MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001400160001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 23, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Middle East
Africa
South Asia
State Department review completed
Secret
1w p
No. 0831/75
July 23, 1975
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
Saudi Arabia: Policy Toward the USSR........... 1
Iran: Controlled Factionalism .................. 3
Iraq: Bakr's Revolution Day Address ............ 5
North Yemen: Looking Toward Elections .......... 7
Rhodesia: Planning Ahead ....................... 9
Tunisia: Diplomatic Relations with Pyongyang... 10
Sri Lanka: Opposition Leader Wins By-election.. 11
July 23, 1975
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Saudi Arabia
Policy toward the USSR
Recent statements to the press by Saudi Crown
Prince Fahd suggest that the Saudis may be adopting
a more conciliatory attitude toward the Soviet
Union and the East European communist countries.
Fahd told a North Yemeni newspaper in early
July that "Saudi Arabia follows an open-door
policy towards all countries of the world, whether
eastern or western, and has economic relations
with all states." His interview was then replayed
by the Saudi press, probably at the encouragement
of the Saudi ministry of information. In a state-
ment published by a Beirut daily during the same
week, Fahd was quoted as saying: "We want good
relations with both East and West on the same
footing. We will conduct our relations with
foreign states in the light of our best interests
and according to the positions adopted by those
countries towards our causes."
Such comments contrast sharply with the late
King Faysal's uncompromising hostility toward
communism, which he invariably equated with zionism.
It is not likely that the Saudis are willing to go
so far as to exchange diplomatic representatives
with the Soviet Union, at least at present; such a
dramatic shift in Saudi policy would be undertaken
only after protracted deliberation.
The Saudis may see several advantages, however,
in a more open policy toward the east. For one
thing, they may see such a stance as a useful
signal to the US that results must be forthcoming
in Arab-Israeli settlement negotiations if Washington
is to continue its close ties with Riyadh. They
may also wish to prevent the breach in Arab-Soviet
relations from widening, perhaps with a view to
guaranteeing Soviet support for Egypt in the event
(Continued)
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of renewed fighting. Finally, they may hope their
more conciliatory posture will encourage the USSR
to allow a greater degree of religious freedom to
Muslims within its borders--a factor mentioned by
Fahd in one of his statements.
The Soviets, who have been interested in
developing a relationship with Saudi Arabia for
some time, have taken public note of Fahd's statements
and are probably intrigued by them. They may
follow up with low-key demarches to find out if
there has been an actual change in Riyadh's attitude.
Recently, a senior Soviet diplomat said Soviet UN
"
lim
Representative Malik was maintaining
contacts" with the Saudis in New York.
July 23, 1975
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ControZZed Factionalism
When the Shah created the Iran Resurgence Party
in March 1975 as the country's sole legitimate
political grouping, he said factions would undoubtedly
emerge in the new mass organization. Two wings are,
in fact, now forming. Impetus for their development,
however, comes from the Shah's own careful orchestration,
not from spontaneous political debate. Most Iranians,
realizing this, have adopted a cautious attitude
while they assess the signals emanating from
Saadabad Palace.
Each wing of the party is led by one of
the Shah's trusted political lieutenants. Economics
Minister Ansari leads the "constructive liberals,"
whose program is to lower consumer prices and end
profiteering. Ansari heads a newly created cabinet-
level committee tasked with leading the fight on
inflation.
Interior Minister Amuzegar heads the "progressive
liberal" faction. Its platform calls for a more
equitable distribution of Iran's wealth and
contains a declaration that no Iranian should have
to pay more than 20 percent of his salary for
housing.
The cost of housing and the inflation are a
source of much grumbling among Iranians. The government
has made little headway against either. Organizing
a political faction around these subjects may reduce
popular frustrations over the short run, but real
progress is unlikely soon. A meaningless barrage of
rhetoric could eventually backfire and discredit
the party's two wings.
The US embassy in Tehran points out that the
development of the factions reflects the rivalry
between Ansari and Amuzegar. They are widely
talked about as candidates for prime minister
(Continued)
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if the Shah drops Prime Minister Hoveyda, now in
his eleventh year in that office. The Shah may
be testing both men for the position.
The official blessing given to Amuzegar and
Ansari as leaders of factions indicates that the
Shah is deliberately creating rivals to the
popular Hoveyda.
There were reports last spring that the old
parties were dissolved, in part, because the Shah
was displeased with the power base developed by
Hoveyda, then head of the ruling party. Hoveyda,
more than any other Iranian--including the Shah--
was in direct contact with the people and with
provincial politicians through his frequent trips
to the countryside.
Although Hoveyda was named leader of the Iran
Resurgence Party, his new party post seems to give
him less power than his old one. He lost an early
fight with Amuzegar over a question of party
organization. Amuzegar was also named to the
potentially powerful Executive Board of the
party, which implements executive decisions,
approves the agenda of the party congress, and
reviews party nominees for election to office at all
levels. Retention of this post will give Amuzeqar
an advantage over Ansari.
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Iraq
Bakr's Revolution Day Address
President Ahmad Hasan Bakr's speech last week
commemorating Iraq's revolutions in July 1958 and
July 1968 emphasized two departures in Baghdad's
foreign policy during the past year: the rapproche-
ment with Iran, and Iraqi efforts to improve relations
with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arabs.
Bakr paid only a perfunctory tribute to Baghdad's
ties with Moscow and other Communist states. On the
other hand, the Iraqi leader's caustic remarks on oil
and on US policy toward the Middle East conflict show
no sign of a shift in Iraq's hard stand against resump-
tion of diplomatic relations with the US.
Bakr's terse description of Iraq's "fruitful
contacts" with the Soviet Union and East Europe is in
marked contrast with a speech last July in which he
stressed the need of Arab revolutionary states to
build alliances with the Soviet Union and "other
socialist countries." The change of tone may indicate
some strain in Iraqi-Soviet relations. The Soviets
are deeply concerned over recent developments in Iraq.
Moscow fears that Iraq's accord with Iran, the end of
the Kurdish war, and Baghdad's increased economic and
military dealings with the West are leading to a
marked reduction in Soviet influence in Iraq.
Bakr's sniping at the US gives little or no
encouragement to observers who see the expanding
economic ties between Iraq and the US as a prepara-
tion for closer political ties. It was West Europe's
escape from "US imperialist pressures," Bakr explained,
that has freed the Europeans to develop their ties
with Iraq. On oil, the speech portrayed creation of
the International Energy Agency as an attempt to
break the unity of OPEC and impose a formula on the
producers benefitting consumers alone.
(Continued)
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Bakr exhorted the Arabs to resist efforts made
by "imperialism"--read US--to arrange a negotiated
settlement in the Middle East. Arguing that the
military and economic power equation has shifted in
favor of the Arabs, Bakr repeated Iraq's standard
call for "liberation of Palestine and all the usur?ed
Arab territories." He pledged Iraq's participation
with Syria in a "northern front" on condition that
Syria reject any Geneva conference as well as UN
resolutions calling for a negotaited settlement.
But Bakr's talk of a "northern front" sounded some-
what hollow when he concluded by dwelling on Baghdad's
version of its recently intensified and increasingly
strident feud with Damascus over allocation of
Euphrates River water as well as on other outstanding
bilateral issues.
July 23, 1975
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Looking Toward Elections
Colonel Ibrahim Hamdi, head of the ruling
command council, apparently intends to put off the
election of a new legislature until he is sure
that a more "responsive" consultative assembly
will be chosen.
The elections, which had been scheduled for
late summer or early fall, will not take place until
late this year or early next year
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(Continued)
July 23, 1975
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Rhodesia
Planning Ahead
Prime Minister Ian Smith's government seems
to be preparing white Rhodesians for a possible
resumption of full-scale insurgency by the black
nationalists if meaningful settlement talks between
the Smith regime and the African National Council
do not get started.
Since Salisbury and the Council agreed to a
cease-fire last December, insurgents who have
remained in place in north-east Rhodesia have
staged occasional attacks. Last week four white
Rhodesian soldiers were killed and four wounded in
a clash with black insurgents. This was the worst
loss suffered by the Rhodesian security forces
since late 1972.
Government officials are now saying the
security forces will intensify their operations
against the black insurgents within the next few
weeks. Prime Minister Smith recently stated in
Parliament, that new anti-guerrilla plans were
rapidly being implemented and a cabinet official
promised Rhodesia's whites, in an interview on
July 12, "positive and aggressive plans" to
eliminate the threat of insurgency on Rhodesian
soil.
While these statements are clearly aimed at
shoring up white morale, the government has made
an effort in the last two months to strengthen its
security forces. On June 30, all troops serving
in the border areas were given a 40 percent pay-
hike. The government announced at the same time
that women would be recruited for the Rhodesian
army and air force so as to release men for service
in the field. The cabinet official, in his inter-
view, urged Rhodesians to volunteer for service
with the security forces now conducting counter-
insurgency operations near the Mozambique and
Zambian borders.
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Tunisia
Diplomatic Relations with Pyongyang
President Habib Bourguiba last week extended
diplomatic recognition to North Korea and indicated
his willingness to exchange ambassadors. In an
apparent signal to South Korea that this move was
made reluctantly, however, Tunisia reportedly will
delay the opening of the North Korean mission in
Tunis until late this fall. By that time the ques-
tion of the entry of the two Koreas into the UN will
be before the General Assembly.
Tunisia had been stalling on granting North
Korea diplomatic recognition. Bourguiba appears
to have relented only after witnessing the success
of Pyongyang's overtures to other nonaligned
countries.
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Sri Lanka
Opposition Leader Wins By-election
J. R. Jayewardene, leader of the United National
Party (UNP), the main opposition party in Sri Lanka,
garnered an impressive 74 percent of the vote in a
by-election last Friday to regain his National State
Assembly seat. Jayewardene had resigned the seat in
May, claiming that the government had been honor
bound to hold elections within five years of the
May 1970 national elections. The government rejects
this contention, insisting that, under a new consti-
tution promulgated in 1972, the five-year limit
will not expire until 1977.
Jayewardene was expected to win under any cir-
cumstances, but the ruling coalition's decision not
to field a candidate assured him an overwhelming vic-
tory over several weak independents. Prime Minister
Bandaranaike apparently decided that a direct en-
counter with Jayewardene in what was certain to be
a losing cause could only prove embarrassing to her
United Front government. She also wished to avoid
giving Jayewardene a public forum from which to
further inflame popular dissatisfaction over the
government's failure to make good its economic
pledges.
The election strengthens Jayewardene's position
within the UNP, but without a candidate from the
ruling coalition it provides little indication of
the UNP's relative support among the people. In-
deed, despite several UNP by-election victories in
recent months, Jayewardene has failed to generate
much popular enthusiasm, either for his party or
for his campaign to force the government to hold
general elections this year.
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