
Many in the island's majority with European and Carib
Indian ancestries resent black officials in the federal
April 23, 1975
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government who allegedly neglect and misrule Aruba.
With the exception of the tourist industry, which
is still booming, Aruba suffers from many of the
same problems facing its neighbors on Curacao
--inflation, unemployment, labor strife, and a de-
cline in oil refinery revenues.
Bonaire Voters on Bonaire are expected to re-
turn the incumbent administration to office. The
Bonaire Patriotic Union under the young and dynamic
L.R. Ellis may receive a somewhat smaller majority
vote than in the 1973 elections, however. Three
other parties are contesting the nine seats on the
Island Council. If past experience is repeated,
better than 90 percent of the 4600 registered voters
will cast ballots.
Bonarie is enjoying an unprecedented economic
boom. Unemployment now stands at 4 percent, down
from a high of 26 percent last year. A $35-million
terminal for the transfer of Middle Eastern oil from
supertankers to the smaller ships which serve U.S.
east coast ports is under construction and will be-
gin partial operation later this year. In addition,
tourism has increased as enthusiasts of scuba diving
and other water sports have discovered the island.
These factors of prosperity and dramatically
increased employment are likely to make for spirited
but orderly electoral competition. (CONFIDENTIAL)
April 23, 1975
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Ramiro Valdes Appeals to Cuban Youth
In a speech on April 5 commemorating the an-
niversaries of the Union of Communist Youth (UJC)
and the Union of Communist Pioneers (UPC), Political
Bureau member Ramiro Valdes reflected Fidel Castro's
disappointment with the level of political conscious-
ness among the masses.
Valdes stated that an era has begun in which the
struggle against imperialism will be fought on the
ideological level. The Cuban leadership fears that
its youth are particularly vulnerable to undesirable
cultural and ideological influences. It will be the
task of the UJC, according to Valdes, to insure the
maintenance of a permanent ideological fervor to com-
bat the challenge of ideological penetration.
Valdes emphasized the need to perpetuate an
"internationalist" spirit among youth. He said that
Cuba will "always be ready to offer the necessary
help to people who liberate themselves and who face
the tasks of overcoming underdevelopment." This re-
affirms the Cuban position--evident for some years
--that the Castro regime has shifted its emphasis
from assisting the liberation struggle to aiding in
overcoming underdevelopment after liberation has been
achieved, but adds the new element that this change is
being reflected verbally as guidance for Cuban youth.
Youth have also felt the impact of the Cuban
emphasis on institutionalization. Valdes announced
that the UJC doubled its membership during' the last
three years, and that it will continue to expand.
Valdes revealed that the third congress of the UJC
will meet next year in order to implement decisions
made at the party congress in December. Preparations
will also be made at the UJC congress for the 11th
World Youth and Student Congress which will be held
in Cuba in 1978.
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The tone of the speech was reflective of a spirit
of confidence that has seemed to arise among the Cuban
leadership from the knowledge that the years of struggle
are behind them and that the future, to quote Valdes,
"has never been so promising." (UNCLASSIFIED)
April 23, 1975
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