EAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001300360001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 15, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2 /08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01300Q~Q~~~~
No Foreign Dissem
East Asia
SepW
July 15, 1975
SC No. 00465/75
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01300360001-9
 Appro i e 11M /.dJ,AJflWLQO 9; 300360001-9
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01300360001-9
 Approved For ReleaseSNQ3J> ': gVeRT9T00865A001300360001-9
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the East Asia - Pacific Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
July 1.5, 1975
North Korea: Redefining the Political
Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Tokyo Finds Vietnamese Tough Customers . . . 10
Okinawa: Possible Expo Violence . . . . . . . . 12
North Korea: Honoring Kim Il-song's
Deceased Wife . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
ANNEX--The Two Koreas and the United Nations:
The Debate Approaches a Critical Stage This
Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
f -%T7
Approved For Release 9(A)W. & MRwAT00865A001300360001-9
 25X1D Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01300360001-9
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01300360001-9
 Approved For ReleasSS! 18 : AyQE79T00865A001300360001-9
North Korea: Redefining the Political Committee
A new look at the Political Committee of the
Korean Workers Party (KWP) Central Committee indi-
cates that it is a small, stable leadership group.
Previous research had suggested that the committee
had expanded greatly in recent years and was rela-
tively unstable in its lower ranks.
A reassessment of leadership appearance pat-
terns and identifications indicates that roughly
one third of the people carried as committee mem-
bers for the last two years should not be listed
as such. Most of those who do not belong on the
committee are government administrators. They
had never been confirmed as members and had seemed
to move off and on the Political Committee with
startling rapidity. There was considerable fluctua-
tion in their ranking from month to month.
The high turnover rate suggested by this re-
porting had led analysts to believe that there was
instability in party politics and significant pol-
icy failures in many administrative areas. Our new
definition of the Political Committee excludes the
technocrats, and ranking now indicates a five-year
record of stability under the firm and fatherly hand
of Kim II-song.
The Difficulties of Definition
Difficulties in defining Political Committee
membership stem from the North Korean practice of
publishing full committee rosters only at party
congresses and conferences. In the four-to-five
year intervals between conclaves, Pyongyang does
July 15, 1975
Approved For Release - C )?- P1V9T00865A001300360001-9
 Approved For Release K8 9p6P9T00865A001300360001-9
not announce the appointment or dismissal of com-
mittee members. A full committee was last announced
at the Fifth Party Congress in November 1970.
The problem of identifying members became par-
ticularly acute after December 1972, when the revised
constitution created the Central Peoples Cornunittee
(CPC) to sit above the cabinet and provide ruling
party oversight of government operations. Many mem-
bers of the Central Peoples Committee were confirmed
Political Committee members and, as all CPC members
were accorded the same honorific title "tongji," it
was assumed that the remainder--although unconfirmed
--also sat on the Political Committee. By equating
Political Committee membership with that of the Cen-
tral Peoples Committee, the Political Committee was
assumed to include all but one of the secretaries
of the KWP Central Committee, all vice premiers of
the cabinet, and a smattering of other cabinet
officials.
A New Ay rp oach
The older, expanded definition of the Political
Committee produced a roster of approximately 15 full
members and 17 candidates. our redefined committee
has 14 full members and only 8 candidates, a total of
22. This reduced proportion of candidates to full
members is in keeping with the composition of the tra-
ditional Political Committee in North Korea.
In redefining the committee, North Korean con-
firmation of individuals as members is the primary
criterion. Only one of the officials on the new
listinq--Pak Su-tong--is not confirmed. We believe,
nonetheless, that his sensitive party assignments,
recent strong upward movement, and high rank within
the Central Peoples Committee, mark him as a new
addition to the candidate roster of the Political
July 15, 1975
Approved For Release 1W.(MBT- - T00865A001300360001-9
 Approved For ReleaseSpffl ': f;1Qt19T00865A001300360001-9
North Korea Party and Government Structure
Party Congress
Government Organization
Supreme Peoples Assembly
Central Committee
Secretariat
I Inspection
i Committee
Audit
Committee
!President, DPRK
Vice Presidents
Standing
Committee SPA
Political Committee of KWP
Other members
State Administration Council
Premier
Vice Premiers
Committees
Corru;~.ittee. There may, in addition, be two or three
other candidate members, but the evidence is not yet
strong enough to include them.
Two principal factors have contributed to the
decision to remove most of the unconfirmed officials
from committee membership. There are increasing in-
stances in which officials once thought to be members
of the Political Committee were pointedly not identi-
fied as such when in the company of others who were.
The example of Ho Tam, foreign minister and vice pre-
mier, is most notable. In April and May of this
year, other members of Kim's entourage visiting
China, Eastern Europe, and Africa, were listed as
committee members; Ho was not. His dossier shows sim-
ilar occurrences in 1973 and 1974.
July 15, 1975
Political
Committee
Liaison Central
Bureau Committee
Departments
Approved For Release W1i)68T- C R T00865A001300360001-9
 Approved For Release NV 8 : ( T00865AO01300360001-9
Second, the North Koreans have publicly noted
that the membership of the Political Committee does
not include all party secretaries and cabinet vice
premiers. Thus there should be some secretaries
and vice premiers who sit on the Central Peoples
Committee but not on the Political Committee.
The revised committee membership, with approxi-
mate rankings, is as follows:
Kim Il-song
Choe Yong-kon
Kim Il
Kim Tonq-kyu
Choe Hyon
Kim Chunq-nin
President, DPRK, General
Secretary, KWP
Vice President, DPRK;
Secretary, KWP
Vice President, DPRK;
Secretary, KWP
Vice President, DPRK;
Secretary KWP
Chief of Staff, Army;
Secretary, KWP
Chairman, Inspection
Committee, KWP
Vice Premier, DPRK
Vice Premier, DPRK
Secretary, KWP; Chairman,
Liaison Bureau, KWP
.July 15, 1975
Approved For Release $N14 1rB, C -I DT00865AO01300360001-9
 Approved For Releas&E?JI
*Yon Hyong-muk
Kim Yong-chu
*Yi Yong-mu
Yang Hyong-sop
Candidate Members:
*Yu Chang-sik
*Kim Yong-nam
Hyon Mu-kwang
*Pak Su-tong
*Chong Chun-ki
Han Ik-su
*Kang Song-san
*Chon Mun-sop
TB STQ 79T00865AO01300360001-9
Secretary, KWP
Vice Premier, DPRK;
Secretary, KWP
Director, Political Bureau,
Army
Secretary, KWP
Secretary, KWP
Secretary, KWP
Secretary, KWP
Deputy Department Chairman,
KWP
Vice Premier, DPRK
Secretary, KWP; Colonel
General, Army
Committee Chairman,
Cabinet
Colonel General, Army
All of these members, save the elderly and ailing
Choe Yong-kon, are active and appear fairly regu-
larly in public. Among those officials no longer
'Members added since November 1970.
July 15, 1975
Approved For ReleaseF-20 /08: ei`A 9T00865A001300360001-9
 Approved For ReleasecW/8: 481P 9T00865A001300360001-9
included as committee members are Ho Tam, Kim Song-ae
(wife of Kim Il-song), and Nam II (currently a vice
premier, and a committee member in the early 1960s).
Kang Yang-uk, vice president of the DPRK and uncle
of Kim Il-song, we now believe to be a member of
neither the ruling party nor its Political Committee.
The Five Year Trend
Constructed on the basis of official identi-
fications, the North I'orean Political Committee
forms a discrete unit at the top of the Central
Peoples Committee. There is marked stability in
the ranking of full Political Committee mein ers;
adjustments and promotions are more apparent in the
candidate roster.
only two of the 15 men named as Political Com-
mittee members in November 1970 are no longer serv-
ing. One died; the other--responsible for agricul-
tural affairs--was removed from office following
several years of poor harvests. An additional offi-
cial, who joined the committee in 1971, was removed
earlier this year in connection with North Korea's
massive foreign trade deficit.
Today's committee has seven persons more than
announced at the Fifth Party Congress. Nine of the
22 members have been appointed since 1970--three full
members and six candidates. While we now believe
that few technocrats sit on the committee, there is
still a trend toward increasing specialization. For-
eign affairs experts Yu Chang-sik and Kiir Yong-nam
exemplify both this development and the increased
recruitment of men in their forties and fifties.
The most dramatic changes in rank since 1970 in-
clude the promotion of Kim Tong-kyu to the post of
DPRK vice president, the advancement of military
chiefs Choe Hyon and 0 Chin--u, and the downgrading
July 15, 1975
Approved For Release ( 'W T: aRO&E T00865A001300360001-9
 Approved For ReleaswAe"A : "9T00865A001300360001-9
of Kim Yong-chu who was once regarded as the most
likely successor to his brother Kim Il-song. Han
Ik-su, a colonel general in the army, seems to have
suffered the highly unusual fate of demotion from
full to candidate membership, but the overall pres-
ence of military specialists, like that of the for-
eign affairs specialists, has expanded. (CONFIDEN-
TIAL)
July 15, 1975
Approved For Release S/R)H C R-RhT00865A001300360001-9
 Approved For Release /j8: CSI r T00865AO01300360001-9
Tokyo Finds Vietnamese Tou h Customers
Tokyo's earlier expectations of an imminent
exchange of embassies with Hanoi may prove to be
overly optimistic.
Talks between the two countries have been hung
up on Hanoi's demand that Japan grant a total aid
package of some $49 million before embassies are
opened. Tokyo originally had offered $17 million,
with an additional amount to be negotiated after
the embassies were established.
The Japanese foreign office has apparently
decided in general to meet Hanoi's demands, although
it may try to negotiate a slightly lower figure.
The Finance Ministry, however, opposes concessions
to Hanoi, partly because of fears of an adverse US
reaction. Even if the foreign office can achieve
a consensus within the government, Diet approval
would be required, since only $17 million has been
legally allocated for aid to North Vietnam. Diet
approval could not be obtained before this fall at
the earliest, when an extraordinary session of the
Diet may be called to consider budget matters. Tokyo
is also concerned that Hanoi may insist on Diet ap-
proval of any aid agreement before permitting Japan
to open an embassy.
As for ties with Saigon, Tokyo has decided not
to rush efforts to name a successor to the ambassa-
dor in Saigon, who was asked to leave by the revo-
lutionary authorities because of his past association
with the Thieu regime. Tokyo will not consider a
successor until negotiations with Hanoi are com-
pleted--unless they drag on endlessly. Some exchange
of views between Japanese diplomats and South Vietna-
mese ambassador Pham Van Ba in Paris, however, will
continue.
July 15, 1975
Approved For Releases OiJ$: S 9T00865A001300360001-9
 Approved For Release tp> ,: g 9T00865A001300360001-9
Although the issue apparently has not yet been
raised, Tokyo expects the South Vietnamese communist
regime to demand economic aid equivalent to that
given the Thieu regime. The Finance ministry in par-
ticular is known to oppose further aid to the South
unless Saigon makes some effort to meet $25 million
in debt obligations incurred by the former South
Vietnamese government. (CONFIDENTIAL)
July 15, 1975
Approved For Releas6 RlMR : SR 9T00865A001300360001-9
 Approved For Releas>fOf : ?1F9T00865A001300360001-9
Okinawa: Possible Expo Violence
Japanese police are worried about the possi-
bility of radical violence marring the opening of
the International Ocean Exposition (Expo) on Okinawa,
later this week. Their most immediate concern is
a violent incident involving Crown Prince Akihito
who will be present at Expo from July 17-19; Japa-
nese police reportedly have evidence of an alleged
plot to assassinate him. There is also the possi-
bility of clashes between leftist and rightist groups,
as well as leftist actions directed against the large
US military presence on the island.
Leftist political groups have had difficulty
developing a coordinated opposition plan because
Expo, including the Crown Prince's visit, has been
endorsed by Okinawa's leftist governor, Chobyo Yara.
Yara and other local leaders view Expo as a "cele-
bration" of Okinawa's reversion to Japan, a catalyst
to economic development on the island, and a major
stimulus for tourism. They are not eager to support
actions opposing a member of the imperial family.
The police are nevertheless jumpy because of
recent radical threats and incidents, including
several Molotov-cocktail incidents in the Tokyo
area and the self-immolation of a Red Army activist
in front of the main gate to the US Kadena Air Base
on Okinawa. About 2,400 specially trained riot
police will be brought in from the main islands as
reinforcements.
US military authorities are naturally concerned
over the possibility of incidents directed against
US bases. In addition, the Japanese government is
especially sensitive at this time to leftist criti-
cism of base related issues, particularly crimes
July 15, 1975
Approved For Release (/ $ W- c94 ID T00865A001300360001-9
 Approved For Relea / "8 S r 4 I$79T00865A001300360001-9
perpetrated by US servicemen. Sensational media
coverage of a recent rape case involving a US
serviceman and continuing leftist charges that the
Japanese government has failed to hold the US ac-
countable for a number of other incidents during
the past year have caused Japanese officials to
fear that a new incident, especially during the
Crown Prince's visit, could spark widespread leftist
protests and cause considerable embarrassment to
Japanese officials.
To emphasize Tokyo's concern, the Japanese
ambassador to the US recently asked US officials
to take every possible measure to reverse the "un-
fortunate upward trend" in incidents involving US
servicemen on Okinawa. (CONFIDENTIAL,)
July 15, 1975
Approved For ReleasdS2001'/0>08 : 1CtA=Rt3P79T00865A001300360001-9
 Approved For Release2rQZ1fl: ?9T00865A001300360001-9
North Korea: Honoring Kim Il-song's Deceased Wife
A campaign to idolize Kim Chong-suk, Kim I1-
song's wife who died in 1949, has been quietly under
way in North Korean literary journals since the lat-
ter half of 1974. The key element in the campaign is
the use of honorific language which places Kim Chong-
suk in the same category as Kim Il-song. Honorific
speech--an integral part of the Korean language--is
used to show respect to persons in socially superior
positions.
In the North Korean media, the use of honorifics
had been restricted to Kim Il-song and certain of his
deceased relatives. Its extension to include Kim
Chong-suk is significant in that it is apparently
the first time that such terms have been officially
used to refer to a person not related to Kim Il-song
by blood. Furthermore, since she is alleged to be
the mother of Kim Chong-il--a son of Kim I1-song and
his rumored successor--this might be part of a cam-
paign to transfer Kim I1-song's revolutionary heri-
tage to his son and legitimize his claim to power.
Although it is believed that Kim I1-song's mar-
riage to Kim Chong-suk is widely known among the
North Korean people, the media seem to astutely avoid
any direct mention of such a relationship. A cur-
sory survey of newspapers and magazines published
during the past year yielded only one oblique refer-
ence. (Here it should be mentioned that references
to Kim Chong-il have not to date been uncovered in
the North Korean mass media.)
Exactly when the campaign to idolize Kim Chong-
suk began is not known, but one of the earliest
references to her in the honorific was in an April
July 15, 1975
Approved For Release IMIA&Fff CT00865A001300360001-9
 Approved For Rele.' )OEifP79T00865A001300360001-9
1974 article in KuZZoja, the theoretical journal of
the Korean Workers Party Central Committee. The
present campaign seems to be the first time she has
been referred to as "Mother Kim Chong-suk," an ex-
pression vaguely reminiscent of the appellation given
the mother of Kim Il-song. The campaign is low-key,
with no significant references appearing in Nodong
Sinmun, Minju Choson, and Nodong Chongnyon, the organ
papers of the ruling party, government, and youth
federation, respectively. (CONFIDENTIAL)
July 15, 1975
Approved For Release WU108 SCI2k 79T00865A001300360001-9
 Approved For ReleasV5MR0 $ S1 E79T00865A001300360001-9
The Two Koreas and the United Nations:
The Debate Approaches a Critical Stage This Year
Both North and South Korea appear to sense that
the debate on the Korean question, which has taken
place almost every year at the UN for nearly three
decades, may be approaching a climax. As a result,
the two states and their supporters have already
begun vigorous lobbying for the support of UN mem-
bers, even though the fall session of the United
Nations General Assembly is still several months away.
Diplomats from both sides are active in New York and
in capitals throughout the world, and many foreign
delegations have been invited to Seoul and Pyongyang
to hear their respective arguments.
The growing number of Third World countries
sympathetic to North Korea in the General Assembly
have taken the initiative in the Korean debate in
recent years. South Korea has argued that both
Seoul and Pyongyang should be given an opportunity
for UN membership, pending reunification at some
future time. North Korea has adamantly opposed
this approach, contending that it would tend to
ratify a permanent division of the country. Peking
and Moscow, as well as North Korea's Third World
allies, have resisted a two-Koreas solution. Con-
sequently, the UN debate in recent years has focused
not on the membership issue but on the roles of the
UN and US forces in South Korea. This year, if cur-
rent trends continue, it appears likely that Pyongyang's
supporters will succeed in passing a resolution at
the UN calling for the unconditional withdrawal from
South Korea of both US forces and the UN command.
July 15, 1975
Approved For Release /T8 :9QI79T00865A001300360001-9
 Approved For ReleaW8r/0>PCI9#~6P79TO0865AO01300360001-9
Last year in the General Assembly North Korea's
backers came close to passing such a resolution; it
was defeated on a 48 to 48 tie vote, with 38 absten-
tions. The passage of this resolution in the General
Assembly would be legally binding neither on US forces,
which are stationed in the South under a bilateral
agreement, nor on the UN command in South Korea, which
was established by the UN Security Council and can
be terminated only by that body. Such a resolution
would, nevertheless, be a psychological and diplo-
matic defeat for Seoul and its supporters.
Seoul's Defense
South Korea and its supporters have accepted the
principle of ending the UN role in South Korea. The
problem of terminating the UN command is complicated,
however, by the fact that the command was the only
signatory on the allied side to the 1953 Armistice
Agreement, which has provided the legal basis for the
peace on the peninsula since the Korean war. (The
other signatories were North Korea and China.) If
the UN command were terminated unconditionally, the
validity of the Armistice Agreement would be called
into question.
Of particular concern in this event would be
the status of the islands off the West Coast of
Korea which, according to the Armistice Agreement,
come under the control of the UN command. If the
agreement were undermined, Pyongyang, considering
the proximity of the islands to North Korea, might
be tempted to assert a claim to them, something Seoul
is determined to resist.
Last year South Korea's supporters in the
General Assembly succeeded in passing a resolution
calling on the Security Council to consider "in due
course" dissolution of the UN command "in conjunc-
tion with appropriate arrangements to maintain the
July 15, 1975
SECRET SPOKE
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01300360001-9
 Approved For Release6-1A&X: 69T00865A001300360001-9
armistice agreement." The vote was 61 to 43, with
31 abstentions. The resolution has not been imple-
mented because it requires North Korean participa-
tion and the cooperation of all permanent members
of the Security Council. The North Koreans have
little interest in ending the UN command in this
manner, which would leave the status of US forces
in South Korea unaffected.
A New Proposal
Last month the US proposed a new pro - South
Korean resolution for General Assembly consideration.
It carries essentially the same message as last
year's resolution, but addresses the UN command-
armistice issue more directly, announcing that the
US and South Korea are prepared to terminate the
command--on 1 January 1976--provided that the other
signatories to the 1953 armistice agree that its
provisions will continue in force. The US has
indicated that it will designate US and South Korean
officers to replace the UN command as a party to the
Armistice Agreement. As an interim measure, the US
is limiting the role of the UN command solely to the
administration of the armistice and forming a sepa-
rate headquarters to command US and ROK forces.
The North Koreans have not yet reacted to Washing-
ton's new proposal. It is almost certain, however, that
Pyongyang and its backers will renew their effort
this fall to pass a resolution linking the US and UN
roles in South Korea and condemning both. As in the
past, Pyongyang's objectives would be to isolate
South Korea internationally, damage the prestige
of the US, and bring diplomatic pressure to bear on
the US to withdraw its forces from South Korea.
It has been clear since the General Assembly
last fall that it will be difficult to head off
another pro - North Korean resolution at the UN this
year. Pyongyang has only to increase slightly the
July 15, 1975
SECRET SPOKE
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001300360001-9
 Approved For Release 2 "VTC T00865AO01300360001-9
backing it obtained last fall. While it is still
too early to predict with certainty how the next
Assembly will act, several factors are likely to
affect the outcome.
Factors Favoring Pyongyang
Among those factors likely to favor the North
Koreans are the following:
Pyongyang's success in broadening its diplo-
matic relations. In mid-1972 the North Koreans had
diplomatic relations with 38 countries; they now
have ties with some 73 states. At least nine coun-
tries have established formal diplomatic ties with
the North since the General Assembly last fall--
Austria, Switzerland, and Portugal in Europe; Burma,
Cambodia, Thailand, and South Vietnam in Asia; and
Ethiopia and newly independent Mozambique in Africa.
Diplomatic relations do not automatically signal
an additional UN vote for North Korea. Australia
established relations with Pyongyang in 1974 but
has continued to back Seoul in New York. Malaysia,
however, abstained on the Korean resolutions at the
UN last year after establishing ties with North Korea
in 1973. Thailand could shift to an abstention on the
pro - North Korean resolution this year, although it is
also expected to back the pro-Seoul proposal.
North Korea has also strengthened its existing
ties with a number of nonaligned, Third World coun-
tries in the past year, as evidenced most dramatically
by Kim Il-song's trip to Eastern Europe and North
Africa this spring. The North Koreans have a good
chance of gaining membership in the nonaligned move-
ment at the Lima conference in late August, which
would provide an additional boost for Pyongyang.
South Korea itself is working hard to gain member-
ship in the nonaligned movement this year, in order
to block a success by Pyongyang, but its efforts may
July 15, 1975
Approved For Release 208]GCS'EIASRO%.00865A001300360001-9
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001300360001-9
SECRET SPOKE
have come too late to erode the strong position
Pyongyang has built up with many years of diligent
spadework.
i2creasing solidarity among the nonaligned
countries. At the General Assembly last year the
""new majority" of developing countries, made up in
large part of African and Arab states, managed to
provide a sympathetic forum for the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization, silence Israeli representatives,
suspend South Africa, and endorse an economic charter
sanctioning the expropriation of foreign investments.
The new majority came close to winning victories for
the Cambodian communists and North Korea. Of the
48 countries that voted yes on the pro - North Korean
resolution, nearly half (23) were from sub-Saharan
Africa and eight were Arab states.
North Korea's current "peace offensive. " Fol-
lowing the communist victories in Indochina this
spring, Pyongyang appeared to believe that the broader
cause of liberation movements had been given new
momentum, enhancing the prospects for the early re-
unification of Korea. Kim Il-song said as much in
his initial, militant banquet speech in Peking in
April. Since that speech, however, the North Koreans
as well as the Chinese have strongly emphasized that
North Korea's policy calls for peaceful reunifica-
tion. In his visits to two leading nonaligned
states, Yugoslavia and Algeria, Kim came across
as a man with a "realistic" view of the situation
in East Asia. Pyongyang's peace offensive is de-
signed in part to enhance its argument at the UN--
that tension on the Korean Peninsula is caused not
by the North, but by the presence of US forces in
the South.
New UN member states. Several countries will
apparently become new members of the General Assembly
this fall. One, Papua New Guinea, is likely to
support South Korea, probably following the lead of
July 15, 1975
Approved For Rele e 0 U0 /0?pM DP79T00865A001300360001-9
12
 Approved For Release 2 OP 8Q' P79T00865A001300360001-9
SEGHTpv
have come too late to erode the strong position
Pyongyang has built up with many years of diligent
spadework.
Increasing solidarity among the nonaligned
countries. At the General Assembly last year the
"new majority" of developing countries, made up in
large part of African and Arab states, managed to
provide a sympathetic forum for the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization, silence Israeli representatives,
suspend South Africa, and endorse an economic charter
sanctioning the expropriation of foreign investments.
The new majority came close to winning victories for
the Cambodian communists and North Korea. Of the
48 countries that voted yes on the pro - North Korean
resolution, nearly half (23) were from sub-Saharan
Africa and eight were Arab states.
North Korea's current "peace offensive." Fol-
lowing the communist victories in Indochina this
spring, Pyongyang appeared to believe that the broader
cause of liberation movements had been given new
momentum, enhancing the prospects for the early re-
unification of Korea. Kim Il-song said as much in
his initial, militant banquet speech in Peking in
April. Since that speech, however, the North Koreans
as well as the Chinese have strongly emphasized that
North Korea's policy calls for peaceful reunifica-
tion. In his visits to two leading nonaligned
states, Yugoslavia and Algeria, Kim came across
as a man with a "realistic" view of the situation
in East Asia. Pyongyang's peace offensive is de-
signed in part to enhance its argument at the UN--
that tension on the Korean Peninsula is caused not
by the North, but by the presence of US forces in
the South.
New UN member states. Several countries will
apparently become new members of the General Assembly
this fall. One, Papua New Guinea, is likely to
support South Korea, probably following the lead of
July 15, 1975
Approved For RelegHOVej8/O~pI P79T00865A001300360001-9
 Approved For Release 20@y~B ft.pIPS 9 00865AO01300360001-9
backing it obtained last fall. While it is still
too early to predict with certainty how the next
Assembly will act, several factors are likely to
affect the outcome.
Factors Favoring Pyongyang
Among those factors likely to favor the North
Koreans are the following:
Pyongyang's success in broadening its diplo-
matic relations. In mid-1972 the North Koreans had
diplomatic relations with 38 countries; they now
have ties with some 73 states. At least nine coun-
tries have established formal diplomatic ties with
the North since the General Assembly last fall--
Austria, Switzerland, and Portugal in Europe; Burma,
Cambodia, Thailand, and South Vietnam in Asia; and
Ethiopia and newly independent Mozambique in Africa.
Diplomatic relations do not automatically signal
an additional UN vote for North Korea. Australia
established relations with Pyongyang in 1974 but
has continued to back Seoul in New York. Malaysia,
however, abstained on the Korean resolutions at the
UN last year after establishing ties with North Korea
in 1973. Thailand could shift to an abstention on the
pro - North Korean resolution this year, although it is
also expected to back the pro-Seoul proposal.
North Korea has also strengthened its existing
ties with a number of nonaligned, Third World coun-
tries in the past year, as evidenced most dramatically
by Kim II-song's trip to Eastern Europe and North
Africa this spring. The North Koreans have a good
chance of gaining membership in the nonaligned move-
ment at the Lima conference in late August, which
would provide an additional boost for Pyongyang.
South Korea itself is working hard to gain member-
ship in the nonaligned movement this year, in order
to block a success by Pyongyang, but its efforts may
July 15, 1975
Approved For Release 2068E' AM$0865A001300360001-9
 Approved For Releaj> tc/ 8 SOR!79T00865AO01300360001-9
Australia. Both North and South Vietnam are making
soundings regarding UN membership; if they are
accepted they will, of course, vote for Pyongyang.
Mozambique is a sure vote for the North. There is
some possibility that the Cape Verde Islands,
independent since 5 July, will also become a UN
member, with another vote for Pyongyang.
Factors Favoring Seoul
The factors likely to favor South Korea include
the following:
The new US - South Korean resolution. The more
direct US - South Korean resolution this year has the
advantage of:
--sharpening the distinction between US
forces and the UN command in South Korea,
--making explicit US and South Korean
willingness to end the UN presence in
the South, to some extent pre-empting
Pyongyang's approach.
These distinctions and considerations were lost
on the more radical nonaligned states last year, which
were inclined to accept Pyongyang's simpler message--
that both the UN command and US forces have no business
in Korea. The new US - South Korean resolution will
still be brushed aside this year by the radicals, but
it will be a bit more difficult for the more moderate
states to do so. It will take some time for full re-
actions to the new resolution to come in, but the early
returns indicate a favorable response, which will help
Seoul's case in New York.
Heightened tension on the Korean Peninsula. In
spite of North Korea's current peace offensive, many
foreign observers appear to share a perception that
July 15, 1975
Approved For ReleaseSM?': 81MKZ9T00865A001300360001-9
 Approved For Releas(?0,.179T00865A001300360001-9
the situation in Korea is somewhat more dangerous
now than it was several months ago. This is a re-
sult of events in Indochina and the parallels that
have been drawn between the situation there and in
Korea; Kim Il-song's strong language in Peking has
also played a part. While the initial war scare in
Seoul has eased greatly, there remain uncertainties
about what comes next in Korea. A number of diplomats
from western countries and more moderate Third World
states have expressed the view that now is not the
proper time to abolish the peacekeeping machinery
in Korea. This perception will strengthen backing
for the pro-Seoul resolution, which strongly
emphasizes the need to preserve the armistice
agreement.
Redefining the Korean Issue
Another factor that might help Seoul is a
proposal that has been raised with South Korean
officials by diplomats from a number of friendly
countries in recent months: that the Korean debate
at the UN be broadened this year to include the
issue of membership for both North and South Korea.
The proposal is attractive to other countries which
prefer to avoid taking sides in the annual Korean
discussions, and see this as an even-handed solution.
As long as the debate focuses on the UN command,
and the problem of maintaining the armistice,
Pyongyang has virtual veto power. As a price for
its agreement to a follow-on armistice, Pyongyang
is likely to hold out for a commitment from the US
to withdraw its forces from South Korea. North
Korean Foreign Minister Ho Tam strongly implied as
much in a major address last fall; there has been no
sign that Pyongyang's policy has changed.
A call for dual UN membership, or a "German
solution," added to the present US - South Korean
July 15, 1975
Approved For Release S?, J`. g F DT00865AO01300360001-9
 Approved For Relegl8/q p(jFP79T00865A001300360001-9
resolution, would draw stiff opposition from North
Korea and its more radical Third World allies, and
Pyongyang would look to Peking and Moscow to resist
such a move in the Security Council, which initially
passes on all membership applications. North Korea
would strongly oppose any linkage between UN
membership for the two Koreas and the two Vietnams.
A call for dual membership from some friends of
South Korea might offer tactical advantages at the
UN, nevertheless, putting North Korea and its allies
on the defensive, and raising an issue on which
Pyongyang by itself does not have the same veto
power it has on the UN command-armistice problem.
The Chinese would be most reluctant to press
North Korea to accept dual membership. In 1973
Peking was instrumental in securing North Korean
agreement to a compromise formula for terminating
UNCURK (the UN Commission for Unification and
Reconstruction of Korea), the UN political organ
in Korea. Last year, however, when Pyongyang insisted
on a voting showdown in the General Assembly, Peking
backed the North Koreans fully. Peking has pro-
gressively strengthened its ties with North Korea in
recent years and seems likely to provide Pyongyang
with strong diplomatic backing again this fall.
The Soviets might be more helpful on the member-
ship issue. Moscow's support for North Korea in the
General Assembly last year was largely pro forma.
This year the Soviets will want to preserve their
limited equities in North Korea, but they could pos-
sibly take a position contrary to Pyongyang's interests
if they perceived strong incentives in other areas.
In a conversation with a US diplomat in Moscow on June
13 the Soviets indicated that they would support North
Korea at the UN, but they did not show much enthusiasm.
The Soviets hinted that they would favor UN membership
for both parts of Korea, but that membership could not
be "forced" on North Korea. In a June 19 discussion
July 15, 1975
Approved For Releas%B d'8 1k)79T00865A001300360001-9
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001300360001-9
SECRET SPOKE
with however, a Soviet
official s owed concern about a possible US veto on a
South Vietnamese application for UN membership, and
he strongly implied that a trade-off might be dis-
cussed whereby Moscow would support the admission
of both Koreas if the US would allow both Vietnams
to enter the UN.
There are additional factors that could influ-
ence the outcome of the Korean debate over the next
several months. Political repression and dissent
in South Korea could diminish support for Seoul.
North Korea's continuing failure to meet its foreign
debt obligations promptly could weaken backing for
Pyongyang to a limited degree. Tension-building
incidents on the Korean Peninsula (depending on which
side appears responsible) might erode support for
either Seoul or Pyongyang. Bilateral problems between
the US and third countries, unrelated to the Korean
question, could also affect the UN voting on that
issue.
Despite the uncertainties, if the Korean debate
at the UN continues to focus on the UN command-
armistice problem, the current trends strongly in-
dicate that the pro - South Korean resolution will
again pass, but that a pro - North Korean resolution
will also pass in the General Assembly, although by
a less substantial margin. The result would be an
ambiguous situation in which the General Assembly,
having passed essentially conflicting resolutions,
would have failed to speak with a clear voice on
the Korean question. Even so, North Korea and its
more militant supporters would certainly acclaim
the passage of their resolution as a victory that
undermines the international standing of Seoul and
the legitimacy of the US position in South Korea.
(CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY)
July 15, 1975
Approved For Release C,L7T00865A001300360001-9
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01300360001-9
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01300360001-9