STAFF NOTES: SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 16, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

Alk
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000 001-
op Secret
No Foreign Dissem
2UIFT HOUE9 0
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
Top Secret
May 16, 1975
SC No. 00430/75
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
No Dissem Abroad
Background Use OnZy/ControZZed Dissem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NA'iIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Ex,jmpt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
g 5B (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
TOP SECRET UMBRA
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
May 16, 1975
USSR--Libya: Warming
Trend Setting In?.
Vienna Recalls Its
Ambassador to Belgrade . .
. . . . . . . . .
3
Warsaw Pact Anniversary . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
4
Poland: President Gierek? .
. . . . . . . . . . .
6
Romanians Sympathetic
To US on Mayaguez . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
7
Hungary To Negotiate
Textile Agreement with EC.
. . . . . . . . . . .
9
Soviet Ambassador Forbids Demonstration
by Austrian Communist Party. . . . . . . . . . .
10
Key Link Opened on
Trans-Siberian Railroad Project. . . . . . . . .
11
TOP SECRET UMBRA
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
TOP SECRET UMBRA
USSR-Libya: Warming Trend Setting In?
Soviet Premier Kosygin's visit to Libya ap-
pears to have resulted in a general commitment by
Moscow and Tripoli to expand their military and
economic ties and enter into some degree of polit-
ical cooperation.
Kosygin's reception was initially cool, and
it is clear there are still important differences.
The Soviet, however, did hold two conversations
with President Qadhafi that were billed as
"friendly." Judging by Moscow's account, the com-
munique marking the end of the visit was notably
more positive than the one issued after Libyan
Prime Minister Jallud's visit to Moscow last year.
Moscow's rapidly growing military sales to
Libya were undoubtedly discussed, and new agree-
merits may well have been reached. A Soviet mili-
tary delegation had preceded Kosygin to Libya,
and a senior military aid specialist was in his
entourage.
Kosygin brought
with im a pledge to increase the number of tanks
Moscow will sell Tripoli from 600 to 1,200 and in-
clude 200 of Moscow's latest model--the T-72--among
them. So far, the Soviets have not exported the
T-72--which 0001 equipped with laser, un sights and
computers, the Libyans
will raise t ing on ovie military techni-
cians allowed in the country from 300 to 600.
Moscow last year entered into a major mili-
tary deal with Libya and has gradually been de-
livering promised weapons. The Soviet desire to
get some of Libya's oil money is one important
factor behind the sales.
TOP SECRET UMBRA
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
TOP SECRET UMBRA
Diffezences between the two countries over a
Middle East settlement were on open display. Kosygin
said publicly that Geneva should be reconvened in
order to ensure the independence of "all" states--a
clear allusion to Israel. Although the Soviets con-
tinue to cell for Arab unity in dealing with Israel,
it is unlikely that Moscow has much expectation of
swaying the Libyans.
Libyan Prime Minister Jallud met with the head
of one of the mos-: extreme fedayeen groups on the
eve of Kosygin's visit to make plain Libya's con-
tinued support for radical Arabs. Tripoli also de-
leted references to Geneva from its account of
Kosygin's speech.
Antagonism to Egypt is a key reason Moscow and
Libya began to search last year for ways to put
their relations on a better footing. Both will
therefore be pleased at Sadat's anxious reaction to
Kosygin's visit. In an interview Wednesday, the
Egyptian said the trip "poses a strange question
mark" in v:'-ew of the "legendary dimensions" of Mos-
cow's arms commitments to Tripoli.
Sadat will -probably take particular note of
the commun:Lque's statement that Moscow and Libya
have many "identical interests" and its call for
regular consultations aimed at closer political
coordination. Such phrases are new to the Libyan-
Soviet relationship. Although Moscow and Tripoli
hope this Language will increase Sadat's nervous-
ness, it i,= doubtful that their relationship has
yet reached the point where they are actively con-
certing against Egypt. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/
NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE
ONLY)
Phone: [phone]
May 16, 1975
'TOP SECRET UMBRA
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
TOP SECRET UMBRA
Vienna Recalls Its Ambassador to Belgrade
Vienna recalled its ambassador to Belgrade on
May 15 in reaction to what it described as the "ex-
ceedingly peculiar and astonishing statement of
the Yugoslav government" on the 20th anniversary of
the Austrian state treaty.
The top Yugoslav governmental body, the Fed-
eral Executive Council, had published a statement on
May 13 charging Vienna with failure "to implement in
good faith in relation to Yugoslavia the fundamental
provisions of this treaty." Among the many charges
leveled at Vienna were national intolerance, hatred,
and territorial irredentism, and allowing to go un-
punished the activities of Yugoslav emigre organiza-
tions that "launch terrorist actions" from Austria
against Yugoslavia.
Milika Sundic, radio Zagreb's authoritative com-
mentator, added fuel to the fire on May 15 when he
attacked not only Vienna's alleged lax observance of
the treaty, but also Austrian Chancellor Kreisky per-
sonally. Sundic described Kreisky's reaction to Bel-
grade's statement as being the most "crude and in-
sipid" to be heard "for a long time." Reminding the
Austrian chancellor that Hitler's propagandist Goebbels
indulged in similar rhetoric, Sundic acidly remarked
that "Austria has not ceased to plot with the vestiges
of Naziism since the day it acquired its independence."
Kreisky--who is running for re-election in October
--could hardly have ignored the official Yugoslav de-
marche, since it came at a time when many high-level
foreign delegations were in Vienna to mark the state
treaty anniversary. The governing Socialist Party
managed to retain all its seats in recent provisional
elections in Carinthia by taking a tough stand on the
issue of Yugoslav minorities in Austria, and this, too,
may have contributed to Vienna's strong reaction.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
May 16, 1975
TOP SECRET UMBRA
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
TC-P SECRET UMBRA
Warsaw Pact Anniversary
Moscow used the twentieth anniversary cele-
bration of the Warsaw Pact this week to urge again
the need for greater foreign policy coordination
among the pact members.
The Soviets had hoped to announce the crea-
tion of a permanent committee of pact foreign min-
isters and a pact secretariat headed by a strong
Soviet secretary general. They were stymied by
the Romanians, whose concern over Soviet domina-
tion has led them to fight similar ideas in the
past. These differences may have prompted the can-
cellation of Soviet plans for an anniversary sum-
mit in Moscow and. the convening instead of pact
parliamentarians in Warsaw to celebrate the oc-
casion. According to a Romanian diplomat, there is
a possibility that. a pact summit could take place
in early June after the NATO chiefs of government
meeting.
In an anniversary speech Soviet Foreign Min-
ister Gromyko reiterated B:rezhnev's long-standing
intention, also echoed in substance by Pravda and
by the Warsaw Pact commander Soviet Marshal Yaku-
bovsky, to make the pact "the main center for co-
ordinating the fraternal countries' foreign policy."
The Soviet statements did not spell out precisely
how pact coordination would be enhanced, but the
"leading role" of the pact's political consulta-
tive committee was singled out for praise. Gromyko
also extolled the use of bloc summit meetings out-
side the Warsaw ].Pact framework, perhaps as a way
of signall:Lng Moscow's determination to ride herd
on the foreign policies of the pact members even
if structural changes in the pact organization are
not immediately forthcoming.
May 16, 1975
-. 4-
T()P SECRET UMBRA
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
TOP SECRET UMBRA
Gromyko indicated that in pushing the pact to-
ward greater foreign policy coordination, Moscow
has no intention of diminishing its usefulness as
a mechanism for Soviet control in Eastern Europe.
He stated that the pact served as a "reliable
shield" for the "gains of socialism," a clear ref-
erence to the pact's police functions in Eastern
Europe, and that the pact was based on the "granite
foundations of proletarian internationalism," the
Soviet rationale for the 1968 invasion of Czecho-
slavakia.
In the area of military coordination, Gromyko
broadened the pact's pledge of mutual aid "in the
event of an armed attack by an aggressor" by de-
leting the treaty language calling for such aid if
the attack took place in Europe. This will once
again raise the specter of Warsaw Pact troops being
used in any fighting along the Chinese border.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
May 16, 1975
TOP SECRET UMBRA
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
TOP SECRET UMBRA
joland: President Gierek?
the Polish
regime will soon create the position of Presidency
of the Republic, which Gierek will take over to sup-
plement his post of party first secretary. The par-
liament may establish the presidency when it meets
later this month to approve Gierek's wide-ranging re-
organization of the Polish bureaucracy.
do not indicate whether the party
chief will be president ex officio, as has been the
case at some lower levels of the Polish administrative
bureaucracy, nor do they indicate what powers the pres-
ident would have. Under the present system, the chief
of state is the Chairman of the Council of State, and
has very little political authority.
generally imply that Gierek's power
woul be en ance under the new system, but we suspect
that Gierek would accept the presidency largely for
reasons of prestige. As president under the law, he
would avoid the protocol problems that face an East
European party boss who is not also chief of state.
Party chiefs Tito and Ceausescu both hold the office of
president, and Bulgaria's party boss, Todor Zhivkov,
is chief of state. There are strong indications that
Czechoslovakia's Eusak will assume the presidency by
the end of the month, while retaining the party's top
office.
In any case, the real center of power in Poland
will remain within the party Politburo. Current in-
dications are that Gierek will almost certainly be re-
elected first secretary at the 7th party congress in
December. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/
BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
May 16, 1975
TOP SECRET UMBRA
25X1 C
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
TOP SECRET UMBRA
Romanians Sympathetic to US on Mayaguez
Foreign Minister Macovescu has said
that Bucharest understands the US decision to re-
trieve the Mayaguez and its crew from the Cambodians.
Macovescu added that he had "great admiration" for
Washington's conduct of its affairs in Indochina in
recent weeks.
Speaking to the US ambassador on May 15, Maco-
vescu commented that he knew the President's decision
must have been very difficult, and hoped Washington
had observed that Bucharest "played it quiet" during
the crisis. As trying as the situation might be in
the Far East, Macovescu continued, the rest of the
world will, fairly or unfairly, look to the US as the
principal source of stability in the region.
Macovescu's comments were no doubt intended to
offset Bucharest's public reiteration of the line taken
by other Warsaw Pact members earlier this week, but a
show of strength by the US is not regarded by the Ro-
manians--in private at least--as altogether a bad
thing. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE
ONLY)
MM
Phone: - 1
May 16, 1975
TOP SECRET UMBRA
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
 25X1D Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
TOP SECRET UMBRA
Hungary To Negotiate Textile Agreement with EC
Hungary and Romania have told the EC that they
are prepared to negotiate textile agreements with
the community.
These would be the first formal negotiations be-
tween the EC Commission and individual CEMA countries
since Soviet-inspired efforts to establish an overall
CEMA-EC relationship got under way more than a year
ago. The textile talks will be taking place in the
context of the international Multilateral Fiber
Agreement, to which both Hungary and Romania are sig-
natories.
EC officials probably see the Hungarian decision
as a hopeful sign that the EC can establish direct
contacts with individual CEMA countries. In the past,
EC members have responded cautiously to overtures for
a CEMA-EC accord because of their reluctance to have
all dealings with member countries channeled through
the CEMA organizational structure.
Budapest--unlike maverick Romania--has recently
shown little disposition to independent flirtations
with the EC, presumably so as not to give the appear-
ance of undercutting higher level CEMA-EC talks. It
may have decided on its own to go ahead, but more likely
advised Moscow of its plans. The Soviets may have
raised no objections because they calculated that Hun-
gary's difficult economic situation, the lack of progress
in the CEMA-EC dialogue, and the special nature of the
talks all argued for an exception in thin case. (UN-
CLASSIFIED)
Phone: - 41
May 16, 1975
TOP SECRET UMBRA
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
TOP SECRET UMBRA
Soviet. Ambassador Forbids Demonstrations
by Austrian Communist Party
Soviet Ambassador Yefremov has flatly for-
bidden the Austrian Communist Party or its sub-
sidiary orcranizations to participate in any demon-
strations during Secretary Kissinger's meeting
with Gromyko next week or the President's meeting
with Sadat on June 1. Yefremov's original order
was conveyed to the Austrian party on May 5 and
was repeated on May 9 after the Austrian party had
been invited by the Association of Austrian So-
cialist Students to join in a demonstration sched-
uled for the arrival of President Ford at the Salz-
burg airport. The Austrian communists estimated
that prior to the US action against Cambodia, the
student association would have been able to muster
only about 200 demonstrators without .,ommunist
support.
The Soviets have imposed similar restrictions
during previous appearances of US leaders in Aus-
tria, and their orders have been carried out, al-
though other leftists did stage demonstrations.
(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
M
Phone: -
May 16, 1975
TOP SECRET UMBRA
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
TOP SECRET UMBRA
Ku Link Opened
On Trans-Siberian Railroad Project
Operations began May 8 on a 110-mile rail line
linking the main Trans-Siberian line at Skovorodino
and a major construction base at Tynda.
The Tynda base, until now accessible only by
highway over difficult terrain, will serve as a
center for construction work eastward and westward
on the central section of the important Baykal-Amur
railroad project.
Work on the 2,000-mile project began in mid-
1974 and is scheduled for completion in 1982. The
line will extend from a junction with the Trans-
Siberian railroad west of Lake Baykal to the Amur
river at Komsomolsk, running as much 200 miles north
of the existing Trans-Siberian railroad, which runs
near the Chinese border.
The Baykal-Amur line will be a principal over-
land route for export traffic to Soviet Pacific
ports; it will be several hundred miles shorter than
the Trans-Siberian.
From Tynda, a railroad will also be built north-
ward to the rich coal fields at Chulman. (UNCLASSIFIED)
P one 143-7931
May 16, 1975
-11-
TOP SECRET UMBRA
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0
Top Secret
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000010001-0