STAFF NOTES: SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001000170002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 22, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01000170002-2
54nAPP a
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
Secret
No Foreign Dissem
Secret
May 22, 1975
No. 0099/75
Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01000170002-2
~?
 Approved For Release 2001 /Ig/17,iPI 4- P791Q&5A001000170002-2
Background Use OnZy/ControZZed Dissem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
? 513 (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001000170002-2
 Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : 01J00865A001000170002-2
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
May 22, 1975
USA Institute Officials Hedge on
Strategic Arms Reductions . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Soviet Trade Union Plenum Fails To Name
Successor to Shelepin . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Soviets Deal Cautiously with
Portuguese Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Soviets Annoyed at Chinese Meddling
in Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Some Probable Successors as President of
USSR Academy of Sciences. . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Soviet Car Sales in the West. . . . . . . . . . . 6
USSR: New Cargo Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
i
Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01000170002-2
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2001/05/17: dh.@MVW00865AO01000170002-2
USA Institute Officials Hedge
on Strategic Arms Reductions
L. S. Semeyko, a strategic specialist in the
USA Institute, has backtracked on his suggestion to
US officials in March (Staff Notes, March 13, 1975)
that a 20-30 percent reduction in Soviet strategic
weapon systems was possible immediately following
conclusion of a SALT II agreement.
Semeyko and a senior institute colleague,
M. A. T71lshtein, recently told US diplomats that
the 20-30 percent reduction was largely a personal
perception. Semeyko now predicts that any initial
reduction would probably be less than 10 percent.
He also said that any specific proposals on reduc-
tions should come from the US rather than the USSR
and endorsed proposals he attributed to Senator
Jackson which would begin reductions by retiring
obsolete systems.
Semeyko's new stand is closer to the official
Soviet position, which envisions reductions in the
post-1980 period if the problems of nuclear forces
of third countries and of US forward-based systems
can be resolved. While academicians are obviously
studying a range of possible reductions, the USA
Institute would be concerned about having its people
stray very far from the official line on this sub-
ject of delicate bilateral negotiation. Soviet lead-
ers themselves have affirmed Moscow's interest in
eventual strategic reductions, but studiously avoided
specifics. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE
ONLY)
one: - 285
May 22, 1975
-1-
Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : C 4 - 4
 Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : ?"T7rT00865A001000170002-2
Soviet Trade Union Plenum Fails To
Name Successor to Shelepin
The failure of the Soviet trade union plenum
yesterday to name a successor to Aleksandr Shelepin,
whom it retired as a trade union head, suggests that
in this as in other :recent personnel shifts, the
regime is undecided or perhaps deadlocked on whom
to choose. The trade union post carries little
power in itself, but usually calls for full or
candidate Politburo membership. The filling of this
vacancy, like that of former party secretary Petr
Demichev, involved patronage and will thus play a
role in the political maneuvering and shifts of
alignment that will gather momentum prior to next
February's party congress.
Most previous heads of the Soviet trade unions
have had considerable party experience and have
usually held either candidate or full membership on
the Politburo. The job has only rarely served as a
stepping stone to higher office, however, and has
not been a significant power base in itself. An-
nouncement of a new trade unions chief may be de-
layed until arrangements for further shifts in the
leadership have been completed.
There are: unconfirmed but plausible reports in
Moscow that Shelepin will be named a deputy chairman
of the State Committee for Vocational and Technical
Education. Since Stalin's death, high-ranking party
officials whose careers have collapsed have been
allowed to retire, sent into diplomatic exile, or
appointed to minor government jobs. Shelepin at 56
is too young to retire. Diplomatic exile seems out
of the question in view of the hostile reception he
received during his brief visit to the UK this spring.
His former colleagues, who apparently regarded him
as an overly volatile combination of ability and
ambition, would regard the deputy chairmanship of a
relatively unimportant state committee as an ap-
propriate form of "government exile." (CONFIDENTIAL)
May 22, 1975
Approv
 Approved For Release 2001/05/17S1LAA19T00865A001000170002-2
Soviets Deal Cautiously
with Portuguese Situation
As the political situation in Portugal becomes
increasingly heated, the Soviets apparently are
advising the Portuguese Communist Party with re-
newed urgency to cling tightly to the skirts of
the Armed Forces Movement.
The head of a Soviet youth organization who
met with the entire Politburo of the Portuguese
Communist Party in late April, told an Austrian
colleague on May 13 that the Portuguese party can
increase its influence only in cooperation with
the Armed Forces Movement. All "progressive" and
communist groups, he said, should do everything in
their power to strengthen the position of the Move-
ment. The Soviet official expressed concern that
"rightist elements" in the army returning from
Angola in November could create a dangerous turn-
ing point in the Portuguese situation.
Careful cultivation of the Armed Forces Move-
ment has been the backbone of Soviet policy in
Portugal since the overthrow of the old regime.
Moscow has recognized that the military control
the political process, and good relations with the
Movement, give the Soviets a hedge if the fortunes
of the Communist Party go the route of other Por-
tuguese parties. The Soviets cannot be pleased
that an open breach seems to be developing between
the Portuguese Communists and at least some impor-
tant elements of the Armed Forces Movement.
The Soviets continue, however, to be uneasy
over future policies of the Movement. Moscow's
misgivings about the Portuguese situation are also
reflected in its diffident media coverage of de-
velopments there. The Soviets press has been
avoiding the subject, and has published no major
editorial on Portuguese events since the elections
of April 25. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
ER 25X1A
one: i- 25X1A
May 22, 1975
Approved For Release 2001/05/1 7? f yfq,9T00865A001000170002-2
A_ X
 Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : J Tf 00865AO01000170002-2
Soviets Annoyed at Chinese
Mc~ inq in Western Europe
Soviet sensitivity to Chinese diplomacy in
Western Europe has become very evident in the wake
of Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's recent visit to
France. The Soviets have accused Peking of attempt-
ing to undermine detente and to return Europe to the
worst days of the cold war and have charged that
Teng's mission in France was another Chinese effort
to unite Europe against the Soviet Union.
The volume of Moscow's propaganda on the Teng
visit and the appointment of a Chinese representative
to the EC suggests that the Soviets are genuinely
concerned that Peking will have some success in rally-
ing anti-Soviet forces in Western Europe to impede
progress toward winding up the European Security talks
and to complicate whatever plan Moscow has for a
follow-up. Soviet propaganda has stressed that Chi-
nese contacts with conservative politicians like
Edward Heath and Franz-Josef Strauss reflect a common
feeling of anti-Sovietism and hostility toward detente.
Moscow has also linked Chinese efforts to rally
opposition to European security measures with Peking's
opposition to a Soviet-sponsored Asian security pro-
gram. The Asian program, announced six years ago in
Moscow, has not taken on specific form but its ob-
vious anti-Chinese intent has been clear all along.
In tying Asian to European security in this way,
Moscow may be suggesting that the conclusion of CSCE
will enable it to present a formal framework for
Asian security arrangements. (UNCLASSIFIED)
Phone: 143-7 85
May 22, 1975
-4--
Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01000170002-2
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : ~ M-t00865A001000170002-2
Some Probable Successors as President
of the USSR Academy of Sciences
Leading the list of probable successors to
M. V. Keldysh, who submitted his long-expected res-
ignation from the post of Academy president on May
19, is B. Ye. Paton, president of the Ukrainian
Academy of Sciences. In fact, Paton told an East
European scientist last March that he was slated
for the job. It may not be all that cut and dried,
but Paton would seem to have all the necessary qual-
ifications. The 56-year-old Paton was born in the
Ukraine but is of Russian descent. He is a respected
scientist and current member of the academy Presidium,
which would make him acceptable to his academician
colleagues. As a voting member of the central com-
mittees of the CPSU and the Ukrainian party, as well
as deputy chairman of the Council of the Union of the
USSR Supreme Soviet and a member of the Ukrainian
Supreme Soviet Presidium, he enjoys high status in
both the party and state.
Paton is known for his practical application
of research and his contributions to the Soviet
economy, particularly to the heavy machine industry.
This will be a plus for the Soviet leadership which
has complained that the academy places too much em-
phasis on basic research. Other candidates for the
presidency of the academy are: Yuriy Ovchinnikov,
at age 411 the youngest of the academy's vice presi-
dents, who has had a very rapid rise in the academy
hierarchy; Anatoliy Logunov, 48, who was recently
appointed first vice president and is now technically
second in position to the president; and Nikolay
Basov, 53, a member of the Presidium and director
of the prestigious Physics Institute imeni P. N.
Lebedev. (CONFIDENTIAL NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED
DISSEM)
May 22, 1975
SOURCES:
App
 Approved For Release 2001/05/17c3PCAJp9T00865A001000170002-2
Soviet Car Sales in the West
The USSR's early success in building up markets
in the West for its passenger cars faded in the past
year in the wake of recession and inflation in key
market countries. In 1973, the peak export year,
the USSR shipped a total of 60,000 cars to the West,
mainly to Western Europe. In the UK, sales rose to
18,000 in 1973, but dropped to about 7,000 last year.
Sales are also declining in West Germany and a number
of other West European countries.
The Soviets have pushed the sale of their low-
priced cars so aggressively that some Western manu-
facturers complain of dumping. For example, in the
UK the Lada is priced at $2,400--23 percent below
the price of its Italian counterpart, the Fiat 124--
and the Moskvich sells for $1,800. After several
years of double digit inflation, British car prices
start at around $3,000. Nevertheless, the Soviet
cars sold poorly in :1974 at the several hundred
dealerships in the UK, and inventories are high at
the new $1.5 million distribution center opened
last year at Carnaby.
Western car builders have not viewed the So-
viets as serious competitors because, until re-
cently, Soviet cars were poorly built, sales and
service organizations inadequate, and the output
small. The quality of new cars has substantially
improved since the USSR opened its new Fiat plant
at Tolyatti. Moreover, the industry is no longer
small. Over 600,000 cars in several models from
the Tolyatti plant and 300,000 newly designed Mosk-
viches are turned out annually. The USSR can easily
expand exports to the West several fold when market
conditions improve. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DIS-
SEM)
May 22, 1975
25X1A
Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01000170002-2
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : C 7b*0865A001000170002-2
USSR: New Cargo Aircraft
The USSR's new medium- to long-range IL-76 jet
cargo aircraft recently began regular civil air op-
erations in western Siberia.
Earlier this year, Civil Aviation Minister
Bugayev had hinted that the IL-76 would be entering
service, and the Soviets are known to have run a
series of test flights between cities in European
Russia and Siberia. The Soviet military has received
most of the estimated 19 IL-76s that have been pro-
duced, however, and the aircraft will be used pri-
marily as a military cargo transport.
Current production of the IL-76 is running at
one per month. The four-engine turbofan aircraft
can carry a payload of some 17 tons for up to 5,300
nautical miles, or 44 tons for up to 2,800 miles.
(CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
25X1A
one: - 931 25X1A
ti
May 22, 1975
-7-
Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : gMRP JT00865A001000170002-2
 Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01000170002-2
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01000170002-2