EAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000900160002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 7, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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No Foreign Dissem
East Asia
Secret
1 157 G
May 7, 1975
No. 0095/75
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Background Use Only
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
? 513 (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the East Asia - Pacific Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
? Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
May 7, 1975
The Thai Insurgency--A Current Assessment . . . 1
Indonesia's Army: Diversity in Unity. . . . . . 7
Burma: An Upright Domino. . . . . . . . . . 12
NORTH ASIA
South Korea: Pak Bears Down on Opponents . . . . 14
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The Thai Insurgency--A Current Assessment
One of Bangkok's immediate reactions to Commu-
nist victories in Cambodia and Vietnam has been ap-
prehension that the North Vietnamese will now in-
crease their support of the Thai insurgency. Indeed,
sensationalized Thai press accounts of recent in-
surgent attacks have given many Thai officials the
impression that an "insurgent offensive" has already
begun. Such a prospect seems highly unlikely any
time soon.
The insurgency today is not too different from
what it was five years ago. Despite continued growth,
it is still small, vulnerable, and for the most part
limited to the periphery of the Thai nation and
society. The Thai communists, who are outmanned and
outgunned by the government, would 'probably not
choose to escalate dramatically the tempo of their
military activities at this time. The insurgents
continue to attack only those weakly defended gov-
ernment positions in remote areas of the country.
It seems unlikely that they will change their tactics
any time soon.
The Threat
in the space of ten years the communist move-
ment has grown to some 8,000 insurgents scattered
in three principal areas of the country--the north,
northeast, and south. The character of the insurgency
varies widely from region to region in its level of
sophistication, quality of leadership, armaments,
capabilities, and political impact.
Insurgency in the northeast has achieved a far
higher level of political organization than elsewhere
in Thailand. Some 3,000 insurgents have begun to erode
Bangkok's political control at the village level in
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remote areas near the Laotian border. Although there
has been only a gradual increase in the number of
armed insurgents--some 1,000 have been added to the
ranks over the past seven years--there has been a
significant improvement in military capabilities due
to better leadership, training, and the introduction
of North Vietnamese and Chinese supplied modern arms.
At the same time, the communists' political base re-
mains vulnerable to government civic action programs.
Villager support of the insurgents is based largely
on fear of retribution rather than on dissatisfaction-
with the Bangkok government. Support for the insurgents
is more of a negative phenomenon--a result of Bangkok's
inability to expand its presence into these remote
villages on a permanent basis and keep the insurgents
out of the villages.
In the north, the communists have a strong mili-
tary organizatsan but a weak political base. Signifi-
cantly limiting communist political appeal among the
lowland ethnic Thai is the fact that the bulk of the
insurgents in the north come from the hill tribe popula-
tion. Even among the hill tribes, communist political
control is resented, and many villagers have moved into
the lowlands to avoid insurgent influence.
The strength of the insurgency in the north, in
fact, rests largely on its geographic isolation. The
government's "containment" policy, in effect, concedes
control of mountainous strongholds to the communists,
while concentrating on preventing insurgent expansion
into the lowlands. That there is little insurgent
influence in the lowlands is due largely to local
prejudice against the hill tribes, rather than any
positive support for government programs. The
communists, increasingly sensitive to the prejudice
factor, are now shifting some of their ethnic Thai
leaders from the northeast into the north in an effort
to improve their political appeal among the lowland
Thai, but the odds favor a continuation of the present
stalemate, at least for the next year or so.
May 7, 1975
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The insurgent movement in the south has long
been the stepchild of the Thai Communist effort.
Geographically isolated from the main area of com-
munist interest in the north and northeast, the south
has suffered from lack of capable leadership, money,
and a reliable supply of armaments. While numbering
well over a thousand, the insurgents are no more of
a threat to the government than the sizable number
of bandits and Malaysian separatists that operate
along the Kra Peninsula.
The View from Bangkok
The Khukrit Pramot government's desire for a
rapprochement with Hanoi and Peking is certain to
influence its assessment of and response to the in-
surgency. Some leading officials in the Foreign Min-
istry and military believe that the insurgency is
principally a countermeasure by Asian communist
powers in response to Thailand's close cooperation
with the US in Indochina. This viewpoint, which is
almost certainly shared by Foreign Minister Chatchai
Chunhawan, plays down the threat and holds that sup-
port of the insurgency by Hanoi and Peking is largely
in retaliation for Bangkok's allowing US aircraft to
be based in Thailand. Other civilian officials, while
recognizing the insurgent problem cannot be ignored,
believe that insurgent ranks are predominantly "mis-
guided" people temporarily estranged from Thai society
by corrupt officials and that the problem should. be
solved by political rather than military means. Many
outside the government are openly skeptical of the
threat, believing that the old military regime ex-
aggerated the problem to justify martial law and
large military budgets. These perceptions could, of
course, change if the insurgents choose to become
more visible and step up attacks against government
outposts closer to population centers. Until now,
Thai communist strategists, turning Bangkok's
parochialism to their advantage, have avoided mount-
ing spectacular terrorist acts that would force the
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government to resort to harsher policies and possibly
awaken the general populace to the threat. A change
in this basic approach seems unlikely for the fore-
seeable future.
Nor is it likely that the Khukrit government will
place a higher priority on counterinsurgency programs
than did previous Thai governments. Indeed, student
charges that the government committed atrocities
against the civilian population while combatting
insurgents in 1972 have led many officials to slow
down ongoing government operations. Sensitive to
the student charges, which are still a live political
issue, army planners are recommending that greater
emphasis be placed on civic action programs. Given
the unwieldy nature of the Khukrit coalition, a
consensus on any government strategy for dealing
with the insurgency seems unlikely. For the mordent
at least, it would appear that the path of least
resistance for Thai politicians will be to "solve"
the problem on the diplomatic level in talks with
Peking and Hanoi.
External Support
There can be little doubt that external support
has played an important role in bringing the insur-
gent movement to the point where it is now, and it
will continue to play a vital role in the growth of
the insurgency. Improved tactics and firepower clearly
reflect the benefits derived from Chinese and North
Vietnamese training programs and arms shipments.
While there is not sufficient evidence to estimate
the current level of external support, the insurgents
do not appear to be suffering from shortages of
either arms or supplies. Growth of the insurgent
threat, however, is far from being a simple matter
of increased external support.
what the insurgent movement lacks is not guns,
but a strong political appeal. There is simply no
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issue in Thailand today that would cause large num-
bers of Thai to want to take up arms against their
government. Most Thai own their own land and have
enough to eat. The economy is strong and growing,
and the new government is proving to be responsive
to the needs of the rural population. At the urging
of the Khukrit Pramot government, the National As-
sembly has just passed a bill that will pump mil-
lions of dollars into local development projects.
Bangkok is also working on a new land reform bill
that should open up new land to djsplaced farmers.
Insurgent growth has been limited to the poorest
and most remote areas of the country, where only a
small fraction of the population lives. Even in these
areas, the insurgents have had to resort to terror to
gain the support of the villagers. Continued defec-
tions from these areas suggest that the communist
political base at the village level is tenuous at
best.
Certainly one factor that seriously reduces the
insurgents' political appeal is their outward identi-
fication with Peking. Many insurgent groups sport Mao
badges on their uniforms and carry Mao's "little red
book." Others make no secret of the fact that they
have been trained in North Vietnam, China, or Laos.
In some instances, whole training classes have been
taught in Chinese. It is common knowledge among
educated Thai that the Thai communist radio broad-
casts from Kunming, China.
The communists have also been undercut on the
two issues that have dominated their propaganda the
longest--the US military presence and Thai military
rule. The US presence is dwindling and an elected
government sits in Bangkok. Yet the Thai communist
leadership's rigid embrace of Maoist revolutionary
strategy and the tone of recent propaganda broadcasts
would seem to rule out any shift in strategy from
rural insurgency to "united front" political tactics
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in the urban areas for the foreseeable future.
Indeed, recent communist victories in Indochina
have probably strengthened the convictions of party
hard liners who decided over 20 years ago to take
their struggle to the countryside.
In the final analysis, it will be internal
rather than external factors that will determine
the ultimate success or failure of the insurgency.
Continued government neglect of the problem will
be important to its continued growth. In addition,
the outcome of Thailand's current experiment with
parliamentary democracy could play a crucial role.
A military coup against an elected government be-
fore a public consensus had emerged on its worth
could quickly radicalize large numbers of well-
educated civilians and government officials who
support the concept of representative government.
Some of the nation's youth would certainly see the
communists as offering the only realistic alterna-
tive to resisting a military regime--a development
that would provide the insurgent movement with the
type of leadership personality badly needed if the
insurgency is to expand its membership and widen its
appeal. A quantum jump in Chinese or North Vietnamese
training programs, advisers, and arms shipments can-
not in itself significantly alter the threat unless
the insurgents have the people and organization to
absorb such support. For the near future, the pos-
sibility of significant growth in insurgent ranks
is remote, despite whatever psychological advantage
the movement may have gained from communist victories
in Indochina. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
May 7, 1975
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Indonesia's Army: Diversity in Unity
Indonesia's political stability over the short
term depends on the cohesion of the Indonesian army
which controls the major instruments of national,
political, and economic life. Student discontent,
urban unemployment, rural economic dislocation, and
rampant corruption are symptoms of fundamental prob-
lems that may in time produce social and political
upheaval. Signs of disunity or loss of confidence
among the army leadership would hasten the day, and
President Suharto and the generals who advise him are
acutely aware of this.
Thus far, army leaders have been able to compose
their differences and unite behind Suharto when the
situation requires, as they did after the urban riots
of January 1974. Such unity, however, depends on
agreement among most of the army that a potential
threat to its rule exists and that Suharto represents
the army's best hope for preserving its interests.
More importantly, there must be general consensus on
what the army's overriding interests are and what
methods are best for preserving them.
The Past as Prologue
The present day Indonesian army developed from
a collection of autonomous regional units that fought
the Dutch between 1945 and 1949. This inheritance
resulted in a national army that had weak command-and-
control mechanisms and whose regional commanders had
large amounts of power based on their alliances with
local political and commercial interests. At the
same time, however, the post-revolution army had a
sense of corporate identity as the winner of indepen-
dence, and few of its members had ties to the com-
peting national civilian political groups.
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During the Sukarno years, rivalry within the
military, based on ethnic and religious differences
as well as service and unit loyalties, helped weaken
the army as a political force and often allowed the
former president to ignore his generals' desires.
In addition to its institutional weaknesses in com-
peting for influence under Sukarno, the army was un-
able to devise a convincing, integrated vision of
its role in Indonesian society, and none of Sukarno's
various ideological formulae recognized the army as
an independent component.
During the early 1960s, the high command gradually
became more unified. After the unsuccessful regional
revolts of 1957-58, most non-Javanese officers were
eliminated from the army, bringing a new ethnic homo-
geneity to the officer corps. Javanese dominance of the
army councils, however, exacerbated competition between
the three Java-based divisions.
The army's sense of itself as an elite body with
a mission was also intensified by the beginning of a
philosophy that depicted the army as the embodiment of
the 1945 revolution and of Indonesia's national ethos.
The army's position in society was enhanced when Su-
karno began choosing military men to fill top civil
service posts and to run nationalized foreign enter-
prises. Reorganization of the territorial command
system and other institutional changes chipped away
at the autonomy of regional army commanders.
Centralization under Suharto
Sukarno's political downfall after the abortive
communist coup of September 1965 and the subsequent
rise to power of General Suharto put the army command
in full control of its destiny for the first time.
From the beginning, Suharto stressed the need for a
full-scale reorganization that would guarantee defense
ministry control over the military, army control over
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the defense ministry, and Suharto's personal control
over the army. The military reorganization which
followed greatly enhanced the power of the commander
in chief at the expense of all other elements. Re-
gional officers in particular lost their former free-
dom of action and, in addition, they are now rotated
frequently to prevent the entrenchment of local war-
lords. Improved communications from Jakarta have
contributed greatly to the defense ministry's new
ability to keep close watch over local army affairs.
Army leaders have not neglected the need for ideo-
logical unity. The various military schools and train-
ing courses now provide large doses of an all--encom-
passing philosophy that focuses on the army as the true
embodiment of the national ideology, Pancasila. In-
structors also stress professionalism and mastery of
the military arts. In this way, they hope to create
a self-conscious elite group free of the kinds of ri-
valries that plagued the army in the past.
Such institutional and ideological measures con-
tribute to cohesion largely in the middle and lower
ranks and among the younger generation of officers.
For the generals who run the country, the most signifi-
cant force for unity is their shared belief that dis-
unity will lead to political chaos that could in turn
open the way for a resurgence of leftist political ac-
tivity. The generals lived through the Sukarno era
and remember how their civilian rivals exploited intra-
army competition. In 1973, widespread belief that
dissension existed within the top army leadership un-
doubtedly contributed to the rapid spread of a civilian
protest movement. The ease with which the small-scale
student demonstrations of late 1973 blossomed into
widespread urban violence in Jakarta in January 1974
was interpreted by Suharto and others as an object
lesson in the political perils of army disunity.
These concerns work to Suharto's political advan-
tage. Private and public expressions of independent
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thinking or criticism of government acts have been
consistently discouraged in Suharto's army. Since
assuming power in 1967, Suharto has picked off his
opponents and rivals one by one, enforcing conformity
on recalcitrant generals; otherwise they are exiled
to powerless high prestige jobs or forced into re-
tirement. As a result, Suharto has gradually evolved
from the first among equals to something more closely
approaching authoritarian control. It also works to
Suharto's advantage that even those who might oppose
his leadership could not agree among themselves on a
satisfactory substitute.
Intimations of Mortality
Despite the public display of consensus and the
ideological and institutional changes, competing
cliques still exist. Evidence of disunity in late
1973, while it should not be overstated, nonetheless
demonstrated that there are important chinks in the
public facade. The ostentatious closing of the ranks
in the spring of 1974, although impressive, did not
resolve any of these fundamental problems. Present
army leaders belong to the same generation that won
the revolution, and loyalties to revolutionary com-
rades, territorial units and ethno-religious iden-
tities are still important to them. Moreover, there
is a new built-in tension created by the army's added
role as a government--the cleavage between those pri-
marily responsible for its military-security duties
and those dealing with the civilian-administrative
tasks.
Most of Suharto's efforts to create a unified army
have been directed at disunity arising within the army
as a military institution. Since 1965, however, the
army has operated as much as a political party as an
army--perhaps more so. Army generals spend more time
discussing national political and economic strategies
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than defense problems. As with any civilian politi-
pal party, such amorphous issues easily give rise to
factions based on personalities, interest groups, and
differences over goals and methods. Differences over
how the Suharto government was handling civilian dis-
content, for example, contributed to army disunity in
late 1973.
A new split based on different military genera-
tions is a growing possibility. The top ranks are
filled with those whose careers are based on revolu-
tionary trial by combat in 1945, while the younger of-
ficers are being judged against new standards of pro-
fessional competence. Although the evidence is frag-
mentary, this schism may be reinforced by the new na-
tionalist ideology being taught in the academies. The
younger men are being taught that the army's role is
nation building, whereas many of the older men in posi-
tions of responsibility seem more bent on self-gratifica-
tion. It is not inconceivable that such a split could
give rise to a "colonels' reform movement" within the
army, perhaps with ties to civilian opponents of the
regime.
Another potential source of disunity is the nu-
merous army leaders who, over the years since 1965, have
been forced out of the ruling group. Some of them rep-
resented important groups within the army that may now
feel bereft of a voice in decision making.
Over the short term, however, the main factor af-
fecting continued military cohesion will probably be
whether the generals' historic memory of past conse-
quences of disunity will continue to override their per-
sonal and philosophical differences. A showdown was
avoided in 1974 because General Sumitro and his friends
chose not to contest Suharto's decision to remove Sumitro
from power, but there is no guarantee that future pro-
tagonists will follow suit. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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Burma: An Upright Domino
The Burmese army has fought well and has made
some territorial gains in recent campaigns against
communist insurgents. In the Pegu Yomas area of
central Burma--an old communist stronghold--the
army has successfully completed an operation begun
last fall that wiped out most of the remnants of a
communist force and killed the last two communist
leaders active in this area. In northeast Burma,
government units early this year threw back a series
of attacks by the main communist insurgent force.
Rangoon may now be preparing to follow up these
successes with an offensive against the communists
in the northeast. President Ne Win optimistically
claimed, during a tour of military installations in
the northeast last month, that the army would recap-
ture the eastern Shan State from the communists. He
and Defense Minister Tin 0o recently told subordinates
of plans for such a drive. In a later conversation
the President gave the
impression that he wanted to push the insurgents up
to the border with China.
tae Win's willingness to move more forcefully
against the insurgency may be related, at least in
part, to renewed confidence that such military opera-
tions will not prompt a reaction from Peking. The
President told that he was
encouraged by the relatively low eve of Chinese in-
volvement in recent Burmese communist military activity.
In the past, Ne Win has expressed concern over how "Big
Brother" might respond to Rangoon's efforts against the
Burmese communists. Peking apparently is continuing to
provide them with some supplies, but Chinese support
has been reduced during the past two years.
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Recent communist victories in Indochina may
also figure in Rangoon's military plans. Ne Win has
shown little concern that developments in Indochina
might pose a threat to Burma, but he may hope to
deal the Burmese insurgents a crushing blow before
they can draw encouragement from communist successes
elsewhere and act more aggressively against the Bur-
mese army.
The army probably can make further inroads on
Burmese communist territory, but it lacks the capa-
bility to wipe out the insurgents completely in the
near future. The army reportedly is building up its
troop strength and introducing some tanks into east-
ern Shan State. The Burmese communists, however, have
an estimated 5,000 to 8,000 troops under their com-
mand, and the situation is complicated by the presence
of numerous small ethnic insurgent groups in the re-
gion, including some who cooperate with the communists.
In recent months, several hundred troops from the Shan
State Army have accepted aid and military training
from the Burmese communists. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DIS-
SEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY)
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South Korea: Pak Bears Down on Opponents
President Pak of South Korea is citing an in-
creased threat of attack from the North as justi-
fication for cracking down on his domestic opposi-
tion.
over the past several weeks, the Pak government
has executed eight political prisoners, sent troops
to occupy one major university, closed down many
others, passed an "anti-slander" law curbing politi-
cal dissent, arrested a number of political opponents,
and expelled an American missionary who had been crit-
ical of the regime.
Pak reportedly is planning other steps to con-
trol former political prisoners and to restrict what
he terms left-wing organizational work among the
urban poor and in labor unions by Christian leaders.
The governmen is con-
sidering outlawing any criticism of the government.
This tougher approach reflects, in part, Pak's disap-
pointment with the conciliatory tactics he tried last
winter--the staged national referendum and the release
of some 150 prisoners. These gestures took the steam
out of the anti-Pak movement for a time, but opposition
politicians soon began to speak out again, and univer-
sity students went ahead with their customary spring
demonstrations.
The President's inclination to get tough has
been reinforced by developments in Indochina and by
the recent trip of Kim Il-song to Peking. Pak says
these events increase the threat of attack from the
North. Although obviously dramatizing this threat to
justify suppression of criticism, he does seem alert
to the danger of overdoing it. In a major address on
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April 29, for example, he emphasized that the threat
from the North should not be overestimated.
Pak is aware that a domestic crackdown may lead
to diminished support in the US Congress. He seems,
nevertheless, to have decided that the need for
stricter discipline--demanded by national security--
is`worth the risk, that he will never be able to
satisfy his critics in the US, and that to attempt
it would undermine his position.
Mayor Problems
Pak is convinced that unquestioning acceptance
of his leadership is necessary if South Korea is to
meet the challenge of the tightly disciplined North
Korea. South Korean society, however, has changed
greatly with the economic achievements fostered over
the past 15 years by his own administration. The
educated, largely Westernized, urban middle class is
no longer willing to accept strong man rule. More
and more members of this elite are demanding an open
system, more citizen participation in government, and
greater opportunities for political and economic
change.
Many in the opposition share Pak's concern about
North Korean intentions, but they argue that Pak's
political views are the greater danger to South Korea.
In their view, his increasingly unpopular system,
maintained in large measure by police-state methods,
dilutes national unity and weakens the nation's abil-
ity to stand up to the communists.
The new constitution that Pak pushed through in
a 1972 referendum has become the major target of the
opposition, which objects particularly to provisions
that virtually guarantee Pak the presidency for life.
The opposition demands changes that would provide for
genuine elections for the presidency and the national
legislature.
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Pak faces a number of other potentially serious
problems:
--There are few in the government hier-
archy these days with the temerity to
question Pak's judgments and decisions.
He thus acts with limited information.
--Pak has no ally other than the US to
whom he can turn, and indications of
concern in the US about violations of
civil rights encourage his opponents
to believe they might win US support
for their positions.
--Some South Korean military and security
leaders believe that government troops
and police might refuse to fire on anti-
Pak demonstrators if the chaotic pattern
of the 1960 anti-Rhee riots is repeated.
--Pak faces difficult economic problems.
The South Korean economy depends greatly
on exports, hit hard over the past year
by recession in the industrialized states.
The government is concerned that steep
inflation and rising unemployment in key
export industries could at some point
bring the largely apolitical urban labor
force into active opposition.
Assets
Pak still enjoys some advantages in dealing with
his opponents, who are largely concentrated in Seoul
and a few other major cities. Most of the top army
commanders are loyal to Pak, as are the managers of
the extensive and reasonably effective police and in-
telligence services.
May 7, 1975
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Major business interests probably support Pak,
although there is some concern that Pak's inability
to end demonstrations and unrest could discourage
foreign investment. The regime appears strongest
in the countryside where the peasants are not doing
badly and, in any case, are usually apolitical.
Pak's political shrewdness makes him a tough
adversary; under pressure he digs in, intimidating
most opponents. Some experienced observers point
out that Pak also seems to know when to ease up in
order to avoid provoking explosive reactions.
Outlook
Pak has to decide whether to permit constitu-
tional changes that would allow the opposition a
legitimate and meaningful role, to continue with the
parrot'-and-stick tactics of recent years, or to
clamp down even harder.
Pak is too wary of his political enemies at
home and in the North to let his guard down and to
choose the first option.
The third option, which would mean dropping most
of the appearances of democracy, seems more likely
now than at any time in recent years. Pak may calcu-
late that, in the aftermath of recent events in Indo-
china, the US will be reluctant to appear to be with-
holding support from any established ally, regardless
of its faults. US congressional attitudes, however,
provide some brake on this option.
The outlook is for a continuation of Pak's carrot-
and-stick policies--an essentially hard domestic line,
with an occasional olive branch for the opposition.
This will bring Pak into open conflict, sometimes in
the streets and on the nation's campuses, with South
Korea's nascent middle class. The opposition will try
to keep the pressure on, despite repression.
May 7, 1975
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Pak's authority, however, probably will not be
significantly impaired as long as he is able to avoid
a sharp deterioration in the country's economic and
security conditions. In the absence of such a de-
cline, the North's opportunities for political sub-
version will be very limited. (SECRET)
May 7, 1975
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