WESTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001400180001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 24, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Growing Opposition in France to Stationing
Nuclear Missiles in West Germany 1
Portuguese Leaders Reported Considering
Reorganization . 4
Turkey and Greece Caught Between US and EC 6
EC Moves on Raw Materials Policy 8
DOS review(s) completed.
' July 24, 1975
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Growing Opposition in France to Stationing
Nuclear Missiles in West Germany
Political opp~,sition to the possible station~n.g
of French Pluton missiles 3_n [~~est Germany
is mounting in France. The debate on the
Pluton's deployment has been given new impetus
by meetings between French and [nest German
officials last month and by the public display
of the missile system during the ~~~astille
Day parade in Paris last week. There is also
widespread speculation that the matter will
be discussed at the meeting today between
President Giscard and Chancellor Schmidt.
Official [nest German sources have denied that
the Pluton issue is on the summit agenda,
but it may be discussed in private between
the two leaders.
French President Giscard is sensitive
to Bonn's concern that the tactical nuclear
missiles--with a range of only 65 miles?-
would fall on West German soil i.f they were
fired from France. In line with his desire
to establish closer political ties to the
EC and West Germany in particular, Giscard
may personally favor deployment of Plutons
in West Germany. Such a policy decision,
however, would create formidable problems--
externally from the Soviet Union and domestically
from the left and right of the political spectrum.
It is generally believed by the French
public that Bonn would not allow Paris to
maintain exclusive control over French missiles
in West Germany. Stationing of these weapons
in West Germany would therefore seem to imply
agreements between France and the NATO joint
command.
July 24, 1975
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--The Gaullists, on whom Giscard depends
for his parliamentary majority, are
unalterably opposed to deploying Plutors
beyond French borders. They would
interpret such a move as a step toward
rejoining the NATO integrated military
command and a dangerous renouncement
of France's political and military
sovereignty.
--On the left, the Communist Darty is
equally adamant in its rejection of
deploying the weapons in West Germany
on the grounds that the missiles would
clearly be intended to menace the Warsaw
Pact countries.
--The Socialists, too, are apparently
opposed although their position is
somewhat more equivo-cal. The party's
defense spokesman--who is known to
be more pro-NATO than most Socialists--
seems willing to accept deployment
of Plutons in West Germany. A powerful
faction of the party, however, opposes
the French nuclear weapons program,
while the left wing CERES group--about
25 percent of the party--would fight
the forward stationing of the Pluton
as a step taward a "European" tactical
atomic force.
--The Centrists, typically, have no united
point of view on the problem.
--Giscard's Independent Republicans would
presumably follow the President's lead.
Should they come out in favor of stationing
the missiles in West Germany, however,
friction with their majority partners,
the Gaullists, would increase--perhaps
to the point of rupture.
July 24, 1975
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Giscard is unlikely to take the political
risk of moving Plutons into West Germany in.
the near future. The majority of the French
electorate is opposed and the move would
simultaneously split his majority and give
the bickering Left Alliance an issue on which
to focus their opposition. Giscard would
also be reluctant to stir up relations with
the Soviets before his visit to Moscow in
October.
In the meantime, the French and West
German military are probably engaged in contingency
planning for use of the Pluton in West German
in the. event of hostilities.
July 24, 1915
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Portugues-e Leaders Reported Considering Reorganization
Reports that a move is under way to restructure
the present military regime Nave been denied by tree
president's office. The denial may, however, mean
only that military leaders want to scotch such rumors
until the Revolutionary Council and the Armed Forces
General Assembly have a chance to vote on the restructur-
ing plan.
ea e y an -man directorate drawn from the
present ruling Revolutionary Council. The directorate--
whose members have not been named---would be served by
a three-man executive collegium composed of President
Costa Gomes, Prime Minister Gonsalves, and security
chief Otelo de Carvalho.
The collegium, in turn, would be assisted by
two vice prime ministers--one civilian and one
military man--who would have charge of the day-
to-day running of the provisional government.
The present Revolutionary Council would be relegated
to a pro forma role linked to the directorate.
Such a formula could streamline the present
unwieldly governing machinery and, depending on the
proposed composition of the 11-man directorate,
might be acceptable to a battle-weary majority in
the Revolutionary Council.
The reasons for she official denial are not
yet clear. The reorganization proposals, which
have been widely publicized by the international
media, may have triggered an initial unfavorable
response among opposition groups, including the
Socialists.
~tuly 24, 1975
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A meeting of the General Assembly, which has
been postponed several times, was erroneously
reported by the Lisbon press as scheduled for yes-
terday. This apparently was confused with a meeting
of the army assembly, which is to be held today to
prepare for a full assembly meeting on Friday. The
army assembly reportedly is taking up the formation
of the new government.
Meanwhile, the Socialists have called for a
"government of national salvation," which is reminis-
cent of the "national salvation junta" formed immediately
following the coup of April 1974. The Socialists also
threatened to expel any party memUer who agrees to
join a government headed by Goncalves.
Although we have seen no serious weakening on
the part of the Socialist leadership's reso~_ve to
continue the struggle to oust the Prime Minister,
party concern that Soares might not be able to retain
full control of the membership may be borne out.
four renegade
Socia fists rom a ex reme e o e party have
reportedly agreed to join the government that Goncalves
is still trying to form.
Should the stalemate drag on much longer, there
will be the growing risk that right-wing elements will
be stirred into acts of violence or ill-planned moves
similar to the fiasco last March. Any such attempt
would likely serve the Communists in their effort 25X1
to smear the Socialists' campaign as counterrevolutionary
and could provide the government an excus a other--
and perhaps decisive--lurch to the left.
July 24, 1~l75
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Turkey and Greece Caught Between US and EC
Turkey and Greece are strongly urging
that they not be denied access to the
projected US scheme giving trade preferences
to developing countries. To qualify for benefits
from the US plan, Ankara and Athens must
prove that their imports from the US do not
suffer from existing preferential arrangements
with the EC. Both countries want to retain,
and even strengthen, their ties to the
Community .
Turkey is arguing that, on balance,
its existing association agreement with
the EC has not damaged US exports and
that, if Ankara does not benefit from US
preferences, bilateral trade relations
with the US will suffer. US exports to
Turkey currently amount to about $350
million a year.
Ankara is not happy noel with the
terms of its EC association, but does
not want to abandon its long-term goal
of full members~iip. Turkish officials
believe that preferential treatment by
the US would strengthen their hand in
seeking a better deal from the EC. The
Turks want from the Community greater
freedom to trade with o-~her countries,
in particular the Arab and OPEC world.
P~ioreover, the Turks are worried that,
in their relations with the EC, they may
lose out to the Greeks, who have aleady
requested full membership in the Community .
July 24,1975
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The Greeks themselves have been placed
in a dilemma by having to satisfy the
US requirements for preferential status.
Athens intends to develop the data which
the US needs, but is clearly in something
of a quandary over how to handle problems
that may arise .for their commitments to
tn.e EC .
July 24, ].975
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EC Moves on Raw materials Polices
The EC Council concluded its last meeting of
the summer by agreeing on guidelines for a community
poli-cy on raw materials. The guidelines will enable
the community to present a common point of view at
the 7th Special Session of the iTiv General Assembly,
as well as at a subsequent conference of oil pro-
ducers and consumers.
The Nine agreed to examine individual commodities
to determine what, if any, kind of agreements between
developed and developing states can be worked out.
The community also agreed to endorse a plan to sta-
bilize the export earnings of all developing states.
The plan would be less generous than a similar scheme
between the EC and 46 developing states under the
Lome convention. The idine further agreed that
special consideration should be given to the needs
of the least developed countries.
EC officials point out that details of the com-
munity's position have not been worked out and that
the community will still lack specifics at the UPd
meeting in early September. The dine plan to be
ready to discuss details in time for the oil con-
ference, which will examine problems related to
other raw materials as well.
The EC guidelines are not fundamentally at odds
with the thinking of other industrialized countries.
The EC effort represents a compromise between those
in the community who wanted to emphasize commodity
agreement::--France in particular--and those who pre-
fer to emphasize income. maintenance for developing
states--the UK and West Germany.
July 24, 1975
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h.e com-
promise was made possible by the discussions held
last week in Brussels among EC heads of state.
French President Giscard may have compromised on
some of France's ideological attachment to com-
modity arrangements in return for Chancellc-r
's willin ness to "examine" them.
the commitment to 0o a commo y ag
does not commit Bonn to participation.
Bonn has pushed for using gold held by the
International T-Zonetary Fund to finance a stabiliza-
tion program in order to avoid a large dirE;ct pay-
ment. It remains questionable that Paris has
changed its i IP~,F old for such
a purpose.
July 29:, 1975
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