SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001200280001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 14, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 26, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
rL\cP LNJ@YEflE
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
State Department review completed
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L.. p0
June 26, 1975
No. 0739/75
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
June 26, 1975
Soviets Relaxed on Middle East . . . . . . . . . 1
Brezhnev's Wartime Authority. . . . . . . . . . . 2
East Germany: Doctrine of Two German
Nations Reiterated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Yugoslavia and the Communist Conference. . . . . 5
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Sovie'ts' Relaxed on Middle East
The acting chief of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's
Near East division was unusually relaxed in a recent
discussion with a US official in Moscow. He reaf-
firmed what has been apparent for some time, that Mos-
cow does not intend to push for an early reconvening
of the Middle East conference.
He suggested that Moscow believes the Middle
East initiative again rests with the US and that there
is little the Soviets can do at the moment to affect
the situation significantly. His remarks are in line
with the minimal public attention Moscow has been
giving the Middle East situation.
The Soviet official, however, reiterated the So-
viet contention that attempts at a Middle East settle-
ment will prove futile unless the interests of other
parties, including the Soviets, are taken into account.
He claimed to be "astonished" that the US seemed to
be ignoring the Palestinian question, which he said
was the central issue of the conflict. Although the
Soviet official suggested several ways the matter of
Palestinian attendance could be handled at Geneva,
the implication of his remarks was that the Soviets
retain the option of intensifying their support of
Palestinian demands if the US continues to exclude
Moscow from the settlement process.
The official made no effort to use the developing
Soviet-Libyan relationship to suggest that the Soviets
had a new iron in the Middle East fire, or that Mos-
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would move to support the "rejectionists" if it
continued to be cut out of the negotiating process.
Responding to a question, he said that the Soviet po-
sition on a Middle East settlement had been "made
clear" to the Libyans by Premier Kosycxin.
June 26, 1975
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Brezhnev's Wartime Authority
In time of war, Soviet Communist Party General
Secretary Brezhnev will become the Supreme Commander
in Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces, according to a
Soviet military officer on the SALT Standing Consul-
tative Commission (SCC).
The office recently told a US adviser to the
SCC that Defense Minister Grechko is now commander
in chief and would remain so as long as the Soviet
Union is not at war. He went on to state, however,
that in the event of war Brezhnev would follow Stalin's
example and assume command of the armed forces, be-
coming chairman of the Stavka (the wartime organiza-
tion of military and political leaders which con-
stitutes the Supreme High Command).
This new information is consistent with reports
provided by high-ranking Soviet officers in the mid-60s,
shortly after Khrushchev's ouster, when Brezhnev was
identified as the wartime commander. In 1966 and 1967
however, a series of articles appeared in
Soviet military publications
that. seemed to conflict with this description of
Brezhnev's wartime role. The articles reflected the
military high command's concern about the timely pro-
vision for command authority in the event of emergency.
The military apparently wanted a predesignated supreme
commander in chief to whom they could turn as a source
of political-military authority in emergencies, and
expressed the need for an institutionalized supreme
command in peacetime, capable of timely response in
military crisis situations. Brezhnev, however, was
emphasizing collectivity in leadership matters, as
he still does to some degree. Unlike Khrushchev and
Stalin before him, Brezhnev seemed to shun public
identification as "supreme commander in chief." In
fact, a remark identifying the General Secretary as
June 26, 1975
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supreme commander in chief designate in the 1963 and
1964 edition of Sokolovskiy's Military Strategy was
deleted from the 1968 edition. The consistent identi-
fication of Brezhnev as supreme commander in chief
only in wartime, even now, when Brezhnev is clearly
in a position of political pre-eminence, continues to
highlight the political sensitivity of the position.
The new clarification by the Soviet officer
indicates that Brezhnev is indeed regarded as the
wartime commander, and the consistency of the new
explanation with earlier information indicates that
Brezhnev has been so designated since at least 1965.
Apparently the central issue of the controversy in
1966-1967 was not the need for a supreme commander
in chief, but rather the need for an institutionalized
supreme command even in peacetime.
The controversy seems to have been resolved by
October 1967, when Grechko published an article
stating that organizational questions were being
dealt with along lines established by Lenin and
based on the Soviets' World War II experience. The
Soviet SCC officer's reference to the Stavka is one
of many from a variety of sources which have appeared
in this context since 1967. This may indicate that
a Stavka-like supreme command was :Formally established
by late 1967.
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East -Germany : Doctrine of Two G'er ma n
Na;tlons- -Rei-t-e-r'at'ed
As the US and East Germany prepare to resume
negotiations on a consular convention, East Berlin
is again stressing the concept of two distinct Ger-
man nations. The first round of negotiations in
February was complicated by the East German demand
for inclusion of a definition of nationality. Now,
as then, professors of the party's Institute for
Social Sciences are the authors of the commentaries.
Officials in Pankow are seeking the recognition
of a separate East German nationality in consular
conventions with all non-communist states. They
hope to refute Bonn's claim, under article 116 of
the West German constitution, to represent all
citizens of "German nationality." The inclusion of
as nationality clause in the consular convention
negotiated with Austria early this year was touted
aas an important precedent and predictably provoked
indignation in Bonn.
The doctrine of two "German nations" is more
than ammunition for East Berlin's squabbles with
Bonn. It is of paramount importance in establish-
ing the political legitimacy of the East German
regime. Since assuming power in May 1971, party
chief Honecker has worked hard to develop the idea
of a separate East German identity. Last fall,
the East German constitution was amended to remove
all outmoded concepts of reunification and reference's
to a single German nation. The East Germans can,
therefore, be expected to maintain a tough line on
the nationality clause when negotiations with the
US reopen in East Berlin next month.
June 26, 1975
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Yugoslavia and the Communist Conference
The Yugoslav ambassador in Bucharest claims
that Belgrade will send a delegation to the next
session of the commission charged with drafting a
final document for the European Communist conference.
He says that a new show of Soviet flexibility has
prompted the Yugoslavs to decide, after all, to at-
tend the working group now slated to be held in East
Berlin next week.
Although Moscow has been sufficiently flexible
to keep preparations for the formal meeting moving
ahead, the Yugoslavs and other independent parties
have no illusions about the real intentions of the
Soviet party. They know that whatever Moscow's
present tactics are, the Kremlin will try to use the
formal conference to bind all participants to a final
document reflecting Soviet policies and objectives.
Even if it is present at the next drafting session,
a Yugoslav delegation could decide not to attend the
conference itself.
The Yugoslav ambassador cited the visit to Ro-
mania from May 20 to 23 of Aleksander Grlickov, his
country's chief negotiator for the conference, as
proof that Belgrade and Bucharest still see eye-to-
eye on resisting Soviet aims. He expressed the per-
sonal opinion that while Romania would probably at-
tend the European Communist conference, it would not
sign the final document. Bucharest refused to sign
several documents at the international Communist con-
ference held in Moscow in June 1969_
June 26, 1975
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Secret
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