CHINESE AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001300120001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 7, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

//t
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A0013004
lop 20000 ecret
No Foreign Dissem
gul~~ X10
Chinese Affairs
Top Secret
Handle via COMINT Channels
July 7, 1975
SC No. 00459/75
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001300120001-5
 No Dissem Abroad
Approve k9jQkamci20O?/608=ZMA t7c8TD08t5'MO$300120001-5
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01300120001-5
 Approved For Rfdp2Q/0 fIQ;,~2QV TD0865A001300120001-5
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the East Asia - Pacific Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence and from the Directorate of Science and Technology. Comments
and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the
individual articles.
CONTENTS
July 7, 1975
Malaysian Strains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Harsh Reaction to Gandhi Moves . . . . . . . . . 6
Promoting Pyongyang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
China's Other Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Approved For Rel GP2 ETCIORA0865A001300120001-5
 Approved For Releapb?,QOgM -MfiiM5A001300120001-5
One year after the establishment of diplomatic
ties, some of the bloom is off the rose in Sino-
Malaysian relations.
In addition to the well-known Malaysian unhap-
piness with Peking's recent expression of support
to the Malayan communists, there are signs that other
relatively minor bilateral problems may be on the
horizon. Neither side has yet suggested, however,
that it considers these problems sufficiently im-
portant to jeopardize overall relations with the
other country.
Malaysian leaders almost certainly recognized
at the time diplomatic relations were opened last
summer that Peking would not soon abandon propa-
ganda support of the Malaysian communists. Prime
Minister Razak, however, had enthusiastically re-
ferred to Peking's commitment--made in the communi-
que announcing relations--not to attempt to impose
its social system on any other country. Razak knew
that fear of possible Chinese subversion was the
major obstacle to opening ties, and he was anxious
to show that progress had been'made on that score.
As a result, he implied after his return from Pe-
king that the trip signaled the end of Chinese sup-
port to the communist rebels.
The Chinese Communist Party's late April mes-
sage of greetings to the Malayan communists--and
especially its expression of support for "armed
revolution"--hit a raw nerve in Kuala Lumpur. The
Chinese had been silent on the issue for more than
a year, but Malaysian leaders almost certainly
were concerned that the Chinese message would sug-
gest to some that nothing had changed, despite rec-
ognition. This concern was probably compounded by
July 7, 1975
Approved For Relel-Q]20(l % WAMIMfQ&865A001300120001-5
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01300120001-5
TOP SECRET UMBRA
the recent overthrow of non-communist governments
in South Vietnam and Cambodia, and the slight in-
crease in terrorist activities in Malaysia itself.
Kuala Lumpur's strong protest and demands for
an explanation from the Chinese have not got them
far. Although the Chinese ambassador in Kuala
Lumpur was apparently personally distressed at the
strength of the April message, his formal response
to Malaysian protests was merely to express his
government's opinion that the affair did not con-
stitute a violation of Malaysia's sovereignty. No
formal apology has been extended.
This incident together with increased contact
between China's diplomats in Kuala Lumpur and the
local Chinese communique have apparently convinced
the Malaysians that a slap on the wrist is in order.
Malaysia has decided to cancel the tour of a Chinese
acrobatic troupe and postpone the visit of a trade
delegation which was under discussion. There is no
evidence that the Malaysians expect any significant
increase in Chinese support to the rebels, a develop-
ment that would, of course, cause a much stronger
Malaysian reaction.
The Chinese seem to be persuaded that their
interests would not be served by stepping up their
involvement with the Malaysian communists. In
fact,
was "no question" about supplying the rebels with
arms or ammunition, despite his view that the sit-
uation in Malaysia was becoming less stable.
suggested that Peking was
unhappy wi Kuala umpur's "Malayanization" program
by claiming that Malaysia's leaders had broken an
agreement, made at the time of independence, that
allowed ethnic Chinese to "run the economy."
July 7, 1975
-2-
Approved For Rele 'i00gLVMEgA 1 A865A001300120001-5
 Approved For Release 8/CR08 --RQP_7,9 OV65A001300120001-5
Malays were now moving into trade and commerce and
were be inning to ease out the ethnic Chinese.
added that this was a long-term problem
an that Peking must for the time being recognize
the government and cooperate with it.
In their bilateral trade relations, both sides
appear to be less than completely satisfied with
developments since recognition. The Malaysian rub-
ber delegation that recently visited Peking got less
than an enthusiastic response to its request for in-
creased Chinese rubber imports. Moreover, the out-
look for increased Chinese imports is dim because of
increased domestic production and the possibility of
imports from other countries. There also appears to
be some Chinese resistance to Kuala Lumpur's at-
tempts to cut out Singapore middlemen from the Sino-
Malaysian trade.
Despite these problems, both sides seem genu-
inely interested in limiting the damage that these
relatively minor conflicts might have on their de-
veloping relationship. The Malaysians recognize
that their patience will probably be rewarded in the
long run with gradually increased Sino-Malaysian
trade, and the Chinese seem to be anxious to play
down activities that might jeopardize their improving
position in Malaysia. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO
DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
July 7, 1975
Approved For Rei X J 2IO.E:'I RAD865A001300120001-5
 25X1D Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01300120001-5
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01300120001-5
 Approved For Release ~2001~~08~~A-~R7~9~T0~0~865A001300120001-5
Peking has sharply criticized Prime Minister
Gandhi's recent actions, leveling the harshest
personal attack against her in some time and link-
ing her moves to Soviet machinations in Delhi.
In a signed article in People's Daily on June
29, prominent foreign policy commentator Jen Ku-ping
charged that:
--The "sanctimonious" Gandhi govern-
ment abandoned the pretenses of democ-
racy and adopted repressive measures
to enable the Prime Minister to remain
in office against the popular will.
--The Gandhi government has protected
the interests of the Indian landed
and capitalist classes and pursued
reactionary domestic and foreign
policies.
--Mrs. Gandhi has guided India to eco-
nomic ruin and famine despite her
claim of Indian well-being.
NCNA carried on June 27 a relatively straight-
forward news account of developments leading up to
a declaration of a state of emergency that made many
of the same points although in less biting and sar-
castic fashion and without much of the anti-Gandhi
invective of Jen's commentary.
The communist-owned press in Hong Kong went
further than Jen by equating the emergency decrees
to Hitler's burning of the Reichstag and lumping
the Gandhi government with "cliques" in South
Korea and Taiwan.
July 7, 1975
-6-
Approved For ReIWOgM
,Mr1A 9Q865A001300120001-5
 Approved For Relp, 6e 0gp0 /AB i4ATF QZ1 Q 865A001300120001-5
The Chinese have paid special attention to
Soviet backing for Mrs. Gandhi's actions. NCNA
on June 28 catalogued public expressions of Soviet
support following Mrs. Gandhi's conviction for
electioneering malpractices and her declaration of
a state of emergency. Jen was unsparing in his
criticism of the Moscow-Gandhi linkage. He charged
that Mrs. Gandhi, "who has always received the sup-
port of the overlords in the Kremlin," is attempt-
ing to act as Moscow's "sub-regent" in South Asia
so that the USSR can maintain its control of India
and "contend" with the US for hegemony in the
region.
This Chinese treatment has highlighted the two
greatest obstacles in Peking's eyes to a significant
improvement in Sino-Indian relations: Moscow's
close ties in Delhi, particularly with the incum-
bent regime, and Mrs. Gandhi's continued tenure
in office.
On this score, the Chinese handled with discre-
tion Mrs. Gandhi's conviction on June 12, issuing
only two low-key NCNA reports which largely sum-
marized foreign news reports. Peking may have cal-
culated that a heavy Chinese propaganda hand could
only help her cause. The Chinese may now believe
that her tactics and open Soviet support will speed
her departure from office and that propaganda on
these developments is in Peking's interest.
Peking has exercised some restraint, however.
Treatment in China's media has not been profuse.
The Chinese have not replayed any of Pakistan's
sparse commentary on Mrs. Gandhi's actions and have
not even hinted at the possibility of the Gandhi
government using China to divert Indian attention
from the emergency decree. Peking obviously does
not want to provide the Indians a pretext for attri-
buting Mrs. Gandhi's actions to a threat from China
or turning to Moscow for additional military assist-
ance.
July 7, 1975
.-7-
Approved For Re .GP2(FJ@&E-'tId: FDM*865A001300120001-5
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01300120001-5
TOP SECRET UMBRA
The Chinese also want to avoid foreclosing
completely the possibility of eventually improving
relations. Following the Sikkim crisis this spring
--which brought to an abrupt end another promising
move toward warmer ties--Foreign Minister Chiao
Kuan-hua indicated that China and India were tradi-
tional friends and that improved relations were
"inevitable." (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACK-
GROUND USE ONLY)
July 7, 1975
Approved For Relga?l20%LK@Wl%lA{@} (g865A001300120001-5
 25X1D Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01300120001-5
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01300120001-5
 Approved For Rele, ,so20Og fbOihT-E2VBIPQ865A001300120001-5
Promoting Pyongyang
While continuing to stress a moderate, non-
military approach to the Korean problem, Peking is
showing signs that it will provide strong support
for North Korea's increasing diplomatic efforts
to improve its own international position at Seoul's
expense. The immediate objective appears to be to
gain the best possible showing for Pyongyang at
the nonaligned conference in Lima later this sum-
mer and in the UN this fall.
Since President Kim I1-song's visit to Peking
last April, the Chinese have tried to portray
Pyongyang as the more moderate and sensible of the
two Korean regimes. At the same time, the Chinese
appear to have adopted a somewhat firmer position
on Kim's claim to represent all of Korea. Both
stands are clearly intended to show Pyongyang that
it has a friend in Peking and to contrast firm
Chinese support with Moscow's less committed stand
on these issues.
Peking pointed up this approach in a June 24
People's Daily editorial marking the 25th anniver-
sary of the beginning of the Korean war. The
editorial refers to Kim's travels to Europe and
Africa earlier this year, and declares that "unity,
friendship and cooperation" between North Korea
and other countries has been strengthened as a
result. As it did last year, the editorial also
claims that Pyongyang's international prestige
continues to grow daily. Seoul, on the other
hand, is depicted as responsible--at US instigation
--for "constantly aggravating tension" on the
Korean Peninsula. The point clearly is that a
moderate, peace-loving Pyongyang is winning friends--
and votes--all over the world.
July 7, 1975
Approved For ReITa 0I E'ElAJMWGk865A001300120001-5
 Approved For Releyt)0011/08 8 C IAA-U B9TOO8865AO01300120001-5
SECR
Chinese officials have privately emphasized
the same points in recent weeks as well as their
desire for stability on the Korean Peninsula.
The remarks were almost certainly made to counter
the speculation about Pyongyang's intentions that
arose in some Asian countries after Kim's visit
to Peking. The Chinese have been especially
insistent that Pyongyang was not planning military
moves against the South. The other main emphasis
of their remarks has been that Korea is a single
country whose unification is inevitable and that
Koreans must decide for themselves how to achieve
reunification, without foreign interference.
Peking continues to support Pyongyang's
demands that US troops withdraw from South Korea,
as a step toward eventual reunification. The
Chinese reiterated this stand in the June 24
editorial, stating that US troops must be com-
pletely withdrawn. As in previous statements on
this issue, however, no mention was made of a time-
table for the withdrawal.
The absence of any sense of urgency on this
question was also reflected in the fact that this
year's editorial did not call for an end to US
military aid to Seoul, as the 1974 editorial had
done. This omission is especially remarkable in
view of Defense Secretary Schlesinger's recent
comments on the possible use of nuclear weapons
in Korea, remarks that drew a strong North Korean
reaction but have gone unmentioned in the
Chinese press.
It is not yet clear exactly how Peking's
stronger support of Pyongyang's diplomatic
objectives will affect Chinese tactics at Lima and
in the UN. In fact, the Chinese themselves may
not yet have settled on a specific course of
action. As they have during the past two UN
General Assembly sessions, the Chinese will be
July 7, 1975
-12-
Approved For Rel&iQBO 11ATgjf QV865A001300120001-5
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01300120001-5
TOP SECRET UMBRA
walking a narrow path between their support for
Pyongyang and their desire for stability on the
Korean Peninsula. The fact that the Chinese have
not yet commented on the US proposal to dissolve
the UN Command--made public nearly two weeks
ago--suggests that Peking may not wish to place
itself in public opposition to this US initiative.
(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/
BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
July 7, 1975
Approved For Reif s 10Sj(?REETIALRMRQ865A001300120001-5
 Approved For Re1p"132QVIMT~0865A001300120001-5
This is International Women's Year, and the
Chinese seem to be marking the occasion by bringing
more women into the limelight and giving them
positions of some responsibility. At the same time,
Chiang Ching, who for several years as virtually
the only woman of any real importance, remains
well in the background.
No current discussion of Chinese women on the
political scene can ignore the sudden prominence
of Li Su-wen, a 42 year old woman from Liaoning
Province who has apparently moved her base of
operations to the capital. At the National People's
Congress (NPC) in January, Li was elected a vice
chairman, a relatively unimportant position in
itself but one that has kept her in the limelight
ever since. She has frequently been involved in
meetings with foreign visitors, and most recently
led the Chinese delegation to the International
Women's Conference in Mexico.
Li will very likely be awarded an important
position in the Women's Federation, when that
organization is re-established at the national level.
A slightly ironic twist is that Li's sudden impor-
tance apparently derives from her position as NPC
vice chairman, a job for which Chiang Ching re-
portedly was nominated; Mao subsequently vetoed
the appointment.
Another woman who has received considerable
publicity of late is Kang Ko-ching, the wife of
Chu Te. Kang, along with the wives of Chou En-lai
and Teng Hsiao-ping, has welcomed foreign visitors
at Peking's guest house and was the woman selected
by NCNA for an interview to mark International
July 7, 1975
Approved For Re1Ta9d` 2 08 'IAW- M865A001300120001-5
 Approved For Rel~aVp2KA/ t~EI URTA0865AO01300120001-5
Women's Year. The NCNA release lauded Kang's
contributions to the revolution, including her
participation in the Long March, and noted that
she has worked ceaselessly to improve the lot of
Chinese women ever since. No such claims have
ever been made about Chiang Ching, who has never
been associated with women's causes and was a
relative latecomer to the revolution.
Although Chu Te is 89, Kang is only 65, roughly
the same age as Chiang Ching. She seems to stand
a good chance of outlasting Madame Mao on the
political scene. Kang was a vice chairman of the
Women's Federation and will probably be re-elected
to that post. Chiang Ching was not a member of
that organization and is not likely to become one.
Because Kang's husband is Chairman of the NPC,
which approximates the position of head of state,
Kang is in essence China's first lady. It is in
this capacity that she greets foreign visitors at
the guest house even as her husband, in the absence
of a head of state, accepts the credentials of
foreign ambassadors. As de facto first lady, Kang,
of course, rivals Chiang Ching in much the same
way as did Wang Kuang-mei, the wife of former head
of state Liu Shao-chi, a woman whom Madame Mao
openly despised.
A third prominent woman is Wu Kuei-hsien, at
one time merely a model worker. She has risen
above that status to become the only woman among
China's 12 vice premiers and the only other woman
on the Politburo besides Chiang Ching. Wu has met
with women's delegations, suggesting that she, too,
will play a role in the Women's Federation. In
addition, she has assumed some foreign policy
functions, most recently as co-host, along with
Chang Chun-chiao, of President Bongo of Gabon.
Wu is in her forties and could well be on the
Chinese political scene for some time.
July 7, 1975
Approved For ReiTasP205 EIA 7P~A&865A001300120001-5
 Approved For Re 0g 8iJA f ff 0865A001300120001-5
Although none of these women have the clout
that Chiang Ching enjoyed in her heyday during
the Cultural Revolution, nor do they equal her in
official party status, they all seem to hold a
variety of positions and appear to be in better
political health today than she is. (SECRET NO
FOREIGN DISSEt4)
July 7, 1975
Approved For Re1GR08/'MAIAbf*865A001300120001-5
 25X1D Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01300120001-5
Next 8 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01300120001-5
 Ap roved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01300120001-5
Top Secret
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01300120001-5