SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001000320001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 29, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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No Foreign Dissem
gul~~ JE1UE
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
Top Secret
May 29, 1975
SC No. 00436/75
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No D2ssem Abroad
Background Use Only/Controlled Dissem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. O. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B (1), (2). and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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GAMMA ITEM
SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
May 29 , 1975
Soviet Concessions Offered
on CSCE Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Polish Parliament Enacts Reforms. . . . . . . . . 3
Poland: Military Officers Question
Party's Explanations of Economic Problems . . . 4
Yugoslavia After Tito--Part I . . . . . . . . . . 5
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Soviet Concessions Offered on CSCE Issues
The Soviets have offered several signifi-
cant concessions intended to hasten the conclusion
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe.
The Soviet concessions apparently were timed
to influence the NATO summit meeting at Brussels
and to enhance the prospect for a summit-level
conclusion to the security conference in July.
During lunch with the heads of the US, UK, and
French delegations, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
Kovalev offered, as a "gesture of goodwill," to ac-
cept a number of Western proposals in the area of
human contacts and information, which has been the
key hurdle to completion of the negotiations. He
said the USSR would accept that section of the
Western text which facilitates international travel.
Kovalev also accepted the Western text in-
tended to prevent the expulsion of journalists
engaged in legitimate professional activity. This
step is a major Soviet concession on an issue many
Western delegates had regarded as hopelessly dead-
locked. He added that the USSR would meet the
West halfway in terms of a commitment on the sub-
ject of family reunification and would agree to
a paragraph on international broadcasting that
would avoid a statement on national responsibility
for such transmissions.
The NATO allies, who began discussing the So-
viet proposal yesterday, generally have indicated
a strong desire to wrap up the remaining issues.
They are agreed, however, that these issues will
require difficult and time-consuming negotiations
and that a united front may elicit additional So-
viet concessions. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
May 29, 1975
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Polish Parliament Enacts Reforms
On Wednesday the parliament (Sejm) enacted
party chief Gierek's massive reform of Poland's
territorial-administrative structure (Staff Notes,
April 14, May 19).
The changes will go into effect June 1, and
Prime Minister Jaroszewicz has made clear that
there can be no delay in their implementation.
the reform will affect 250,000 people, including
120,000 party workers. Of these, 50,000 will be
retired. Other have claimed that more
than 100,000 governmen workers would be involved.
The Sejm also ratified several personnel
changes in the Council of Ministers. As a result
of the administrative reform, two former provin-
cial party first secretaries were named to head
important ministries. The embassy reports rumors
that a close associate of Gierek, Katowice first
secretary Zdzislaw Grudzien, will soon be promoted
to membership on the party secretariat and polit-
buro.
Gierek's plans will be complicated by the
apparent loss of politburo member and Deputy Pre-
mier Mieczyslaw Jagielski.
he suffered a serious heart attack ear-
ier is month, and a Polish journalist says that
he has less than a fifty percent chance for full
recovery. Jagielski is the politburo member re-
sponsible for economic planning, the ranking
deputy premier, and chairman of the state planning
commission. His loss would deprive Gierek of one
of Poland's most experienced and able party eco-
nomic planners and managers. (CONFIDENTIAL)
May 29, 1975
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Poland: Military Officers Question Party's
Explanations of Economic Problems
Some military officers, like many civilians,
have apparently not been convinced by the official
explanations of Poland's current economic problems
(see Staff Notes, April 21).
a "serious in-
cident" took p ace at the Military olitical Academy
last month during a lecture by an economic special-
ist of the Central Committee. The party official
was shouted down at least twice by officers who
demanded that he "tell the truth and stop talking
nonsense." One officer said he had heard the "same
old story" for 30 years and criticized the speaker
for trying to talk down to the members of the class
as if they were little children. He was applauded
by his classmates.
This incident probably reflects more discon-
tent with the party's explanations than with the
economic situation itself. The officers at this
school are sophisticated senior political workers
whose job it is tc justify party decisions to the
troops. They apparently felt they would need more
than the pat explp-.nations and partial information
that were offered. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/
NO DISSEM ABROAD/E>ACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED
DISSEM)
May 29, 1975
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Yugoslavia After Tito
Tito's eighty-third birthday last Sunday found
Yugoslavia facing a potentially complicated succes-
sion, wrestling with chronic problems in ensuring
its independence and domestic order, and nervously
testing the winds of change in Europe. To prepare
his country for a future without him, Tito has
strengthened and modernized the armed forces against
external threats and has liberally applied the stick
to those internal factions that forget that federal
interests always outweigh parochial concerns. We
present the first of a two-part series assessing
the outlook for Yugoslavia after Tito.
Background
The united kingdom of Yugoslavia created after
World War I was threatened continually by irreden-
tist neighbors and was flawed from the start by
deeply ingrained internal divisions during its short
and troubled lifespan. The royalist regime's deci-
sion to seek security by joining the Axis at the on-
set of World War II sharpened internal dissent, and
Hitler's invasion of the country in 1941 effectively
ended Yugoslav sovereignty. The invasion fostered
bitter partisan warfare both against Nazi troops
and local collaborators and between the various
partisan groups.
Then, as now, Yugoslavia lacked genuine security
guarantees. However, linking the national fate to
a more powerful, self-seeking foreign power proved
as unsuitable after the war--when Moscow briefly
played the role of patron--as did the first attempt.
Since Yugoslavia's ouster from the Cominform in 1948,
Tito has rejected all binding ties with major foreign
powers.
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The Threat from the East
Throughout the postwar era, Yugoslavia's most
persistent foreign policy problem has been to main-
tain an acceptable working relationship with Moscow.
Tito has by turns defied and placated successive
Soviet leaderships, but he has constantly refused
to become a pliant subordinate of the Kremlin. In-
deed, he has stressed developing healthy suspicions
of the Soviets among all levels of Yugoslav society
--and succeeded sc well that during his rapprochements
with Khrushchev and Brezhnev, he had to force some
doubting subordinates to go along. On the other hand,
his periodic diatribes against alleged western "im-
perialist" intrigues have never evoked the patriotic
outbursts that followed his struggle with Stalin and
the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
His most recent effort to patch up old quarrels
and work out a new, basis for friendship with Moscow
reached a new height after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war,
when Tito--in an unusually unguarded assessment--af-
firmed his "trust and confidence" in the Soviets.
Shortly thereafter, a major arms sale was initialed,
and talks began or an exchange of intelligence.
The period of" "trust and confidence" lasted less
than six months. The discovery in April 1974 of a
Soviet-supported subversive group inside Yugoslavia,
and Tito's denunciation of the plot--after six months
of probing Moscow's motives--triggered a slide toward
cooler relations.
Yugoslavia and Detente
Belgrade's open misgivings about detente--both
the US-Soviet version and its European variant--re-
flect Yugoslav suspicions that the great powers have
entered into private arrangements that ignore Yugo-
slav interests. Belgrade is increasingly uneasy over
May 29, 1975
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Moscow's continued ability to assert its control in
the Warsaw Pact countries, when NATO--particularly
the southern flank--is sinking into disarray. The
prospect that the European security talks will en-
dorse Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe contributes
to Yugoslav fears that the Soviets will feel free to
nibble away at Yugoslav sovereignty without risking
a serious Western response.
A seldom mentioned--but crucial--tenet of the
Yugoslav interpretation of nonalignment holds that
Belgrade remains free to join militarily with any
country--socialist or capitalist--when the nation
is in immediate danger. This position necessitates
wide-ranging flexibility in foreign policy and pre-
sumes that an invasion of Yugoslavia would so threaten
the political balance in Europe as to generate foreign
support for Belgrade.
The prospect of increasing Soviet influence in
European affairs has prompted the Yugoslavs to begin
a round of exploratory talks in Western capitals.
Belgrade's representatives seem to be probing Western
resolve to help Yugoslavia should the need arise.
Regime planners are taking pains, however, to avoid
precipitating a collision with the USSR. To this
end, Premier Bijedic recently visited both Moscow and
Washington, and will reportedly also visit Peking.
The military in particular are canvassing West-
ern arms producers and establishing more active con-
tacts with Western high commands. During the past
six months, several exchanges have taken place be-
tween Yugoslav military leaders and their US, French,
British, and Swedish counterparts.
Belgrade's Balkan Policies
Despite its misgivings about detente, Yugoslavia
remains a vocal advocate of decreased tensions in
May 29, 1975
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Europe. Its location on the Balkan peninsula plays
a key role in its desire to help raise the flash
point of potential conflict.
For the home audience, Yugoslav news and propa-
ganda media constant=ly harp on real or imagined
threats to the national security from Yugoslavia's
neighbors--most of whom were forced to modify their
territorial designs after Yugoslav borders were re-
drawn in 1945. The audience! is sympathetic.
Periodic eruptions of bad feeling toward Vienna,
Sofia, and Rome have not diminished appreciably de-
spite detente. Over the past few years, Tito's im-
patience with the failure of his neighbors to accom-
modate him on disputed questions has, if anything,
grown. He fears they are deliberately keeping their
options open against the possibility of Yugoslav in-
stability after he dies. Although Belgrade's immod-
erate outbursts do not contribute to reduced tensions,
they do serve both to warn against miscalculations of
Belgrade's resolve and to remind Yugoslavs--particu-
larly the youth--of the consequences of fratricidal
bickering.
In the east, Belgrade's relations with its commu-
nist neighbors range from extremely close cooperation
with Romania to deliberate baiting of Bulgaria as an
irredentist, anti-Yugoslav pawn of Moscow. To the
south, Yugoslavia is wooing the new regime in Athens
that is groping for more autonomy in NATO, and has
tried to be responsive to Albania's generally more
conciliatory attitude.
The Nonaligned Movement--Moving at Last?
Since the first efforts in the 1950s to shape
the "Third World" into an international force, Bel-
grade has loudly trumpeted the potential benefit of
Yugoslav identification with the nonaligned world.
May 29, 1975
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Nevertheless, the gains from Tito's energetic in-
volvement have amounted to little more than increased
prestige and a growing sense of international in-
fluence.
The newfound cohesion of Third World voters in
the UN and the sharply increased economic strength
of the OPEC countries has, however, convinced many
doubting Yugoslavs that their nonaligned course could
pay off. Although the nonaligned world is still far
from being able to protect member states from outside
aggression, some Yugoslavs believe that the movement
could ultimately achieve this capability. Indeed,
Belgrade's substantial military aid to the Arabs in
1973 may well have been devised as an obligation that
can be called in if the need arises. (SECRET NO FOR-
EIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CON-
TROLLED DISSEM)
May 29, 1975
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